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IMPRESSIONS OP THE KAISER 



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IMPRESSIONS OF 
THE KAISER 

BY 

DAVID JAYNE HILL 

FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO GERMANT 




HARPER y BROTHERS 

PUBLISHERS 
NEW YORK AND LONDON 



^Jl. 






Impressions of the Kaiser 



Copyright, 1918, by Harper & Brothers 

Printed in the United States of America 

Published November, 1918 

L-S 



DEC -9 1918 



'^\. i \ 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I The Sources op the Kaiser's Power . . 1 

II The Kaiser's Methods of Personal Con- 
trol 30 

III The Kaiser as a Stage-Manager ... 63 

IV The Kaiser Under Fire 90 

V The Kaiser's Eeversion to Type . . . 118 

VI The Kaiser and His People 144 

VII The Kaiser's Attitude Toward War and 

Peace 168 

VIII The Kaiser's Efforts for British Neu- 
trality 200 

IX The Kaiser's Double Diplomacy . . . 224 

X The Kaisep 's Responsibility for the War 251 

Epilogue 296 

Illustrative Documents 326 

Index 363 



PREFACE 

As I send this book to the press I find that, al- 
though it has been written in a strictly judicial 
spirit, appealing only to facts that have been care- 
fully verified, I have described the genesis of the 
greatest crime which history records. 

The fifth year of the Great AVar reveals the enor- 
mity, but it does not yet disclose the denouement, 
of this crime ; which has filled with grief and smit- 
ten with poverty tens of millions of homes, swept 
from the earth in the vigor of youth the flower of 
the manhood of several great nations, and leaves 
vast spaces scorched and blasted by the fires of 
devastation to be again rendered habitable by the 
labors of old men, cripples, and half-famished chil- 
dren. 

With such a scene spread out before the eyes of 
the civilized world, vituperation and invective are 
only signs of impotence. We cannot repair this 
calamity by denunciation. We cannot prevent its 
recurrence without suppressing its cause. The first 
necessity is to perceive wherein is to be found the 
root of this evil. 

At first sight we seem to have discovered it in a 
single spontaneous personal act, but a little reflec- 
tion should convince us that no human being alone 



PREFACE 

and unaided could perpetrate such a crime as has 
been committed. To render it possible there is 
necessary a contributory perversion of human in- 
stitutions. Through such a perversion this catas- 
trophe has come to pass. 

It is, therefore, not merely with William II as a 
personality that we are here concerned, but with 
the whole process of seduction by which as German 
Emperor he has led the German people, at first dis- 
trustful of his purposes, to render themselves 
subservient to the Prussian conception of the state 
and the ambitions of the Hohenzollern dynasty. 
Under his tuition and guidance, from motives which 
he has been able to excite and call into action, they 
have built up a war-machine of perilous potency 
without providing means for its rational control. 
They have rendered the state omnipotent and irre- 
sponsible, and have placed its powers at the dis- 
posal of a single will that holds itself without 
accountability to men. 

The first four chapters of this volume were 
printed in Harper's Magazine for May, June, 
July, and August of the present year. They con- 
stitute only the vestibule of the present record, 
which broadens into an outline of Imperial German 
diplomacy after Kaiser William II became the ac- 
knowledged master of Germany's destinies. It 
culminates in an answer to the primordial question 
upon which the future Peace Congress will be called 
upon to act, Who is to be held responsible for caus- 
ing the Great War? and raises the collateral ques- 



PREFACE 

tion, What must be done to prevent a similar as- 
sault upon civilization in the future ? 

The one blessing we may hope for as the outcome 
of this struggle is that out of the sorrow, desolation, 
and impoverishment which it will leave behind it 
enough courage and resolution may survive to ren- 
der impossible a purpose to repeat it. 

David Jayne Hill. 

September, 1918. 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 



IMPRESSIONS 
OF THE KAISER 

CHAPTER I 
THE SOURCES OF THE KAISER'S POWER 

THE true lessons of a tragedy are not to be 
found in the supreme moment when the drama 
has reached the climax of passion, but in the errors 
of judgment or defiance of moral law that have 
made it a tragedy. 

In attempting at this time an analysis of the 
sources of the Kaiser 's power and the methods em- 
ployed for its further development, my purpose is 
to throw a new light, if possible, upon the present 
European situation by lifting a curtain, not upon 
the scene as it is set upon the stage of contemporary 
action, but upon the evolution of the chief character 
of the drama in the course of his preparation for 
the role which he has cast for himself. 

This process of development is possibly more 
vivid to my mind, and certainly more impressive 
in my judgment, from the fact that it was my lot 
to be in Germany in the two most critical periods 
of the political evolution of the Empire. As a 
result, there is an inevitable concentration of 

1 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

thought, not merely upon the contrast between the 
two periods — which may be roughly designated as 
1888-90 and 1908-14 — but upon the causes that have 
connected them and that explain the transition from 
the earlier to the later period. 

In these two periods my points of view were dif- 
ferent, and each had its peculiar advantage. In 
the first period I saw William II as his own people 
saw him, and intimacy with them disclosed the esti- 
mate they placed upon him. In the second period 
my personal contacts with the Kaiser himself dur- 
ing more than three years were more intimate and 
more varied than usually fall to the lot of a foreign 
ambassador at the Court of Berlin. 

At the time of the accession of William II as 
King of Prussia and German Emperor, on June 15, 
1888, after the brief reign of Frederick III, the Ger- 
man Empire had already taken on its definite form 
and was regarded as a firmly established great 
power, which might or might not become a menace 
to the rest of Europe according to the policies by 
which its future might be determined. The unity 
of the German states was secure, the power of 
Prussia was every^vhere felt among them, and the 
work of Bismarck was complete. 

That the Empire was an achievement of superior 
military force on the part of Prussia, and in no 
sense a creation of the German people, was uni- 
versally understood. No one familiar with the 
history of Prussia doubted that its influence would 
continue to be dominant in the Empire. The Prus- 

2 



THE SOURCES OF THE KAISER'S POWER 

sian philosophy of the state had completely tri- 
umphed ; and to that philosophy, based on monarch- 
ical absolutism, the idea of parliamentary control 
was known to be repugnant. The King of Prussia 
was by heredity the German Emperor, and no King 
of Prussia had ever forgotten the traditions of the 
House of Hohenzollern, which had advanced from 
a Suabian lordship to the eminence of empire by 
centuries of conquest, annexation, and unscrupu- 
lous diplomacy, seeking alliances wherever addi- 
tional power or prestige could be obtained, and 
renouncing them whenever they became a burden or 
ceased to oifer an advantage. 

Every intelligent German understood this; but 
now that the strength and policies of Prussia were 
at the service of the Empire, the state that had long 
been the common menace and often the hated 
enemy had become the protector and potential or- 
ganizer of all, and the primitive tribalism that had 
always characterized the Germans, that had at- 
tached them to their local princes, that had in its 
time effectively nullified the Holy Roman Empire 
of the German nation, that had embroiled them in 
internecine Avars, and for centuries had made Ger- 
man territory a prey to foreign conquest and hope- 
less division, was now merged in a larger tribalism. 
Germany had at last become self-conscious as a 
nation, and the mutual hostility that had doomed 
the German tribes to separatism was now trans- 
formed into a general hostility to all that is not 
German. No longer a mere geographical expres- 

2 3 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

sion, as for centuries it had been, Germany had be- 
come through blood and iron the victor over a com- 
mon foe. Thenceforth, as throughout German his- 
tory the stronger tribe had dominated over the 
■weaker, so now Prussia, which had evoked the soul 
of Deutschtum, had imposed upon it a superior 
Avill, and there arose from a united people the cry, 
" DeutscJiland ilher Allesf 

The economic advantages of the Empire had be- 
come evident and immense. A great realm for ages 
divided by a tangle of limited frontiers was now 
made one. Exchanges had been promoted by the 
Zollverein, which had afforded a foretaste of the 
advantages of unity ; but now the walls of separa- 
tion were entirely swept away. Central authority 
was clearing the ground of local impediments to 
general industrial and commercial prosperity. But, 
above all, the provincial spirit of earlier times was 
vanishing, a universal emancipation of thitherto 
restricted energies was occurring. Germany, uni- 
fied, victorious, prosperous, and aspiring, felt- a 
s.ense of mighty strength and a keen impulse toward 
wider expansion. Poverty was giving way to 
wealth, frugality to luxury, and humility to 
pride. 

Before the Germany of 1888 two paths were open. 
Had Frederick III, surnamed the ''Noble," con- 
tinued to reign a decade, instead of only ninety-nine 
days, the tendency in government would have been 
toward liberalism. More and more the Imperial 
Constitution would have been interpreted in a lib- 

4 



THE SOURCES OF THE KAISER'S POWER 

eral spirit. Ministers would have been chosen with 
reference to the will of the people as expressed in 
the Reichstag. The Emperor would have reigned, 
but his Ministers would have governed. The high- 
est ideals of self-government might not have been 
swiftly realized, and certainly not immediately; 
for, as all German statesmen and writers have 
agreed, the Germans have not been bred to self- 
government. They have always relied upon their 
princes as more or less paternal rulers, and they 
would think it presumptuous to dictate to their 
recognized superiors. But actual government al- 
ways consists more in a spirit than in a form. 
Autocracy and democracy are theoretically anti- 
thetical ; but practically a ruler nominally absolute 
may listen to the voice of his people, while the head 
of a democracy may exercise the will and display 
the qualities of a Csesar. 

For Germany strong central control seemed to be 
essential, and the character of the Prussian mon- 
archy opened a path toward absolutism in the fu- 
ture development of the Empire. There was, it 
must not be forgotten, an Imperial Constitution. 
The whole future of Germany depended upon the 
interpretation of it. Without changing an article, 
it could be administered liberally or autocratically ; 
for in all constitutional governments it is the his- 
toric spirit that prevails. 

The point of conspicuous interest here is the in- 
terpretation of the Imperial Constitution that was 
actually made and accepted, and to this must be 

5 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

added the tendency to confirm or to reject it that 
has been developed during the present war. 

Whoever will take in hand the Constitution of the 
German Empire ^ and read it merely as a document 
will be surprised, if not already familiar with its con- 
tents, at the f agade of liberalism that presents itself. 

First of all, it is a written constitution; which 
implies that it is, in effect, a definition and re- 
striction of sovereign power so far as the preroga- 
tives of government are concerned. It begins with 
a list of independent sovereigns — ^kings and grand 
dukes — the King of Prussia heading the list and 
acting in the name of the North German Confed- 
eration, who "conclude an eternal alliance for the 
protection of the territory of the Confederation and 
the rights of the same, as well as for the promotion 
of the welfare of the German people." It neither 
renounces nor abrogates the sovereign rights of 
the monarch s who form this new alliance. It con- 
fers a "common citizenship" upon all Germans 
and enumerates their rights. "Against foreign 
countries all Germans shall have an equal claim 
upon the protection of the Empire." The legis- 
lative power of the Empire is conferred upon the 
Bundesrat and the Reichstag, a majority of the 
votes of both bodies being necessary and sufficient 
for the passage of a law. The King of Prussia 
has merely the "presidency" of the Confederation, 
with the title of "German Emperor." 



iDodd, Modern Constitutions, Chicago, 1912, I, pp. 325, 351. 

6 



THE SOURCES OF THE KAISER'S POWER 

Nothing in all this sounds in the least autocratic. 
On the contrary, all seems very liberal. The Ger- 
man Emperor is not a monarch, except in Prussia. 
All the other confederated sovereigns are equally 
monarchs in their own realms. He is only a * * presi- 
dent,'' primus inter pares. Whence, then, his auto- 
cratic power I 

Ninety-nine one-hundredths of the Imperial Con- 
stitution could be transcribed into the constitution 
of the most democratic federal state mthout seri- 
ous criticism. The absolute authority which the 
Imperial Constitution undoubtedly confers upon 
the King of Prussia is ingeniously concealed under 
the most plausible camouflage. 

It is impossible here to enter upon a detailed 
exposition of this device, in which Bismarck be- 
lieved he had triumphed over parliamentarism, 
which he bitterly opposed, and had rendered him- 
self as Imperial Chancellor omnipotent in the 
Empire under a "president" whom he intended to 
be merely titular. The whole structure of govern- 
ment in the Empire pivots on the action of the 
Imperial Chancellor, as provided in Articles 15 to 
17. The Chancellor is appointed by the Emperor, 
requires no confirmation, and cannot be removed 
except by the Emperor. The Imperial Chancellor 
alone can by his signature give validity to the de- 
crees and ordinances of the Emperor, and "thereby 
assumes responsibility for them"; but only to the 
Emperor, who has the right of forcible execution 
in all the states. 

7 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

It did not require very long for the alert intel- 
ligence of William II to perceive who, nnder this 
organic law, possessed all the power in the Empire. 
Armed with the prerogative of personally appoint- 
ing and recalling every one of real importance nn- 
der the Imperial Constitution, and with the author- 
ity to execute by force his owti decrees and ordi- 
nances, "this young man," as Bismarck rather con- 
temptuously called him, at the age of twenty-nine, 
ascended what he understood to be, in effect, the 
imperial throne, regardless of the pretense that it 
was only the seat of a "presidency." As soon as 
the death of Frederick the Noble was announced, he 
promptly took possession of his entire heritage, in 
the full consciousness that as King in Prussia he 
could extend the prerogatives of kingship over the 
entire Empire. 

As a youth he had aroused the deep concern of 
his father. On the twelfth anniversary of his son's 
birth, Frederick III wrote in his diary : 

"It is an occasion for fear when one thinks of the 
hopes that rest from this time forward upon the 
head of that child, and what a great responsibility 
is incumbent upon us toward our* country for the 
direction of his education, since considerations of 
family and rank, the life of the Court of Berlin, 
and so many other things render his education dif- 
ficult." 

The condition of Germany in the years that fol- 
lowed in no way diminished the reasons for this 
solicitude. The return to Berlin of victorious 

8 



THE SOURCES OF THE KAISER'S POWER 

armies, the coronation of his grandfather, William 
I, the universal exhilaration of newly unified Ger- 
many, the glory and the praise of Prussia, had all 
acted upon his sensitive nature like the excitement 
of a play, and yet it was palpable reality. All the 
prose of life seemed dull to him. As a young 
soldier he passed rapidly through the different 
grades up to that of general ; but it was never for- 
gotten by his comrades when at school in Bonn, or 
in the army, that he was some day to be the head 
of that glorious Germany that had more than real- 
ized the dreams of the medieval time, when mailed 
knights led their armies over the Alps to be crowned 
at Rome ; and, most of all, the young prince himself 
never forgot it. All the realities with which he 
came in contact were veiled in the glamour of a 
time when it seemed that everything was pos- 
sible, and that a new and marvelous era had just 
begun. 

Of all those youthful impressions that had 
touched the imagination of the young Kaiser the 
deepest was that of the victorious army which in 
his boyhood had returned from France. Of the 
three rescripts with which he began his reign, the 
first, on the day of his accession to the throne, was 
addressed to the soldiers. ''The absolute and in- 
destructible fidelity of the army,'* runs this first 
utterance of the young Emperor, "is the heritage 
transmitted from father to son from generation to 
generation. . . . We are inseparably united. . . . 
We are made for each other, I and the army, and 

9 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

we shall remain closely attached whether God gives 
us peace or storm/ ^^ 

This has been the keynote of the Emperor's entire 
reign. The army, that was his first thought, for it 
was that which had created his imperial heritage, 
it was that which could enable him to read into the 
Imperial Constitution the full meaning of the 
Hohenzollern traditions, and make the whole realm 
what his ancestors had made Prussia, a patrimonial 
estate to be transmitted by him to future genera- 
tions of his House. 

To "William II the army was a dynastic pos- 
session. Was it the "nation in arms," as Germans 
love to speak of it, that was in his mind ? Perhaps, 
but not the nation controlled by the people's will. 
The oath of its allegiance is not taken to the Con- 
stitution, but personally to the Emperor. The 
Prussian Constitution openly proclaims this, and 
explicitly declares, "A swearing-in upon the Con- 
stitution of the country does not take place." As 
King of Prussia and as Emperor the Kaiser is the 
head and chief of the Prussian and the Imperial 
army, to whom alone and without question they 
owe obedience. He has, therefore, the legal right 



1 In quoting from the Kaiser's speeches, unless otherwise stated, 
the text has been taken from one of the following authorities : 
Wilhehn II, die Reden Kaiser Wilhehn II (Reclams Universal 
Bibliothek, 4 vols.) down to 1912; The Kaiser's Speeches, trans- 
lated and edited by Wolf von Schierbrand, New York, IQ03 ; The 
German Emperor as Shown in His Public Utterances, by Christian 
Gault, New York, 1915 ; and Arren, Guillatime II, ce qu'il dit ce 
qu'il pense, Paris, 1912. To avoid multiplying foot-notes, the date 
and place of utterances are mentioned in the text, which renders 
easy reference for verification. 

10 



THE SOURCES OF THE KAISER'S POWER 

to say, as he has said, ''The more people shelter 
themselves behind catchwords and party considera- 
tions the more firmly and securely do I count upon 
my army, and the more confidently do I hope that 
my army, either without or within my realms, will 
wait upon my mshes and my behests.'' Not only 
this, but he felt it necessary to say to the new 
recruits: "You have sworn loyalty to me; that 
means that you are now my soldiers, you have 
given yourselves up to me body and soul ; there is 
for you but one enemy, and that is my enemy. In 
view of the present agitations it may come to pass 
that I shall command you to shoot your own rela- 
tives, brothers, yes, parents — which God forbid — 
but even then you must follow my command with- 
out a murmur." And, in saying tliis, he knew 
that he was appealing to an instinct of personal 
fealty nowhere in the world so strong as that bred 
into the nature of Germans through the many cen- 
turies of obedience when existence depended upon 
the feudal consecration of a vassal to his lord, who 
alone could afford protection to his life. 

Such an army cannot inquire into the causes, the 
laws, or the moralities of war. Mute and obedient, 
it marches where it is ordered to march, stands 
where it is ordered to stand, and falls, when it must 
fall, in the faith that God will reward its fidelity 
with eternal blessedness. 

The second thought of the new Emperor on the 
day of his accession was of the neglected little 
navy. Already his fancy had taken wings beyond 

11 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

the frontiers of the Empire, and led him to dream 
of its extension beyond the sea. No German Em- 
peror had ever thought it worth while to address a 
rescript to the navy, but it was William's second 
act. "Whoever knows the navy," he wrote, ''is 
aware that every man is ready to sacrifice his life 
for the German flag. ... In grave moments we 
shall certainly be united, and in fair or cloudy days 
we shall always be ready to shed our blood to safe- 
guard the honor of the German flag and the glory 
of our German Fatherland." 

Having thus identified the army and the navy 
with himself as the two most powerful instruments 
of his purposes, it was not until the fourth day that 
he issued a rescript to the people. 

The eagerness with which the new Emperor had 
addressed himself to the army and navy before 
issuing a general proclamation to the nation as a 
whole, joined mth his reputation for impulsive- 
ness, his inexperience, and his independence of 
character, awakened in serious minds much appre- 
hension. 

In his proclamation of June 18, 1888, to the peo- 
ple, William II apparently endeavored in some de- 
gree to mollify this feeling of popular distrust. 
His filial references to his father, whose noble quali- 
ties had won for him the love and trust of the 
people, aided, perhaps, to dissipate the rumor that 
they had not been in close accord. "Looking to 
the King of all kings," he said, "I have vowed to 
God, following the example of my father, to be a 

12 



THE SOURCES OF THE KAISER'S POWER 

righteous and gentle prince, to foster piety and the 
fear of God, to maintain peace, to be a help to the 
poor and oppressed, and to be a righteous man, a 
true protector." 

Notwithstanding this effusion of lofty sentiments, 
and the formal declaration of public policies, on 
June 25th, before the Reichstag — in which the hand 
of Bismarck is plainly visible — there remained for 
some time in the minds of thoughtful Germans a 
deep solicitude for the future of the Empire, and a 
fear, often freely expressed in private conversa- 
tion, that the impetuosity of the young Emperor 
might involve the country in serious complications, 
especially in relation to foreign powers. 

Conscious of this, and determined not to be in- 
fluenced by it, William II took his owm counsel, but 
not without resentment toward his critics. Years 
afterward he said, referring to this period of 
doubt : *'I assumed the crown with a heavy heart ; 
my capacity was everywhere doubted, and every- 
where I was wrongly judged. Only one had con- 
fidence in me, only one believed in me, and that was 
the army; and, mth its support, and trusting in 
our old God, I undertook my responsible office, 
knowing full well that the army is the mainstay of 
my country and the chief pillar of the Prussian 
throne, to which God in His wisdom has summoned 
me." 

This passage reveals not only Kaiser William's 
original and persistent basis of self-confidence, but 
the ground of the public anxiety regarding his want 

13 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

of discretion. In a sense, all Germany was mili- 
tary, and relied upon the army for its protection ; 
but many a shoulder was significantly shrugged 
at the thought of what this imaginative, sponta- 
neous, and as yet undisciplined potentate might 
rashly undertake to say or do that would involve 
danger to his country. 

With violently militaristic inclinations the Em- 
peror combined a disposition to introduce the 
practice of personal government and personal 
diplomacy. The first public acts of the new reign 
were hardly over before William II, to the dread 
of the conservatively minded, started out upon a 
round of personal visits to the neighboring courts. 
On July 14th he reviewed the fleet at Kiel in the 
uniform of a Prussian admiral, which no King of 
Prussia had ever worn. The next fortnight was 
consumed in calls upon his Baltic neighbors. Cruis- 
ing from port to port on the Hohenzollern, he spent 
five days at Cronstadt with the Czar of Russia, and 
followed this mth personal visits to the King of 
Sweden and the King of Denmark. A little later 
Stuttgart, Munich, Vienna, and Rome were visited ; 
and the year ended with the laying of the first 
stone of the free port of Hamburg and an inspec- 
tion of the shipyards of the Vulkan Gesellschaft at 
Stettin. Already the thought was plainly in the 
Kaiser's active mind which he afterward expressed 
in the sentence, *' Germany's future lies on the 
water. '* 

Germany was not at that time quite ready for so 

14 



THE SOURCES OF THE KAISER'S POWER 

great a widening of its horizon, but William II 
evidently intended to make it so. The staid con- 
servatism of Bismarck, tempered with the moder- 
ate liberalism of **Unser Fritz," as the Germans af- 
fectionately called Frederick III, wonld have been 
far more acceptable to those who had played a great 
role in the founding of the Empire ; but, so far as 
sounding the depths of the German soul is con- 
cerned, William II was a better psychologist than 
either of them. The people might distrust the 
Kaiser's personal diplomacy, but they were in- 
spired by his imagination. He was bent on creat- 
ing a new age; and Germany, especially Young 
Germany, was ready to welcome it. 

What the new Kaiser most completely repre- 
sented was that vague entity knoA\Ti as Deutschtum. 
From myth and saga and song, from the clash and 
rattle of arms and the blare of trumpets, he knew 
how to evoke it. What Richard Wagner caught 
and put into music that William II caught and put 
into government. All that lingered about the Rhine 
was laid on German lips to sing again. All that 
was heroic in chivalrous adventure was once more 
recalled, and it was all made to seem German — only 
German. 

Running through all this was the legend of the 
Kaiseridee — the religious sanctity of God's anoint- 
ed shepherd of the people. Barbarossa had at last 
awakened from his long sleep and come forth from 
the mountain fastnesses which had hidden and 
guarded his tomb until the day of his deliverance, 

15 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

and his spirit had become reincarnated in the new 
Emperor. 

It is difficult for strangers to realize the forces 
wrapped up in the revival of a national culture 
restored from the mold of ages. As a German 
writer has phrased it: 

**It was as if the golden lute of Walther von der 
Vogelweide sang again softly through the ruined 
castles ; as if unseen hands touched the bells in the 
weatherbeaten cathedral, and a glint of the morning 
rose over consecrated cities. There was a rushing 
in the deep, as if the treasure of the Nibelungen 
mov-ed in the green house of the water ; there was a 
thrill in the air, as if Siegfried's horn sounded in 
the distance."^ 

If the dim remembrance of an old, almost dead, 
national culture worked such wonders, how much 
more would a new, living culture be the sanctuary 
around which in the future the Germans should 
gather from near and far? German power and 
German beauty — these should be the goals of the 
new Germany! As the fathers had made the 
Ehine a German river, so the sons should make the 
ocean a German lake! ^'Noch lebt der alte Qott in 
unserem Blut!" 

Frankly, this is a revival of primitive paganism. 
''The old German God" is not the sorrow-burdened 
Saviour of the world. He is a god of battles, made 



1 Fuchs, Der Kaiser, die Kultitr, imd die Kimst, Munich and 
Leipzig, 1904. 



16 



THE SOURCES OF THE KAISER'S POWER 

potent through the swing and blows of his hammer. 
He is not the All-Holy, or even the Creator of the 
universe, the All-Father. He is a purely tribal 
divinity, the apotheosis of tribal power and tribal 
hate, whose plans and protection are for Germans 
only. How otherwise can he with any sense always 
be referred to as *'the old German God"? Only 
thus can he be spoken of as *'onr unconditional 
and avowed ally." ''Unconditional," because 
whatever Germans do is right; and "avowed" be- 
cause success in arms is the sufficient evidence of 
his alliance. 

What made William II the master of German 
destinies was the fact that he, more than any other, 
was the embodiment of these tribal rhapsodies. 

And, in spite of all opposition, he became the 
master. His idealism, his impetuosity, his self- 
confidence, to Bismarck appeared positively dan- 
gerous. To many the venerable Chancellor, the 
virtual creator of the Empire, seemed the essential 
counterpoise and balance-Avheel to the young Em- 
peror's spontaneity; and this was the opinion of 
Prince Bismarck himself, who intended to keep 
"this young man" within proper bounds. 

It is unnecessary here to repeat the story, so 
often told, of the "dropping of the pilot. "^ Bis- 
marck himself believed it to be impossible. When 



1 A very circumstantial account, and the most recent, is given 
in Germany Under Three Emperors, by Princess Catherine Radzi- 
will (Catherine Kolb-Danvin), London, etc., 1917, to which I am 
indebted particularly for the quotations from Holstein, Bismarck's 
confidential clerk in the Foreign Office, and other quotations. 

17 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

they appeared upon the streets of Berlin, where 
I often saw them pass in open carriages, the Chan- 
cellor received as many signs of deference and 
devotion as the Emperor. In truth, to all observ- 
ers, in 1888-89, Bismarck seemed to be the corner- 
stone of the whole imperial structure. The best 
asset of the young Emperor was the fact that this 
seasoned statesman was by his side as friend and 
counselor. 

In the Emperor's eyes the country squire, whom 
his grandfather had made a prince, was, notwith- 
standing his ability and his services, merely the 
creature and the temporary instrument of the 
Hohenzollern dynasty, for that alone possessed true 
authority, which God had directly bestowed upon 
it. The difference, he thought, must be understood. 

Personally, William, as CroM^n Prince, had 
learned much from the astute statesman, and Bis- 
marck's great services to the House of Hohen- 
zollern were distinctly recognized by him ; but from 
the moment of his accession the Emperor felt that 
he was overshadowed in the world's esteem and 
made distinctly secondary — he who should be first. 

For the break, which in the Emperor's mind was 
inevitable, there were many reasons. Not only was 
the Prince too conscious of his importance, but he 
was scheming to cast the mantle of succession to 
the chancellorship upon the shoulders of his un- 
principled son. Count Herbert, for whom he had 
an inordinate affection. The Prince had aimed to 
stamp out Socialism; but William intended, to the 

18 



THE SOURCES OF THE KAISER'S POWER 

Chancellor's disgust, to destroy it as a party by 
winning it as a beneiiciary. Bismarck, after form- 
ing tlie Triple Alliance with Austria and Italy, be- 
lieved he had a reinsurance for peace in a close 
friendship with Russia; but William, who had 
seen with indignation the grim fortifications at 
Brest-Litovsk — a name recently made famous by 
almost farcical peace negotiations — had conceived a 
profound distrust of the Czar's purposes, and was 
disposed to cultivate the good-will of France and 
hold firmly to the Austrian alliance. 

It was a risk of some magnitude for the young 
Kaiser to base the Chancellor's overthrow on a 
question of foreign policy, In which he was re- 
garded by all Germans as a past-master. It was, 
therefore, on an issue of personal primacy that the 
rupture was staged. 

On March 15, 1890, having reprimanded the 
Chancellor on the day before, through a court of- 
ficer, for having held conversation with Wind- 
thorst, chief of the Catholic party, without the pre- 
vious assent of the Emperor, and having received 
the Chancellor's reply that he would allow no one 
to say whom he should receive in his house, William 
II drove to the palace of the Prince and demanded 
to see him in person. 

Although it was ten o'clock in the morning, the 
Chancellor was still in bed and had to rise and 
dress. A stormy interview followed, in which. 
William II asked Bismarck what he meant by nego- 
tiations with Windthorst without previously con- 

3 19 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

suiting liim. The Prince replied that there were 
no negotiations, only a private conversation; 
whereupon he was instructed that in the future he 
must keep the Emperor informed when he con- 
ferred with parliamentary leaders. 

Deeply resentful, the Prince replied that he could 
not permit interference with his relations with any 
one, affirmed that it was only in compliance with a 
promise to William I that he had consented to 
remain in the service of his grandson, and that he 
was ready to retire. 

Contrary to the Chancellor's expectation, the 
Emperor cried out, ''I accept your resignation," 
and left the room in a rage, without being accom- 
panied by the Chancellor, as the etiquette of the 
court required. 

For days Bismarck struggled with his pride, his 
ambition, and his indignation, holding back the 
resignation on the ground that so important a step 
required careful preparation. In the end it was 
peremptorily sent for and delivered. Unwilling to 
admit that he was forced out of office, the Prince 
aimed a parting arrow in his words to Moritz 
Busch, that he "did not wish to take upon his 
shoulders at the close of his career the stupidities 
and mistakes of a presumptuous and inexperienced 
mind."^ To Holstein, who had worked with him 
in the Foreign Office, he said: "It is all over, and 
destiny wants me to look upon the destruction of 



1 Busch, Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of His History, New 
York, 1904. 

20 



THE SOURCES OF THE KAISER'S POWER 

my own work. . . . Can you understand what it is 
to feel that one has become nothing after having 
been everything?"^ 

It was the Kaiser's victory. Men called him 
light-minded, but he had appropriated the last 
ounce of personal power, and that is what he de- 
sired. The appointment of Caprivi, a general 
without experience in foreign, or even civil, affairs, 
as Chancellor seemed the acme of rashness. Yet 
no one was disposed to challenge *'this young 
man." 

At one moment, after the indignities heaped upon 
the fallen 'Chancellor w^hen the Kaiser intervened 
to prevent his promised audience by Francis Joseph 
at Vienna, and other honors he was expecting on 
the occasion of his visit to Austria to attend Count 
Herbert's wedding to an Austrian lady, Bismarck 
was disposed to react openly against his royal and 
imperial master. Holstein had gone to him to 
negotiate a peace with the Kaiser, and as a last 
argument had said, what if his sovereign should 
in his anger have him imprisoned. **I wish he 
would," answered the old Prince; "that would be 
the end of the Hohenzollern dynasty." ^ 

But this was only an ebullition of the Prince's 
long pent-up wrath. Bismarck himself had closed 
the door to revolution. In framing the Imperial 
Constitution he had introduced a "joker" for him- 
self, but the card was in the Emperor 's hand. He 



1 Radziwill, Germany Under Three Emperors, p. 344. 

2 The same, p. 356. 

21 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

had made the Emperor absolute, irresponsible, with 
no tribunal before which he could be summoned, 
and no legal power in the hands of government or 
people by which his personal will could be con- 
trolled. He who had dealt a death blow to par- 
liamentary government could not appeal to the 
Eeichstag, which he had emasculated. At a word 
from the Emperor it would be dissolved. If it 
resisted, the army was there to execute the law. 
In the Bundesrat the case was equally hopeless. 
Nothing but a general revolution could shake the 
power of tlie Kaiser. The ease with which the 
Chancellor had been overthrown by a single mes- 
sage, delivered through a court officer, was a con- 
clusive demonstration of his utter impotence, ex- 
cept as he spoke by the Emperor's authority. 

There was, moreover, something else besides the 
Constitution and the army; there was the German 
tribal religion, of which tlie Kaiser was the High 
Priest. *'My grandfather," the Emperor said to 
his faithful Brandenburgers a few days before 
Bismarck's fall — "my grandfather considered that 
the office of king was a task that God had assigned 
to him, to which up to the last moment he conse- 
crated all his forces. That which he thought I also 
think, and I see in the people and the country that 
have been transmitted to me a trust that is con- 
fided to me by God, which it is my duty to increase. 
. . . Those who wish to aid me in that task, who- 
ever they are, I welcome with all my heart; those 
who oppose me in this work I shall crush." 

23 



THE SOURCES OF THE KAISER'S POWER 

The overthrow of Bismarck was a convincing 
object-lesson. Fortified by the law, the army, and 
the religious sentiment of the people, the Kaiser 
was supreme. 

But William II was too intelligent to permit 
himself to be considered ungrateful for the immense 
services rendered to the House of Hohenzollern by 
the recognized creator of the German Empire. In 
every way he tried to make it appear that the dis- 
missal of the Chancellor was to him a painful act 
of duty. Two days after the Prince was relieved 
of his office the Kaiser telegraphed to Count Gorz 
Schlitz at Weimar: "I suffer as if I had for a 
second time just lost my grandfather. But God 
has so willed it. I must support it." And then, as 
if to justify his action as a high political necessity, 
he adds: *'I have the position of officer of the 
watch on the bridge of the Ship of State. The 
course remains the same; and now, full steam 
ahead!'* 

But neither in spirit nor in fact did the course 
remain the same. Between William II and Prince 
Bismarck, who was by no means pacified by being 
created Duke of Lauenburg at the time of his re- 
tirement, there were differences of view so wide 
as to be utterly incompatible, and this was recog- 
nized by both. The result was that the influences 
emanating from Bismarck's estate at Friedrichs- 
ruhe had to be officially repressed. On May 23d a 
general order was issued by the new Chancellor, 
Caprivi, to all the diplomatic representatives of 

23 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Germany to inform the governments to which they 
were accredited ''that His Majesty distinguishes 
between the Bismarck of other days and the Bis- 
marck of the present," and that ''no importance 
should be attached to what the press may say re- 
garding the views of Bismarck." 

A later Chancellor, Prince von Hohenlohe, who 
heard from the Kaiser's own lips, as the Prince 
reports in his memoirs, the story of the es- 
trangement, quotes William II as saying to him 
— and for this revelation the Kaiser never for- 
gave him — that for the three weeks before his dis- 
missal of Bismarck he had had "a devil of a 
time" with him, the question being "whether the 
dynasty Bismarck or the dynasty Hohenzollern 
should reign. ' ' ^ 

In the public speeches immediately following 
Prince Bismarck's retirement the Kaiser took pains 
to make it understood, both at home and abroad, 
that in foreign relations it was the head of the 
state alone who should be reckoned with. At a ban- 
quet in the royal palace at Christiania, on June 29, 
1890, for example, he said: "I consider it neces- 
sary for a sovereign that he should personally in- 
form himself about everything ; that he should form 
his opinion for himself ; that he should become ac- 
quainted with his neighbors, in order to establish 
and maintain good relations mth them : such is the 

1 Prince von Hohenlohe's Memoirs were not published until 
after his death, in 1906. His account makes it indisputable that 
the Kaiser's motive was personal supreniacy. The conversation 
with Windthorst, the Prince considers, was only an excuse. See 
Illustrative Document No. i, at the end of this volume. 

24 



THE SOURCES OF THE KAISER'S POWER 

object of my foreign journeys." In the next six 
months he made six visits to foreign courts. 

It was this personal diplomacy, this attempt to 
base international relations upon personal senti- 
ments and compliments and toasts after dinner, 
that had seriously disturbed the mind of Bismarck ; 
and, as we shall have occasion to see in following 
the consequences of this policy, in opposition to a 
policy of foreign affairs based on legal principles 
and a reasoned understanding of mutual interests, 
it is this attitude that has kept the German Empire 
in a ferment and all Europe in a state of periodical 
crises ever since the reign of William II began. 
*'It is very natural," said Bismarck, after his re- 
sentment had cooled down, *'that a mentor like my- 
self does not please him, and that he rejects my 
advice. An old cart-horse and a young courser go 
ill in harness together. Only political problems are 
not so easy as a chemical combination: they deal 
with human beings."^ 

In the opinion of AVilliam II, the only human be- 
ings to be considered in international politics were 
the sovereigns; but Bismarck understood that di- 
plomacy has also to do with the interests of nations. 
The Prince had warned him not to trust to merely 
personal relations and impressions, but the Kaiser 
had pursued his ovm course. His early visit to 



1 Paul Liman, Der Kaiser, Berlin, 1904, endeavors to show that 
Bismarck was not really greatly mortified by his dismissal and 
bore no grudge against his young master ; but this view cannot be 
sustained in the light of the evidence. Even Hans Blum, a partisan 
of Bismarck, Das Deutsche Reich zur Zeit Bismarcks, Leipzig, 
1893, does not dispute this. 

25 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Alexander III, a man of experience and calcula- 
tion, immediately after his accession as German 
Emperor, had left him with a deep prejudice 
against Russia. The Czar had not taken his youth- 
ful enthusiasms very seriously, and the Kaiser had 
not failed to resent this. When, therefore, Bis- 
marck insisted that care must be given to the 
friendship with Russia, "William II was disposed to 
think lightly of it. 

What Bismarck had feared was a possible alli- 
ance between France and Russia, both of which 
were left isolated by the situation that had been 
created on the Continent by the formation of the 
Triple Alliance, begun by the defensive agreement 
of Germany and Austria in 1879, and completed by 
similar agreements between Austria and Italy and 
Germany and Italy in 1882. But the friendship 
of Prussia with Russia was a far older one, and in 
Bismarck's mind it was still of great importance to 
Germany. He had been anxious to retain it, and 
had taken measures to do so. In fact, had he not 
feared making Germany altogether dependent upon 
Russia, and liable in this relation to be held in 
check by her in any future attack upon France, he 
might even have preferred an alliance with Russia 
rather than with Austria; for, as he once said, ''In 
point of material force I held a union with Russia 
to have the advantage. ' ' It was, in fact, the policy 
which Emperor William I would have preferred. 

Bismarck's alter ego, Herr Holstein, the cunning 
spider at the center of the web in Wilhelmstrasse, 

89 



THE SOURCES OF THE KAISER'S POWER 

has left on record a sentence that reveals the main- 
spring of Bismarck's diplomacy with a sudden 
glare of light: ''With Russia as an ally we might 
crush Austria, but w^e could never destroy France, 
and it is France that must be destroyed before the 
German Empire can develop itself, as it is essential 
it should do in the future.'*^ A friendship with 
Russia strong enough to secure her neutrality in 
the future as in the past, but not the obligations 
of an alliance — unless it became necessary to peace 
— that, in Holstein^s mind, was the policy of Bis- 
marck. "You see," he went on, in a confidential 
interview, ''the next w^ar is bound to be for us a 
question of existence. If we fight it successfully, 
then we shall be able to proceed to a general dis- 
armament of Europe, together Avith a restriction of 
our own military forces. Therefore, we ought to 
w^atch carefully for the moment when this war can 
be brought about with the minimum of risk to our- 
selves and the maximum to our foes. When we 
consider this moment to have arrived we must be- 
gin it, whether we like it or not ; and what neither 
Bismarck nor myself was sure of was, whether 
Russia would allow us to seize it, whereas with 
Austria no such complication could be feared. . . . 
With Austria beside us — who knows — perhaps one 
or two Balkan States, we can crush both France and 
Russia and neutralize England. ' ' ^ 

Equally with Bismarck, William II understood 



1 Radziwill, Germany Under Three Emperors, p. 266. 

2 The same, p. 266. 

?7 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

the importance of another war in Germany's pro- 
gram of development; but, whereas the old Chan- 
cellor found the real enemy in France, the Kaiser 
found him in Russia. The difference was based 
upon different conceptions of empire. Bismarck 
contemplated a Germany ultimately dominant on 
the continent of Europe at the least possible ex- 
pense. Hence a general reduction of armaments 
when that position was once attained. But William 
II wished no such limits. He aimed at world pre- 
dominance, and understood that the disarmament 
of Europe would terminate the necessity for kings 
and emperors altogether. Bismarck Avas planning 
as a Prussian statesman, William II as proprietor 
of the Hohenzollern dynasty. From the beginning 
he looked toward the East as the path of empire. 
It was not France but Russia that blocked the way. 
A permanent friendship with Russia was, in his 
eyes, impossible. The Balkan Peninsula, the de- 
bris of the Ottoman Empire, Constantinople — 
these were the real pawns in the imperial game. 
Bismarck believed nothing of this. For him Ger- 
many's greatness would consist in drawing the 
Austrians into the German union; the permanent 
weakening of France, to be kept in conflict with 
Great Britain over the spoils of colonial expansion ; 
the development of Russia on the Asiatic side ; and 
the consequent military domination of the Euro- 
pean continent by Germany with a minimum of 
cost. William II wanted as much as possible 
of all this, but also new territories and access 

28 



THE SOURCES OF THE KAISER'S POWER 

to the southern waters, a route to the Far East. 
In. 1890 this was only a vague dream, but across 
every vista of the vision loomed the shadow of a 
resisting Russia. 

In these first years of the Kaiser's reign was 
sounded the key-note of his personal use of power. 
* ' I can hardly believe that he will ever bear to have 
a Chancellor with a private opinion of his own," 
Bismarck once remarked. *'That," he went on, 
"means a return to absolute government, which 
requires different qualities from those of William 
II." When asked why he spoke of a "return" to 
absolute government, and not of a continuance of 
it, since he himself had governed absolutely, the 
Prince replied: "Ah! that was quite a different 
matter. I may have been autocratic, but I never 
boasted of it!" ^ 

We now know what the Kaiser's boasting has 
brought upon Germany, upon Europe, and upon 
the world. 



Radziwill, Germany Under Three Emperors, p. 363. 



CHAPTER II 

THE KAISER'S METHODS OF PERSONAL 
CONTROL 

TIKE money put out at usury, power in govern- 
•*--' ment grows mth astonishing rapidity. "WHien 
it is both concentrated and undisputed, as in the 
case of imperial absolutism, it soon becomes irre- 
'sistible. 

No better example of the rapid centralization of 
power can be found in history than the growth of 
Kaiser William II 's personal control not only of 
German action, but of German thought. 

"William I, who had the habits of mind of a 
Prussian king, had hardly become accustomed to 
think imperially — a task which he intrusted chiefly 
to Bismarck — when his reign came to an end by 
his death. Frederick III, an invalid from his 
accession, hardly had time as Emperor to consider 
any great question. But William II was a child of 
the Empire. His thought was imperial from the 
beginning. 

Germany, too, was ready to think imperially. 
The reaction from the constraint of small kingdoms 
and the parochial rule of tin}'- principalities was 

30 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

a stimulus that made all kinds of mere bigness 
objects of aspiration in which all Germans were 
prepared to participate. There was a revulsion 
from the littleness of the past and an abnormal 
craving for modernity. 

On the material side, as he has more than once 
assured me, the great example in the mind of 
William II was America. Too remote to be a 
rival, in the political sense, as it then seemed, its 
large ways were most interesting to the young 
Kaiser. They awakened his interest and fired his 
imagination. Americans who could tell him of the 
great achievements of the United States in its eco- 
nomic development were always welcome guests. 
Although in other respects not much approved of, 
America was the model upon which the Kaiser built 
his plans of material prosperity, and the great 
movements that quickened the economic life of the 
Empire were initiated by men who took the pains, 
first of all, to learn the lessons of America. The 
sympathy between the two countries at that time 
was intense and sincere. Friendship was not so 
much sought for as spontaneously offered. It was 
not apparent that the interests of the two peoples 
would ever anywhere come into collision. The 
world, it was felt, was large enough for the full 
development of both; and, with sincere pride and 
appreciation, a German Geheimrat somewhat later 
called his book about the United States TJie Land 
of Unlimited Possibilities. 

Even a young country, the United States had 

31 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

proved, could become great. The late arrival of 
the German Empire in the family of nations should 
not, therefore, the Kaiser thought, prevent it also 
from attaining a great position as a world power. 
It, too, had ''unlimited possibilities." What could 
not be accomplished with the resources and within 
the limits of the German Empire, as it existed, 
must be accomplished by extending the power of 
the Empire beyond its frontiers, and even beyond 
the sea. This ambition, which the Kaiser lost no 
opportunity of promoting in his people, he himself 
pre-eminently entertained. Nothing has so facili- 
tated the growth of William II 's personal power as 
the conviction of his subjects that he was sincere in 
his constantly reiterated assurances that the in- 
crease of his personal authority was identical with 
the increased power of the Empire, which they al- 
ways translated into the tacit assumption that this 
meant the wealth, the prosperity, and the glory of 
all the German people. 

How much of this ambition was personal and 
dynastic few persons felt disposed to inquire. A 
simple test would, however, have answered the 
question. No one ever doubted that there is room 
enough in the world for the prolific German race, 
but William II thought that German territory 
should increase mth the German population, in 
order that as few Germans as possible should cease 
to be his subjects. To this end they must be re- 
strained from migration until the Empire could be 
so expanded as to provide homes for all Germans 

32 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

under the German flag. When this could not be 
done, in every foreign land the Teuton must be a 
missionary for German culture and German trade. 
Germans, wherever they lived, should have their 
own schools and their own churches, where the 
maternal language should be kept alive. 

In this respect the Kaiser's policy was a glaring 
anachronism. No other monarch in the world in- 
sisted that personal fealty to himself must be car- 
ried into foreign lands. Seldom, perhaps, did the 
faithful surmise that the Kaiser's interest in them 
was chiefly dynastic, regarding them not as Ger- 
mans, but as his subjects. 

That, in the circumstances, there should be a 
Pan-German party and propaganda in Germany 
was inevitable. We know what it has accomplished 
since the organization of the Alldeutscher Verband 
in 1894. In every form, from popular tracts to 
erudite volumes, its literature has been scattered 
broadcast among the German people. Appealing 
ostensibly to racial unity and sentiment, its under- 
lying motive is imperial. Wherever a German goes, 
he must never forget that he is a German ; and, as a 
German, he owes perpetual fealty to the Kaiser. 

One would have supposed that at least one class 
of Germans would resist this influence and would 
defend the broad cosmopolitanism which character- 
ized the German universities in the early part of 
the nineteenth century. It is a matter of surprise, 
therefore, that the learned world of Germany, in 
all the constituent states of the Empire, including 

33 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

teachers and professors, from the "universities down 
to the lowest schools, should become rabid imperi- 
alists and adulators of Prussian aims and Prussian 
methods/ To their keeping had been intrusted the 
treasure and ideals of academic freedom, the tradi- 
tions of personal political independence as its nec- 
essary support, and the example of their forerun- 
ners who were responsible for the democratic and 
constitutional movement of 1848, which a little 
more political experience might have made trium- 
phant. It was well knoA\m that it was Prussia that 
had rendered that development abortive; that 
Prussia had never been a home of culture, as even 
the smallest German principalities had been; and 
that every flower of philosophy that by its omti 
vigor and without the nurture of the state had ever 
blossomed on the great northern plain had been cut 
down, as Immanuel Kant and William von Hum- 
boldt had been — Kant, who boldly declared that 
there would be no lasting peace in the world until 
all states were republican, and was publicly 
snubbed for it by the King; and Von Humboldt, 
who fell into disfavor because he championed pop- 



1 In a discourse of December 4, i8qo, at the first session of the 
Commission on Secondary Education, William II violently op- 
posed classical education, as contrasted with technical instruction ; 
insisted upon the duty of teachers to inculcate right doctrines 
regarding the government and to see that students were not "se- 
duced" by "political novelties" ; and asserted, regarding the "new 
edifice of the state," the Empire, "I can judge of it with absolute 
certainty, for I am at the apex of all the questions having refer- 
ence to me." "Consider the young generation which you prepare 
for the defense of the country," he continues. "/ have need of 
soldiers, we want vigorous men who can also serve their country 
as intellectual leaders and functionaries." 

34 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

"ular liberty, and souglit solace for his wounded 
spirit by leaving Prussia and exercising his great 
talents in more congenial climes. 

That the teachers and writers of Germany were 
in twenty years transformed into "Byzantines," as 
they privately accuse one another of having be- 
come, was indeed unnatural; and the phenomenon 
is inexplicable until the process by which it was 
accomplished is explained. 

Even the possibility of such a transformation 
does not become apparent until one considers that 
in Germany, since it has been Prussianized, the 
state is omnipotent, and that all education in Ger- 
many is a function of the state. All teachers being 
state officials, the employment and promotion of 
professors are regulated by state authority; and 
all state authority is, in the last analysis, an emana- 
tion of the power of the Emperor. Nothing of im- 
portance can happen in Germany in direct and open 
opposition to his will. 

The decapitation of Bismarck as Chancellor all 
the world knows; but it does not, perhaps, recall 
how, near the commencement of his reign, William 
II began his program for the subjugation of the 
professors. 

In 1844 there was established at Berlin the 
^'Verdun Prize," in memory of the separation of 
the Carlovingian empire into the distinct nationali- 
ties of Germany and France by a treaty of 843. 
It had been the annual custom to award this prize 
to the most meritorious historical work of the year, 

4 35 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

and in 1894 the Academy of Berlin had unani- 
mously awarded it to the well-known historian, Von 
Sybel, for his great work, The Foundation of the 
New German Empire. To the amazement of every 
one, when the award was submitted to William II 
for his ratification, the Kaiser drew his pen through 
the name of Von Sybel and awarded the prize to 
Erdmannsdorfer, a Heidelberg erudite, who had 
produced a rather crude work on the Great 
Elector/ 

What, then, was the fault of Von Sybel? Cer- 
tainly not that he was not a loyal Prussian, wholly 
devoted to the Hohenzollern djTiasty ; but the Em- 
peror had indicated his vdsh that German histori- 
ans should in the future give to the representation 
of the Prussian monarchs a "heroic grandeur." 
This Erdsmannsdorfer had tried to do for Fred- 
erick William, but Von Sybel had had the hardi- 
hood to make Bismarck the hero of the founding 
of the Empire, and relegated King William I to 
second place! 

If any German had deserved the gratitude of the 
Prussian dynasty, it was undoubtedly Treitschke, 
who with incomparable fervor had for more than 
two decades poured forth a volcanic stream of 
weird eloquence blazing with satire and invective 
against democracy, and had frescoed with, all the 
colors of the rainbow the House of Hohenzollern as 
the Savior of Europe. Not only so, but at Kiel, 



1 For further details, see Guilland, L'Allemagne nouvelle et scs 
historiens, Paris, 1899. 

36 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

as professor, he had been hissed by the Danes, and 
at Freiburg had been personally menaced, because 
of his eulogy of the Prussians — all this before the 
advent of the Empire — to a point where it was nec- 
essary to pack up and hastily leave the place. Yet 
this martyr — for he had suffered deeply for his 
devotion to Prussia — although he had hailed with 
an outburst of joy the accession of William II as 
the salvation of the Empire, was caused to feel the 
power that could make and unmake the idols of the 
day. 

Venturing in the self-confidence of his great 
fame to draw a picture of Frederick William IV 
which reflected upon the foibles of William II, 
Treitschke had aroused the Kaiser 's wrath. 

** Having imagined," wrote Treitschke, *'with 
the fancy of an artist a world of magnificent plans, 
being now the master, Frederick William wished to 
realize them. Weary of the parsimony of the Court 
of Berlin, in order to maintain a state of sumptu- 
ousness worthy of the Hohenzollerns, he hoped to 
assemble all that was great in the realm of art. He 
was never happy except when emitting a flood of 
thoughts and sentiments. *I could not rest until I 
had spoken,' he wrote one day to a friend." ^ 

The picture was too accurate to be mistaken. 
The old professor fell under disfavor, and he was 
threatened with having the archives closed to him. 
A worse punishment would have followed upon the 
least sign of resentment, but the death of Treitschke 

1 See Guilland, as above. 

37 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

ended the process of humiliation. As in the case 
of Bismarck, every court of appeal was closed to 
him. Had he not written, "The state is power"? ^ 

The case of Quidde, the Munich professor, is less 
pathetic and more amusing. In 1894 he published 
in a magazine, and afterward in a pamphlet, an 
article entitled "Caligula.''^ 

*'The young prince," wrote Quidde, ostensibly 
of the Koman Emperor, "was suddenly called to his 
high office before obtaining maturity. His father, 
Germanicus, had succumbed to a vicious disease in 
the prime of his years. The people had adored the 
deceased man, from whom they had hoped to secure 
an increase in freedom and happiness. The posi- 
tion of Caligula's father as presumptive heir to 
the throne had been delicate enough during the de- 
clining years of old Emperor Tiberius and was 
made still more trying by the haughty and pas- 
sionate temper of Caligula's mother, who was an 
extremely unpopular woman. 

"The new Emperor was at first considered to be 
an unknown and enigmatic character and every- 
body expected that Marco, the all-powerful Minis- 
ter of State and Prefect of the Guards, would rule 
in fact, especially since the imperial house was 
greatly indebted to him. But soon the great §tates- 



1 Of Treitschke Guilland says : "He is not a veritable historian. 
A man of sentiment and imagination, he needs to be carried away 
by his subject, to be inspired by enthusiasm, to storm or to curse. 
He is incapable of studying scientifically a question in itself : it is 
necessary for him either to love or to hate." 

'^ A copy of Quidde's Caligula may be found in the Congressional 
Library at Washington. 

38 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

man fell into disgrace and the Emperor assumed 
complete control of affairs and established a purely 
personal regime." 

For this Quidde was summoned to answer to a 
charge of Use-ma jeste. "Whom have you in mind 
in writing this article?" demanded the cross- 
examiner. ''Caligula, of course," was the prompt 
reply. *'Whom have you in mind, Mr. Solic- 
itor?" 

The government, for once, was completely cor- 
nered. The proceedings were dropped, but the 
pamphlet is said to have run through more than 
thirty editions. 

More successful was the discipline administered 
to Professor Delbriick, of Berlin, a devoted Prus- 
sian, who had, nevertheless, in 1898, the courage to 
criticize in his Preussische Jahrhucher the brutal 
policy applied to the Danish subjects in Schleswig- 
Holstein. A reprimand and a fine of five hundred 
marks served as a caution to those who, on grounds 
of justice, were disposed to pass judgment on the 
government. So long as professors and writers 
did not express doubts of the rightful onmipotence 
of the state, of the divine appointment and holy 
mission of the Hohenzollern dynasty, or of the high 
destiny of Deutschtum, they were permitted to lec- 
ture and write about almost anything they pleased, 
and this is what is now understood in Germany by 
"academic freedom." Attacks on religion and on 
the family, and even atheism and socialism of the 
most rampant kind, pass without official censure; 

39 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Lilt no one is permitted with inununity to cast re- 
flections upon the government. 

But the power of the Kaiser consists in practice 
far less in what he can prevent than in what he can 
promote. From top to bottom civil life is controlled 
by the long line of his servitors, whose interest al- 
ways lies in courting his favor as well as in avoid- 
ing his displeasure. To be a guest at his table, to 
be the recipient of his confidence, to be rewarded 
with a word of his approval, is a passport to esteem 
in every community of Germany. By the ignorant, 
obedience to his will is regarded as a religious duty. 
To inculcate this duty on the part of the people is 
esteemed a service to the state. To glorify the 
state on all occasions, therefore, becomes an official 
obligation which it is deemed a grave delinquency 
to disregard. AVhy should even chemists, or physi- 
cists, or mathematicians — not to speak of histori- 
ans and philosophers, who must discuss such mat- 
ters — be expected to obstruct their own promotion 
by a failure to meet this expectation? And when 
in time of need a manifesto, declaring the inno- 
cence of the German army in the invasion of Bel- 
gium and its right to impose the superiority of 
German culture upon neighboring peoples, was 
passed around for signature by the most eminent 
university professors and men of science in the 
Empire, for the purpose of balancing this violation 
of neutral soil by the weight of their great author- 
ity, what wonder that they were induced to sign a 
false and purely dogmatic statement in open con- 

40 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

tradiction of documentary evidence in the hands of 
every scholar in every neutral country? 

Knomng personally many of the ninety-three 
distinguished Germans who signed this manifesto 
in 1914, it is difficult to believe that they were 
actuated by mere vulgar fear of what might hap- 
pen to them if they refused to sign. Their act was 
the fruit of twenty-five years of subservience so 
habitual that they solemnly proclaimed a falsehood 
because they had been accustomed to thinly that 
whatever the Emperor ordered could not be wrong. 
He had so shaped public opinion that the political 
and ethical standards of judgment in Germany had 
ceased to be individual. 

It is difficult for men not indoctrinated in the 
imperial cult to accept such an explanation. But 
listen to the most celebrated scholar in Germany, 
the son-in-law of Mommsen, Wilamowitz-Mollen- 
dorff. He is speaking of the superiority of Prussia 
to Athens: 

"Your sages," he says, in an apostrophe to the 
Athenians, — *'your sages tell us of that highest 
love which, freed from all bodily entanglements, 
spends itself on institutions, on laws, on ideas. We 
Prussians, a rough, much-enduring tribe of North- 
erners . . . believe that love is on a higher level 
when the fullest devotion to an institution and an 
idea is linked with an entirely personal devotion to 
a human being. . . . When our children have scarce 
learned to fold their little hands before God, we 
set a picture before them, we tell them to recognize 

41 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

the noble features ; we tell them, * This is our good 
King.' Our young men, when they are of age to 
bear arms, look with joy and pride on the trim garb 
of war, and say, 'I go in the King's coat.' And 
when the nation assembles to a common political 
celebration, the occasion is no Feast of the Consti- 
tution, no Day of the Bastille, no Panathenaic Fes- 
tival. It is then that we bow in reverence and loy- 
alty before him who has allowed us to see with our 
own eyes that for which our fathers dreamed and 
yearned, before him who ever extends the bounds 
of the kingdom in freedom, prosperity, and right- 
eousness; before His Majesty the Emperor and 
King." 

Here is the secret of Junkertum, the old feudal 
relation of a vassal to his lord, beside whom con- 
stitutions, conventions, and treaties are mere 
scraps of paper ! Did not King Frederick William 
IV once say, speaking of a proposed constitution, 
"Never will I permit a piece of paper to come be- 
tween God and my people ' ' ? Safe from divine con- 
demnation in "the trim garb of war," covered with 
righteousness by "the King's coat," the German 
soldier, regardless of "institutions, laws and 
ideas," goes forth wherever he is led, to "extend 
the bounds of the kingdom." Whoever does this 
loyally to his lord does nothing wrong! 

Every German professor is proud to wear "the 
King's coat." When he does not wear that, he is 
proud to wear the Order of the Red Eagle — the 
Black Eagle is usually too much to hope for — third 

43 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

or fourth class. Not to become a Geheimrat is to 
live a wasted life. And this is not wholly a matter 
of vanity. It is social status. It is more than that ; 
it is a baptism, a chrism, in a holy service, the 
service of the Emperor, who is a king by ** divine 
right.'' Not that every German professor really 
believes in ''divine right"; for, logically, that 
would imply the existence of a divinity, in whom 
frequently he does not believe. To him the expres- 
sion means that the Kaiser is divinely right, be- 
cause he symbolizes the might of Germany. To be 
a conscious part of this higher system, a privy 
councilor, is to attain a great height; but to be a 
''Wirklicher Geheimrat," with the attribute of 
''Excellency," that is to reach the highest pinnacle 
of earthly honor attainable by a German professor. 
In private many Germans would, no doubt, be 
disposed to smile over the strange conception of 
values implied in this passion for decorations ; but 
no one would dispute the fact that the expectation 
of imperial recognition exerts a powerful influence 
over the German mind. It would, no doubt, be 
unjust to say that these honors work the miracle of 
making otherwise democratic minds imperialistic. 
The more exact statement would be, that, to minds 
already bred to imperialism, these honors have a 
value which to others they could never seem to 
possess, and are on that account an important 
means of extending the influence which the Kaiser 
is able to exert over thought and its expression by 
the learned world. 

43 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Where affirmative support cannot be obtained 
open opposition must at least be silenced ; and hence 
the control and subjection of the German press and 
news agencies. A perfectly free press would speed- 
ily imdermine this system, and it cannot therefore 
be tolerated. Above all, no strictures must be miade 
upon the Kaiser's authority; and, as personal re- 
spect is tlie ultimate basis upon which it rests, all 
public criticism of the Kaiser's words or conduct 
is regarded as lese-majeste — a crime whose gravity 
seems to be augmented by the weight of the Ger- 
man name, Majestdtsheleidigung , — to be severely 
punished even in its mildest forms. 

Personally, the Kaiser sees no value in public 
opinion as an independent personal state of mind. 
The proper substitute for it is imperial instruction 
followed by strict obedience. In private conversa- 
tion, and even in public addresses, he does not hesi- 
tate to express his bitter antipathy to the whole 
pestilent tribe of editors and journalists. Even 
those who are under government influence and in 
government pay hardly command his considera- 
tion. They are regarded as mere hirelings, and are 
not invited to court. Armed with power to sup- 
press all hostile publications — a power frequently 
exercised upon such periodicals as Harden 's Die 
Ziikunft, the Social-Democratic Vortvdrts, and 
others far less radical — the Kaiser's government 
takes pains to see that his own views are authori- 
tatively expressed in officially dictated articles fur- 
nished to the NorddciifscJie Allgemeine Zeitung 

44 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

and othor inspired publications, which sometimes 
have a lively experience in their endeavors to in- 
culcate a safe political orthodoxy and to explain 
such unguarded conduct and expressions of His 
Majesty as the bureaucracy finds it expedient in 
the Kaiser's owm interest to interpret or disavow. 

Believing that the only legitimate function of a 
German newspaper is to increase the prestige of 
the Emperor, William II, at times finding that duty, 
as he thinks, neglected, himself gratuitously sup- 
plies the deficiency in public speeches and open 
telegrams. Quite in the manner of American 
statesmen, he has occasionally availed himself of 
the good offices of the "interview"; sometimes, 
however, with disastrous results to his reputation 
for discretion. Even in Germany it has occasion- 
ally been doubted if the chief function of the press 
is to extol the Emperor and his system, but such 
dissent does not augment the list of privy coun- 
cilors. 

Quite naturally, the attitude of the Kaiser 
toward the press is manifested also toward all 
other organs of public opinion. He has always 
been particularly hostile to the whole idea of po- 
litical parties. His condemnation of the Social 
Democrats is, of course, unqualified, since the aim 
of their existence as a party is to control public 
policies, and even to take them entirely out of the 
Kaiser's hands. But he is, in fact, opposed to all 
parties, irrespective of their objects ; for, however 
organized and whatever its aims, a political party 

45 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

exists for the purpose of making effective the views 
of its o^\^l members. When many parties- exist, 
there is of necessity a division, and a consequent 
weakening, of the national force. What William 
II desires is the total abolition of political parties 
and unrestricted direction of the Empire by him- 
self. In technical matters he is willing to accept 
advice from experts and specialists, but he claims 
as his own right the shaping of all general policies 
without counsel or obstruction of any kind. 

At the very commencement of his reign William 
II openly declared his position on this subject and 
endeavored to impress it upon the nation. The 
German people, he announced, constitute one great 
family, of which their sovereign is the father. 
Nothing can be more lamentable than family dis- 
putes, which can be avoided only when the head, 
the sovereign, decides every question. "It is one 
of the great merits of my ancestors," he said to 
the deputies of Brandenburg, on February 20, 1891, 
*'that they have never belonged to a part}^ that 
they have alwaj^s been above all parties, and that 
they have succeeded in making them work together 
for the common good." Even before this he had 
said at Konigsberg : ' ' The King of Prussia is high 
above all parties, above the manoeuvers and hates 
of politicians. ... I know very well what you 
need, and I have ordered my conduct accordingly." 
But it is not only as King of Prussia, it is as Em- 
peror, that William II considers himself above all 
parties. In 1899, at Hamburg, speaking of the 

46 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

needs of national unity of action, lie said: "This 
sentiment spreads but slowly among the German 
people, who, unfortunately, spend their forces too 
freely in party conflicts. It is with profound dis- 
quietude that I have observed what slow progress 
is made in Germany by interest in the great ques- 
tions which stir the world, and in the comprehen- 
sion of them. ... It requires from me and from 
my government strenuous efforts, which can prove 
successful only if the Germans are all behind us, 
renouncing the divisions of party." 

Already, in 1899, tlie Kaiser had left far behind 
him the constitutional idea of a German "presi- 
dency," and insisted upon applying in the entire 
Empire the patriarchal tradition of the Kings of 
Prussia. A j-ear later, in 1900, responding to a 
toast of Prince Huprecht of Bavaria, at AVilhelms- 
haven, on the occasion of the launching of the 
Wittelshacli, the Kaiser showed that he did not fear 
publicly to proclaim his supreme authority over 
the entire Empire and its destiny, even in the pres- 
ence of a ro^^al representative of the second great- 
est state in the confederation. "Your Royal High- 
ness," he said, "has been able to see with what 
force the waves of the ocean come to knock at the 
doors of our country and force us to take our place 
as a great people in tlie world ; in a word, to enter 
into world politics. The ocean is indispensable to 
the greatness of Germany. But the ocean proves 
also that on its billows, and beyond it, nothing great 
can be decided without Germany and mthout the 

47 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

German Emperor. I do not believe that our Ger- 
man people have conquered, and have shed their 
blood under the conduct of their princes, thirty 
years ago, to be left aside in great international 
decisions. If that should happen, once for all the 
position of the German Empire in the world would 
be done for, and I am not disposed to let that occur. 
To use in this sense without hesitation the means 
most appropriate, and, if necessary, the most ener- 
getic, is my duty and my high prerogative." In 
the execution of that task, he added, he expected 
the princes and the German people to be behind 
him; but there was no intimation that his "pre- 
rogative" would be determined by their will. His 
divine authorization was as clear to him for the 
Empire as it was for his kingdom of Prussia. Of 
the constitution he made no mention. It is doubt- 
ful if it was even in his mind. 

That the German Empire had anything to do 
with "the empire of the sea," of which the Kaiser 
spoke with confidence, as if it were a part of his 
divine right, few Germans were originally disposed 
to believe. When he first began to exploit this idea 
•of sea-power, some considered it an adventurous 
fancy that might involve Germany in serious inter- 
national complications, while others received it 
with indifference. Germans had, in general, no 
expectation of ever becoming, by nature of their 
country, a great sea-power. To the life and use 
of the sea only a few of them were accustomed. 
The sea-coasts were narrow and secluded from the 

48 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

great waters. Much labor and expense were neces- 
sary to give tliem safe and ample harbors. The 
recent acquisition of Schleswig-Holstein made pos- 
sible to them the Kiel Canal, and the purchase of 
Helgoland from England gave them a strong ma- 
rine fortification; but even mth these it was felt 
that they were at a great disadvantage as a sea- 
power. Without the urgency of AVilliam II, it is 
doubtful if Bavarians, Saxons, and Wiirtembergers 
would ever have become aware of a close commu- 
nity between themselves and the seafaring inter- 
ests of Hamburg, Bremen, and Liibeck. 

To effect this awakening the Kaiser had first to 
Prussianize commerce, industr}^, and finance. This 
was not difficult. Prussia had learned the secret of 
effective organization. The army in all its many 
branches was a imit, and subject to one command. 
All Germans were soldiers. The task involved 
nothing but the transfer of the military system, 
\\ith its unity, correlation, discipline, and obedi- 
ence, into the affairs of civil life — the railways, the 
mines, the factories, the banks, and the mercantile 
marine. 

The Kaiser made himself the patron of organ- 
ized industrial and commercial life. **My prin- 
ciple is," he said at Brunsbiittel, in 1899, 'Ho find 
everywhere new points of departure for our activ- 
ity. . . . With a German, a spark has always 
ignited the fire of an idea ; everything will soon be 
aflame. ' ' 

Industry demanded commerce, commerce a 

49 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

mercantile marine, a mercantile marine a navy, a 
navy coaling-stations ; and colonies alone, the Kai- 
ser thought, could furnish a firm and secure basis 
for this world-wide development of German power. 

Such an intrusion into the sphere of world rela- 
tions by a great power — already the greatest mili- 
tary force in the world — would, of course, excite 
apprehension. The spark was struck and the fire 
was kindled, but it threw a new light on the whole 
problem of world relations. 

No one had ever interfered with peaceful Ger- 
man commerce, even after the world was deeply 
penetrated by German industry ; but the Kaiser had 
plans which he believed would be resisted. "You 
know that our industry," he said at Crefeld, in 
1902, "in spite of all our labor, can prosper only on 
condition that a sovereign sufficiently powerful 
maintains the peace of the world." Since the for- 
mation of the Empire, he went on to declare, the 
force had been created which permits Europe to 
work tranquilly and in peace. The army could pro- 
tect the German frontiers. "But you, a commer- 
cial city, well understand that, besides the army, 
something else is necessary: it is our fleet. ... A 
fleet is necessary in order that you may everywhere 
tranquilly sell your products!" 

It was not a question of coast defenses; it was 
not a question of the freedom of the sea — no one 
disputed that — for all ports were open to German 
traders and all waters were safe for German ships. 
But peaceful commerce under the police protection 

50 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

of a limited navy was not wliat the Kaiser had in 
mind. The purpose of William II was to carry- 
militarism beyond the frontiers of the German 
Empire, and through it eventually to win for Ger- 
many ''the empire of the sea." 

To the Kaiser "the empire of the sea" meant 
colonies and coaling-stations in every part of the 
world, to be acquired through superior power on 
the sea. On January 1, 1900, he said: "What my 
grandfather did for the army on land that is what 
I shall do for the navy ; without permitting myself 
to be troubled, I shall accomplish the work of re- 
organization, in order that it may hold the same 
rank as my land forces, and that, thanks to it, the 
German Empire can take the place in the world 
that it does not yet occupy. By means of the two 
armies, land and sea, I hope to be able, with the 
aid of God, to realize the saying of Frederick Will- 
iam I, 'When one wishes to decide anything in this 
world, the pen is not sufficient, if it is not supported 
by the force of the sword.* " 

In view of the whole history of colonization by 
the states of Europe, and the imperial pretensions 
that had sometimes been made by them regarding 
remote portions of the earth, the desire of the 
Kaiser to see his people equally fortunate was not 
unnatural. Unquestionably, they had come to be 
heartily in sympathy with him in this regard, and 
were disposed to support his plans of naval and 
colonial expansion. Thus the industrial and com- 
mercial magnates who at first were inclined toward 

5 51 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

liberalism in government, flattered by the personal 
attentions which the Kaiser bestowed upon them, 
and stimulated by the prospect of increased re- 
wards held out by his policy of expansion, were 
converted into ardent imperialists, eager to form 
an alliance with the military party of the Empire 
for the realization of a Greater Germany. As for 
the great landed proprietors who constitute the 
nobility of the country, while less interested than 
the commercial class in oversea development, they, 
by all the instincts and necessities of their caste, 
were bound to the chariot-wheel of the Emperor, 
without whom their whole fabric of feudal survivals 
would be swept away. "While they looked down 
upon the navy as a plebeian upstart, born of the 
vulgar necessities of trade, the army offered to 
their sons the only great profession open to gen- 
tlemen in a country where politics had been mech- 
anized into bureaucracy and the clergy were cus- 
tomarily drawn from the peasant and bourgeois 
classes. Diplomacy and high administrative office 
were for the small nobility the only available sup- 
plements to the army, and the almost exclusive 
appropriation of these functions by this caste was 
dependent upon the maintenance of the imperial 
system. The divine right of the hereditary land- 
owners to these positions was closely bound up with 
the divine right of royalty, which therefore had to 
be sustained. To imperialism the only ultimate 
alternative was democracy; but, for the Junker, 
democracy meant extinction. 

52 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

And so it happened that the power inherited by 
the Kaiser in 1888 had by 1904 been so skilfully 
exercised as to weave into one solid fabric all the 
threads of German self-interest, until one by one 
the tribal spirit of the old principalities, through 
the exigencies of a new age, had merged them into 
the wider and more compact tribalism of the new 
German Empire. 

The German people, thus compacted, had at this 
time attained not only to great ind^istrial prosper- 
ity, such as no German state had ever known, but 
to a dangerous self-consciousness of imperial 
strength. The Navy League and the Colonial 
part)% inspired by the Kaiser, were carrying on a 
strenuous propaganda for world dominion, backed 
by a marvelous growth of popular Pan-German 
sentiment, the result in large measure of the activ- 
ities of the Alldeutscher Verband. 

In June, 1904, King Edward VII had come to 
Kiel to attend the regatta, accompanied by a squad- 
ron of British battle-ships, which were saluted by 
the German fleet at anchor in the harbor. Together 
the two navies were able to form a splendid oceanic 
police force to protect the commerce of both na- 
tions. Nothing was wanting but an agreement be- 
tween the two countries to insure to each other, 
and to all other maritime powers, equal commercial 
rights upon the sea. 

At the gala dinner the Kaiser said to his royal 
guest: ''Your Majesty has been welcomed by the 
thunder of German guns. It is the youngest navy 

53 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

in the world, and an evidence of the growing im- 
portance npon the sea of the German Empire, re- 
created by my grandfather. It is designed to pro- 
tect its conmierce and its territory, and it serves, 
like the German army, for the maintenance of 
peace.'* 

What a snperb opportunity for cementing a good 
understanding with Great Britain! Was King 
Edward in a mood for this! We have the Kaiser's 
OMTi testimony on this subject, for in the course 
of the meeting William II telegraphed to Nich- 
olas II : 

*' Uncle Albert's visit going, of course, well. He 
is very lively and active and most kind. His msh 
for peace is quite pronounced, and is the motive 
for his liking to offer his services wherever he sees 
collisions in the world. ' ' ^ 

But what was the Kaiser's own attitude? Was 
he offering his services to avoid future collisions? 
He was, as usual, prompt in declaring his peaceful 
intentions ; in fact, he seemed altogether to protest 
too much. Was German commerce or German ter- 
ritory likely to be anywhere attacked? If so, why 
did he not join mth ''Uncle Albert" in an endeavor 
to avoid collisions'? The British and German 



1 Bernstein, The Willy-Nicky Correspondence, New York, 1918, 
p. 47. This interesting little volume, reprinted from the private 
correspondence of the late Czar of Russia, Nicholas II, w^ith Will- 
iam II, with a "Foreword" by ex-President Roosevelt, is of capi- 
tal importance. It throws new searching light upon the secret 
plans of the Kaiser, while to the world at large he was making 
professions which are placed in contrast in the pages immediately 
following. A critical examination of the text confirms its authen- 
ticity. 

54 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

navies united could command peace everywhere on 
the ocean. 

There is no evidence in the available records of 
this period to indicate on the part of the Kaiser 
either a disposition to arrange for avoiding future 
collisions or of a complaint to ^' Uncle Albert" that 
Great Britain was in any way menacing German 
rights on the sea ; yet, on September 6th, at a great 
dinner at Hamburg, the Kaiser announced, ''The 
German Empire has the right to have the army and 
the fleet of which it has need to defend its interests, 
and no one shall prevent it from organizing them 
as it pleases!" 

Wlio, then, was disputing the right of the Ger- 
man Empire to have the army and navy it thought 
necessary to defend its ''interests'"? If those in- 
terests were the safety of its shores and the privi- 
leges of its commerce, no one was disputing them. 
Yet the Kaiser was representing to his people that 
some one was trying to prevent Germany from 
organizing its navy as it pleased. It could not at 
that time have been Russia, then engaged in war 
"VAdth Japan; for, on October 8th, the Kaiser was 
saying to the Czar, "I think it would be practical 
for you to begin ordering a line of battle-ships to 
be built, with private firms, as the Japanese have 
done in England, so that when in a year or two the 
negotiations for peace begin you can dispose of a 
fresh reserve to impose your will and make your- 
self independent of foreign intervention."^ It 



The Willy-Nicky Correspondence, p. 59. 

55 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

could not be Japan, for he then expected the 
strength of Japanese sea-power to be shattered by 
the victorious success of the Baltic fleet of Russia. 
It could not be the United States, for in his melo- 
dramatic fashion he telegraphed, on November 
19th, to President Roosevelt: 

**The friendship of Germany and the United 
States, of which Frederick the Great laid the first 
stone, rests on an unshakable granite founda- 
tion/'^ 

Was it, then, ** Uncle Albert,'' of whose passion 
for avoiding collisions, and of ^vhose pronounced 
wish for peace, he had so lately testified, of whom 
the Kaiser was thinking! 

We have positive evidence that, notwithstanding 
his o^vn pacific protestations and the peaceful dis- 
position of ''Uncle Albert," it was precisely Great 
^Britain which was the power he had in mind as 
the obstructor of German oversea projects. As 
Great Britain certainly had no designs on German 
territory, and was not interfering mth German 
commerce — the Kaiser made no complaints upon 
^hese points — the ''interests" the Kaiser was 
anxious to "defend" were other than these. What, 
then, were those interests'? 

Every German and every Englishman under- 
stood what "interests" William II had in mind. 
He had made it evident in his public speeches. The 
Pan-German writers had indicated it on their maps 
— in Asia, in Africa, and in America. The aim of 

1 Arren, Guillaume II, p. 279. 

56 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

the great increase in the German navy was to con- 
vince Great Britain and other maritime powers 
that it would not be wdse to obstruct the colonial 
expansion of the German Empire by the protection 
of the weak nations from which new colonies were 
to be taken. 

Now that Russia was rendered temporarily pow- 
erless by her war with Japan, the opportunity was 
presented for Germany, as it seemed to William II, 
to gain more by an arrangement mth Nicholas II 
than by taking immediate advantage of his dis- 
tress. Accordingly, behind the scenes William II, 
through secret correspondence with the Czar, which 
the accidents of the present war have revealed, was 
urging Nicholas II to pursue what promised to be 
a ruinous war betw^een Russia and Japan, and in 
the mean time availing himself of an opportunity 
to isolate Great Britain by creating a secret alli- 
ance between Germany and Russia, into which 
France was to be artfully drawn, as a preliminary 
to his own maritime expansion. Great Britain iso- 
lated, Russia weakened in the war with Japan and 
bound to Germany by ties of obligation and a secret 
treaty, France would be secure in the imperial net ; 
for, as the Kaiser boldly stated to the Czar, al- 
though Delcasse was termed by him an " anglopJiile 
enrage," he would '*be wise enough to understand 
that the British fleet is utterly unable to save 
Paris!" And A\dthal what a fine stroke of busi- 
ness! *'Do not forget to order noAV ships of the 
line also, so as to be ready wdth some of them when 

57 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

war is over. They will be excellent 'persuaders' 
during the peace negotiations. Our private firms 
would be most glad to receive contracts!" ^ 

Precipitately, like a hypnotic subject, Nicholas 
II fell into the trap. The new treaty was already 
fully prepared by William II. Once signed, 
France, it appeared, in order to retain her only 
ally, would be bound to sign it also. To the Czar 
it seemed to mean, as had been suggested by the 
tempter, ''peace and rest for the world." But in 
November the conscience of Nicholas II hesitated. 
Ought not France to know of the compact that was 
to secure this peace and rest? "A pre\'ious infor- 
mation of France," the Kaiser urges, "will lead to 
a catastrophe. ... It would be absolutely danger- 
ous to inform France before we have both signed 
the treaty." In December William II becomes 
solicitous. The Russian need of coal for ships, 
which Germany as a neutral could not supply in 
accordance with international law, became an occa- 
sion for urgency. 

"Serious news has reached me," writes the 
Kaiser ; "there is now no time to be lost any more. 
No third power must hear even a whisper about 
our intentions before we have concluded the con- 
vention about the coaling business." ^ 

Nicholas II was complaisant; but the coaling 
convention, whatever it was, appears to have prof- 
ited him little. Insistence that France was leaving 



1 The Willy-Nicky Correspondence, pp. 69, 70. 
~ The same, p. 90. 

58 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

him in the lurch, while Germany was his only true 
and loyal friend, seems to have overcome his 
scruples about not informing his ally ; and, on July 
23, 1905, at a meeting secretly arranged to appear 
as a merely casual encounter, the treaty of alliance 
was signed at Bjorko, without the presence of min- 
isters on either side. 

Personal diplomacy had reached its zenith. 

But what had ''"William the Peacemaker" done 
for the benefit of Nicholas II or the cause of uni- 
versal peace 1 Having repudiated the Russian pro- 
posal for the limitation of armaments, and the 
Anglo-American plans for an international tribunal 
of justice, at the first Hague Conference, the Kaiser 
had never once proposed any plan for maintaining 
peace, except the supremacy of German armed 
force. During the whole of the Russo-Japanese 
War he had exercised no influence upon the plastic 
mind of the Czar, except to urge him to war and to 
fire him with displeasure toward England and sus- 
picion of France. 

Missing every chance to be a peacemaker. Kaiser 
William was using every secret means of fanning 
the flames of war. To Nicholas II he intimated 
that the suggestion of mediation between Russia 
and Japan seemed to leave a trail ''that led across 
the Channel," as if mediation for peace were a 
crime to be tracked to its lair. With better infor- 
mation the Czar replied, "across the Channel or, 
perhaps, the Atlantic";^ and, in February, 1905, 



1 The Willy-Nicky Correspondence, pp. 62, 67. 

59 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

the American ambassador at St. Petersburg pre- 
sented an offer of mediation by the President of 
the United States. It was not, however, until 
months afterward, when the preliminaries of peace 
had been agreed upon, that the Kaiser said of 
President Roosevelt's efforts: "I hear he has 
made nearly superhuman efforts to induce Japan 
to give way. He has really done a great work for 
your comitry and the whole world. ' ' ^ But even 
then he could not resist the impulse to intimate 
that *' England had not budged a finger to help 
him.*' What, then, had the Kaiser himself done to 
help? 

And what was he saying to the world during all 
these secret intrigues with the Czar ? 

On March 22, 1905, while he was still awaiting 
the signature of the secret treaty for the isolation 
of England, in his address at Bremen — the famous 
**We are the salt of the earth" speech, at the un- 
veiling of the monument to Frederick III — the 
vision of a '* worthy" Germany seemed to spread 
out before him, the tone of aggression was wholly 
suppressed, and the note of a ''golden peace" 
was sounded, in which Bremen, as he ex- 
pressed it, might ''grow green, bloom, and pros- 
per." 

Was it the memory of Frederick the Noble that 
on this solemn occasion touched his deeper springs 
of sentiment, and recalled him for a moment to 
those eternal verities which ambition had obscured? 



1 The Willy-Nicky Correspondence, pp. 128, 129. 

60 



THE KAISER'S PERSONAL CONTROL 

*'I have made a vow," he confided to his world 
audience, **as a result of what I have learned from 
history, never to strive for an empty world domin- 
ion. For what has become of the so-called world- 
empires? . . . The world-empire of which I have 
dreamed shall consist in this, that the newly cre- 
ated German Empire shall first of all enjoy on all 
sides the most absolute confidence as a quiet, hon- 
orable, and peaceful neighbor; and that, if in the 
future they shall read in history of a world-empire 
of a Hohenzollern world-ruler, it shall not be 
founded upon acquisitions won with the sword, but 
upon the mutual trust of the nations who are striv- 
ing for the same goals," 

Here is pictured what Germany might have been 
if Frederick III had lived to direct the energies of 
the German nation. But was it really for this that 
William II had built his navy, and upon so many 
occasions exhorted Germans to strive for the mas- 
tery of the sea? Was it true that he had steadily 
gathered into his own grasp all the potencies of the 
German people in order, from the height of his 
throne, in a critical moment, to cast the die for a 
regenerated world and go down in history as 
''William the Peacemaker"? 

Listening to his Bremen speech, there were many 
who looked with gratitude and hope to the future 
influence of William II. 

'*To develop steadily; to shun strife, hate, and 
jealousy; to rejoice in the German Fatherland as 
it is, and not to strive for the impossible" — these 

61 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

were the noble words with which in that speech the 
Kaiser described the task he had set for the Ger- 
man people. What a glorious mission, if this were 
true! How superbly he could render his final ac- 
count to God, if this were really the secret inspira- 
tion of his life ! 

But, if this was the expression of his inmost 
desire, why, on July 23d, just four months after- 
ward, did he conclude the secret treaty with Nicho- 
las II, for the purpose of isolating Great Britain, 
which he was at this very time negotiating? Wliy 
isolate a power that could, together with Germany, 
secure peace throughout the world, at a time when 
the King of England was ready to "offer his ser- 
vices wherever he sees collisions in the world'"? 

Did William II in this Bremen speech describe 
the Germany he really desired, or was he merely 
staging a new scene in the drama, by presenting 
the picture of a Germany which all the world might 
respect and trust implicitly, while he was plotting 
in secret to control Russia through his influence 
upon Nicholas II, bring France into vassalage 
through the agency of her only ally, and leave 
Great Britain to watch in her *' splendid isolation" 
the progress of Germany to that world-empire, of 
which even then, while Germania in white robes 
was chanting hymns of peace in the middle of the 
stage. Kaiser William had never for a moment 
ceased to dream? 



CHAPTEE III 
THE KAISER AS A STAGE-MANAGER 

TITITHOUT question, Kaiser William II is the 
^^ most histrionic sovereign of his time, and 
perhaps of any time. As a boy in school at Cassel, 
he was fond of amateur acting and sketched a 
scenario and dramatis personcB of a play in which 
Charlemagne was the principal character. The in- 
stinct to set the stage has been manifested in every 
period of his life. He has not only collaborated in 
the writing of plays ; he has superintended the re- 
hearsal of them on the stage, and is fond of organ- 
izing historic ballets. In the larger field of scenic 
impression which only a monarch can command, he 
has displayed the same talent for dramatic effect. 
Not only has he patronized the theater, but he 
has affirmed the value of it to him as a sovereign. 
* ' Yes, ' ' he once stated in public, ' ' the theater is also 
one of my weapons. ... It is the duty of a mon- 
arch to occupy himself with the theater, because it 
may become in his hands an incalculable force." 

Among the Kaiser 's rules, one is that no Hohen- 
zollern may be represented on the stage without the 
Emperor's express permission, and he must be pre- 

63 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

vioiisly given an opportunity personally to revise 
the part. Nothing political can be permitted to be 
introduced. Joseph Lauff's ''Frederick of the 
Iron Tooth," dealing with a revolt against an Elec- 
tor of Brandenburg, was thus revised; and Leon- 
cavallo was invited to write an opera upon it, ''Der 
Roland von Berlin"; but the Kaiser personally cut 
out the story of the woman who figured as Fred- 
erick's mistress, and wrote in the margin of the 
manuscript, *'A courtesan has no place in a Hohen- 
zollcrn drama. "^ 

He has even attempted to rescue the reputation 
of the half-mythical kings of antiquity, apparently 
for no other reason than to maintain the dignity of 
the royal caste. The Greeks and Lord Byron had 
represented Sardanapalus, the Assyrian king, as 
the most effeminate and debauched monarch that 
ever existed ; but the Kaiser, at the expense of two 
hundred thousand marks, with the help of the As- 
syriologists, in an opera of great magnificence has 
restored him to respectability as a brave sovereign 
who could face a heroic death rather than yield to 
his enemies. The effort was incidentally a fine trib- 
ute to scholarship as well as to kingship, but it was 
not so great an artistic success as the Emperor had 
expected. **You can't dramatize a museum," a 
Berlin critic had the courage to say, and the public 
joined in confirming the judgment. 

It is convenient for a monarch, claiming to rule 
by divine right, to possess a gift for histrionic ac- 



1 Shaw, William of Ccrmanv, London, 1913, p. 234. 

64 



THE KAISER AS A STAGE-MANAGER 

tion. Not being able by any current system of 
philosophic thought to establish the thesis of a riglit 
to rule by special divine authority, such a claimant 
must resort to other means. This pretension being 
merely a dogma incapable of proof, it belongs to the 
realm of faith rather than of knowledge. To induce 
faith in it, or assent to it, signs, symbols, and, above 
all, the practical advantages of the doctrine to the 
believer, must be employed. In brief, whoever 
makes this claim must play the part it implies suc- 
cessfully, or he is lost. As a claimant of divine 
right a plain person in civilian clothes, and crowned 
by a silk hat, could hardly hope to have a follow- 
ing, even among a superstitious people. 

There is no evidence that as a young prince 
William II was especially pious or exceptionally 
devoted to the offices of religion ; but he understood, 
as Frederick the Great, although personally a dis- 
ciple of Voltaire, understood, that there was in the 
German people a deep undercurrent of religious 
feeling which German princes had successfully util- 
ized to increase their power and their estates. 

In his first proclamations to his subjects the 
Kaiser did not set up the claim which he afterward 
made the foundation of his throne. The memory 
of the Kulturkampf , in which Bismarck had so 
deeply offended the Catholics of the Empire, was 
a sufficient reason for not too much accentuating 
questions of religion at a time when the new Em- 
peror was gaining his foothold. It was not until 
these wounds had at least partly healed, and Bis- 

65 



IMPRESSIONS OP THE KAISER 

marck had been disposed of, that tlie claim was posi- 
tively asserted in the Emperor's speeches; for 
Bismarck considered the expression von Gottes 
Gnaden to mean "by the grace of divine permis- 
sion," not *'by the grace of divine appointment.'* 
He had had too much to do with maintaining the 
Prussian throne and establishing the Empire to 
accept any form of mysticism in connection with 
either. 

The Kaiser's first enunciation that even remotely 
savored of the full-blown dogma was in March, 
1890, at a meeting of the provincial diet of Bran- 
denburg, where he spoke simply of '*a talent in- 
trusted to me by God, which it is my task to in- 
crease." A year later, at Bremen, he said, "We, 
the Hohenzollerns, regard ourselves as appointed 
by God to govern and lead the people whom it is 
given us to rule." It was not, however, until 1895, 
at Konigsberg, that he announced that his crown 
was "born with him," and that he Avould follow the 
same path as his ancestor, Frederick I, "who of 
Ms oivn right was sovereign prince in Prussia.'* 
Two years later, at Coblentz, he spoke of his "fear- 
ful responsibility to the Creator alone, from which 
no human being, no minister, no parliament, no 
people can release the prince." 

So long as this presumption led practically to no 
oppressive act, the German people felt no impulse 
to challenge this apparently harmless obsession. 
German writers who have commented upon it have 
not taken it very seriously, and have been inclined 

66 



THE KAlSEK AS A STAGE-MANAGEK 

to excuse it as an ebullition of sincere religious 
rapture, induced in great measure by the thrilling 
events of the War of 1870 and the sudden rise of 
the Empire, which had touched all imaginations and 
appeared to many pious minds as a direct divine 
intervention. If the Empire itself was a miracle, 
why should not the Emperor, who certainly had 
never been chosen by the people, be recognized as 
a part of it? 

The Kaiser has always seemed to his people a 
sovereign over whom a special divine watchfulness 
was needed, and might, therefore, be graciously 
vouchsafed. Who could prove, or wish to prove, 
that his extraordinary spontaneity, his occasional 
Delphic ambiguity, and his extreme exaltation of 
will and purpose unfitted him to be a medium of 
supernatural influence ? He has been so devoted to 
his task, so industrious, so versatile, so completely 
a symbol of the aspirations of the German people, 
that he has had only to play the role in order to 
create faith among his trustful subjects and to si- 
lence, upon nearly all occasions, the impulse to 
detraction. Other nations do not understand this. 
The impossibility lies in the fact that they are not 
Germans. 

The Teutonic race may not possess so refined an 
esthetic sensibility as the Latin, but it has been 
peculiarly receptive to the symbolism of art. Here 
was an avenue to German faith which the Kaiser 
was quick to perceive and to utilize. Monuments 
in great numbers have marked his reign, the silent 
6 67 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

sentinels of national glory. Not only have his an- 
cestors been thus memorialized, but he himself has 
been constantly brought home to every city, toAvn, 
hamlet, and home in Germany. He has been 
painted as a Roman Emperor and as the war-god 
Mars. His life-size statue in marble forms part of 
the external decoration of the new portal of the 
cathedral of Metz, where he figures as a canonized 
saint. He and his House are glorified in windows 
of stained glass, and magnificent vases of porcelain 
are adorned with his portraits. Every German 
embassy throughout the world possesses a life- 
size representation of his well-known face and 
figure. Photography has made his features fa- 
miliar in a hundred ways, until his image is 
stamped indelibly upon the memory of nearly 
the whole human race. He would be recog- 
nized if he passed by in any village, not only 
of Germany, but wherever the printing-press is 
known. This is no accident. The world wants 
to Imow what a sovereign by divine right is 
like. 

One distinction which William II is said to have 
craved has been denied him. His grandfather, 
William I, had raised objections to the title ''Ger- 
man Emperor" {"Deutscher Kaiser'*), and wanted 
to be called "Emperor of Germany." To this Bis- 
marck objected that it would involve a claim to 
non-Prussian territory, that the council had chosen 
the former title, and that the German sovereigns 
would, perhaps, not agree to a change; and, after 

68 



THE KAISER AS A STAGE-MANAGER 

some contention, but in a testy humor, the lesser 
title was accepted. 

When William II became Emperor, it is said, he 
desired to magnify his office by the ceremony of a 
regular coronation, and in 1892 had a throne con- 
structed for this purpose after antiquarian draw- 
ings made by Emile Dopier. There was to be 
ordered a reproduction of the crown of Charle- 
magne, Emperor of the Holy Koman Empire, who 
on Christmas Day, 800, had been crowned at Rome. 
The unwillingness of the federal princes to assent 
to a coronation is reported to have defeated the 
project; but it is claimed that a photograph is in 
existence in which the Kaiser is represented seated 
upon the throne, an ermine cloak over his shoul- 
ders, the imperial scepter and the globe in his 
hands, and a gilded imitation of the crown of 
Charlemagne in stucco on his head. ^ 

But this is only the corollary of a far greater 
demonstration. Art, all art, in the Kaiser's opin- 
ion, is a valuable and appropriate vehicle of sover- 
eign influence. History is wholly the work of 
princes. All that is great in the world emanates 
from them. Of his grandfather, William I, he has 
said : ''God had destined him to realize the desire of 
all Germans and to give unity to Germany on the 
field of battle. For that work he was able to find 
great men who had the honor to execute his designs, 
and as his councilors to work with him.'* The 
whole of civilization is nothing but the result of 



1 Nousanne, The Kaiser as He Is, New York, 1905, p. 173. 

69 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Such instruments of God, chosen to carry out tlie 
divine plan in human life. ''Properly speaking," 
he says, ''William I has become for us a saint." 
By inference, all Hohenzollerns are saints, or in 
process of becoming saints. All painters, sculp- 
tors, musicians, and architects have the duty of 
teaching this religion of imperial supremacy, re- 
vealed through their princes. ' ' The cult of the ideal 
is the greatest work of civilization. ... It can ac- 
complish its task only with the aid of art." But 
what is the "ideal" in the Kaiser's mind? It is 
defined by him as "the inspiration which God sends 
to the artist," and the highest existing example of 
it is in the Siegesallee, which tells the story of the 
House of HohenzoUern. 

Believing himself especially open to this form of 
inspiration. Kaiser William II has always consid- 
ered himself a great critic of art, and, therefore, 
the most competent person to direct its develop- 
ment. Even in Germany, however, this conviction 
is not generally shared. Indeed, the Kaiser and 
the experts in art have seldom agreed ; but in prac- 
tice his judgment has usually triumphed. 

Although artistic feeling is, perhaps, the most 
refractory and untamable of all the impulses to 
self-realization, artists, being human, have for ob- 
vious reasons been anxious to receive imperial ap- 
probation. But the artistic inspiration of Kaiser 
William is not always calculable. 

The passion of the Kaiser for the grandiose is 
celebrated sumptuously in Berlin. What it might 

70 



THE KAISER AS A STAGE-MANAGER 

lead to in time is, perhaps, only prefigured in the 
attempt to embody Prussian history in the vista 
of the Siegesallee, in the image of Germania on the 
top of the Siegessaule, and in the Gargantuan archi- 
tecture of the Kurfiirstendam. Grossartig and 
Jcolossal are the vocables that express the impres- 
sion everywhere created. 

In a long personal conversation, the substance of 
which it is no violation of confidence on my part to 
repeat, the Kaiser dwelt upon the value of **form" 
as a medium of public education. *'Men think most 
often and most deeply,'* he said, '*of what they have 
seen. To impress the eye is to take possession of 
the mind." It is a mode of conquest which the 
Kaiser has practised all his life. 

In the large field of imperial development also 
art has had a great part to play. The time, the 
place, and the scenic accessories for dramatic ef- 
fect, with the world for an audience, have been 
carefully chosen. The result, primarily calculated 
for Germany, has not always been precisely what 
was intended. At Damascus, for example, on No- 
vember 8, 1898, during his journey in the East, 
William II took occasion to say how deeply moved 
he was "at standing on the spot where one of the 
most knightly sovereigns of all times, the great 
Sultan Saladin, had stood"; overlooking the fact 
that this "knightly sovereign" was a heartless mur- 
derer who had sacked Jerusalem and turned its 
holy places into mosques. Not content with this 
fulsome compliment to a fanatic of the past, the 

71 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

ICaisor next proceeded to offer the hand of perpet- 
ual friendship to the most notorious criminal of the 
age, the Sultan Abdul-Hamid, and ' ' the three hun- 
dred million Mohammedans scattered over the 
earth who venerate him as their caliph." While 
at home the words were passed over lightly as an 
excusable means of preparing the Mohammedan 
mind for the favorable reception of German com- 
mercial penetration and control, even in Germany 
the performance evoked smiles among those who 
knew that the Kaiser was astray by a hundred mill- 
ion of the population in his estimate of his Oriental 
friends, and that it was precisely Saladin who had 
struck Christendom its most fatal blow by the cap- 
ture of the Holy City; while to other nations this 
adulation was a clear premonition of the exclusive 
Oriental policy on the part of Germany that has 
culminated in a world war. 

Under ordinary circumstances, the Kaiser finds 
it easy to play the role of apparent omniscience, 
because he can summon to his side for his informa- 
tion on any subject the most learned specialists in 
the Empire, who are always eager to enjoy this 
distinction. Having utilized this advantage to an 
extraordinary degree, he is, undoubtedly, in matters 
in which he is interested, as far as German knowl- 
edge extends and German prejudice permits, one 
of the best-informed persons in the world. For all 
his important audiences and utterances he carefully 
prepares. He speaks wdth American exchange 
professors with a fullness of knowledge of their 

72 



THE KAISER AS A STAGE-MANAGER 

subjects that frequently surprises them. Nothing 
gives him greater pleasure than to exploit in con- 
versation with his guest some new discovery just 
learned of from a German professor, or from a 
military or naval officer. Sometimes, however, his 
informant has been wrongly selected or has misun- 
derstood the theme ; as when, for example, the Em- 
peror delivered a rather technical discourse to a 
supposed expert in the science of seismology, only 
to learn that his visitor was a geographer. 

Within the limits of his knowledge, which is wide, 
and served by an excellent memory, the Kaiser's 
mind is extremely alert and active, prone to resort 
to and to evoke repartee. He is seldom caught 
napping, for his position gives him every advan- 
tage, and his courtiers are disposed to leave him the 
victor in every encounter of wit, and even in every 
serious controversy. Except by Americans, he is 
seldom frankly dealt with ; and his interest in them, 
when it is not for purely political purposes, arises 
largely from his real interest in the freedom with 
which they are accustomed to express themselves. 
The legend of the Kaiser's ** spontaneity" has 
caused to be ascribed to him some indiscretions 
which were not original with himself. Such, for 
example, was the celebrated *'Kruger telegram" 
of January 3, 189G. It is now well established that 
this was not an impulsive and personal perform- 
ance. It was so strictly official that the text of it 
was prepared in the Foreign Office and brought 
ready for signature to the Chancellor's palace by; 

73 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Baron Marschall 
von Bieberstein, the Kaiser having been summoned 
to l>erlin from Potsdam to approve it. ' TT(! at first 
demurred, but at last permitted liimsc^lf to }je per- 
suaded; and Ilerr von Tlolstein, who was waiting 
for the result in the anteroom, has testified to the 
,'ju])ilation of the Secretary as he came from the 
presence of His Majesty waving in triumph the pa- 
per to which the Kaiser had just appended his sig- 
nature. The telegram was generally interpreted as 
a purely personal message of congratulation to 
President Kruger that ho had defeated the Jameson 
raid "without calling on the help of foreign pow- 
ers"; thereby conveying the intimation of willing- 
n(^ss on the part of the Kaiser to intc^rvene if it had 
been nec(!ssary. Not unnaturally the British gov- 
ernment, considering it as a menace that might be 
followed by action, as an answer put a flying squad- 
ron in immediate^ commission and made an official 
announcement that, by a convention of 1884, the 
foreign relations of the Transvaal had been placed 
under tlie supervision of the British Foreign Office. 
As nothing further happened, the Kaiser for many 
years bore in silence the odium of this unwise sug- 
gestion of Herman intervention. It was just that 
li(! should do so, for by his own theory of govern- 
ment there is no definite distinction between his 



* The text of the Kruger telegram is as follows: 
"I express to you my sincere congratulations that, without ap- 
pealing to the help of friendly powers, you and your peoi)Ie have 
succ<'e(Ied in repcUing the armed bands wliich iiad broken into 
your country ruid in maintaining the indei)endence of your country 
with your own forces against foreign aggression," 



'I'HE KAISER AS A STAGE-MANAGER 

personal and liis official acts. Being responsible to 
no one, a sovereign by divine riglit can never be ex- 
pected to apologize or explain. To do either would 
be a confession of his own accountability. An ab- 
solute ruler can punish a councilor for giving him 
bad advice, but if h(^ follows it the act cannot be 
regarded by him as an error. The king can do no 
wrong. 

The attempt in any way to separate the personal 
and the official acts of tlie Kaiser is, therefore, 
purely academic. So long as William TT's theory of 
his personal supremacy is not rejected, the Imperial 
German government, and even the whole German 
nation, are bound to assume responsibility to other 
powers for what the sovereign does or fails to do. 
It is tlie necessary consequence of submitting to 
absolute personal authority. 

The speech made by William TT at Tangier, on 
March 31, 1905, only nine days after tlie *'W(^ are 
the salt of tin; earth" proclamation at Bi-emen, was 
regarded throughout Europe as an open challenge 
to P>ance, whose proposals of reform in Morocco 
the Sultan, Abdul-Aziz, was practically cautioned 
not to regard. 

**It is to the Sultan," said the Kaiser, **in his po- 
sition of an independent sovereign that I am paying 
my visit to-day. I hope tliat under tlie sovereignty 
of th(! Sultan a free Morocco will remain open to 
the peaceful rivalry of all nations, without monop- 
oly or annexation, on the basis of absolute equality. 
The object of my visit to Tangier is to make it 

75 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

known that I am determined to do all that is in my 
power to safeguard efficaciously the interests of 
Germany in Morocco, for I look upon the Sultan 
as an absolutely independent sovereign.'' 

The news of the pronunciamento was instantly 
flashed round the world, and for weeks all Europe 
was breathlessly awaiting what would happen next. 
Like the *'Kruger telegram," this fulmination was 
at first set down as one of the Kaiser's personal 
indiscretions ; but it soon became evident that it was 
the Foreign Office where the mise en scene of Ger- 
many's new foreign policy had been conceived. 
Prestige in Europe was, undoubtedly, one of the 
objects to be obtained ; but there was a still more 
important reason for declaring the ''integrity" of 
Morocco. Kaiser William had promised the Mo- 
hammedans ''scattered over the globe" that the 
German Emperor "will be their friend at all 
times." "We should have completely destroyed 
our credit in the Mohammedan world," said Von 
Billow, "if so soon after this declaration we had 
sold Morocco to the French. Our ambassador in 
Constantinople, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, 
said to me at the time, ' If we sacrifice Morocco in 
spite of Damascus and Tangier, we shall at one fell 
swoop lose our position in Turkey and therefore 
all advantages and prospects that we have painfully 
acquired by the labor of many years.' " ^ 

Certainly, no more effective method of proclaim- 
ing an intention to intervene in the affairs of North 



1 Von Billow, Imperial Germany, London, etc., 1913 and 1916. 

76 



THE KAISER AS A STAGE-MANAGER 

Africa, where Germany was exposed to no danger 
and had no other than very limited commercial in- 
terests, could have been chosen. What shocked the 
chancelleries of Europe was that it was thought 
necessary thus publicly to strike France a blow in 
the face. It seemed like the opening of an entirely 
new school of diplomacy, in which the mailed fist 
was to take the place of argument. 

From a less strident declaimer than William II 
the same acts might not have been subject to the 
same interpretation; but, notwithstanding profes- 
sions of peace, he was constantly justifying the im- 
putation of aggressive purposes by his utterances 
at home. At the gala dinner attending the unveil- 
ing of the statue of Moltke, for example, a short 
time after the speech at Tangier, the Kaiser intro- 
duced his toast by crying out, ''We have seen, 
gentlemen, in what a position we are placed with 
reference to the rest of the world : in consequence, 
hurrah for the powder dry and the sword sharp- 
ened, for the recognized purpose and our forces ever 
on the alert, for the German army and the General 
Staff!'' 

It is true that there had been in 1904 an agree- 
ment between Great Britain and France, whereby 
Great Britain was not to be interfered with by 
France in safeguarding her interests in Egypt, and 
France was to be free to demand reforms in her 
near neighbor, Morocco; but the commercial in- 
terests of Germany were in neither case denied or 
affected. The attitude of Germany was expressed 

77 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

in the speech from the throne of November, 1905. 
"The difficulties which have arisen between France 
and us, apropos of the Morocco affair," said the 
Kaiser, **have no other origin than a tendency to 
regulate without our collaboration questions where 
the German Empire has interests to defend." 

In claiming equal commercial privileges in an 
independent country awaiting future development, 
the position of Germany was entirely reasonable; 
but it was the first time the saber had been publicly 
rattled and a virtual threat of war uttered by a 
great power in the face of friendly nations for 
such a cause. "The signs of the times," the Kaiser 
declared in his speech from the throne, "make it a 
duty to the German people to reinforce their de- 
fenses against all aggression." 

A different temper might have secured to Ger- 
many, without disturbance, every right, in so far as 
her interests could be made to appear ; but the pur- 
pose of William II was not so much to maintain 
German interests in Morocco, which at most were 
inconsiderable, as to assert, in a manner to force 
recognition, the dominant position of Germany as 
a world power that had always to be reckoned with 
in every question. To force this admission, the 
demand was made that France should be summoned 
before a European Conference — a tribunal before 
which the Kaiser has since systematically held that 
no nation could honorably be compelled to appear. 

For a time it seemed as if the boast of Berlin 
were well founded. M. Delcasse, who had negoti- 

78 



THE KAISER AS A STAGE-MANAGER 

ated the arrangement with Great Britain, was 
forced out of office, while Von Biilow was created a 
Prince. Diplomatically, the calling of the Confer- 
ence of Algociras, in 1906, at first appeared to be 
a triumph for Germany ; but in the end proved the 
virtual isolation of the German Empire, except for 
the loyal adherence of Austria-Hungary, which won 
the distinction of a "brilliant second." It served 
to reveal the ambition of Germany to dominate ; but 
substantially it obtained for her nothing that could 
not have been secured by a reasoned exchange of 
notes — namely, the **open door" in Morocco, which 
was never denied. In its ultimate consequences, as 
a thinly veiled threat to France at the moment when 
Russia was impotent as an ally, German insistence 
threw the stress of future diplomatic intercourse 
upon armed force and rendered the problems of 
equity mere problems of power. It is, however, 
only in the light of later developments that the true 
significance of the Moroccan question can be accu- 
rately understood. 

It immediately became evident that France would 
never permit herself, through a rapprochement be- 
tween Russia and Germany, to be brought into vas- 
salage to the Kaiser, as he had intended. The 
interest of William II in the secret treaty with 
Nicholas II, therefore, soon began to relax. The 
agreement the two Emperors had made, that the 
Kaiser, on his visit to Copenhagen, in July, 1905, 
should inform the King of Denmark that, in case 
of war with England, Germany and Russia would 

79 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

be obliged jointly to seize and occupy that kingdom, 
fell by the wayside; and the Kaiser informed the 
Czar, "I thought it better not to touch the subject 
with the Danes and refrained from making any 
allusions, as it is better to let the idea develop and 
ripen in their heads and to let them draw the final 
conclusions themselves, so that they will of their 
own accord be moved to lean upon us and fall in 
line with our two countries.''^ 

Evidently, since Russia was losing in the Russo- 
Japanese War and threatened with domestic revo- 
lution, the Kaiser was not so eager to insist upon 
the alliance he had been laboring to impose upon 
Nicholas II. In fact, in the changed conditions, an 
alliance would, perhaps, be wholly undesirable ; for 
it might, without a substantial equivalent, place 
Germany under obligations to a power unable even 
to save itself. 

Just here we have, through recent disclosures, 
an interesting revelation of the Kaiser's real esti- 
mate of the divine right and responsibility of rul- 
ers. In August, 1905, William II was encouraging 
Nicholas II to accept parliamentary government 
for Russia. **I beg you," he writes, ''to accept my 
warmest congratulations for this great step for- 
ward in the development of Russia." Not only so, 
but he explicitly advises the Czar to place the re- 
sponsibility of the terms of peace upon the Duma ! 
*'I would in your place not miss this first and best 
opportunity," he continues, "to decide to get in 

^Bernstein, The Willy-Nicky Correspondence, New York, p. 119. 

80 



THE KAISER AS A STAGE-MANAGER 

close touch with your country's feelings and wishes 
about peace or war, giving the Russian people the 
long-wished-for opportunity to decide, or take part 
in the decision, relating to its future. . . . The de- 
cisions which are to be taken are so terribly ear- 
nest in their consequences and so far-reaching that 
it is quite impossible for any mortal sovereign to 
take the responsibility for them alone on his shoul- 
ders without the help of his people." ^ 

Is this the spirit in which the Kaiser was ruling 
Germany, when he said, '*You Germans have only 
one will, and that is my will ; there is only one law, 
and that is my law"? Should the people's parlia- 
ment bear 'Hhe odium of the decision'* between 
peace and war, as the Kaiser proposed, and have 
nothing to say regarding secret treaties of alliance 
which might lead to war? Yet the Kaiser wishes 
the secret treaty to remain secret, although he at- 
taches less importance to it than before. Still, with 
a change in the cards, it might prove useful. ' ' We 
joined hands and signed before God, who heard our 
vows," he says. "I therefore think the treaty may 
well come into existence. ' * Nevertheless, as bitterly 
as any democrat, he rails against the alleged secret 
diplomacy of **the arch mischief-maker of Europe 
in London," as he calls Edward VII, whom, he 
says, ''the revelations of Delcasse" convict of 
"planning war against our friendly nation in 
peace." "Like brigands in a wood," he declares, 
he has sent the Russian ambassador to Copenhagen 



1 The Willy-Nicky Correspondence^ pp. 123, 124. 

81 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISEH 

on a clandestine mission, to induce the Czar's 
mother to influence him for a policy against Ger- 
many. ^ 

Nicholas II, with the war off his hands and the 
Duma to "bear the odium" of the terms of peace — 
but only to be disbanded a short time afterward — 
was resuming his independence, defending his am- 
bassador as grossly misunderstood, and thinking 
lightly of the secret treaty. William II, on the 
other hand, having arrived at the conclusion that 
England, after all, was likely to be a more useful 
friend than Russia, while tightening the alliance 
with Austria-Hungary, who at the Conference of 
Algeciras had proved, "to fidelite d'un allie sur/' 
was soon staging a closer entente with Great Brit- 
ain. On August 3, 1906, during the visit of Edward 
VII at Kiel, the Kaiser wrote to the Czar: "The 
maintenance of friendly relations between Germany 
and England is an absolute necessity for the world. 
I am pleased about this result of Uncle Bertie's 
visit." In less than a year, "the arch mischief- 
maker of Europe" had become the mainstay of 
peace. The meeting with Uncle Bertie at Wilhelms- 
hohe, in August, 1907, was also "satisfactory"; 
and the Kaiser recorded, "Uncle Bertie in good 
humor and peacefully disposed."^ In November 
of that year William II returned the King of Eng- 
land's visit, and in his speech accepting the degree 
of Doctor of Civil Law conferred upon him by Ox- 



1 The Willy-Nicky Correspondence, pp. ill, 131, 139. 

2 The same, pp. 152, 155. 



THE KAISER AS A STAGE-MANAGER 

ford University, praised Cecil Rhodes — who had 
been reported to be the inspirer of the Jameson 
raid — for "the amplitude of his views" in foundini^ 
scholarships at Oxford which "permitted young 
Germans to associate themselves with young Eng- 
lishmen in studying the character and qualities of 
their respective nations." Even the journalists 
were not neglected, and in a speech to them the 
Kaiser said: "We belong to the same race and to 
the same religion. These are bonds which ought to 
be strong enough to maintain harmony and friend- 
ship between us." Wearing a British uniform and 
adorned with British academic honors, for the Kai- 
ser there was now no need of the secret treaty with 
Russia. 

Thus, within two years, and without other rea- 
son than the hope of increasing the power of 
Germany, William II had abandoned the Czar in 
the time of his weakness, after secretly conspiring 
with him to isolate Great Britain and attach France 
to a Russo-German alliance ; and, failing in this, he 
had endeavored to form a close relation with Great 
Britain, in order to prevent an entente with France. 
We shall see how, a little later, unable even with 
these new professions of friendship for the "arch 
mischief-maker of Europe," as he had called Ed- 
ward VII, to prevent the growing good understand- 
ing with France, the Kaiser made most bitter 
accusations of hostility against Great Britain, 
merely because the King was endeavoring to be 
friendly with the Czar. 

7 83 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

It is, perhaps, an inevitable consequence of the 
system that has long prevailed in Europe that all 
general understandings are in danger of being ren- 
dered impossible by the assumption that friendship 
between a sovereign's friends signifies hostility 
toward himself. So long as the friendship of na- 
tions is based on the conception of offensive and 
defensive alliances, this assumption is a perfectly 
natural one. It runs through the entire history of 
European diplomacy. It is the foundation on which 
the whole theory of the balance of power rests. Too 
large an aggregate of mutually friendly nations 
has always created the suspicion of a conspiracy 
among them against the others, which then feel it 
necessary to find new friends, outside the combina- 
tion, in order to hold the first group in check. As 
the aggregation broadens, isolation is believed to 
be complete, and the peril is felt to be unendurable. 
So long as secret diplomacy is practised these con- 
ditions may be expected to prevail. 

It would be agreeable to find evidence that at any 
time since the beginning of his reign William II 
had in mind any plan, any principle, or any desire 
for a general understanding in Europe that would 
relieve the nations from dependence upon armed 
force for their safety. 

The opportunity had been twice offered. In 
1898, the Czar of Russia had proposed a limitation 
of armament. The German delegates to the first 
Hague Conference w^ere instructed to take no part 
in discussing tliis subject, and it "was promptly 

84 



THE KAISER AS A STAGE-MANAGER 

dropped from the program at Germany's instiga- 
tion. The English and American delegates, sup- 
ported by Russia and France, sought to establish 
international institutions that would enable nations 
disposed to act justly to solve at least some of their 
problems in a judicial manner. The history of 
that effort is well known. The German first dele- 
gate, Count Miinster, dismissed the idea of arbi- 
tration as ''humbug"; and the reason he gave for 
this opinion, as reported by the American first dele- 
gate, was that ''Germany is prepared for war as 
no other country is; Germany can mobilize her 
army in ten days, a performance that could not be 
equaled by France or Russia or any other state. 
An arbitration court would, however, give an enemy 
time to make his preparations. Therefore it would 
only place Germany at a disadvantage."^ 

It was only after extraordinary efforts to induce 
the Emperor to see that this attitude, if persisted 
in, would cause him and his country to be dis- 
trusted, scorned, and hated by every civilized peo- 
ple, and especially by millions of the German race 
in America, that instructions were finally issued 
from Berlin to accept some kind of purely volun- 
tary and occasional method of adjudicating inter- 
national differences ; but without the least promise 
to resort to it, even in the case of strictly legal 
questions. 



^ See for the whole Conference, Andrew D. White's Autobiog- 
raphy, 2 vols., New York, 1905, and extracts in Illustrative Docu- 
ment No. II. 

85 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

The second Hague Conference offered another 
opportunity. It was treated in a different manner, 
but with almost the same result. Three eminent 
German jurists were sent as delegates. Their in- 
structions have not been published, as those of the 
United States have been; but it was given out by 
them that, while the limitation of armaments, either 
on land or sea, could not even be considered, Ger- 
many was ready for arbitration and a court of 
international justice, and was prepared to work for 
them. This time, the Kaiser, although he had mani- 
fested no interest in this Conference, had set the 
stage for avoiding the error his delegates had made 
in the first. 

It soon became evident, however, that while Ger- 
many, her allies, and her Balkan satellites were, "in 
principle," ingeniously professing to accept every 
great aim of peaceful international organization, 
they were blocking every practical proposal leading 
to a definitive result. 

The method was very simple. Unlike the par- 
liamentary bodies of a single nation, in which de- 
cisions are made by majorities, an international 
conference requires, because of the complete sover- 
eignty of the separate states composing it, entire 
unanimity before any final result can be obtained. 
Playing several small powers as mere pawns upon 
a chess-board, the German first delegate was able, 
when he did not find it convenient himself to raise 
objection, to prevent unanimity by the objection of 
one of Germany's allies or benevolent colleagues. 

86 



THE KAISER AS A STAGE-MANAGER 

By those accustomed to trace the intricacies of 
negotiation, and who knew the affinities that were 
controlling this collusion, often quite perplexing, 
the procedure was from the beginning perfectly 
comprehended ; and, months before the termination 
of the Conference, they were prepared to predict 
that, notwithstanding Baron Marschall von Bieber- 
stein's bland and plausible assurances that Ger- 
many was eager for a court of arbitral justice, no 
such court would ever be brought to completion in 
that Conference. 

Hardly credited at first, this prediction was ex- 
tremely disappointing to the American delegation, 
which throughout toiled bravely on, in the hope that 
success might ultimately prove attainable. 

Whispered from time to time, even by those dele- 
gates who sincerely wished for a good result, were 
the words, * * Germany must not be isolated ! ' ' With 
the support Baron Marschall von Bieberstein was 
able to command, the danger of Germany's isolation 
w^as not so imminent as her nervous neighbors 
sometimes feared. If Germany were isolated, they 
knew what the Imperial wrath would be, and saw 
in such a denouement the gathering of the storm; 
for, with the plans that were then in contemplation, 
Germany would not yield to the decisions of a Eu- 
ropean Areopagus. Baron Marschall von Bieber- 
stein knew that there was no probability of Ger- 
many's isolation. To isolate Germany would be 
to defy Germany; and it was felt, even by the most 
ardent advocates of the judicial method of dealing 

87 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

with international controversies, that it was not the 
part of wisdom to permit a convocation called in 
the name of peace to become the occasion of pro- 
voking war. 

As weeks and months slipped by, the intention of 
Germany became so evident that the American first 
delegate, the Honorable Joseph H. Choate, who had 
toiled like a giant in the cause of effective interna- 
tional justice based on law, had the courage, with 
greater regard for truth than for diplomatic 
precedent, to say of Baron Marschall von Bieber- 
stein, the German first delegate, in a plenary ses- 
sion of the Conference, and in his presence : ''Baron 
Marschall von Bieberstein is an ardent admirer of 
the abstract principle of arbitration and even of 
obligatory arbitration, and even of general arbi- 
tration between those he chooses to act with; but 
when it comes to putting this idea into concrete 
form and practical effect he appears as our most 
formidable adversary. He appears like one who 
worships a divine image in the sky, but when it 
touches the earth it loses all charm for him. He 
sees as in a dream a celestial apparition which ex- 
cites his ardent devotion, but when he wakes and 
finds her by his side he turns to the wall and mil 
have nothing to do with her."^ 

A few weeks after the adjournment of the Con- 
ference His Majesty the Kaiser visited Holland as 
the guest of the Queen. He spoke with fervor of 



^ Deuxiime Conference Internationale de la paix, Actes et 
Documents, Tome II, p. 72. 



THE KAISER AS A STAGE-MANAGER 

the relations between the Houses of Orange and 
Hohenzollern, recalled how the Great Elector had 
found his noble spouse in Holland, and wished the 
kingdom ''prosperity in the midst of the benefits of 
peace''; but of the great work so recently under- 
taken there, for the peace of the whole world by 
representatives of all civilized nations — the only 
universal international congress that ever assem- 
bled — he had not one word to say. 

To play the double role of AVilliam the War Lord 
and William the Peacemaker at the same time, even 
with such able support as the Kaiser believed him- 
self to have in Count Miinster, who was chosen for 
his ** common sense," and Baron Marschall von 
Bieberstein, who was chosen because in Oriental 
diplomacy he had out-Turked the Turk, exceeded 
the dramatic talent of even this prodigy in his- 
trionic art. Beneath the flowing robe of the peace- 
maker the protruding scabbard of the sword has 
always trailed across the stage, and it has rattled 
loudest when the Kaiser has discoursed most vo- 
ciferously of the German love of peace. 



CHAPTER IV 
THE KAISER UNDER FIRE 

"IXT'HEN my official relations with Kaiser Will- 
'^ iam II began he was just completing the 
twentieth year of his reign. He had attained to the 
prime of mature manhood, he had never suffered 
any serious reverse, and he was fully conscious of 
his unquestioned power. 

Not only had there been during this long period 
no European war, but the general conditions in 
Europe were favorable for the organization of per- 
manent peace. And yet, notwithstanding serious 
efforts, peace had not been organized. On the con- 
trary, the efforts to organize it had terminated in 
the conclusion at The Hague of a series of general 
treaties nearly all of which were constructed in 
open anticipation of future war, being composed 
chiefly of rules intended, if possible, to render war 
only slightly less horrible than the growth of mili- 
tary science had made it evident that it probably 
would be. 

There was, it is true, no reason inherent in the 
social order why war should then be regarded as 
inevitable; and the chief ground for believing it 

90 



THE KAISER UNDER FIRE 

might occur was the evident unwillingness of cer- 
tain powers to make the necessary provisions for 
averting it. If, in fact, it was inevitable, it was 
owing solely to ambitions that were not open to dis- 
cussion. 

At that time the German Empire had taken a 
place in Europe which made its action of the high- 
est importance ; for no international question could 
arise without suggesting the inquiry, ""V^Hiat will 
Germany do about it?" And the answer was com- 
plicated by the fact that Berlin was an enigma. All 
depended upon the uncertain mood of Kaiser Will- 
iam II. 

How incalculable a factor the Kaiser really was 
the year 1908 was to reveal in an astonishing man- 
ner. Not only was it a critical time for the inter- 
national relations of Europe, as the events will 
show, but a trying time for the theory of personal 
supremacy that underlies the conception William 
II had formed of his position as German Emperor. 
His pretensions, his purposes, his character, and 
his popularity among his own. people were in 
that crucial period to be subjected to unexpected 
tests. 

The second Hague Conference had brought into 
vivid contrast two conflicting conceptions of di- 
plomacy that had there come into collision : on the 
one hand the secret, obstructive, and evasive pro- 
cedure characteristic of personal sovereignty; on 
the other the open, constructive, and frankly 
avowed statement of purposes aimed at for the 

91 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

common good, advocated and practised by the great 
democracies. 

The fact that the new American ambassador, who 
had received from the German Emperor his agre- 
ment in December, 1907, but was not actually 
transferred from The Hague to Berlin imtil June, 
1908, had not only been a delegate to the second 
Hague Conference, but had for many years been 
closely identified with the movement represented 
there by the American delegation, did not add to 
the probability of his being persona gratisshna at 
the Court of the Kaiser. It was, in fact, understood 
that the government of the United States intended 
to accomplish, if possible, by separate negotiation, 
what it had failed to achieve at The Hague. It was 
further knowoi that the new ambassador, during the 
winter of 1908, had publicly advocated this policy ; 
and that separate treaties were to be made, if 
possible, with each of the great powers, by which 
the ground would be prepared for a better inter- 
national organization. It was, in fact, with special 
reference to his aiding in this task of separate ne- 
gotiation at Berlin that the new ambassador had 
been selected. 

This mission, it was evident, would not be so much 
an affair of ceremony as a sober undertaking, hav- 
ing in view the establishment of the future relations 
of the two countries upon a basis of mutual under- 
standing and legal engagements, with provision for 
adjudicating through improved treaty arrange- 
ments future difficulties that might arise. 

92 



THE KAISER UNDER FIRE 

There can be no doubt that many of the German 
people, as well as the American people, greatly 
desired such open and duly legalized relations, but 
this was not the Kaiser's personal conception of 
diplomacy. In such a system the personal element 
would be practically eliminated. 

Nothing can be more certain than that William 
II earnestly desired to maintain friendship with the 
United States, but he did not msh the American 
sj^stem to gain a foothold in Europe, or that inter- 
national relations should be made to rest upon a 
body of well-defined law and a tribunal with au- 
thority to interpret and apply it. Such a system 
would inevitably in time, if logically carried out, 
diminish the necessity for armies, and what would 
then become of the War Lord ? If the people— man- 
ufacturers, ship-owners, and traders, doing busi- 
ness internationally — could carry their wrongs to 
a court of justice, it could not fail to affect the 
status of kings and emperors as well as of armies 
and navies. 

What the Kaiser wanted of America was peace, 
trade, and neutrality so far as Europe was con- 
cerned. For these he looked largely to the racial 
loyalty of men of German blood living in the United 
States. With this support, war •with Germany 
would always be difficult. Disputes, if they should 
arise, could be dealt with as occasion might require ; 
but enlarged treaty arrangements were not, he 
thought, desirable. They would, perhaps, prove 
embarrassing to personal government ; and if made 

93 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

with the United States, other nations would de- 
mand them and refusal would thereby be made more 
difficult. 

It was perfectly natural for the Kaiser to take 
this view. It was a necessary corollary of his 
theory of personal government. For twenty years 
he had promoted amities, softened asperities, and 
kept Germany prosperous by a regime of personal 
visits to other sovereigns, personal telegrams of 
felicitation and condolence, secret correspondence, 
and casual words dropped into the ears of ambas- 
sadors at Berlin which he knew Avould be repeated 
to their sovereigns. A Europe based on public 
treaties, open, known of all men, would take all the 
charm out of a sovereign's existence. All the plot 
interest of diplomacy would be gone. Could any- 
thing be more inartistic than playing a part so 
commonplace as that of an emperor who had no 
secrets and in case of controversy would be required 
to assent to the decisions of a court? 

To the Kaiser, as to most sovereigns before the 
constitutional era, the essential part of diplomacy 
is the quasi-social intimacy of kings. The chief 
function of ambassadors, upon this theory, is to 
bridge distances by creating a common court life, 
where personal influence can be made to count. 
An embass}^, therefore, is from this point of view 
merely an extension of the court of the country it 
represents, and should be constituted and main- 
tained for the performance of that function. 

As between personal sovereigns, there is, no 

94 



THE KAISER UNDER FIRE 

doubt, much to be said in support of this idea. The 
ambassador is the direct and authorized representa- 
tive of his sovereign. He lives in his sovereign's 
house, receives his bread from his sovereign's hand, 
is his servitor, keeps his secrets, and concerns him- 
self only with his sovereign's interests. 

But the United States has no personal sovereign ; 
and the Constitution provides for no personal rep- 
resentation of the President, who has no court and 
is supposed to have no court favorites. There be- 
ing no power in a constitutional government to ex- 
change secret understandings between the heads of 
states, such a nation must base its international 
relations on its treaty engagements ; and these must 
be open, public, and sufficient to safeguard its in- 
terests, regardless of personal sentiments or per- 
sonal influences. To such nations diplomacy means 
international business, a very serious and exacting 
business, upon the proper transaction of which the 
most important interests of a people, and even life 
itself, may depend. 

However widely imperial purposes and republi- 
can conceptions of international relations and inter- 
course may differ, both sides must admit that 
between sovereign nations a basis of mutual under- 
standing must be found. The amenities of life are 
not incompatible with the serious discussion of 
business, even where contradictory views are held. 
On the contrary, the wider the chasm of differences 
the more essential these amenities become. 

When, therefore, on June 8, 1908, the new Ameri- 

95 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

can ambassador made his appearance at Berlin, it 
was with the conviction that, whatever the chances 
for the success of his mission, he would receive a 
cordial welcome; and in this he was not disap- 
pointed. 

The provincial Prussian capital of other days 
had been in twenty years transformed into the most 
modern city of continental Europe, an impressive 
symbol of the wonderful material progress of the 
Empire. From a sleepy thoroughfare Unter den 
Linden had become a cosmopolitan bazaar with 
shops of unsurpassed brilliancy of self-disclosure, 
as if to challenge comparison with their rivals in 
older centers of merchandise. Of its new Hotel 
Adlon, in which all that could be learned of sump- 
tuous hostelries from our most splendid American 
experiments had been embodied, the Kaiser, who 
had honored the opening with his presence, had con- 
descended by way of encouragement to say, ^^Es 
ist sclioner als hei tins." The Wilhelmstrasse, 
which in one 's student days had seemed so impene- 
trable and mysterious, now flung mde its doors of 
welcome to cheerful interiors, where the amiable 
Baron von Schon presided over the Foreign Office, 
and Prince von Billow, affable, courtly, and always 
adjusted to the situation, however complicated, sat 
in the chair of Bismarck in the palace of the Chan- 
cellor. 

Whatever may be said of the Kaiser's personal 
rule, the machinery of government is very much in 
evidence in Berlin. No Foreign Office in the world 

96 



THE KAISER UNDER FIRE 

is better organized, for obtaining information, in- 
fluencing the press, or handling with expert knowl- 
edge every question affecting the political or eco- 
nomic interests of the Empire. When treaties are 
to be made, there are at hand all the knowledge and 
all the skill for making them prudently and to the 
advantage of Germany; and, in addition, all the 
agencies for the accumulation and presentation of 
obstacles to making them, when impediments are 
the order of the day. And when it is deemed de- 
sirable to fix a policy in the mind of the country, 
the Chancellor — especially Prince von Billow, who 
was a past-master in the art of public statement — 
speaks ex cathedra with an authority hardly known 
elsewhere. 

But concealed behind all this complicated ap- 
paratus of bureaus is the personality of the Kaiser. 
From the Chancellor down to the humblest assessor, 
all are obedient to his will when they know it. In 
order to know what you can or cannot do in Ger- 
many it is necessary to know the mind of Will- 
iam II. 

It was with great interest, therefore, that the 
new ambassador looked forward to his first audi- 
ence of His Majesty. He had not long to wait. 
With unprecedented promptness the notice came 
that on the Sunday morning following his arrival 
in the capital he would be received at the Old Palace 
in Berlin. 

It seemed perfectly natural that the audience 
should occur in the open air, under the trees in the 

97 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

little garden of the Schloss. The seclusion and in- 
timacy of such a meeting gave it a welcome char- 
acter. The three flamboyant court carriages, each 
dra^vn by six horses, with bewigged drivers, pos- 
tilions, and footmen clinging on behind, made a 
spectacle for the crowd that lined tlie way; but 
neither these nor the red-breeched lackeys that 
formed in open colunm on the grand staircase 
awakened the slightest interest. The seventeen 
volleys at the castle gate were hardly heard. All 
this Avas the old story, the stage trumpery that is 
supposed to enhance **the divinity that doth hedge 
a king," the commonplaces of every royal court. 

Invited by the Grand Master of Ceremonies, the 
Emperor's ever-faithful servitor, Count Eulenberg, 
to descend alone an outer flight of steps into the 
garden, one was surprised to see, standing like a 
statue, perhaps twenty yards away, a solitary fig- 
ure, clad in white, covered with a silver helmet 
bearing on its crest a high-poised eagle, adding 
considerably to the apparent height of a medium- 
sized man. Seen in the coulisses of an opera-house, 
this apparition might have been taken for Lohen- 
grin waiting for his cue. It was the Kaiser in the 
brilliant uniform of an officer of the Garde du 
Corps. 

From the embankments of the Spree outside the 
garden the Sunday promenaders, of whom there 
were many, could behold, at a discreet distance, His 
Majesty in all the glory of his warlike panoply, 
and the black-coated ambassador approaching; a 

98 



THE KAISER UNDER FIRE 

picture of imperial magnificence, on the one hand, 
and republican simplicity, on the other, in which 
for impressiveness the odds were far from even. 

Presently the statuesque figure moved, the shin- 
ing metal flashing radiantly in the soft June sun- 
shine that glinted through the branches of the 
trees, a strong right hand was extended, the mask 
of monumental sternness fell, and a pleasant smile 
lighted up the well-bro\\med features and the un- 
fathomable gray eyes. 

Unimportant what was said. It was all of the 
friendship that should exist between two great peo- 
ples, of their community in blood, religion, science, 
interest, good-mil, and a common civilization; 
spoken on the Kaiser's part in very English Eng- 
lish, fluently, accurately, expansively, with a roll 
in the "r" when President Roosevelt's name was 
mentioned that had in it a strong suggestion of the 
North Sea. 

It seemed like a real personal contact, frank, sin- 
cere, earnest, and honest. One could not question 
that, and it was the beginning of other contacts 
more intimate and prolonged; especially at Kiel, 
where the sportsman put aside all forms of court 
etiquette, lying flat on the deck of the Meteor as she 
scudded under heavy sail with one rail under water ; 
at Eckernforde, where the old tars came into the 
ancient inn in the evening to meet their Kaiser and 
drink to His Majesty's health a glass of beer. 

"Did you ever see anything more democratic in 
America?'* the Kaiser asked gleefully, one time. 

8 99 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

**What would Roosevelt think of this?'' he in- 
quired, at another. 

Hating him, as many millions no doubt do, it 
would soften their hearts to hear him laugh like 
a child at a good story, or tell one himself. Can it 
be? Yes, it can be. There is such a wide difference 
between the gentler impulses of a man and the rude 
part ambition causes him to play in life! A, role 
partly self-chosen, it is true, and not wholly thrust 
upon him. A soul accursed by one great wrong 
idea, and the purposes, passions, and resolutions 
generated by it., A mind distorted, led into cap- 
tivity, and condemned to crime by the obsession that 
God has but one people, and they are his people; 
that the people have but one will, and that is his 
will; that God has but one purpose, and that is his 
purpose; and, being responsible only to the God 
of his 0A\Ti imagination, a purely tribal divinity, the 
reflection of his own power-loving nature, that he 
has no definite responsibility to men. 

No one who has personally met the Kaiser in 
friendly mood has failed to note the fascination he 
is capable of exerting when he is disposed to exer- 
cise his talent for making himself agreeable. The 
human side of him, when he consents to be for a 
moment just a man, is undeniably engaging. It is 
only when he feels called upon to play his part as 
Kaiser that one sees him in a different light. Then 
he becomes a wholly different character, an an- 
achronism in an age of liberal thought. 

Undoubtedly William II is conscious of his per- 

100 



THE KAISER UNDER FIRE 

sonal power of fascination, and he uses it with 
consummate art. To be made by an environment 
of pomp and ceremony to feel the presence of maj- 
esty and to expect at most a stiff and formal con- 
descension, and then suddenly to be greeted with 
an outburst of human qualities that causes the Kai- 
ser to seem like an old friend delighted to see you 
— could human skill devise a more subtle way of 
drawing a doubtful human being into the orbit of 
a sovereign's interests and confidence? It seems 
to say: **At last you have broken through all these 
stupid barriers that my people employ to shut you 
out, and me in, and keep the crowd away ; but here 
we are now, at last, face to face. Let us open our 
hearts to each other!'* 

I am not sure that this often happens, but it has 
happened; and something of it is felt by every 
American who has been personally presented to the 
Kaiser. And some, once drawn into that orbit, have 
always remained there. And it is not the meeting 
alone that binds. Some added delicate remem- 
brance ; some word of praise or approbation spoken 
by the Kaiser in the presence of a courtier or a 
minister designed to be repeated to the person it 
concerns; in due time the suggestion, perhaps, of 
a decoration. Such things, coming from His Maj- 
esty, who is under no compulsion to do them, the 
recipient naturally reasons, must be from his heart. 
And in this he may be right. To scorn such cour- 
tesies would be ungracious ; but to overvalue them, 
to see in them all that vanity suggests, to forget 

101 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

that these attentions are the warp and woof of 
diplomacy, would be to fall asleep on a pillow of 
illusion. They might even make a messenger for- 
get the errand on which he was sent ! 

Although my main mission was never for a mo- 
ment forgotten, and notwithstanding obstacles was 
never wholly despaired of, the chances of success 
seemed to grow less promising as time passed by. 
In the Foreign Office the temperature was chilly 
when the arbitration treaty was discussed. The 
bankers of Frankfort had been in communication, 
and out of dusty drawers had been recovered musty 
papers yellow with age, old securities, probably 
bought for a song by speculators, but represented 
by their owners as valid debts owed by some of the 
American States. One lot in particular was made 
specially impressive. A venal legislature had 
passed a bill making a state liable for the payment 
of an issue of bonds by a Southern railroad. The 
next legislature, placed in power by the indignation 
of the taxpayers, had declared the indorsement by 
the state to be illegal. As the railroad was bank- 
rupt, the bonds were found to be worthless. 

Unless the government of the United States was 
ready to assume responsibility for these "sacred 
obligations,'' an arbitration treaty, it was held, 
would be regarded as valueless in Germany. The 
Frankfort bankers would condemn such a treaty if 
■^hey did not receive full payment. What they ac- 
tually paid for these bonds, if anything, was never 
disclosed; but I should have a new opinion of 

102 



THE KAISER UNDER FIRE 

Frankfort bankers if it could be proved that they 
ever really paid anything for them. If the gov- 
ernment of the United States should agree to be 
responsible for these alleged debts, the next exhibit, 
I suppose, would have been a collection of Con- 
federate notes, if they could have been borrowed 
from some museum. 

Back of this reluctance of the Imperial Grovern- 
ment to make an obligatory arbitration treaty was, 
of course, the personal aversion of the Kaiser to 
abridge in any way his absolute sovereignty. It is 
no violation of confidence to say that, in conversa- 
tions upon this subject, William II, while not den}^- 
ing that monetary matters might, perhaps, in 
many cases be properly left to a court — in questions 
of civil rights his own German courts have some- 
times decided against him — has declared his opin- 
ion that nothing of political importance can be 
subjected to the judgment of an international tri- 
bunal ; for no principle of law can be permitted to 
constrain the free exercise of a sovereign will. 

On the social side, a generous hospitality made 
life at Berlin very pleasant for the new American 
ambassador. One occasion, soon after his arrival, 
is memorable for the kindly effort made to point out 
the close similarity between the American and the 
German systems of government! 

A distinguished company of men was assembled, 
as a token of welcome, in the palace of the Chan- 
cellor. After dinner it was found agreeable to 
spend the evening in the open air, in the spacious 

103 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

garden under the starlight of a glorious June sky. 
It was the gracious host himself, Prince von Billow, 
who led up to the close friendship there had always 
existed between the two countries since Frederick 
the Great had expressed his sympathy with the 
American cause, and Franklin, Jefferson, and 
Adams had signed the unique treaty of amity mth 
Prussia in 1785. But these A\"ere not the only bonds 
of mutual sympathy. Both countries had tri- 
umphed over separatism and become great powers, 
America by preserving the union of the states, and 
Germany by the formation of the Empire; which 
gave the ambassador an opportunity to remark 
upon the loyalty to the Union of our citizens of 
German origin and their important services in the 
War of Secession. Into the minor details of 
the method by which national unity had in each 
case been accomplished, and especially the manner 
in which the victors had treated the vanquished, it 
did not seem at the time necessary to enter, al- 
though they could hardly have failed to be sug- 
gested to the mind of every one present. The really 
original stroke, however, in this conversation was 
the statement by the Chancellor that a deeper anal- 
ogy was to be seen in the fact that in neither form 
of government was the ministry dependent for its 
continuance upon the approval of the parliament 
— a point which he considered of prime importance 
to the continuity of public policy. ^'Besides," he 
added, **your President has a power of appoint- 
ment that is unsurpassed." 

104 



THE KAISER UNDER FIRE 

I was, I inust confess, for a moment slightly- 
startled by this sudden identification of the two 
systems, which I had thought of as almost diamet- 
rically contradictory. I could not, of course, deny 
the verity of the Chancellor's statements; but I 
ventured to suggest that, although the President's 
Cabinet could not be changed by the Congress after 
the members had once been installed, except by im- 
peachment, they, and all other appointed officers, 
must be confirmed by the Senate ; and I had never 
known important public duties to be assigned to 
persons of whose fitness the Senate had not had at 
least one chance to judge. As for permanence of 
policy, I added that the people were supposed to 
frame public policies in their party platforms, and 
reserved the right to choose the Chief Executive 
every four years ; so that, if our President did pos- 
sess certain constitutional powers analogous in 
some respects to some of those exercised by the Em- 
peror, the electors could at intervals withhold or 
renew their mandate as they thought best. 

A slight almost imperceptible titter of laughter, 
emanating from the shadows where some of the 
gentlemen sat, caused me to wonder if I had been 
indiscreet. Really, there had been no intention to 
reflect upon the Kaiser; but the suspicion was at 
once formed in my mind that perhaps they had been 
thinking of him! Of this there is, however, no 
further evidence. The subject was changed, the 
conversation followed other lines, and in due course 
a pleasant evening came to an end. 

105 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

The annus mirahilis of 1908, as it has been called, 
brought sore trials to the Kaiser. In the twenty 
years of his reign he had never attempted so much", 
never succeeded in so little, and was never so dis- 
trusted. It began with a private letter, written by 
him on February 17th, to Lord Tweedmouth, First 
Lord of the British Admiralty, the letter being 
supposed to contain a defense of Germany's naval 
policy and a criticism of Great Britain's attitude 
toward it. 

The letter had not been published, and its full con- 
tents were not publicly kno"\vn, but the mere fact of 
its existence raised a storm of objection in Germany 
and created resentment in England. In the British 
press it was represented that the design of the 
communication was "to make it more easy for Ger- 
man preparations to overtake our own." In Ger- 
many the fear was that it had contained some 
indiscretion compromising to Germany's position. 
So long as the letter was not published its contents 
were open to almost any interpretation, and even 
the most extravagant theory could boast that silence 
left it uncontradicted. The really important utter- 
ance concerning it was that of Lord Lansdowne, 
who said in the House of Commons, "Such a com- 
munication as that in question must not be allowed 
to create a diplomatic situation different from that 
which has been established through official channels 
and documents." 

This was statesman-like, but it assumed that a 
distinction existed between official acts and the 

106 ; 



THE KAISER UNDER FIRE 

utterances of the Kaiser. Obviously, this was not 
in accordance with the Kaiser 's own theory of gov- 
ernment; for, being the highest authority in the 
state, what he said was more than ordinarily offi- 
cial: it was final. He could not, in any circum- 
stances, disavow himself. 

When, in March, Prince von Billow was obliged 
to express himself upon the subject, he also had 
to oppose the Kaiser's theory. The letter being a 
''private" one, he said, he could not lay it before 
the Reichstag. That its contents were political, he 
frankly confessed; but he held that "the letter of 
a sovereign, an Imperial letter, does not, from the 
fact that it deals with political questions, become 
an act of state.'* 

Here then was distinctly posed the question, 
How far does the political authority of the Ger- 
man Emperor extend, and how must it be exercised? 
Would a secret treaty, "signed before God" with 
another sovereign, but without the presence or 
knowledge of public ministers, be considered a 
binding official act? The Kaiser undoubtedly 
thought it would. The Chancellor and the Reichs- 
tag evidently thought it would not. The differ- 
ence of views was very wide indeed. The whole 
theory of personal government was suddenly chal- 
lenged. To the Kaiser it was, unquestionably, a 
shock. But this was only the beginning of the issue. 
The year had still more serious differences in store. 

Personally, William II was mute during this con- 
troversy, and wisely so ; for a storm was brewing 

107 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

in the nation. The people were faithful to the 
Kaiser, but they felt that they could not intrust 
their foreign affairs to his personal direction, and 
this the Emperor comprehended. 

Silent, but not without resentment over the 
Tweedmouth episode, he turned his attention to 
other matters. Suddenly, in June, a new setting of 
the stage seemed desirable. On the 14th of that 
month the meeting of Edward VII with Nicholas 
II, at Reval, was interpreted as marking the conclu- 
sion of an Anglo-Russian entente; but William II 
could not tolerate friendly relations between his 
friends. Immediately the cry of *' encirclement" 
was raised. That France and England had become 
friendly was of itself objectionable, but that Great 
Britain and Russia, the ally of France, should at the 
same time abolish their differences was too much to 
be borne. At the conclusion of an inspection of 
cavalry at Doberitz, while King Edward VII was 
still at Reval, the Kaiser said to his assembled offi- 
cers : *'It seems, in truth, that they wish to encircle 
and provoke us. We shall be able to support it. 
The German has never fought better than when he 
had to defend himself on all sides. Let them come 
on against us, then. We shall be ready!" A visit 
to the Court of Sweden — traditionally the enemy of 
Russia — immediately followed, and the remainder 
of the month was occupied with military reviews 
and a visit to Alsace-Lorraine, where the inhabi- 
tants were reminded of what their union with the 
German Empire had done for their prosperity. 

108 



THE KAISER UNDER FIRE 

** Peace is assured," the Kaiser concluded, "by our 
military forces on land and sea, by the German 
people in arms." 

It was the Kaiser's way of making himself seem 
essential to his own people. He knew he could 
count upon the army. He knew that, if Germany 
were in danger, the German people would follow 
him to the death. A military situation was needed 
by him, and he knew how to create it. 

But his rattling of the saber did not end with 
this challenge, which had sent a thrill through 
Europe and caused a profound sensation in Ger- 
many. To add to the effect, on September 11th he 
proceeded in person to approach within one kilo- 
meter of the French frontier, where he passed the 
night and made a proposal to ascend the Hohneck 
from French territory. Had the French refused to 
permit this, or shown any discourtesy, it would, per- 
haps, have furnished occasion for another Ems tele- 
gram; for, had there been an excuse for it, Germany 
was ready for a short, swift war. But, with perfect 
politeness, the French officers offered to furnish the 
Kaiser with a body-guard to accompany him during 
his ascent; whereupon the project was suddenly 
abandoned and he announced that he was expected 
at Colmar. 

During all these occurrences, a very marked in- 
terest was manifested in strengthening the ties of 
friendship with America ; but progress toward the 
realization of America's great desire, the improve- 
ment in international organization, was merely 

109 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

marking time. While the law officers of the Foreign 
Office were unearthing impossible claims from the 
dust of previous centuries as questions that must 
first be settled if arbitration was to become the 
order of the day, the Kaiser did not conceal his per- 
sonal opinion — which was, of course, his official 
opinion — that what had been done at The Hague 
was a futility that did not deserve further encour- 
agement. 

But the reaction against Edward VII 's friendly 
visit with the Czar of Russia having in a measure 
served its purpose, he evidently perceived that, as 
upon some former occasions, he had overplayed his 
part as the testy War Lord. It is difficult otherwise 
to account for the publication, on October 28th, of 
the since famous interview that appeared as com- 
ing direct from the Kaiser in the London Daily 
Telegraph.^ 

The whole detailed history of this extraordinary 
performance has never yet transpired, but the main 
facts may be stated with entire confidence. 

A lover of peace and a friend of both Germany 
and England, as he represented himself to be, pre- 
pared a paper, composed of statements made to him 
by the Emperor in the interest of a good under- 
standing between those countries, which with the 
Imperial sanction was published as being in sub- 
stance an interview with William II by an ''unim- 
peachable authority." 



1 The full text of this interview may be found in Shaw, William 
of Germany, London, 1913, pp. 304, 308, and is reprinted as Illus- 
trative Document No. Ill, at the end of this volume. 

IK) 



THE KAISER UNDER FIRE 

The veracity of the interviewer has never been 
called in question, but the commotion raised by the 
report of what the Kaiser had said to him was inde- 
scribable. *'You English," William II had begun, 
*'are mad, mad as March hares. AVhat has come 
over you that you are so completely given over to 
suspicions quite unworthy of a great nation?" 
Personally, at least, he said, he had not deserved 
such mis judgment as he had received. ''My task is 
not of the easiest," he continued. ''The prevailing 
sentiment among large sections of the middle and 
lower classes of my o\mi people is not friendly to 
England. ... I strive without ceasing to improve 
relations, and you retort that I am your arch- 
enemy." 

Then followed statements that those in Germany 
who had approved intervention in Morocco were 
"mischief-makers"; that, although German senti- 
ment was hostile to England during the South 
African War, he had refused to receive President 
Kruger when Holland and France were feting him ; 
that France and Russia had invited his government 
"to join them in calling upon England to put an 
end to the war," as the moment had come "to hu- 
miliate England to the dust"; that he had pre- 
pared, with the aid of his General Staff, a plan of 
campaign against the Boers which Lord Roberts 
had practically followed; and that Germany's navy 
would some day, owing to the rise of Japan, be nec- 
essary to England in the great debates of the 

future. 

Ill 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Great Britain was amazed, but Germany was ex- 
asperated. The Kaiser, then, according to his own 
public statement, had been all the time a secret ally 
and helper of England, and an enemy of the Boers 
with whom the Germans had sympathized! His 
attitude toward Moroc<?o had been a sham and a 
pretense. He had held his own people up to repro- 
bation as enemies of England, and called himself 
England's devoted friend. And this was their 
Kaiser ! 

A stranger might easily have inferred from the 
tide of public feeling that swept over the Empire 
that William II was about to be deposed. The seri- 
ous journals were loud in their protests. The comic 
papers were remorseless in their caricatures. One 
would have supposed that there was no law in Ger- 
many against lese-majeste. 

What added most to the bitterness of public feel- 
ing was the apparently perfect insouciance of the 
Kaiser, who, during the climax of the storm, from 
November 4th to 7th, was hunting with the Heredi- 
tary Prince of Austria, and from November 7th to 
16th was with Prince Flirstenberg, at Donaueschin- 
gen, being constantly amused mth vaudeville enter- 
tainments reported to be of a character utterly in- 
harmonious mth the serious time he had brought 
upon his Empire. 

Most incredible to relate, the manuscript of the 
interview had been submitted before publication to 
the Chancellor; but Prince von Billow confessed 
that he had never taken the trouble to read it, and 

113 



THE KAISER UNDER FIRE 

the subalterns at the Foreign Office had turned it 
over to its author mthout criticism. 

This, to some , extent, relieved the. Kaiser from 
reprqach, bi;t: only slightly ; for ,when the Chancel- 
lor, humbly taking upon himself blame, for his own 
negligence, offered his resignation, the Kaiser, who 
needed him as a defender before the Reichstag, re- 
fused to accept it ; and Prince von Billow, thus vir- 
tually absolved, stood up in the tribune, not to 
excuse William II as really innocent of wrong- 
doing, but, after as much as possible attenuating, 
his master's error by sldlfully commenting on cer-. 
tain points, he in effect threw the whole burden on 
the Kaiser by pledging that, while he remained 
Chancellor, such personal interference in , the con- 
duct of foreign affairs should not be allowed to 
occur again! 

This, in fact, was the real issue. The Germans 
did not msh to depose the Emperor, but they were 
weary of the indiscretions of William II. They did 
not in their hearts believe in his personal govern- 
ment, but they had never dared to oppose it. Now 
all parties were among the protestants. The 
Kaiser was obliged to bow before the storm. He 
had deeply humiliated his people before the world. 
They resented it. They were at the same time 
ashamed of his conduct and indignant mth him. 
When he came back to Potsdam he was a chastened 
man. He felt that he had been scourged, and pub- 
licly. If he had humiliated his people, they in their 
turn had humbled him. No doubt he w^as resentful, 

113 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

but he was passive. He made no reply. Had lie 
claimed all that he thought to be his right, had he 
insisted that what he had said in the interview had 
been sincerely said and was the truth; above all, 
had he attempted to end the public criticisms in the 
Reichstag and the press by dissolving the parlia- 
ment and suppressing new^spapers, there Avould 
have been a revolution. He did none of these 
things. He simply let the storm pass by. 

Just what occurred between the Emperor and his 
Chancellor at Potsdam we do not know. Some were 
certain that he had shown violent anger. But the 
result was submission on the point at issue. He 
did not accept the Chancellor's proffered resigna- 
tion; and he promised to recognize, as Prince von 
Billow's interpretation of the Imperial Constitution 
required, the constitutional ''responsibility" of the 
Chancellor for official acts relating to foreign 
affairs. 

''His Majesty," stated the Official Gazette, 
*' while unaffected by public criticism which he re- 
gards as exaggerated, considers his most honorable 
Imperial task to consist in securing the stability of 
the policy of the Empire while adhering to the prin- 
ciple of constitutional responsibility. The Kaiser 
accordingly indorses the statements of the Imperial 
Chancellor in the Reichstag, and assures Prince von 
Billow of his continued confidence." 

The words of the Chancellor which the Kaiser 
indorsed were : ' ' The perception that the publica- 
tion of these conversations in England has not had 

114 



THE KAISER UNDER FIRE 

the effect the Kaiser wished, and in our own coun- 
try has caused profound agitation and painful re- 
gret, will — this firm conviction I have acquired dur- 
ing these anxious days — lead the Kaiser for the 
future, in private conversation also, to maintain the 
reserve that is equally indispensable in the interest 
of a uniform policy and for the authority of the 
CrowTi. If it were not so, I could not, nor could my 
successor, bear the responsibility."^ 

In the mean time, another Imperial indiscretion 
was discovered and suppressed before it had dis- 
turbed the public mind. The Kaiser had given a 
private interview to an American journalist during 
his voyage in the Baltic. This also had been sub- 
mitted to the Foreign Office and passed out for pub- 
lication; and, already printed, it was to appear in 
an early number of an American magazine. The 
Foreign Office was in terror. Money was hastily 
cabled to New York, the whole edition of the article 
was withheld and paid for, and to obliterate the 
incident the printed pages were taken out to sea on 
a German war-ship and used to stoke the furnaces. 

For the moment it seemed in December that the 
German people had successfully asserted their 
claim to a responsible government, and that the 
disaster to which the Kaiser's personal diplomacy 
had exposed them would never be repeated. But it 
was, in fact, the Kaiser's triumph. The Chan- 



1 The text of Prince von Billow's speech in the Reichstag may 
be found in Shaw, pp. 31 1, 315, and is reprinted as Illustrative 
Document No. IV. 

Q 115 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

cellor was in future to administer foreign affairs, 
and the Kaiser's task would *' consist in securing 
the stability of the policy of the Empire while ad- 
hering to the principle of constitutional responsi- 
bility" — to himself! 

There could he no mistake about the meaning of 
this apparent concession. There was in the Impe- 
rial Constitution no "responsibility" to any one 
except the Emperor. There was none to the Reichs- 
tag on the part of the Emperor. The chance to 
place in the Constitution responsibility to the parlia- 
ment of the people was allowed to slip by without 
decisive action. The Kaiser was left with the same 
supreme authority that he possessed before; and, 
nine years afterward, in 1917, when the Reichstag, 
by a large majority, declared, *'We are driven by 
no lust of conquest," and professed to repudiate 
*' forced acquisitions of territory and political, eco- 
nomic, and financial violations," the Chancellor of 
the Empire, Doctor Michaelis, was able to announce 
from the tribune, ''The constitutional rights of the 
head of the Empire must not be endangered, and I 
am not willing to permit any one to take the reins 
out of my hands. ' ' 

Thus, without a serious effort on the part of the 
people to prevent it, the German Empire permitted 
itself to be effectively and definitely Prussianized. 
In the Empire, as in Prussia, the Emperor is with- 
out legal responsibility to the people. There were 
presented, as we shall see later, still other opportu- 
nities for securing a truly responsible government ; 

116 



THE KAISER UNDER FIRE 

but there was none when the public mind was so 
completely aroused from its lethargy and so fully 
awake to the danger that the Emperor's personal 
system had incurred. Thenceforth, Kaiser William 
had only to sound the tocsin of alarm in order to 
recall to the nation that, having chosen submission 
to a War Lord, it must abide by the consequences of 
its act. 



CHAPTER V 
THE KAISER'S REVERSION TO TYPE 

KAISER WILLIAM II had been deeply chas- 
tened by the experience of 1908, but it had not 
made him penitent. He felt that he had been 
wronged by his own people, as well as misunder- 
stood abroad. Although Prince von Billow had 
conjured the storm and averted a revision of the 
Imperial Constitution, there was no reason why the 
Kaiser should love him overmuch. After all, he 
had allowed his master to seem the real delinquent 
in the Daily Telegraph interview, when as a faithful 
servitor the Chancellor might have declared that 
the Kaiser, who had not failed to submit his lan- 
guage to him before publication, had taken every 
proper precaution to prevent misjudgment. The 
Chancellor had, in fact, neglected a public duty of 
great importance, and yet he continued to hold his 
high office, with the understanding that neither he 
nor any successor could serve a master who should 
act as the Kaiser had acted ! As in Bismarck's day, 
William II was, for the time, made to appear so 
distrusted by his own people as to require the 
guardianship of his o\\ti minister. A HohenzoUern 

118 



THE KAISER'S REVERSION TO TYPE 

could not be expected to endure for a long time an 
imputation so offensive. 

No one understood better than William II how 
to evade this consequence. While his future status 
was still equivocal, in the midst of the public dis- 
cussion of his ''indiscretion," the Kaiser paid a 
visit to the home of Count Zeppelin, who was at the 
moment in great public favor because of the suc- 
cess he had attained, after long experiments and 
many failures, in the construction of an air-ship 
capable of sailing long distances and carrying a 
heavy charge of explosives. The military had taken 
a great interest in the enterprise, and the general 
public also; for here, it was believed, was a new 
instrument of warfare that could place the cities 
of Great Britain at the mercy of an easy and effec- 
tive German invasion. 

On November 10, 1908, the very day of the inter- 
pellation in the Reichstag regarding the unfortu- 
nate interview, the Kaiser conferred in person the 
Order of the Black Eagle upon Count Zeppelin, em- 
bracing him publicly three times, and praising him 
in an address, in Avhich he said : 

* ' The monarch and the country may well be proud 
to possess sucli a son, the greatest German of the 
twentieth century, who, by his invention, has led the 
human race to a turning-point in its history. It 
would not be an exaggeration to say that we are 
to-day passing one of the most important moments 
in the history of civilization. May it be given to us 
to be able to say, upon our last day of life, that 

119 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

we have served our dear country with as mnch 
success as you." 

Here was no warlike word, but the speech was 
well understood. Whatever the errors of the past, 
William II was still German at heart, he was still 
essential to the Empire, he was still the Kaiser! 
Even during those darkest days of national humili- 
ation, the question arose in the minds of every Ger- 
man, What would become of German hopes, and 
dreams, and aspirations, without the Kaiser? 

In the following January, when the storm of 
November had completely passed, the Kaiser read 
to the generals who came to offer him their New 
Year's greetings portions of an article by General 
Schlieffen on modern warfare, and expressed his 
entire personal approval of its arguments. This 
fact having come to the knowledge of the public 
through some one's unguarded loquacity, a few 
newspapers inquired if this was not a new indis- 
cretion, and, in fact, a violation of the Kaiser 's en- 
gagement to be cautious in his utterances. But who 
in Germany could ever arraign the German Em- 
peror for speaking his mind about war, or the meth- 
ods of conducting it? Was not war a part of the 
Kaiser's recognized business? This time no par- 
ticular foreign nation was threatened by him, and 
the incipient criticism not only fell dead, but the 
Kaiser's words assured the army that its occupa- 
tion with military science was dear to the heart of 
the Emperor. 

Although the position of William II had been 

120 



THE KAISER'S REVERSION TO TYPE 

apparently thus quickly re-established in the minds 
of his own people, the relations of Germany and 
Great Britain had been left in very bad form by the 
Kaiser's mistaken effort to improve them. The 
conspicuous honors bestowed upon Count Zeppelin 
were not calculated to produce the same effect in 
England that they had caused in the German Em- 
pire, and had no tendency to inspire confidence in 
Germany's peaceful intentions. The Zeppelin air- 
ship was obviously a military and not a commercial 
venture. 

In view of the fact that England and France by 
the agreement of 1904, and now England and Russia 
by the agreement of 1907, had secured a peaceful 
and honorable modus Vivendi, which had ripened 
into a virtual compact for peace, the time was not 
opportune for war on the part of Germany with 
either of those nations ; for, if it touched their com- 
mon interests, they would probably stand together. 
Until they could be in some fashion disunited, or a 
case should arise in which at least one of them 
should have no great interest at stake, peace was 
practically guaranteed by the Anglo-Franco-Rus- 
sian Entente. 

But there were other reasons why, in 1909, Ger- 
many was desirous of avoiding immediate conflict. 
The domestic situation was perturbed by the finan- 
cial state of the Empire. Unless some reform of 
the budget could be devised, the growing expenses 
of the army and navy foreshadowed eventual Impe- 
rial bankruptcy. Experts were making very close 

121 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

calculations, but saw no prospect of national sol- 
vency without greatly increased taxation, which 
nobody wanted to bear. 

It was a time extremely propitious for a radical 
international understanding which would justify a 
relaxation in the cost of armament. Proposals of 
this kind were made, but they were not well re- 
ceived by the dominant caste in Germany. The 
army and navy were institutions which had their 
well-understood purposes, and there was no dispo- 
sition to diminish them. On the ground that they 
were "purely defensive" and "the necessary guar- 
antees of peace," it was, on the contrary, urged that 
they must be increased. No one could furnish any 
evidence of a probable attack, since all the nations 
were seeking peace; but, it was alleged, "there is 
always danger." And so, neither arbitration nor 
limitation of armaments seemed in Germany to 
make any appeal to the official mind. The only 
solution, it was thought, was to be found in new 
taxes ; and new taxes were the unsteady steed upon 
which Prince von Billow — whose days as Chancellor 
were in reality already numbered — was traveling 
toward the end of an uncomfortable road. 

There were other and pressing reasons, in addi- 
tion to the heavy cost of armament, why the inter- 
national situation was disturbing. In October, 1908, 
Austria-Hungary had announced the formal annex- 
ation of the Slav provinces Bosnia and Herzego- 
vina. Belonging originally to Turkey, they had 
thirty years before been placed under temporary 

123 



THE KAISER'S REVERSION TO TYPE 

Austrian administration by the Congross of Berlin; 
but, for racial and geographic reasons, they were 
claimed by Serbia as a part of her eventual national 
heritage. Serbia, supported by Russia, and in part 
by France and England, opposed the annexation of 
these provinces by Austria-Hungary as a violation 
of the Treaty of 1878, which was universally recog- 
nized as still in force. Such a step, it was held, 
should not be taken without referring the action to 
the decision of a general European conference ; but 
Germany, in tones that were unequivocal, answered, 
*'No." At St, Petersburg the Kaiser had given the 
Czar to understand that an attempt on his part to 
dispute Austria-Hungary's action, either by arms 
or by insistence upon a conference, would be met 
by the vigorous opposition of Germany. In brief, 
it was submission or war. 

We who lived through those days at Berlin and 
knew the attitude of the German Foreign Office on 
the subject of a conference, perfectly understood 
what was implied; and, two years afterward, the 
Kaiser himself, in a speech at Vienna, confirmed 
the interpretation of that time, by referring to him- 
self as ' ' an ally who had taken his stand in shining 
armor at a grave moment by the side of Austria's 
most gracious sovereign," and plainly intimated 
that Austria-Hungary should remember the indebt- 
edness. 

But those who were aware of the full significance 
of that transaction could not fail to comprehend 
that Germany was not acting for Austria alone or 

123 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

to understand that at some future time, probably 
not very remote, the Teuton and the Slav would 
contend in a desperate struggle for predominance 
in the disintegrated Ottoman Empire, to which 
these provinces had once belonged, and had come 
to form the key that could open to Germany the 
door of the land route to the Far East, with free 
access to all the southern seas. 

There were, of course, vast imperial interests at 
stake. In truth, the whole future of Europe was 
wrapped up in the ultimate solution of the Balkan 
question. What the peace of Europe required was 
that there should be no imperial contest for the 
domination of the Balkan peninsula. The only 
effective means of preventing this disaster was an 
agreement on the part of the great powers, espe- 
cially Austria, Russia, and Germany, to promote 
and protect the development of independent nations 
in this area, on the basis of just racial and eco- 
nomic considerations. What the case imperatively 
called for was a European concert, actuated not by 
purely national covetousness, but by regard for 
the maintenance of future peace. 

The situation was at best a difficult one, and it is 
uncertain what benefits might have immediately re- 
sulted from a conference of the powers, if it had 
been convoked to examine the needs which thirty 
years of arrested international development had 
produced in the Near East. It is not just to say 
that Germany alone is responsible for a failure to 
reorganize the Balkan peninsula and to secure to 

124 



THE KAISER'S REVERSION TO TYPE 

those regions perpetual peace ; for it is by no means 
certain that a general conference would, or could, 
have imposed a just and permanent order of exist- 
ence upon that ferment of struggling nationalities. 
But Germany cannot escape responsibility for de- 
feating any solution of the problem that may have 
been possible, by refusing to permit such a con- 
ference to be convoked. 

Looking back over all the events from 1908 to 
1914, the whole world now understands the motive 
of German opposition to a Balkan settlement upon 
national lines, with the general approbation of the 
rest of Europe. That motive was to prevent the 
placing of obstacles in the path of Austria's ex- 
pansion in the Balkan peninsula, of which Germany 
was to be the beneficiary when Austria should be 
ultimately incorporated in the German Empire, 
thus enabling the Kaiser to hem in Russia and pre- 
vent her becoming a maritime power by control of 
the Balkans and the Bosporus. Hence the close 
relations of the Kaiser wdth the Ottoman Empire 
and the apathy of Germany toward Italy, her own 
ally, in the Turco-Italian AYar. Hence also the aid 
furnished to Austria in forcing through the con- 
ference of ambassadors at London, at the conclu- 
sion of the Balkan War, the establishment of the 
kingdom of Albania under a German prince, in or- 
der to shut Serbia off from the Adriatic Sea, thus 
creating a new cause of conflict, from which Austria 
would profit for Germany's ultimate benefit. 

To keep the Turco-Balkan situation in troubled 

125 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

waters until the favorable occasion for forceful 
intervention should arise, when Germany could 
carry out the project of control from Hamburg to 
Bagdad — that was the Kaiser's policy. To prevent 
the permanent settlement of conflicts and disturb- 
ances by the concerted action of Europe — that was 
the means by which that policy was to be realized. 
To beguile each of the great powers with courteous 
attentions, to hold them, as far as possible, in secret 
co-operation with Germany, and to prevent their 
union for any general purpose whatever — that was 
the method by which these means were to be 
applied. 

No general conference, no general treaties, no 
general understanding; troubled waters, profes- 
sions of peace, increase of the German army and 
navy, personal diplomacy — this is the Hohenzollern 
tradition, and it was William II 's program for in- 
creasing his hold on Austria and his control of 
Turkey. 

Accordingly, in 1909, Austria made a private 
agreement mth Turkey, by the payment of some 
money in purchase of the provinces, and Germany 
proved her devotion as an ally by obtaining from 
the other powers interested in the Treaty of Berlin 
their consent to this transaction. Russia was too 
much intimidated to object alone ; and Serbia, thus 
deserted, was obliged to sign a pledge to abandon 
her attitude of protest against the annexation of 
the provinces by her already too powerful neighbor. 

So far as a permanent European understanding 

126 



THE KAISER'S REVERSION TO TYPE 

is concerned, nothing could more effectively dem- 
onstrate the utter futility of the Kaiser's system 
than the inconsequence of the royal visits that oc- 
curred during this period, each one of which was 
looked forward to and commented upon at the time 
as an important international event, in the vain 
hope that these personal contacts of royalty might 
improve the international situation. 

On February 9, 1909, King Edward VII, accom- 
panied by the Queen, visited Berlin, and they were 
entertained at the royal castle. The occasion was 
celebrated by splendid fetes, and at the gala dinner 
the usual complimentary toasts were pronounced. 
At a reception in the city hall. King Edward made 
a specially favorable impression upon the city fa- 
thers of Berlin. His simplicity, his good humor, 
and his straightforwardness were remarked upon. 
At the luncheon offered to the diplomatic body at 
the British Embassy, the King was especially happy 
in his kindly words to the representatives of dif- 
ferent countries as they were presented to him. To 
the American ambassador he expressed his deep 
interest in the work of the Hague Conferences, with 
the details of which he proved to be unexpectedly 
familiar. 

Socially, the visit of the British sovereigns, made 
in winter, and at considerable inconvenience, was a 
pleasant event ; but, politically, it may be doubted 
if it was of the slightest value. Knowing what 
King Edward VII and William II really thought of 
each other, and how little mutual sympathy there 

187 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

was between them, the fact that they were for a 
few days in each other's presence, sat at the same 
table, and could make pleasant ceremonial speeches 
did not produce the conviction that the visit had 
accomplished any lasting good. The utmost that 
can ever be deduced from such an exchange of cour- 
tesies is that ceremonial intercourse is still possible 
and that neither side is ready for a total estrange- 
ment. On the other hand, such apparently innocent 
encounters not infrequently create alarm in other 
nations. The real motives for the meeting are not 
disclosed; and future intentions, which are seldom 
openly declared except in the vaguest possible 
terms, remain as obscure as if no visit had been 
made. Almost invariably there is a disquieting 
suspicion that secret engagements have been en- 
tered into that may involve disadvantages to other 
countries. As soon as the ceremonies are over, the 
press in the different countries puts its own inter- 
pretation upon the occasion, and the conflicting 
views end either in no result whatever or in more 
or less embittered controversies. 

Whenever the visit of King Edward VII to Ber- 
lin in 1909 is referred to by the diplomats who were 
present, the most memorable incident seems to be 
the fact that the King had so completely outgrown 
his Prussian field-marshal's uniform since he had 
last worn it that he was threatened with strangula- 
tion, until an intrepid princess, who sat nearest to 
him, dexterously unhooked the standing collar that 
was choking him. 

128 



THE KAISER'S REVERSION TO TYPE 

In the Kaiser's speech upon this occasion there 
was no ''indiscretion," which made it a subject of 
remark. In substance it simply recalled ''unforget- 
able hospitality" at Windsor Castle, mshed Their 
Majesties a pleasant sojourn in Berlin, thanked the 
Queen for her ''amiable presence," and ended by 
seeing in the visit "a new guarantee of the continu- 
ation and development of the friendly and peaceful 
relations which unite the two countries." But 
what "new guarantee" had been exchanged? So 
far as the two nations knew, beyond the mere fact 
of the visit there was none. 

But this was, in truth, all that the Kaiser desired 
to give, or needed to receive. There were numer- 
ous questions at issue, but none was settled. A few 
decorations were distributed, but no principle, so 
far as the public knew, had been laid down and 
agreed upon. No cause of future hostility had been 
removed. Happily, no new cause of offense had 
been given ; for the Kaiser was able to say, "I know 
how much our wishes are in accord in that which 
concerns the maintenance and consolidation of 
peace." The angry charge of "encirclement" was 
apparently withdrawn. At least, if any encircle- 
ment existed, it was not of a nature to disturb the 
peace. And yet there was the same basis as before 
for asserting its existence. The problem of raising 
new taxes for the enlargement of the army and 
navy was still unsolved, but the urgency of it was 
in no degree diminished. On March 1st William II 
was celebrating the centenary of the Prussian Min- 

129 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

istry of War, in a speech of intense warlike fervor, 
in which he invoked ''the divine benediction" upon 
the work of that Ministry, whose "task had been so 
fruitful," he declared, and would assure to Ger- 
many '*a triumph over all the tempests which the 
decisions of Providence may call forth"; as if war 
were a part of the divine purpose, and not a human 
crime. 

Next to the German army and navy, the mainstay 
of peace in Europe, according to the Kaiser, was 
the Triple Alliance. Having demonstrated in his 
favorite manner by the royal visit at Berlin the 
friendly relations of Germany and Great Britain, 
in May he received the King of Italy on board the 
llohenzollern at Brindisi ; and the next evening, at a 
gala dinner at Vienna, he assured the -venerable 
Emperor Francis Joseph of the ''benediction that 
would rest upon the alliance," declaring that "the 
whole world knows already with what effectiveness 
that alliance has contributed, even in the last few 
months, to the peace of all Europe." 

What then had threatened the peace of all Europe 
in tlie preceding months? Absolutely nothing but 
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Aus- 
tria-Hungary, in violation of the Treaty of Berlin, 
with the determination of the Kaiser that the other 
powers who had framed and signed that treaty 
should have nothing to say about it, and should not 
even be allowed to meet in a general conference to 
discuss it. 

With Great Britain in a peaceful mood and the 

130 



THE KAISER'S REVERSION TO TYPE 

Triple Alliance, as the Kaiser contended, invincibly 
strong, where were the disturbing elements that 
liad menaced the peace of Europe? Evidently, 
Russia was considered the guilty culprit. But of 
what was Russia guilty? Nicholas II had commit- 
ted the flagrant crime of having sent Mr. Isvolsky 
on a circular mission to sound the other govern- 
ments on the necessity of convoking a general con- 
ference to define or amend the Treaty of Berlin. 
The mission had resulted in a declaration for peace 
so emphatic that the right of appeal to a general 
conference was not insisted upon, and not even 
asked for, unless the Triple Alliance would freely 
consent to it. And so, when, on June 17th, the 
Kaiser was received by Nicholas II on board the 
Czar's yacht Standart, at Reval, William II said 
to his host : 

*'I see with joy in this reception a new and pre- 
cious confirmation of the close and sincere friend- 
ship which unites our persons and our Houses . . . 
and the absolutely pacific sentiments of our two 
countries." 

At last, if William II 's system of personal diplo- 
macy could be relied upon, Europe was finally as- 
sured of peace. So long as all conformed to the 
Kaiser's wdll, there would be no war. The War 
Lord, on this theory, was in truth the guarantor of 
general peace. This role gave him infinite pleasure, 
which he did not hesitate to confess. On Septem- 
ber 15th, at Karlsruhe, he said to his troops : 

**We Germans like to bear arms and we love the 

10 131 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

play of war. Our equipment weighs upon us but 
little, and we gladly carry it because we know that 
it will keep the peace, in the midst of which our 
work can be accomplished. ... As long as there 
are men there will be enemies, . . . and as long as 
wars are possible our army will form a rock of 
bronze on which peace will be supported." 

Subjected to analysis, what is the meaning of this 
theory? Nothing can be simpler. Germany having 
already attained the hegemony of Europe, the 
Kaiser could keep Europe at peace, because he be- 
lieved himself too formidable to be opposed. But 
he could also at any time destroy peace if his will 
was not obeyed. 

What, then, were his intentions? Was he satis- 
fied with this hegemony? If so, why burden his 
people with new taxes that no one wished to bear, 
in order to increase the military strength of Ger- 
many? And yet an increased budget for war pur- 
poses was exacted of the people. Prince von 
Billow, the most skilful virtuoso Germany had ever 
possessed as a parliamentary leader, unable to hold 
his hloc together in the Reichstag, had, in the mean 
time, failed to coax the deputies to provide for the 
funds demanded; and on July 14, 1909, he had 
resigned. 

Measures of financial reform — the most favorable 
Billow could secure, but far below the Kaiser's de- 
mands — were adopted; and there was, therefore, 
no reason why the Chancellor should abdicate, had 
it not been, as was at the time generally believed 

132 



THE KAISER'S REVERSION TO TYPE 

in Germany, that William II preferred in that office 
a person whose opinions were inspired solely by 
ihe Imperial will. The new Chancellor, Herr von 
Bethmann-Hollweg, was a minister likely to play 
successfully his appointed part. A Prussian of un- 
questioned patriotism, broken to administrative 
routine by the service of a lifetime, in no sense a 
cosmopolitan, as Prince von Biilow was, Bethmann- 
Hollweg entered upon his office with no experience 
in foreign affairs and little knowledge of foreign 
countries. Neither a great orator nor an experi- 
enced negotiator, in Billow's sense, he w^as an hon- 
est-seeming man, who suggested b}'' his appearance 
and manner that he was a well-seasoned provincial 
governor rather than the Chancellor of an Empire, 
a type admirably adapted to execute the Kaiser's 
will without flinching and with the approval of a 
conscience object to the authority of a superior. 

The time was now ripe for the Kaiser to show 
himself once more to his own people as a Hohen- 
zollern. On August 21, 1910, at Konigsberg, his 
great coup d'etat was made. He had waited pa- 
tiently for the opportunity to wipe out the humilia- 
tion the nation had imposed upon him regarding 
ministerial responsibility. 

*'It is here," said the Kaiser, *'that the Great 
Elector declared himself sovereign duke of Prussia, 
of his own right ; it is here that his son placed the 
crown on his own head; here Frederick William I 
established his authority *like a rock of bronze'; 
under Frederick the Great, the province partook of 

133 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

the joys and sorrows of his reign; ... it is here 
that my grandfather, of his o^ai right, placed the 
crown of the King of Prussia on his head, shomng 
once again, in a precise manner, that it was ac- 
corded to him by the grace of God alone, and not 
by parliaments, national assemblies, or popular 
votes, in snch a manner that he regarded himself 
as the chosen instrument of Heaven, and as such 
accomplished his duties as regent and sovereign. 
Adorned "with this crown, forty years ago, he rode 
forth to battle to win the Imperial crown also. . . . 
Looking upon myself as the instrument of the Lord, 
without regard for the opinions and intentions of 
the day, I go my way, which is devoted solely to 
the welfare and peaceful development of the 
Fatherland."^ 

There was nothing new in this utterance, which 
was simply a reaffirmation of w^hat William II had 
repeatedly said before; but it was regarded by 
many Germans as a violation of the compact made 
in 1908, and the subject was brought up for con- 
sideration in the Reichstag. 

This time the Kaiser was prepared squarely to 
meet the issue, and had at hand a Chancellor upon 
whom he could rely. 

On November 26, 1910, Herr Bethmann-HoUweg, 
rising in the Reichstag to defend his master, an- 
nounced that there was nothing in the Konigsberg 
speech that was not reconcilable with the Constitu- 
tion. It was merely a strong affirmation of the 



1 Shaw, William of Germany, p. 332, 

134 



THE KAISER'S REVERSION TO TYPE 

monarcliical principle which is the foundation of the 
right of the Prussian state, as well as an expression 
of profound religious convictions shared by numer- 
ous classes of the people. In the historical develop- 
ment of Prussia, it was not the Prussian people who 
had created royalty, but the great monarchs of the 
House of Hohenzollern, who had created the Prus- 
sian nation and the Prussian state. For this reason 
the kings of Prussia, in relation to their own people, 
are kings of their o^vti right. If, in our days, there 
is a temptation, in the interest of democracy, to 
consider more decidedly than in other times that the 
King of Prussia is a dignitary named by the people, 
"one should not be astonished that the King asserts 
vigorously the consciousness he possesses of being 
subject to no sovereignty of the people." And he 
concluded mth the positive statement : 

''Personal irresponsibility of the King, inde- 
pendence and original existence of his monarchical 
right — here are the fundamental ideas of our state 
life, which remain alive in the period of constitu- 
tional development. ' ' ^ 

Historically, the Chancellor stated the precise 
truth. William II, as King of Prussia, claimed 
nothing which had not from the beginning been held 
by his predecessors. William I, in 1861, had explic- 
itly declared: 

''The sovereigns of Prussia receive their crown 



1 A report of this speech may be found in the Official Gazette 
of that date. A good abstract is given in Arren, Guillaume II, 
pp. 219, 220. See Illustrative Document No. V. 

135 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

from God. To-morrow I shall take the crown from 
God's altar and I shall place it npon my head. 
There is the meaning of royalty by divine right, 
and in that resides the sanctity of the crown which 
is indestructible." 

William I had been opposed by the people, and 
the Prussian parliament had refused to vote the 
budget, but the people and the parliament had been 
overcome. He had passed through more sorrowful 
days than William II had ever known. In 1849, as 
a royal prince, he had fled to England. In 1862, 
the opposition to the reorganization of the army 
was so bitter that he expected to fail, and even to 
perish on the scaffold. And yet he had triumphed. 
The events from 1864 to 1871 had not only securely 
established the Prussian monarchy, but had created 
the Empire, with William I at its head. No part 
of this work had been done by the will of the Ger- 
man people or the German princes. It was the work 
of the army under the political guidance of Bis- 
marck. Every German historian admits this, and 
Prince von Billow himself tells the story with pride 
and even mth boastfulness. ^ 

William II does not hesitate to carry his preroga- 

1 Von Billow, Imperial Germany, says : "The opposition in Ger- 
many itself (to the founding of the Empire) could hardly be 
overcome except by such a struggle (as the Franco-Prussian War). 
By this means the national policy was interwoven with interna- 
tional policy; with incomparable audacity and constructive states- 
manship, in consummating the work of uniting Germany, he 
(Bismarck) left out of play the political capabilities of the Ger- 
mans, in which they have never excelled, while he called into 
action their fighting powers, which have always been their strong- 
est point." 

136 



THE KAISER'S REVERSION TO TYPE 

tives as King of Prussia into the administration of 
the entire German Empire. It is because he is 
King of Prussia that he has become German Em- 
peror, and he could not consent to be less as Em- 
peror than he claims to be as King. So long as the 
army is at his back, who will undertake to limit his 
constitutional rights ? It is as a Hohenzollern that 
he reigns. 

As understood by William II, and practised by 
his predecessors in the creation of the Prussian 
Kingdom, sovereign right is an inherent supremacy 
divinely bestowed upon the Hohenzollern djmasty. 
The right to rule is not derived from the consent 
of any people. In consequence, it is not restrained 
by any geographical limitations. It is not, in prin- 
ciple, in any sense territorial. It applies wherever 
it can be applied — that is, wherever conquest can 
extend the Hohenzollern rule. 

William II has expressed this idea as clearly as 
it can be stated. ' ' In our House, ' ' he said, on April 
1, 1890, at Bremen, 'Sve consider ourselves ap- 
pointed by God to direct and lead the nations over 
which it has been given us to rule to a higher state 
of well-being, to the improvement of their material 
and spiritual interests.'* Hohenzollernism is, 
therefore, not a limited authority, or confined to a 
limited area; it is a imiversal mission; and it ex- 
tends, regardless of peoples and parliaments and 
temporary boundaries, to "the nations" over which 
the Hohenzollern d^Tiasty may at any time be able 
to rule. It is, in substance, Dante's conception of 

137 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

universal empire, the antliority for which is not to 
be sought in the consent of peoples, hnt arises from 
the intrinsic excellence of imperial rule itself. 

There is nothing in any utterance of William II, 
so far as I am aware, to indicate that, in his mind, 
there is any difference in the nature of his author- 
ity wherever it may be exercised. To admit such a 
difference would be to disavow the inherent su- 
premacy of his dynasty, and to rest its authority 
upon some external ground, such as the will of the 
people or a constitutional prerogative. William II 
has nowhere admitted the right of any people to 
contradict his inherent authority to rule over them, 
provided he has the power to do so. Being of 
divine origin, nothing of human origin can stand in 
its way. 

If there is coherence in the Hohenzollern theory 
as stated by William II, it has no relation to any 
particular race or any definite area. It would have 
been quite the same to this dynasty if it had started 
in Russia or in Turkey. As a matter of fact, it 
started in Poland. At just what moment, it may 
be asked, was the House of Hohenzollern *' ap- 
pointed by God ' ' ? Was it when Albert of Branden- 
burg, Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, in 1525, 
seized its territories, claiming them as his own, re- 
nounced the Catholic religion, embraced Lutheran- 
ism, and was acknowledged Duke of East Prussia 
by the King of Poland, from whom he then held the 
duchy as a fiief ? Or was it when, in 1656, the Duchy 
of Prussia was detached from the Kingdom of 

138 



THE KAISER'S REVERSION TO TYPE 

Poland by Frederick William, the Great Elector, 
"wlio then passed into temporary vassalage to the 
King of Sweden? Or, finally, was it only after 
Brandenburg-Prussia had been increased by in- 
heritance and conquest, when Frederick III, Duke 
of Prussia, having previously obtained from Em- 
peror Leopold I, of the House of Hapsburg, by a 
treaty of November 16, 1700, in exchange for an 
alliance in a time of need, the reluctant pledge to 
permit Prussia to become a kingdom, on January 
18, 1701, despite the opposition of the other German 
princes, set the royal crown upon his o^vn head at 
Konigsberg and declared himself ''King of Prus- 
sia" as Frederick I? 

It is not unimportant to note that the original 
Hohenzollern kingship was not assumed without 
previous negotiation with a Hapsburg Emperor, 
and that the permission was given in exchange for 
a promised service. 

Upon William II 's theory of divine appointment, 
any form of success, however won, whether by war 
or diplomacy, may be construed as a special divine 
recognition. Wherever the Kaiser's armies and 
navy may establish his powder, there, according to 
his claim, he is "aiopointed by God" to direct and 
lead and rule. This is just as applicable to Bel- 
gium, or Poland, or northwestern France, or to the 
whole of Russia, as it was to East Prussia, or 
Silesia, or Hanover, or any country that has ever 
been brought under the control of Prussia. It is, 
in brief, in the simplest terms, merely the dogmatic 

X39 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

assertion of the divine right of conquest. If the 
Kaiser's armies should extend his sway over the 
whole of Europe, and if his navy should carry his 
rule over distant seas, wherever his standard was 
set up, there he might crown himself at will and 
claim divine appointment with the same justifica- 
tion and the same evidence of divine right as can 
be put forward for the like performances at 
Konigsberg. 

The Kaiser's religious mysticism offers a very 
inadequate shield for his conception of personal 
sovereignty. A mystic he often seems to be, but in 
practice he is a realist and an opportunist of the 
most strenuous type. In Turkey he wears the 
dress and utters the speech of a sincere Moham- 
medan. At Rome he visits the Pope and sends gifts 
to him as if he were a fervent Catholic, professing 
to admire greatly the authority and discipline of 
the Roman Church. Ex officio he is a Lutheran, and 
urges all to help him '* maintain religion in the 
people." 

''Whoever," has said, ''does not establish 
his whole life on the foundation of religion is 
lost." 

But to William II religion has never meant 
either a definite code of ethics or a principle of self- 
subordination to a reign of law. It has meant to 
him that a directing force in nature, which he occa- 
sionally calls "Providence," has laid out a great 
future for the Tlohenzollern dynasty; a faith that 
is comparable to the confidence of Napoleon I in his 

140 



THE KAISER'S REVERSION TO TYPE 

"star. " In this he is no more religious, in the ordi- 
nary sense of the word, than was Frederick II in 
trying to convince his people that he was divinely 
appointed to complete, by the seizure of Silesia, the 
Prussian Kingdom which his ancestors had pieced 
together from the heritage of Brandenburg and the 
spoils of Poland, Sweden, and other enfeebled 
powers — a mosaic so extended and yet so frag- 
mentary that it seemed as if it were in fact a pre- 
liminary sketch of a formidable kingdom. The peo- 
ple might well believe, being piously inclined, that 
it was a work of Providence to which their King 
was called. For what reason had his provident 
father, Frederick William I, gatliered and stored 
up treasure and disciplined troops? Obviously, 
Providence had given him this wisdom, in order 
that his son should use these resources for the aug- 
mentation of the state ! 

It is, however, success, and not any moral prin- 
ciple, that in such matters is taken as the test of 
divine intention. When Frederick's minister, 
Podewils, timidly reminded him that any rights 
which Prussia might ever have had in Silesia had 
already been renounced by treaties, the King re- 
plied : 

*'The matter of right is an affair of the ministers. 
. . . It is time to work in secret, for the orders to 
the troops have been given." ^ 

That which William II has throughout his reign 
most emphasized regarding religion is its utility. 



^ Politische Correspondent, Friedrichs des Grossen, I, p. 91. 

141 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

It makes good subjects, good soldiers, a united 
people. When speaking of religion, the Kaiser 
expressly says he does not take it in its narrow, 
ecclesiastical sense, but in its larger, practical ap- 
plication to human life. 

In a letter to Admiral Hollmann, William II has 
stated very explicitly his views regarding Chris- 
tianity. * God, he says, has eternally revealed Him- 
self to mankind, "now in the person of this, now of 
that great mse man, whether pagan, Jew, or Chris- 
tian. Hammurabi was one of these, Moses, Abra- 
ham, Homer, Charlemagne, Luther, Shakespeare, 
Goethe, Kant, Kaiser AVilliam the Great"! Bis- 
marck is not honored by him with a place among the 
* 'great wdse." 

Of Christian morality he says nothing. Of 
Jesus he declares : "He spurs us on " ; " He allures 
us " ; " His fire burns us " ; " His S3mipathy strength- 
ens us"; "His displeasure annihilates us"; and 
"His care saves us." Finally, "He leads to vic- 
tory." 

Nowhere is the Kaiser more mystical than when 
he tries to speak on the true nature of religion. He 
thinks "the act of legislation on Sinai only sym- 
bolically inspired of God. " Moses may have had it 
from Hammurabi. Still, "Our good Professor 
Delitzsch," he says, "would do well to avoid treat- 
ing of religion as such." "Never," he concludes, 
"was religion a result of science, but a gushing out 



^This letter is printed in full in Noussanne, The Kaiser as He 
Is, New York, 1905. See also Illustrative Document No. VI. 

142 



THE KAISER'S REVERSION TO TYPE 

of the heart and being of mankind, springing from 
its intercourse with God." 

And so the Hohenzollern prerogatives, which 
obtain but little comfort from science, seek their 
safe asylum in the mysteries of religion! 



CHAPTER VI 

THE KAISER AND HIS PEOPLE 

'X^TTE qnestion is often asked in America, How is 
•^ it possible for the people of Germany, so in- 
telligent in many directions, so material and so 
logical in their habits of thought, and so little given 
to mysticism, to endure, and even to seem to re- 
spect, the- pretensions of the Kaiser f 

A complete answer to this question would re- 
quire a careful analysis of the population of the 
German Empire into its different classes and their 
relations to one another, an account of the condi- 
tions in which German society has developed, an 
explanation of the special reasons why the tradi- 
tions of the past have such a strong hold upon the 
people, and an examination of the prevailing state 
of mind resulting from the whole complex of in- 
fluences that liave determined the national psy- 
chology. 

Without undertaking to touch upon all the points 
which an elaborate inquiry would suggest, a few 
observations may prove sufficient to explain what 
at first sight seems difficult of comprehension. 



THE KAISER AND HIS PEOPLE 

In no country of Europe has the feudal system 
continued to affect the social organization to the 
extent it has in Germany. When the French were 
proclaiming the ''Rights of Man'* as axioms of the 
human mind, German princes were selling their 
subjects as foreign mercenaries in the same spirit 
as they would enter upon a transaction for the 
shipment of cattle ; and there was no suggestion of 
revolt. The subject went where he was ordered to 
go, to fight for whatever cause the new master di- 
rected, and with the moral nature or effect of his 
activities the soldier had no concern. The prince 
took the money and used it as he pleased. No one 
disputed his right to treat his subjects as his 
property. 

This relation of sovereign and subject, when not 
the direct result of conquest, had grown out of the 
subject's need of protection, in an age when near 
neighbors were dangerous enemies, and the sove- 
reign's ability as a leader and organizer of his de- 
pendents to a fford the protection they required. To 
widen his frontiers and to strengthen his realm was 
the first preoccupation of the prince. As a Chris- 
tian — for, after his kind, he was a believer in the 
Christian faith — he often had a lofty conception of 
his mission and of his personal responsibility to 
God. Usually, in the medieval time, he held cour- 
age, justice, and mercy, as he conceived them, to be 
duties which were imposed upon him by his relig- 
ion; the performance of which required, however, 
that he should be his own judge, free from the 

145 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

restraint of others, and \vith authority to require 
his subjects to aid him in his divinely appointed 
task. 

From all this, made real in times of storm and 
stress, it resulted that society in Germany came 
to be regarded, not as a co-ordination of equals, but 
as a hierarchy of classes; a system consisting of 
superimposed strata running through ascending 
grades of superiority from the lowest and most 
dependent until the person of the prince was 
reached. All were directly responsible in their re- 
spective stations to those who stood immediately 
above them; and, by inclusion, to the prince, who 
stood at the apex of the social organization. He, in 
turn, by the theory, was responsible to God for his 
conduct as a prince. Duties to those below him he 
undoubtedly had and recognized, but not account- 
ability. 

So universal and persistent was this conception 
of society in Germany that, when the Wars of Re- 
ligion were ended by the Peace of Westphalia, it 
was considered a sufficient concession to the relig- 
ious differences of the German people that they 
should all follow the religion of the particular 
prince that happened to rule over them. Catholic, 
Calvinist, or Lutheran, as the case might be. Cujus 
regio ejus religio, summed up the conclusion at 
which the settlement had arrived. 

All the more logically, in the light of this con- 
clusion, the prince was held to be nearest to God; 
and by this fact authorized to prescribe to his peo- 

146 



THE KAISER AND HIS PEOPLE 

pie the way to eternal blessedness. What the prince 
did or decreed might not always be comprehensible, 
but obedience to him always seemed dutiful; for 
who could fathom the decisions of Providence? 
Having been appointed by God to rule, whatever 
the prince did must be right ; for was he not divinely 
guided? 

In the secularization of German society, a large 
degree of religious toleration has been recognized 
and much irreligion has developed ; but this conces- 
sion to the individual's inner convictions has not 
affected his status in society, or gone to the length 
of permitting him to claim for himself any inherent 
political rights, not to speak of a share in the right 
of sovereignty. He remains a '* subject'^ still, and 
whatever civil rights he may be permitted to enjoy 
they are in theory granted to him as an act of 
sovereign grace. 

To the average German subject there is nothing 
unnatural in this order of things. First of all, this 
system is a fact, and, as such, is indisputable. It 
has become a fact, he thinks, through the operation 
of a historic process ; and, therefore, must be nat- 
ural. The professors of jurisprudence and political 
philosophy in the universities, as servants of the 
state, have worked out a theory, in their oa\ti meta- 
physical way, which supports and apparently jus- 
tifies the German system. From Hegel down to the 
latest doctor of philosophy, with few exceptions, 
the state is represented as a superior entity, for 
whose power, glory, and aggrandizement the indi- 

11 147 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

vidnal person exists. All that he is he owes to the 
state, and in return he should offer it absolute and 
unconditional obedience. Government does not 
proceed from the will or even from the reason of 
the people. It emanates from superior authority. 
The state has been realized through the work of 
dynasties, which by conquest have obtained the 
right to command. Thus has been established a 
mold into which newly acquired subjects are to be 
forced as plastic material until they are conformed 
to its established contours. Only thus do they 
become a part of the nation. Poles, Alsatians, and 
all others who may be subjected to Imperial control 
are to be treated as conquered peoples until they 
thus conform. As the state can acquire complete 
"unity only through monarchy, the monarch is the 
rightful head of the state. Such unity promotes 
efficiency, for it ends debate and renders authority 
absolute. The strength and security of the state 
are derived from the nation in arms — that is, the 
organized army, of which the monarch is the head. 
It is he whom the army must obey and to whom it 
owes fealty. His person is sacred. He cannot be 
made subject to contradiction. His decision is law. 
In such a system, it is the army that forms the 
substantial framework of the nation. It is, of ne- 
cessity, a system of superimposed classes. The 
whole of society is modeled upon it, as it was in the 
feudal organization. In France, every man, from 
the President down to the humblest laborer, is 
Monsieur. In Germany, one gives offense if the 

148 



THE KAISER AND HIS PEOPLE 

correct title is not employed, even in familiar ad- 
dress. Majestdt, HoJieit, DurchlaucJit , Excellent, 
Herr Geheimrat, Herr Professor, Ilerr Dohtor, and 
so on down the scale, must be properly attributed. 
A married woman expects to be called by her hus- 
band's title, and takes her place on the sofa in the 
order of her rank, as Frau Geheimrat, Frau Pro- 
fessor, etc. And to each of these grades belong cer- 
tain prerogatives which it would be disloyal to the 
system to disregard. In the army, and to some ex- 
tent in civil life, it is a recognized privilege to neg- 
lect or to abuse with impunity a person of a lower 
rank. On the other hand, inattention on the part of 
a subordinate, or an inferior in the social scale, is 
considered as a serious offense and deserving of 
punishment. As between the military and the civil 
population, he who walks in *'the King's coat" has 
always the right of way. So paralyzing is the spell 
cast by a military uniform in Germany that a com- 
mon shoemaker, arrayed in the stolen costume of an 
officer, was able unresisted to sack the treasury of 
the little town of Kopenick, near Berlin, in broad 
daylight, and in the presence of its custodians. 

It is not astonishing that the pretensions of the 
Kaiser seem in no way preposterous to a German 
subject who has spent his life in the midst of these 
feudal and military traditions. So long as no par- 
ticular offense is committed against himself, he is 
likely to think the whole system excellent. If he 
also is, or is likely to become, in some degree, a 
dispenser of authority, as a member of the nobility, 

149 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

as an officer, or an agent of government, he con- 
siders the system altogether necessary. And it 
must not be overlooked that, in practice, the Kaiser 
is not an oppressor of his people. His station is so 
high and his person is so remote from the ordinary 
subject that whatever hardships the system may 
impose do not seem to originate with him. On 
the contrary, he is regarded as the friend of the 
people and the promoter of their prosperity. If 
the laws do not always seem equitable, the fault is 
not attributed to the Kaiser, who, in fact, does not 
meddle with civil rights. On the other hand, he has 
often and very urgently advocated better treatment 
of working-men. He is interested in every new 
enterprise that is proposed in the Empire. He 
gives encouragement to all the leaders in industry, 
commerce, and finance. He is neither idle, nor 
dissipated, nor neglectful of the increase of his 
realm. Virtually all, during peace, have prospered 
under the Empire, and the Kaiser is to them the 
living sjonbol of the long-yearned-for unity and 
power of the German nation. Those who know 
Germany best understand how difficult it is for a 
German to dispute the Kaiser's supremacy or re- 
nounce his authority. 

There is another feature of German life that 
must be taken into account in any serious attempt 
to comprehend the position of the German people 
with regard to government. If the traditions of 
feudalism are strong, they are in a certain sense 
intensified by what is most modern in social organi- 

150 



THE KAISER AND HIS PEOPLE 

zation, the idea of a minute division of labor. No- 
where in the world has this idea been carried to 
such lengths as in Germany. The instinct for thor- 
oughness is strong in the Teutonic race. In educa- 
tion, in science, and in every form of practice, the 
Germans have resolved every inquiry and every 
performance into its elements, and have portioned 
these out in such a manner as to produce by means 
of specific training a nation of skilful experts. 
Their success has been so great that before the 
present war no form of higher or technical educa- 
tion was regarded in other countries as quite com- 
plete until the German professor had been heard. 
The gift of the German universities and technical 
schools to the world has, however, not been so much 
a contribution of original and creative thought as 
the result of studious method and detailed research. 
But for this excellence a heavy price has been paid. 
The narrow specialist who has concentrated his 
attention upon a limited field of investigation is, 
for that reason, necessarily deprived of the broader 
vision and the more generous culture which are in- 
spired by wider interests. In this respect there has 
been a noticeable change in Germany even in a 
quarter of a century. The volume of knowledge has 
vastly increased, and in the use of it there has been 
increasing co-operation; but it has not anywhere 
promoted the broadest personal development of in- 
telligence. It has produced a highly differentiated 
social mechanism, but it has at the same time mech- 
anized the German mind. National efficiency has, 

151 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

no doubt, been greatly augmented, for all the talent 
of the country has been organized for the service of 
the state. This has, however, been accompanied 
by an almost complete loss of personal initiative in 
matters of government and by a diminished sense 
of individual responsibility for the policies of the 
nation. 

The idea that each person is competent only in 
that which he has made his Fach, as the Germans 
call it, and consequently is exempt from thinking 
seriously of everything that does not pertain to it, 
is of obvious consequence for the politics of a coun- 
try. Logically carried out — and the German is apt 
to be logical — it would leave the affairs of govern- 
ment entirely in the hands of bureaucrats and ad- 
ministrative officers. A thinking man in America 
or in England considers it a part of his duty to 
reflect upon the public policies of his country, for- 
eign as well as domestic, to obtain information con- 
cerning them, and to form and express opinions 
about them. Except in very limited circles, this 
habit of mind does not exist in Germany. It is 
only when some personal interest is affected, or 
some national danger is incurred, that public at- 
tention is given to such matters, with the result 
that there is, outside the decisions of the govern- 
ment itself, no systematic formulation of political 
doctrine, in the sense of the great party platforms 
of other countries. The various political parties, 
which are so numerous that they are generally re- 
ferred to as **fractions,'' are based on groups of 

152 



THE KAISER AND HIS PEOPLE 

more or less personal interests or points of view; 
the Conservatives being devoted to the agrarian in- 
terests of the landholding class, the National Lib- 
erals to industrial and commercial interests, the 
Social Democrats to the interests of the working 
class mainly in the large towns, the Centrum, or 
Catholic party, to the interests of the Roman Cath- 
olic Church in the Empire, etc. 

The business of administration being left to the 
bureaucrats, legislation becomes a matter of trans- 
action between the different groups. These com- 
promises are negotiated by the government through 
the Chancellor, who takes the legislation proposed 
in the Bundesrat — itself a diplomatic rather than 
a legislative body — and gets it ratified by a major- 
ity in the Reichstag, by means of concessions of 
various kinds to the powerful groups, and exhorta- 
tion and menace to the smaller ones; so that, in 
the end, the various interests are, if not reconciled, 
at least either pacified or subjugated. Of course, 
it is the great ones that triumph. The little ones 
have acquired the habit of waiting. It is essen- 
tially a system of organized privilege. 

In all of this procedure there is no clear asser- 
tion of principle, and no real element of democracy, 
because there is no frank recognition of inherent 
individual rights or of any kind of equality between 
persons which government is bound to respect. By 
this theory ** rights" are such privileges as the 
power of the group is able to extort from the gov- 
ernment. If the group is feeble and alone, it will 

153 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

obtain little. If it is strong and a good trader, it 
will obtain much. 

Beyond mere living conditions, classes, in this 
system, fare well or ill according to their fighting 
strength. When it comes to the "All-Highest," he 
is, theoretically, for everybody; which enables him 
to be in practice pre-eminently for himself and his 
dynasty. He commands the army, which owes 
fealty to him and to him alone. He is, therefore, 
it is assumed, in a position to see that justice is 
done to all. If the lawmakers do not make what 
he considers just laws he can send a regiment of 
cavalry to close the Reichstag. 

There has always been something very fascinat- 
ing to the human mind in this concentration of 
power in the hand of one man who can use it in the 
interest of all and maintain against the opposition 
of many the right of one. Given purity of motive, 
clearness of intelligence, and courage to enforce 
righteousness, great masses of men may feel that 
they can have no better guarantee that all their 
rights will be respected than by committing them 
all, without reserve, to such a supreme trustee. 

Tliis is the boast and the promise of imperial- 
ism. All Germans born in Germany since 1870 
have lived all their lives under the influence of this 
faith, and have from childhood been dedicated to 
this imperial cult. 

Personally, Kaiser William II has been variously 
esteemed at different times. As the ' ' All-Highest ' ' 
he is exempt in Germany from the public scrutiny 



THE KAISER AND HIS PEOPLE 

and criticism which are applied to the heads of 
state in democratic countries. Some bold minds 
have, however, privately expressed the view that 
it would be better if the Kaiser were more of a 
specialist in whatever specifically belongs to the 
Fach of being Kaiser, less versatile, less given to 
the assumption of omniscience. They think he 
would be even more the Kaiser if he did not dabble 
in music, painting, the drama, architecture, etc. 
"William I, they argue, did none of these things, and 
yet he was an excellent Kaiser. 

But, on the whole, on the principle that the spe- 
cialist knows best, who — not being himself Kaiser 
— has the "authority,** taking the word in its 
strictly scientific sense, to say what the Kaiser 
should do? A logical application of the division 
of labor, and of thereby creating experts, would 
require that the Kaiser, being Kaiser — and espe- 
cially having been Kaiser now for thirty years — 
should seem to the German mind to understand his 
business better than any one else ! And thus, that 
which is most modern in German social organiza- 
tion seems to confirm that which is most ancient; 
and the Kaiser, whose whole regime rests on a union 
of medieval conceptions w^ith modern methods, be- 
comes the beneficiary of both. 

No one can rightly comprehend the psychology 
of modern Germany who does not carefully con- 
sider the effect of this union of the feudal spirit 
and modern industrialism. The feudal motive was 
protective organization under a military leader, 

155 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

It was not difficult, therefore, to graft upon the 
dying stock of feudalism the new protective organi- 
zation of industry under the shadow of the im- 
perial sword. To the German tribes the outside 
world had always seemed a group of enemies 
against whose hostile designs the state was a neces- 
sary provision of defense. To increase the forces 
of this defense was in every kingdom and princi- 
pality of Germany a common aim. The war with 
France, by uniting the princes in common action, 
revealed the possibility of a vastly extended de- 
fensive organization, and the present German Em- 
pire was the fulfilment of this general desire. 
Alone, it has been represented, no one of the Ger- 
man kingdoms and principalities, not even Prussia, 
could have entered into economic competition with 
the great powers of Europe. Together, they 
constitute a formidable phalanx of economic 
strength. 

Again and again Kaiser William II has pro- 
claimed in his public utterances the necessity of 
military protection on land and sea for the prog- 
ress of German industry and commerce. The Ger- 
mans understood him as no other people could. All 
their feudal habits of mind gave confirmation to 
his exhortations. To them the real significance 
of the Kaiser was that he was their War Lord, 
their powerful protector. While they worked their 
Emperor would guard. 

In every provincial German mind there was a 
traditional picture that spoke for the Kaiser — the 

156 



THE KAISER AND HIS PEOPLE 

image of the watchful sentinel keeping gnard be- 
hind the turrets of the castle wall, overlooking the 
fields, the vineyards, and the village nestling at the 
castle ^s foot, where in the medieval time their an- 
cestors, looking up from tilling their fields or tend- 
ing their herds, awaited the blast of the bugle that 
called them to arms when the spears of an advanc- 
ing foe glinted over the hill-tops. 

To-day the picture is amplified to imperial di- 
mensions; but the quality of the emotion in the 
breast of the German is quite the same when the 
coming of the Kaiser's automobile is heralded by 
the three silvery notes from the chasseur's horn, or 
the blue and white imperial special train speeds 
along the iron highway. With bowed heads, the 
simple peasants line the way, when the advent of 
the Emperor is announced, and whisper, as if in the 
presence of a sacred epiphany, ^'Er Jcommt, der 
Kaiser!'^ 

Let us clearly understand that the deep longing 
of the German heart has never been for individual 
liberty, in the English or American sense. Its crav- 
ing is for exemption from solicitude. To the Ger- 
man, who even when in bondage can believe he is 
free, "freedom" means being free from want and 
misery. He demands no other liberty. 

Here is the secret of his attachment to the Em- 
pire. It is for him ein feste Burg. 

"What Germans have longed and hoped for has 
never been the liberty of democracy, but the pro- 
tection of a strong man capable of giving them 

157 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

material security and prosperity. Even the con- 
stitutionalists of 1848 were ready to accept a Prus- 
sian king, if he would only grant them written 
guarantees. What they were seeking was, as the 
poet Geibel has expressed it, "a successor to Bar- 
barossa." 

*'0 Destiny," he exclaims, ** grant us a man, only 
a man. ... A man is necessary to us, a descend- 
ant of the Nibelungen." *'War, war!" he cries. 
**Give us war, to replace the quarrels which dry up 
for us the marrow in our bones." 

The ideal War Lord, God's vicar on earth, wise, 
m-ajestic, fearless, and strong — that is the German 
idea of government. Rights of man, constitutions, 
votes, what are these but pretense and confusion? 
Why should any one vote, when wisdom has al- 
ready decided? For what should one vote? For 
taxes? But, alas! they would have to be paid out 
of hard earnings. In Mecklenburg the people have 
never wished either for a constitution or a repre- 
sentative parliament. They leave everything to 
the Grand Dukes. 

This persistent craving for a ruler, this instinct 
of personal fealty to a superior, this readiness to 
fight at a word of command — these are the racial 
qualities of the German people that have made them 
as clay in the hands of their Nibelung Kaiser. 

But there is more than romanticism in this state 
of mind. Among the characteristics of the feudal 
time was the increase of strength, the constant 
pushing back of the frontiers, the absorption of 

158 



THE KAISER AND HIS PEOPLE 

neighbors, and the extension of the realm. The 
feudal habit has become an instinct in the German 
race. As an individual and as a nation, no hesi- 
tation is felt by the Teuton to take wherever he 
can. No opportunity is to be neglected, and no ad- 
vantage gained is to be surrendered. In private 
life acquisition is esteemed a virtue, and is called 
thrift. In national development it is conquest, and 
is claimed as a rightful exercise of superior 
strength. What is surprising to those who reflect on 
it is that the moral obligations which the very ex- 
istence of society renders necessary in civil life 
are held to have no existence as between states and 
nations. 

It is anomalous that in the present advanced con- 
dition of the world such sentiments should prevail 
in Germany. The Germans — even the Kaiser him- 
self — refer with pride to the lofty ethical teachings 
of their great philosophers, and particularly to the 
"categorical imperative" of Immanuel Kant. 
What is this famous precept? The Kaiser, who 
publicly applauds it, seems to have forgotten its 
meaning and to remember only the name. The 
very essence of the categorical imperative is the 
universal application of a moral judgment. **So 
act that thy action could be made universal,'' is the 
formula which, according to Kant, the conscience 
categorically imposes. It excludes all merely per- 
sonal expediency. If the universal application of a 
judgment would be a human good, then it is right. 
If it would be an evil, then it is wrong. 

159 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

How then can it be held that morality ends with 
national frontiers? Should falsehood, bad faith, 
hatred, barbarity, the taking of life for the posses- 
sion of another's goods, be made universal? If 
not, and Kant is to be followed, they are categoric- 
ally prohibited. They are as wrong between groups 
of men as they are between individual persons. 
And the philosopher of Konigsberg himself draws 
from his general principle all its logical conse- 
quences. He most hotly condemns war, and par- 
ticularly dynastic wars. There must, he declares, 
be perfect honesty in international dealings and 
good faith in the interpretation of treaties. Every 
state, he contends, should have a republican consti- 
tution, by which he means a constitution based 
directly and solely on the individual rights of citi- 
zens. When the Kaiser and his apologists appeal 
to the world to respect Germany because Germany 
believes in and follows Kant's high morality, they 
forget that the great philosopher had no love for 
Prussia, because Prussianism meant to him the 
exact reversal of all his ethical maxims. 

"Looking beyond Prussia to America, in whose 
struggle for independence he took a keen interest, 
and looking to France, where the old dynastic mon- 
archy had been succeeded by a republican state," 
writes one of his commentators, **Kant seemed to 
see the signs of a coming democratization of the 
old monarchical society of Europe. In this growing 
influence on the state of the mass of the people, 
who had everything to lose in war and little to 

160 



THE KAISER AND HIS PEOPLE 

gain by victory, he saw the guarantee of a future 
perpetual peace. ' ' * 

The truth is that with the growth of material in- 
terests in Germany the ethical sense, which was 
once so strong in the German character, has given 
place to mere political expediency. The influential 
writers of contemporary Germany boast loudly of 
German virtue, but they repudiate the sanctity of 
international obligations. 

I have sought diligently to find one contemporary 
Prussian writer of wide influence who insists upon 
the binding nature of moral obligations upon gov- 
ernments. Forster of Munich has, indeed, written 
caustic criticisms of Bismarckian diplomacy, and 
Schiicking of Marburg has bravely advocated in- 
ternational organization on a juristic basis, but they 
have few followers and stand almost alone in Ger- 
many. I have hoped that some Prussian jurist 
might have the courage to declare that not all Prus- 
sians hold with the Bernhardis, the Lassons, and 
the Kohlers, that force is the only measure of in- 
ternational justice. In my search I turned quite 
naturally toward my personal acquaintances in 
Berlin, and decided that this might .be expected 
from Professor Otto von Gierke, an erudite jurist 



^ Campbell Smith's introduction to his translation of Kant's 
essay on Perpetual Peace, London, 191 5. Since the present war 
some writers have included Kant among the absolutists as regards 
the nature of the state. Passages may be cited from his Philoso- 
phy of Law to support this view, but the inference that he was 
an absolute monarchist is unfair to Kant. His views, as con- 
trasted with those of Hegel, are referred to in the present writer's 
Rebuilding of Europe,^ New York, 1917, pp. 14, 43-50, 176. Prac- 
tically, at the end of his life, Immanuel Kant was a republican. 

161 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

who has advocated with great ability the corporate 
rights of conmninities and revived interest in the 
ethical conception of sovereignty entertained by 
Althusius; and this, I find, is his position: 

** Foreigners do not realize that war fulfils the 
world-historic task of pitilessly destroying decay- 
ing culture, worn-out law, degenerate freedom, in 
order, with native strength, to breed rejuvenated 
culture, a juster law, and a more genuine freedom. 
They cannot understand that military power has 
the riglit to decide the life or death of nations or 
states."^ 

I confess that I do not comprehend why my es- 
teemed friend regards it as a national distinction 
that Germans alone *' understand'* this ''right"; 
nor do I feel that it is a reproach to be of those 
who do not understand it. Wherein does military 
power reveal its ''right" to decide the life or death 
of nations? Whence is it derived? How, unsup- 
ported by a just cause, can it constitute a right? 
It may be employed either for a good or a bad pur- 
pose, but is it not new doctrine to be told that mili- 
tary power in itself has the "right" to decide the 
life or death of nations? Being a new doctrine, it 
requires new proofs. Are they to be found in the 
mere fact that Germany has destroyed the life of 
Belgium by the murder and deportation of its in- 
nocent citizens and the expropriation of their pos- 
sessions? 

There is, it seems, a "right" for Germany that 



1 Gierke, Unsere Fricdcnszielc. Berlin, 1917. 

162 



THE KAISER AND HIS PEOPLE 

exists for no other nation. ''Peace," says Profes- 
sor Gierke, writing as a jurist and in the name of 
what he considers equity— '* peace must bring us 
an extension of power in East and West, in Europe 
and beyond the seas— extension through closer 
contact with our allies, but also by securing better 
protected frontiers, and, further, by retaining a 
firm control in the conquered enemy territory, by 
winning equal sea-power on seas freed from Eng- 
lish tyranny, and thus, at the same time, an unre- 
stricted share in world-trade; and, finally, by 
increasing our oversea colonial possessions and ac- 
quiring strategic points such as will secure their 
connection with the home country. Nor do we in- 
tend to renounce an indemnity for the huge 
sacrifices which we have made, and we expect in the 
East the cession of ample land for colonization in 
place of cash payment." 

What has become of the Kantian faith in the 
future of international equity, when accredited 
jurists speak like this? Is this the final result of 
the imperial subjugation of the universities, or is it 
a moral degeneration produced by a decay of men- 
tality? 

But the disappointment in not finding a correc- 
tive to irresponsible imperialism, pursuing its quest 
for territory, and colonies, and strategic points to 
be wrested by the right of military power from 
mutilated nations, is deepened by the fact that there 
are left remaining no sacred obligations even be- 
tween sovereigns. Treaties— the only possible 

12 163 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

basis for international organization — says Gierke, 
may be set aside at will; for "the clause rebus sic 
stantibus can always be invoked!" "The decision 
as to whether there has been a breach of a treaty is, 
in the end, a naked question of power." 

All government, then, is, in reality, "a naked 
question of power." Peoples have no rights, ex- 
cept what military power grants. Everywhere, in 
the state where the conquered become subjects, and 
between states, military power has the decision of 
life and death. And thus, with one blow, this 
learned jurist destroys utterly the whole science 
of jurisprudence, to which he has devoted a long 
and laborious life, and reduces the whole problem 
of justice to a naked question of power. 

But Professor Gierke destroys more than the 
idea of justice, he robs the sovereign of the senti- 
ment of honor. Not only where there has been an 
actual change of relations may the clause rebus sic 
stantibus be invoked, but it may, he says, "always 
be invoked." 

But this is old doctrine in Prussia. Frederick 
the Great advised his nephew: "Never blush for 
making alliances with a view to your being the only 
one to draw advantage from them. Do not make 
the stupid mistake of not abandoning them when- 
ever you believe that your interests are at stake, 
and especially maintain vigorously this maxim, 
that to despoil your neighbors is to take away from 
them the means of doing you an injury!" ^ 



1 Frederick the Great, Politische Correspondens, Vol. I, p. 244. 

164 



THE KAISER AND HIS PEOPLE 

And now, I ask,Jiow is it that Kaiser "William II 
has made this Prussian creed also a German doc- 
trine? 

There are two answers to this question: He has 
extended to the Empire the Hohenzollern concep- 
tion of absolute personal authority, the divine right 
to impose a supreme will; and he has appealed to 
Deutschtum, of which he claims to be the divinely 
appointed head, to become its instrument. 

It is will, not reason, which, in this conception, 
is the source of authority. There is no reference 
to principles, no definition of rights, no invocation 
of collective judgment. The right to rule consists 
in the power to compel. 

The appeal to Deutschtum is an invitation to 
partnership in the results of this system. He says 
to the German aspiration for a War Lord : 

*' Behold me, I am he, the anointed of our old 
German God ; I offer you protection, I will enlarge 
your borders, I will aid you to rule, as the superi- 
ority of Deutschtum entitles you to rule, over many 
nations." He has called to the deep, and the deep 
has answered him. 

What, then, is the spirit of Deutschtum to which 
the Kaiser has appealed? 

Being a sentiment, rather than an idea, Deutsch- 
tum is not easily comprehended by one who does 
not entertain this form of feeling ; for, while ideas 
may be shared by all races through their intelli- 
gence, a sentiment is incommunicable by definition. 
Deutschtum is, therefore, incapable of rational ex- 

166 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

planation. It may be described as a complex state 
of exaggerated feeling, composed of a sense of 
racial superiority, intense love for a traditional 
mode of life, a lust for power and possession, and 
a disposition to fight for domination over whatever 
offers opposition to this supreme embodiment of 
human excellence. It can be classed only as an 
orgasm. 

If Deutschtum were really an idea, or capable of 
statement as an assemblage of ideas, it would not 
be necessary to fight for it; it could, in that case, 
be reasoned about, and logically defended. But no 
German has ever thought of extending it by reason- 
ing or argumentative persuasion. He cannot even 
prove that the inhabitants of the German Empire 
are really of one race, to say nothing of intrinsic 
superiority. He cannot name any excellence of 
modern civilization that is of purely Germanic ori- 
gin. He cannot deny that Germany has borrowed 
from non-German sources nearly everything that 
distinguishes a highly civilized from a rudely prim- 
itive state of society. He despises the Latin race, 
as he does the Slav, and yet all that is most valuable 
in German Kultur has been absorbed from Latin 
sources. The German Empire is itself a Teutonic 
imitation of the Roman. There would be no ' ' Kai- 
ser ' ^ if there had not been a * ' C^sar. ' ' 

There remains only the assumption of German 
superiority, which, when analyzed, in the main, 
comes down to superiority in physical strength. 
The Prussian test of superiority is war, the 

166 



THE KAISER AND HIS PEOPLE 

art and science of imposing one's will by armed 
force. 

Starting from this postulate, logical procedure is 
quite simple. "Rights," as known and accorded 
in Germany, are the trophies of strength. They 
have been won by fighting, or by threatening to 
fight. War settled the status of the Germanic 
tribes, it created the Prussian state, and the Prus- 
sian state has created the German Empire. The 
German classes do not all love one another, but 
each one takes its place in the social scale according 
to its fighting capacities. 

In like manner, runs the Prussian argument, na- 
tions should take their places. Since might makes 
right, and Germany is strong, it is right for Ger- 
many to conquer and to rule other peoples. The 
Kaiser's doctrine has become, in effect, the German 
people's doctrine. Their great teachers have sup- 
ported it. He has never been rebuked by the ruling 
classes for asserting it. To dispute him would 
undermine the whole present German system. If 
it were once conceded that human beings, as such, 
possess inherent and inalienable rights, the whole 
imperial organization and claim to expansion would 
receive its logical death-blow. It is, in truth, in 
the tragic moments when William II makes the 
whole question of the world's peace turn upon the 
power of the sword held in German hands that he 
seems to his admirers most transcendently the 
Kaiser. 



CHAPTER Vn 

THE KAISER'S ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR 
AND PEACE 

T T should never be forgotten that, as Kaiser, the 
■*■ main personal interest of William II is to be 
esteemed an efficient War Lord. For Prussia war 
has in the past been the principal industry. The 
kingdom has been created by war. It is war that 
made the King of Prussia German Emperor. No 
one who in the last twenty-five years has lived in 
Germany has any doubt that war is relied upon as 
a means of maintaining and increasing thei Prus- 
sian domination. Nothing in Prussian life, history, 
philosophy, or literature points toward the con- 
clusion that military power has fully accomplished 
its task in extending the limits of the German Em- 
pire. No one of wide public influence in Germany 
has ventured to assert that war is a scourge that 
should, if possible, be prevented. On the contrary, 
war is generally believed in as a divine institution, 
as a biological necessity, and as an essential moral 
discipline. The subject of legally organized peace 
is rarely discussed in Germany. The necessity of 
war is regarded, as the Germans say, as an estab- 
lished standpoint. As much as eating and 

168 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 

drinking, war is considered a natural phenomenon.^ 
To speak in Germany of ending war altogether by 
a voluntary compact between nations is to expose 
oneself to ridicule as a visionary. When in other 
countries plans are proposed for an enduring inter- 
national peace, the suggestion is considered in Ger- 
many either as a sign of degeneration and a mark 
of effeminacy, or more generally as an example of 
hypocrisy, having for its ultimate purpose the 
weakening of the Teutonic defenses. Thus it was 
widely held in Germany that the Czar's proposal 
to limit armaments "was secretly intended to place 
Germany at the mercy of her powerful neighbors"; 
and the English desire to fix a limit to the building 
of war-ships was taken to be a sign of economic 
weakness on the part of Great Britain. 

Like any other business, from the German point 
of view, war is not to be undertaken or conducted 
in a reckless or hazardous spirit, but prudently and 
scientifically. It requires preparation both material 
and moral, and the time for action must, if possible, 
be chosen with foresight. Being an affair of the 
state, it has nothing to do with individual morality ; 
for the state knows no law but the will of the sov- 
ereign, whose end is the augmentation of power by 
means of armed force. When the sovereign calls, 
the subject's duty is to answer and obey. The sov- 
ereign alone can know what the hour demands; 



1 One cannot help recalling Luther's statement that war "an 
ihm selbst gottlich und dcr Welt so notig imd nutzlich set, wie 
Essen und Trinken oder sonst ein ander Werk." 

169 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

and he should, therefore, not be embarrassed by 
hesitation or questioning. Delay may mean defeat. 

In so far as such a state of mind is believed to 
require justification to conscience and intelligence, 
this is found in the belief that other nations, espe- 
cially those previously defeated in war, intend at 
the first favorable opportunity to renew the con- 
flict. Peace, upon this supposition, is only a tem- 
porary suspension of armed hostility, and war is 
the normal and permanent reality. When active 
hostilities will actually break out is, therefore, only 
a question of time and opportunity. It is, how- 
ever, certain and inevitable. Wisdom, therefore, 
consists in being always ready and always stronger 
than any possible adversary. 

It is an error to suppose that this doctrine is held 
only by occasional writers, like Clausewitz and 
Bernhardi. It has been so long inculcated in Prus- 
sia and diffused through the whole German Empire 
that it has become virtually the national German 
creed. 

To those foreigners who had never heard of 
Bernhardi 's doctrines the sudden revelation of their 
existence was a surprise, and it was believed that 
this defense and glorification of deliberately 
planned war was something new. In Germany this 
literature produced no shock, and did not even give 
rise to controversy; for the postulates underlying 
Bernhardi 's whole scheme of thought were already 
accepted by the greater number of persons who had 
any interest in the subject. To the military pro- 

170 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 

fession in Germany the teachings of Bernhardi 
were mere commonplaces. 

There is nothing in these views regarding war 
that cannot be found implicitly, at least, in the doc- 
trines of Prince von Bismarck. He not only acted 
upon them, bnt glorified and proclaimed them with 
a cynicism and in a spirit of opportunism that is 
unparalleled. With him wars were enterprises to 
be deliberately planned and executed, but he was 
careful not to provoke too many enemies at once. 
In the Danish war, he says, ''from the moment 
when our troops crossed the Eider, I was ready 
each week to see the European Council of Elders 
interfere in this Danish affair, and you will agree 
with me that this was highly probable. ' ' Only ' ' a 
circumspect use of events," he declares, enabled us 
to ward off the existing danger of turning the duel 
between Prussia and Austria in 1866 into a general 
European war, but France and Russia were skil- 
fully kept neutral. When in 1867 the Luxemburg 
problem arose, ''only a somewhat firmer reply was 
needed," he affirms, "to bring about the great 
French war in that year — and we might have given 
it if we had been so strong that we could have 
counted on success." As it was, France was kept 
in a state of negotiation with Prussia because of 
the fear that Italy and Austria would make common 
cause with her; but the purpose to isolate France 
and then defeat her was steadily held in mind until 
1870, when the occasion seemed opportune. In the 
mean time the apprehension of war was so great in 

171 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Prnssia that, as Bismarck informs us, he received 
calls from merchants and manufacturers who said : 
*'The uncertainty is unbearable. Why don't you 
strike the first blow? War is preferable to this 
continued damper on all business!" And he adds, 
*'We waited quietly until we were struck, and I 
believe we did well to arrange matters so that we 
were the nation which was assailed and were not 
ourselves the assailants." ^ 

We now Imow how matters were ''arranged" by 
the alteration of the Ems telegram. When Moltke 
had assured him that it would be advantageous to 
Prussian arms for hostilities to begin at once, Bis- 
marck prepared and read to Moltke and Roon, with 
whom he had been dining, the revised telegram, add- 
ing: ''If, in execution of the orders of His Majesty, 
I conununicate this telegram as I have worded it to 
the newspapers, and if I have it at once telegraphed 
to our different embassies, it will be known in Paris 
before midnight. It will have the effect of a red 
flag upon a Gallic bull. Success depends entirely 
on the first impressions that the origin of the war 
will produce at home and abroad. It is most im- 
portant that we should appear as the attacked 
party. ' ' ^ 

It is in this school of ruthless opportunism that 
Kaiser William II learned his first lessons in the 
art of statesmanship. To him also merchants and 



1 Bismarck's speech in the Reichstag of February 6, 1888, made 
famous by his sentence, "We Germans fear God and naught else 
in the world." 

- Bismarck, Gedanken und Erinnerungen, Vol. I, p. 446. 

172 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 

manufacturers have come with their demands that 
the military and naval power of Germany should be 
employed for territorial and especially colonial ac- 
quisitions. With these annexationists and expan- 
sionists to impress the business world, and the 
army and navy ever ready for action, Kaiser Will- 
iam has looked upon war, not as a misfortune to be 
always avoided, but as a part of his mission in the 
task of increasing the power and might of the Ger- 
man Empire. 

Temperamentally, more than any other Hohen- 
zoliern except, perhaps, the present Crown Prince 
— who is said to have expressed his hope that there 
w^ould be war "for the fun of the thing" — the Kai- 
ser is susceptible to appreciation of the romantic 
side of war, simply as an interesting contest. The 
agony and horror of it seem never to have im- 
pressed his imagination. It is, in itself, for him 
something * * glorious. ' ' The moral element does not 
seem to be in any way associated with war in his 
mind. It is a great game. What other ruler, for 
example, would have deemed it appropriate to send 
a high decoration, the "Ordre Pour le Merite," at 
the same time to the Russian General Stossel for 
the brave defense of Port Arthur and to the Jap- 
anese General Nogi for his heroic attack upon that 
fortress? And, strange to say, it is not personal 
bravery that he most highly commends. At the 
battle of Moukden, he declares. General Kouropat- 
kin was gravely at fault for leading his men in per- 
son, and General Oyama was far more to be com- 

173 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

mended, he thinks, for conducting the battle by 
telegraph from a post in the rear of his army. 
**He was as calm as a chess player who moves his 
pieces," the Kaiser has said. 

To "William II war is merely a problem of power. 
Here lies the seat of his interest. I cannot believe 
that he is constitutionally a ferocious and blood- 
thirsty man. I do not doubt that he would rather 
alleviate intense bodily or mental suffering than 
inflict it. But the idea of power, especially his own 
personal power, seems to induce an actual hyper- 
trophy in his brain when he is opposed. He claims 
to be a sportsman, but he does not tranquilly bear 
defeat. Those who sail against him in the races, I 
thinly, really prefer that he should win. The whole 
course of his life has encouraged this impatience 
with even minor opposition. He cannot endure it. 
He would rather sacrifice a million lives than lose 
a battle. ** Calais must be taken," he proclaimed 
in this war; and when it was demonstrated that 
Calais could not be taken with the forces at dis- 
posal, his indignation with General von Kluck, to 
whom he had assigned the task, was reported as 
violent. 

As an example of the Kaiser's ''furor Teuton- 
iciis," his address to the troops of the punitive 
expedition that in 1900 was sent to China to aid 
in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion has often been 
cited. The German Minister, Von Ketteler, had in 
the uprising been murdered, and there was just 
cause for indignation ; but it was expressed in terms 

174 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 

that breathed such a spirit of vengeance that Von 
Billow thought it necessary to revise the phrase- 
ology officially given out. He was, however, 
too late to suppress the verbatim report in the 
Bremen newspapers, which was as follows: "You 
know well that you are to fight a cunning, fearless, 
well-armed and cruel foe. Wlien you meet him, 
understand pardon will not be given, prisoners will 
not be taken. Whoever falls in your hands is 
doomed. As a thousand years ago the Huns under 
King Etzel made a name for themselves which ren- 
ders them still terrible in tradition and story, in 
like manner may the name 'German' in China 
through you be so famed that for a thousand years 
to come no Chinese may venture to look askance at 
a German.*'^ 

The troops did not fail to execute to the limit the 
command of their master. Innocent peasants were 
treated as Boxers, and in resentment of these cruel- 
ties whole provinces that had been peaceful rose 
in revolt. Rich spoils were plundered and taken 
to Germany, and a heavy indemnity was exacted. 
If the Kaiser coveted the name of ''Hun," the con- 
duct of his troops in China was not disappointing. 
There, as later in Belgium and elsewhere, they suc- 
ceeded in earning it by the deliberate practice of 
frightfulness, and the honor to which the Kaiser 
aspired has been accorded to him in every civilized 
country. 



^ The attempt to alter the words of the Kaiser's speech is de- 
tailed by Zurlinden, Der Weltkrieg, Zurich, 1917. I, p. 315. 

175 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

When the time for Chinese atonement came, 
Kaiser William determined to inflict a disciplinary- 
humiliation that brought upon him ridicule, even in 
Germany. Prince Chun, a relative of the Emperor 
of China, was sent to Germany to make amends for 
the action of the Boxers. Having arrived in Swit- 
zerland, in September, 1901, the Prince was in- 
formed that he would be required by the Kaiser to 
appear before him at Potsdam; and the Kaiser, 
being seated on a throne, his marshal's baton in 
his hand, Prince Chun was to kotow before him 
three times, in the ancient manner of the Chinese 
court. As this act implied absolute degradation, 
the Prince declined to render this homage, which 
was afterward compromised to three deep bows as 
the envoy approached the throne. The ceremony 
then proceeded as ordained. 

The style of the speech delivered in reply to the 
expression of the sincere and deep regret of the 
Emperor of China for the murder of Von Ketteler 
by a Chinese soldier betrays the official hand of the 
Protocol, and is lacking in the Kaiser's fervid elo- 
quence. While exculpating the Emperor of China, 
it emphasizes the guilt of his advisers and his gov- 
ernment. 

*'Let them not deceive themselves,'* runs the 
speech from the throne, ' ' by supposing that they can 
make atonement and receive pardon for their crime 
through this mission alone, and not through their 
subsequent conduct in the light of the prescriptions 
of international law and the moral principles of 

176 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND TEACE 

civilized peoples. " Conditioned on ''directing the 
government of his great Empire in the spirit of 
these ordinances," His Majesty the Emperor of 
China was in the end assured of *' peaceful and 
friendly relations" with Germany. ^ 

The ground for discerning the hand of the Proto- 
col in this formal speech is, that in the Kaiser's own 
personal addresses he never refers to "the pre- 
scriptions of international law," or to "principles" 
of any kind. It is one of the marked idiosyncrasies 
of the Kaiser's mind that he never seems to think 
in abstract terms upon any subject. His intelli- 
gence is intuitive, not reflective. Neither war nor 
peace appears to him a matter of principle. His 
favorite expressions reveal this semi-mystical state 
of consciousness. "We shall remain closely at- 
tached," he said in his first address to the army, 
"whether God gives us peace or storm"; as if it 
were all a matter of contingency, in which the hu- 
man w^ill has no part and consequently no respon- 
sibility. 

There is something Oriental in the Kaiser 's man- 
ner of dealing with great questions, which suggests 
to the mind the primitive despotisms of Assyria or 
Babylonia. He speaks as if he were a Tiglath-Pi- 
leser or a Nabopolassar. Nothing appears to him 
subject to law. All is personal, and is adjudged 
meritorious or culpable, according as it favors or 
embarrasses his plans and purposes. Not only so, 



1 Shaw, IVilliam of Germany, relates the story of the penitential 
pilgrimage of Prince Chun. 

177 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

but occurrences having primarily no relation to 
liimself are imagined to be maliciously directed 
against him. If two nations harmonize their poli- 
cies and abolish their antagonisms, it seems to the 
Kaiser's mind that they have combined against 
him. If Edw^ard VII shows friendship for France, 
he is set down as a ''mischief-maker." If he has 
a friendly visit with the Czar of Russia, he is plot- 
ting an ''encirclement." If the United States of 
America exercises its rights of neutrality in ac- 
cordance with definite principles of international 
law which have not previously been challenged, and 
Avhich the German Empire has upon occasion itself 
regarded as properly regulative of neutral conduct, 
the Kaiser informs the ambassador that he "will 
stand no nonsense after this war, ' ' and that ' ' Amer- 
ica had better look out." 

The truth is, nearly all international matters are 
considered by William II merely as questions of 
powder and not as questions of right in any abstract 
and universal sense. They are not only questions 
of power, but questions to be settled by will and not 
by reason. ''Sic volo, sic jubeo/' he wrote on a 
portrait presented to one of his ministers in 1890. 
It is the key to the Kaiser's character. He himself 
has asserted it. 

"Every prince of the house of Hohenzollern, " 
he said, at the inauguration of a statue of the Great 
Elector at Bielfeld, "has always a consciousness 
that he is only a mandatory on the earth, that he 
must render an account of his labor to a supreme 

178 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 

King and Master, and that lie should faithfully ac- 
complish the task that has been committed to him 
by an order from on high. Thence comes that con- 
viction, firm as a rock, that all my ancestors have 
had of their mission. Thence their inflexible will 
to accomplish that which they have once pro- 
posed. ... In spite of all resistance, I shall always 
invariably continue in the way which I shall once 
have recognized to be good." 

But this declaration of inflexibility of will throws 
no new light on the real basis of judgment. Plainly 
it is merely personal, with a chance that it is chiefly 
emotional. Whence come these orders from on 
high ? And in Avhat form 1 Evidently they are mere 
subjective impulses. They have no substantial au- 
thority. They are derived neither from experience 
~ior from reasoning. They base government, in so 
far as the Kaiser is concerned, squarely upon per- 
sonal inspiration. 

The fatal element in this method of treating great 
matters is, that when a decision is once made it 
becomes an act of God. Tlie Kaiser conceives of 
himself as an ''instrument" under divine direction. 
If success follows, he seems to have a new evidence 
of the soundness of his theory. If failure follows, 
it is merely a divine ''delay"; or, perhaps, a "les- 
son" needed by his people ! That there is anything 
essentially "wrong," or that there is any personal 
"guilt," in a decision made in this manner the 
Kaiser's theory does not admit. He is without 
responsibility to men, for he acts as God's instru- 

13 179 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

ment. Even his responsibility to G od, on the inspir- 
ational theory, is limited; for his duty consists 
merely in carrying into execution what God puts 
into his mind ! That millions of men should perish, 
that millions of homes should be made desolate, that 
faith in solemn public promises should be rendered 
impossible in the future, are matters with which, on 
William II 's theory, it is unnecessary to concern 
ourselves. Whatever happens is God's will, and 
God's will must be right ! 

This total effacement of all moral distinctions 
that can be subjected to any intelligent test renders 
impossible any form of international security. I 
would not be understood as affirming that the Kai- 
ser alone, or even the Kaiser and his adherents, are 
the only obstructions to the world's peace; but I 
venture to affirm that the theory of international 
relations which the Kaiser holds and inculcates, and 
especially his unwillingness to permit great deci- 
sions to be openly and franldy discussed in a ju- 
dicial spirit, has prolonged the anarchy from which 
civilization has been trying to emerge and has 
finally plunged the world into the most terrific war 
known to history. He treats the grave issues of 
war and peace as they were treated by the primi- 
tive despots of the early Oriental monarchies. To 
him they are merely questions of power, which can 
be settled only by war, and not questions of right, 
which are susceptible of being regulated by law. 

With Germany always in a warlike mood and the 
Kaiser's hand always on the hilt of his sword, in 

180 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 

spite of repeated professions of peace, defensive 
preparation for war by other European nations has 
been made necessary; and yet, as we now know, it 
has not been sufficient to secure immunity from Ger- 
many 's predatory designs. Since 1908, to those 
familiar with the military spirit which William II 
has developed among his people, it has seemed 
highly probable that, at some well-chosen moment, 
without previous intimation, mthout parliamentary 
consideration, and without sufficient cause of ac- 
tion, the Kaiser would surprise the world with a 
sudden declaration of war and an immediate attack 
upon one or more of his neighbors. 

Behind the fortification of the Triple Alliance, 
Germany has never for a moment had reason to 
fear an assault. No coalition has ever been formed 
against her. France, it is true, has never forgiven 
the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, and 
the enforced Treaty of Frankfort has always been 
felt as a humiliation ; but, by 1908, the French had 
settled down to a state of passive endurance of 
what seemed to be an irretrievable loss. Although 
the cause of resentment could at any time have been 
wholly removed by the restoration of these prov- 
inces torn from the bleeding heart of France, it is 
doubtful if William II or any considerable portion 
of the German people ever for a moment seriously 
considered this solution of the Alsatian problem. 
The pretense that Alsace-Lorraine is really Ger- 
man, or can ever be made so, is too transparent to 
produce conviction. The inhabitants of those prov- 

181 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

inces have never ceased to protest against German 
rule. After forty-five years of strenuous efforts at 
Germanization, it has recently been admitted by 
the late Paul Laband, the eminent professor of con- 
stitutional law in the University of Strasburg, that 
the natives are still loyally French, and that it 
would long be necessary to employ compulsion in 
these conquered provinces. The reason of this per- 
sistent devotion to France is not difficult to compre- 
hend. Until the vivisection of the Republic by the 
excision of these organic parts, the inhabitants of 
Alsace-Lorraine had participated in all the revo- 
lutions of France and had become flesh of her flesh. 
They felt that they had never possessed any other 
freely accepted country. It was not even pretended 
at the time of annexation that the inhabitants were 
really German. The fact that German was spoken 
in Alsace was no better proof of the provinces be- 
ing natural parts of Prusso-Germany than that the 
German-speaking cantons of Smtzerland or the 
city of Milwaukee naturally belong to the German 
Empire. The reason for the annexation was 
frankly confessed by Bismarck and by William I. 
It was purely and solely a question of military ad- 
vantage on the part of the conqueror. For this 
reason the guns of Metz were directed against 
France, and they have offered a perpetual challenge 
to Frenchmen to reclaim their lost territory. 

As for Russia, there was never any reason to 
believe that the Czar would begin an aggressive war 
upon Germany. With singular abstention, suc- 

182 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 

cessive rulers of that Empire have passively per- 
mitted Prussia to expand her frontiers. They re- 
mained complacently neutral during the acquisition 
of Schleswig-Holstein, the defeat of Austria, and 
the Franco-Prussian War. Bismarck was so con- 
fident of Russia's inertia, unless actually attacked, 
that he assured the Reichstag, "Russia cannot in- 
tend to conquer any Prussian provinces, nor, I 
believe, any Austrian provinces." And he added, 
*'I even go so far in my confidence as to be con- 
vinced that a Russian war would not ensue if we 
should become involved in a French war because of 
some explosive happenings in France." Even in 
the doubtful case of a Franco-Russian combined 
attack on Germany, which there has never been any 
sufficient reason to expect, the alliance with Aus- 
tria-Hungary would have afforded adequate pro- 
tection to Germany without relying upon aid from 
Italy. 

The conclusive proof of these statements is found 
in the fact that when, in 1908, Austria-Hungary, in 
violation of the Treaty of Berlin, annexed Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Kaiser William II, as he has publicly 
boasted, openly defied all the Slav nations at once, 
and in fact all Europe, by opposmg the calling of 
a conference to consider the subject, and threatened 
Russia with his appearance ''in shining armor" if 
she did not yield. 

For a decade the people of Germany have been 
taught that a revengeful France, a barbaric and 
jealous Russia, and an envious Britain were the 

183 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

real cause of German military preparations. But 
no one who has lived in Germany, who has con- 
versed with German officers, and who has read the 
brutal and inflammatory Pan-German literature, 
can believe that the purposes of the Imperial Gov- 
ernment have been merely defensive. On the con- 
trary, all the evidence shows that the German 
intentions were not only aggressive, but included 
detailed plans for the invasion, occupation, and 
retention of inoffensive countries, with which Ger- 
many had no prospect of a quarrel. Even the most 
moderate German writers on foreign politics have 
urged the propagation of what they call "the Ger- 
man idea," whatever that may mean, in countries 
with which Germany was at peace. The German 
spy system and the German war plans have literally 
benetted the globe. 

In no other country has there ever been published 
such a mass of literature, ranging from cheap 
brochures to voluminous treatises, containing defi- 
nite proposals for the conquest and annexation of 
other countries. Until war revealed it, the world 
at large was wholly ignorant of this Pan-German 
movement, which took shape in 1895 and broadened 
out immeasurably in 1911. 

Although the vigilance of the police is very alert 
in Germany and the censorship of what is offensive 
to the Imperial Government is extremely strict, 
this literature, as far as I can discover, has never 
been suppressed or even officially condemned. In 
Gross Deutschland, for example, by Otto Richard 

184 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 

Tannonberg, published at Leipzig in 1911, we have 
large portions of Europe, Asia, Africa, and Amer- 
ica marked on the map for future acquisition by 
Germany. 

"We wish to inaugurate a new era in a new em- 
pire," it is announced, "the supreme law of which 
will be the following : The essential end of Greater 
Germany is the profit of Germans. All special laws 
are only the application of that fundamental 
law. " . . . " The word ' peace ' is a detestable word ; 
peace between Germans and Slavs is like a treaty 
made on paper between water and fire. " . . . " The 
time of preparation has lasted long enough — forty 
years of toil on land and sea — the end constantly 
in view. The need now is to begin the battle, to 
vanquish, and to conquer ; to gain new territories — 
lands for colonization for the German peasants, 
fathers of future warriors, and for the future con- 
quests." 

Was the task regarded as difficult? Was Russia 
an enemy to be feared? 

Here is Tannenberg's answer: "We find our- 
selves face to face with the definitive dissolution 
of the power of the Czar. Siberia will become Jap- 
anese as far as the Ural. . . . Western Russia, 
which in other times was called the country of the 
Knights of the Sword, and Great Lithuania will 
revolt and seek aid and protection toward the West, 
toward Germany. The time has come for us to 
familiarize ourselves with the facts that are devel- 
oping, for fear that some day we shall be surprised 

185 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

by events. . . . The honor of entering into the Ger- 
man Empire, and into its customs union, which 
dominates our whole life, should be paid for. Al- 
sace-Lorraine has brought us a dot of four milliards 
of marks. That was very pretty, assuredly, but 
twenty-five milliards would have been better still. 
There is no money to take in the East, but there is 
something of greater value than cash; there are 
lands, lands for colonization by new German peas- 
ants. '* The writer then goes on to speak of the 
extent and adaption for immigration of Courland, 
Livonia, and Estlionia; as large as Bavaria and 
Wurtemberg together, but with only one-fourth 
their population. 

Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland 
are all, in due time, according to Tannenborg, to 
be brought witliin the limits of the Empire — an easy 
task when France is beaten and Russia disinte- 
grated. 

As for Great Britain, her colonies, this author 
thinks, are destined to desert her ; and when, finally, 
her sea-power is destroyed, her possessions, espe- 
cially her Indian Empire, and all others that Ger- 
many desires, will fall to the lot of Germany. To 
accomplish this result, the Mohammedan world 
must be utilized by Germany through uprisings and 
attacks. In the end, Germany is to dominate the 
earth ! 

The means for beginning this vast expansion, 
says this writer, will Ix' a war with Russia and 
France. With astonishing clairvoyance, the desire 

186 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 

of Serbia to unite her Slav kindred in Herzegovina 
and neigliboring lands is pointed out. Then Aus- 
tria mobilizes her troops. What will happen then ? 

The answer is given tlms: ** Germany has only 
one part to take : to send two army corps to ocenpy 
Bohemia, Austrian Silesia, and Moravia. . . . The 
occupation of Prague by the Germans is followed 
by a declaration of war by France, and the same 
day Russia declares mobilization. England holds 
herself in an expectant mood. Business has never 
gone better in England than when the powers of 
the European continent engage in war. England 
will not go in to lose, by declaring for one or tlie 
other, an occasion to increase her wealth!" 

A marvelous prophecy, indeed ; but with a char- 
acteristic miscalculation, later to be shared by oth- 
ers who should have been better informed than this 
writer. And yet, listen to this prediction: "Ger- 
many sends against Russia an army of a million 
of soldiers. The struggle unfolds itself along the 
Baltic provinces. Great Lithuania and the regions 
of the Memel, of the Duna, of the Embach, and of 
the Dnieper. The Russians abandon little by little 
these territories, which, by their population, are 
strangers to them, and retire to Moscow. . . . But 
the German armies do not follow them into the for- 
ests and swamps of Russia ; they content themselves 
with occupying territories the acquisition of which 
we can foresee." 

"It is on the West," he continues, "that Germany 
sends the bulk of her forces. Eight days after tlie 

187 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

declaration of war by France, four millions of Ger- 
man soldiers cross that which has been the eastern 
frontier of that country. . . . The Russian revolu- 
tion, which raises its head anew, destroys among 
the French the elan of which they gave evidence in 
1870. . . . The fortresses of which the French ex- 
pect so much can do nothing against the attacks of 
the German air-ships. They are only bomb-catch- 
ers for the poor Frenchmen who are buried in 
them. . . . Paris does not even try to defend it- 
self. . . . England and America speak of business, 
but do not offer battles. . . . The Germans besiege 
St. Petersburg and proclaim the annexation of the 
regions of the Niemen, of the Duna, and of the 
Embach. The Germans have occupied Paris and 
advance toward the line of the Loire. Holland and 
Belgium have asked to be admitted into the German 
Empire as confederated states, with all their colo- 
nies. The offer is accepted with reserves. Who 
would think of hindering a victorious Germany 
from declaring these countries territories of the 
Empire without conditions'? Questions of detail 
regarding their admission will furnish matter for 
further discussion at Berlin. One thing is certain, 
that the colonies of the two states, for motives of 
public law, should not be the private property of 
a confederated state, but a colonial territory of the 
whole Empire." 

Such was the Pan-German program for the Ger- 
man war of expansion in 1911. Even the treaties 
of peace that were to conclude the war were care- 

188 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 

fully drawn up at that time. By the imaginary 
treaty of Brussels, France cedes to Germany the 
Vosges, with Epinal; Moselle and Meuse, with 
Nancy and Luneville ; the town of Verdun ; and the 
Ardennes, with Sedan. France further gives asy- 
lum to the inhabitants of this territory, and 
establishes them elsewhere within her own bor- 
ders, in order to make room for German settlers; 
declares its assent to the incorporation of Belgium, 
Holland, Luxemburg, and Switzerland into the Ger- 
man Empire; cedes to Germany the twelve mill- 
iards of francs lent to Russia; renounces all colo- 
nies; and pays to Germany a cash indemnity of 
thirty-five milliards of marks. By the suppositi- 
tious Treaty of Riga, Russia cedes vast territories 
to Germany; creates a kingdom of Poland on its 
own soil, where the Prussian Poles, to be expelled 
from Prussian Poland, may reside ; and accepts the 
incorporation of Austria, ceded by the Hapsburgs 
to the Hohenzollerns, into the German Empire. 
As an inducement to Great Britain to sanction these 
proceedings, the French and Portuguese colonies 
are by these treaties to be divided between the two 
empires on the assumption that British neutrality 
would be thus insured ! 

Was the Kaiser ignorant of a prediction that 
dealt so exhaustively with the future of Germany, 
contained in a book that could be had in any book- 
seller's shop in Germany in 1911? 

In principle it was advocating no greater crimes 
than those proposed in General Bernhardi's Ger- 

189 



IMrRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

many in the Next War, published in the same year, 
in which this officer said, *'We can secure Ger- 
many's position on tlie continent of Europe only if 
we succeed in smashing the Triple Entente and in 
humiliating France " ; of which the Kaiser was cer- 
tainly not ignorant and which he did not condemn. 
Nor is it as merciless as Daniel Frymann's Wenn 
ich der Kaiser ivdre, also published in 1911, in 
which the author advocated the annexation of for- 
eign territories, ''but without inhabitants!" In 
trutli. Gross Deutschland differs from these and 
many other Pan-German publications chiefly in be- 
ing more learned, more detailed, and more sug- 
gestive to the imagination. In brief, of all the books 
on Germany's future, it was the one that would 
be the most interesting to the Kaiser as a program 
of German policy. 

Of course, the Imperial Government assumed no 
responsibility for any of this literature, and could 
readily, if complaint were made, have disavowed it. 
It was, however, too extravagantly outrageous to 
be taken seriously in 1911 by any one outside of 
Germany. But at the present time one may not 
improperly ask. Is there anything in any of these 
publications that has not, since 1914, been equaled, 
and even surpassed, in boldness of purpose, in ar- 
rogance of temper, in defiance of international 
law, in predatory design, or in brutality of pro- 
cedure? 

W(; need not here venture upon any speculation 
regarding the real origin of the Tannenberg 

190 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 

schemes, whicli it was easy at the time to dismiss 
as the idle lucubrations of an irresponsible and pre- 
posterous dreamer. But events compel us to admit 
that Kaiser William II must be accepted as either 
the master or the pupil in this school of predatory- 
enterprise which his strident appeals to the in- 
herent right of power had called into being. 

With a singular exactness Tannenberg has out- 
lined for us the actual sequence of events in the 
Great War. The chief spoils were to be obtained 
from the downfall of a disintegrating Russia. 
The starting-point of the conflict was to be the am- 
bition of Serbia, against which Austria-Hungary 
was to mobilize. Russia was to intervene, Ger- 
many was to march against Russia, and France was 
to join in the defense of Russia. Great Britain, 
however, was to remain neutral, and her neutrality 
was to be rewarded with a share of the colonial 
spoils taken from other nations! 

With the exception of the miscalculation regard- 
ing the neutrality of Great Britain, this prognosti- 
cation has been literally fulfilled. And here we 
have to note that, in the mind of the writer, the 
success of the entire scheme turns on the expected 
disposition of England to let Germany have her 
own way in the coming war. The war as planned 
by Tannenberg is precisely the kind of a war which 
Kaiser William II, as I shall later prove, admits 
that he desired and complains that he was pre- 
vented by Great Britain from being allowed to wage, 
a war in which Russia and France, unaided, would 

191 



IMPRESSIONS OF TUK KAISKR 

be placiod at tin; nicrcy of ilie combined powers of 
Oermany and Austria-Hungary. 

hc.i us, tluircifore, in bric^f outline, consider the 
events which in 1011 ^ave reason for assigning to 
Great Britain tlie role assigned to her by '^rannen- 
berg, and also the (events whi(;li afterward rc^ndered 
Grctat Britain's attitude probh^matical to Oermany. 

The Act of Algeciras of 1906 gave to France, and 
in a minor degrf^e to Spain, certain riglits of f)olicc 
KUp(!rvision in Morocco. In order to quic^t tlu; com- 
I>laints of Germany that France was exc^rcising po- 
litical powcT in Morocco in excess of what was war- 
ranted by tli(» Act of Algeciras, on February 9, 
1909, by a private agrctement mad(; at i><!rlin, to 
which the other signatories of the Act of Algeciras 
were not parties, Germany was allowtid special 
commercial y)rivileges in Morocco in (!xchang(! for 
the recognition l)y (ji(!rmany of *'the special politi- 
cal interests of France" in that country. 

This separate dealing with G(!rmany, while no 
doubt w(!ll intend(;d l)y France, and perhaps con- 
sidered n(;cessary to prevc^nt an intcirnational crisis, 
was certainly ill advised ; for it exposed France to 
the alienation of British suf)f)ort, which no doubt 
was th(^ ultimate design of Germany, (intid jirit- 
ain regard<!d the granting of special advantag(!S to 
G(irmany as contrary to the spirit of the Act of 
Algeciras; and, early in 1911, Sir Edward Grey 
protested against it as a step toward a joint Ger- 
man and French economic monopoly in Morocco. 
Had the protest not been heedfid, a rupture of the 

192 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 

Franco-British entente would no doubt have fol- 
lowed. 

Here, then, is the German ground for believing, 
early in 1911, that, in case of a conflict between Ger- 
many and Austria-Hungary, on the one side, and 
France and Russia, on the other, Great Britain 
could be juggled into neutrality. But from this 
illusion there was soon to be a rude awakening. 

Revolution in Morocco promptly brought about a 
change in the Franco-German situation. The ef- 
forts of the French to restore peace and order, 
particularly the march of a French army to Fez, 
aroused the suspicions of Berlin. At noon on July 
1, 1911, the German ambassadors were instructed 
to announce simultaneously to all the powers, by 
an identic note, that German colonists in southern 
Morocco *'had appealed to the Imperial Govern- 
ment to protect their interests,'* and that in re- 
sponse the war-ship Panther had been sent to 
Agadir; but this protective mission would end ''as 
soon as the state of affairs in Morocco had resumed 
its former quiet aspect. ' ' 

In Berlin the coup at Agadir was represented as 
a merely temporary act of self-protection, but at 
Paris it was quite otherwise understood. Incident- 
ally, in the course of a libel suit in Germany, in 
which the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Herr von 
Kiderlen-Wachter, was a witness, he offered 
testimony which illustrates the insincerity of AVil- 
helmstrasse in this incident. He said: "The Pan- 
German demand for Morocco is absolutely justified. 

193 



IMPRESSIONS OP THE KAISER 

You can rely upon it that the government will stick 
to Morocco. M. Cambon is wriggling before me 
like a worm. The German government is in a splen- 
did position. You can rely upon me, and you will 
be very much pleased with our Morocco policy. I 
am as good a Pan-German as you are.'* ^ 

On July 1, the Under-secretary of State, Herr 
Zimmermann, said to a Pan-German visitor at the 
Foreign Office: "To-day the Panther appears be- 
fore Agadir, and at this very moment (tAvelve 
o'clock midday) the foreign cabinets are being 
informed of its mission. The German government 
has sent two agents provocateurs to Agadir, and 
these have done their duty very well. German firms 
have been induced to make complaints and to call 
upon the government in Berlin for protection. It 
is the government's intention to seize the district, 
and it will not give it up again. The German peo- 
ple absolutely require a settlement colony. . . . 
Possibly France will offer us the Congo. However, 
the German government does not want compensa- 
tion elsewhere, but a part of Morocco. "^ 

This, then, was the result of the private efforts 
of France to satisfy the demands of Germany. 
Such a partnership was quickly seen to be impos- 
sible, and the entente with Great Britain was 
promptly reinvigorated. Although the parliament- 
ary situation was at the moment very critical for 
the Liberal government at London, on July 21, 1911, 



1 Cited by J. E. Barker, Fortnightly Review, March, 1912, 

2 The same. 

194 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 

at a public banquet at the Mansion House, David 
Lloyd George made a speech that cleared the air, 
in the course of which he said : ** I would make great 
sacrifices to preserve peace. I conceive that noth- 
ing would justify a disturbance of international 
good-will except questions of the gravest moment. 
But if a situation were to be forced upon us in 
which peace could only be preserved by the sur- 
render of the great and beneficent position Britain 
has won by centuries of heroism and achievement 
— ^by allowing Britain to be treated, where her in- 
terests are vitally affected, as if she were of no 
account in the cabinet of nations — then I say em- 
phatically that peace at that price would be a 
humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours 
to endure.''^ 

The note of warning was sufficient. After this, 
Germany could not, in case of war over the Mo- 
rocco question, count upon British neutrality. 

A few days afterward, on July 27th, the Prime 
Minister, Mr. Asquith, pointed out a path which 
Germany might pursue. *' The question of Morocco 
itself," he said, ''bristles with difficulties; but out- 
side Morocco, in other parts of West Africa, we 
should not think of attempting to interfere with 
territorial arrangements considered reasonable by 
those who are more directly interested."^ 

The hint was plain and was soon acted upon. So 
far as Great Britain was concerned, Germany and 



1 The London Times, July 22, 191 1. 

2 The same, July 28, 191 1. 

14 195 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

France were at liberty to reconcile their differences 
at the expense of France in the French Congo, if 
France chose to pursue that course. 

The effect at Berlin was immediate. The Im- 
perial Government perceived that it could not hope 
to wage a successful war against France and Russia 
unless Great Britain's neutrality could be assured. 
Until the completion of the broadening of the Kiel 
Canal so as to pass the largest battleships — which 
would not be until the summer of 1914 — a war with 
France and Russia that would involve England's 
opposition could not safely be risked by Germany. 
Other influences also soon came to be felt. As the 
war cloud gathered, French bankers began to call 
their loans in Germany. In Berlin a financial panic 
threatened to complicate the situation, which in- 
duced the Imperial Government to reconsider its 
pressure for a portion of Morocco. The Hohen- 
zollern dynasty could not afford to engage in an 
unpopular war. The pretense that such a war was 
one of "defense," where Germany was so obviously 
the aggressor, would not satisfy the masses, whose 
sons might be called upon to perish in battle for 
a slice of Moroccan territory. As a consequence, 
in view of England 's attitude, the demands of Ger- 
many became more moderate. 

At Paris, on the other hand, the gravity of the 
crisis was keenly felt. No one in France wanted 
war with Germany over the Moroccan situation, 
but the Imperial Government, in order to save its 
face by obtaining from France some concessions, 

196 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 

was exhibiting- signs of military movement. The 
solution, therefore, was found, as Mr. Asquith had 
suggested it might be, in ''other parts of Africa"; 
and, on November 4, 1911, a peaceful agreement 
Avas concluded by the Congo Convention, in which 
Morocco virtually became a French protectorate, 
at the price of more than one hundred thousand 
square miles of territory ceded to Germany in the 
French Congo, with a guarantee of the "open door" 
to German commerce in Morocco. 

Neither country was satisfied with the bargain. 
The French felt that they had handed over a purse 
to a highwayman, and the government was severely 
criticized. ''We possessed an empire," said M. 
Hanotaux; "they have left us corridors." 

In Germany, however, the dissatisfaction was 
even more intense. There it was felt that the Im- 
perial Government had suffered a humiliating de- 
feat. It had rattled the saber and had been bribed 
to sheathe it. By the Pan-German party and the 
military clique, who had hoped that at last the 
General Staff was to show the results of its train- 
ing, the settlement was considered a disgrace. The 
Chancellor and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
were bitterly attacked. When Bethmann-Hollweg 
declared in the Reichstag that the Panther was not 
sent to Agadir for the purpose of acquiring terri- 
tory, and that southern Morocco was not really a 
desirable possession for Germany, he was inter- 
rupted with jeers and laughter. Kiderlen-Wiichter 
and Zinunermann were left in a worse plight, for 

197 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

they had said the contrary. The unfortunate sec- 
retary — ^wiio aped Bismarck, whom he slightly re- 
sembled in appearance and his attentions to his 
dog — was quite broken by the ferocity of the attacks 
upon him. To heighten the invective of the war 
party, even Kiderlen-Wachter 's little dog was made 
an object of caricature. "An imitation Bismarck, 
and even the dog a degenerate !" 

The reaction from disappointment in Germany 
left the Pan-German party in a fighting mood. 
Somewhere, somehow, the loss of German prestige 
must be regained. As Baron Beyens has well ex- 
pressed it, ''To dream of a colony, rich in natural 
resources of everj^ kind, and to wake up amid the 
swamps of the Sanga and the Oubanghi — ^what a 
disillusion!''^ 

It was excellent soil for the Bemhardis, the Fry- 
manns, and the Tannenbergs. 

In all this commotion the Kaiser had kept in the 
background. He had taken no part in these nego- 
tiations, and as "War Lord he had escaped the pub- 
lic wrath. There was, however, in truth, no need 
to speak of Germany's regaining political prestige 
in Europe ; for, after all, considering the territories 
extorted from France, Germany's reputation for 
greed was not seriously impaired in the chancel- 
leries of her neighbors. But in Germany itself the 
war spirit had been raised to a fever heat, and it 
was now directed toward Great Britain, whose at- 



1 Beyens, Germany Before the War, London and New York, 
1916, p. 238. 

198 



ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 

titude had prevented the desired war. The Con- 
servative leader, Herr von Heydebrandt — some- 
times referred to in Prussia as *'the uncrowned 
king'* — did not hesitate to proclaim it publicly in 
the Reichstag. 

*'We know now,'* he cried out, ''when we wish 
to expand in the world, when we wish to have our 
place in the sun, who it is that lays claim to world- 
wide domination. "We shall secure peace, not by 
concessions, but mth the German sword." * 

** Peace," as here comprehended, is a condition 
in which Germany does what she pleases without 
obstruction. And this is the sense in which Kaiser 
William II has always employed this word. For 
him "peace" is a trophy to be won and preserved 
by the German sword. 



1 Cited by Holt and Chilton, The History of Europe, New 
York, 19 18, p. 472. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE KAISER'S EFFORTS FOR BRITISH 
NEUTRALITY 

"VJOT less than the outspoken Pan-German lead- 
-^ ^ ers, like Heydebrandt, who had characterized 
Great Britain as an "enemy," Kaiser William II 
was dissatisfied with the outcome of the Agadir 
adventure; but he, with greater perspicacity, re- 
solved to disarm the '* enemy" by offers of friend- 
ship. Until a more opportune moment for action 
should arrive, it was, in his opinion, unmse to 
imperil the Hohenzollern dynasty by a war for 
German expansion. If Great Britain could be 
made a partner in some new understanding \\ath 
Germany, it might be possible, he thought, at the 
critical moment to obtain British neutrality in a 
continental war. 

Without in the slightest degree modifying his 
position that international relations should be 
based upon force alone, he felt obliged to silence 
the clamor of the Pan-German party, while he de- 
voted himself to readjusting the European balance 
in such a manner as to give him a free hand for the 
prosecution of his plans of expansion. 

200 



EFFORTS FOR BRITISH NEUTRALITY 

The task was beset by grave difficulties. During 
nearly a quarter of a century he had built up, at 
times against great odds, the most formidable army 
in the world. He had preached the gospel of the 
sword. He had fanned into a consuming flame the 
military spirit. He had boasted of the Hohenzol- 
lern conquests that had created Prussia and the 
Empire. He had promised to lead on to ''greater 
things." He had claimed a divine vocation, and 
he had construed it as a militant mission which 
only new conquests could fulfil. He had crushed 
out parliamentary control of the army. He had 
never admitted that he was subject to the will of 
his people. On the contrary, he had desired an 
apotheosis like that of the Roman Caesars; and, 
clothed in shining armor, he had come to be looked 
upon as he had desired. Having evoked and stimu- 
lated to the fighting-point the aspirations of the 
German people, he must yet sometime work his 
miracle of glorious conquest or fall into disrepute, 
perhaps even before death would claim him, as a 
weakling and an impostor, overwhelmed by the 
fiery waves of defection and distrust. Having 
created his role, he must play it to the end; but, 
without aggressive action, the end was very near. 

Against France and Russia alone he could at any 
time, upon a pretext that German rights were in 
jeopardy, declare and prosecute a successful war. 
But if Great Britain should intervene, close the 
seas to his ships, and furnish to his enemies the 
material and financial aid which her great resources 

801 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

conld supply, it would be a doubtful combat. In 
the Kaiser 's mind, therefore, a policy of peace was 
necessary until Great Britain's neutrality in a fu- 
ture continental war could be secured, thereby 
granting to Germany full liberty of action in the 
prosecution of territorial expansion. When the 
German position had been sufficiently established 
on the Continent, Great Britain could perhaps be 
successfully challenged on the sea. 

In order to open negotiations in the intimate 
manner for which William II has a predilection, 
early in 1912, the Kaiser sent, through a personal 
friend in England, a private message to one of 
the English Ministers, suggesting a conference be- 
tween the Cabinets of the two countries. In order 
to meet the Kaiser's wishes, the British Cabinet 
selected Lord Haldane, then Lord High Chancellor 
— whose knowledge of the German language, per- 
sonal acquaintance with the Emperor, and famil- 
iarity mth the questions to be discussed fitted him 
in an extraordinary degree for the mission — to visit 
Berlin, where he arrived on February 8, 1912. He 
had a preliminary conversation at the British Em- 
bassy with the Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann- 
Hollweg, on the day of his arrival, and on the next 
day saw both the Emperor and Admiral von Tir- 
pitz, with whom he conversed in each other's pres- 
ence. 

In the course of the conversations, Lord Haldane 
stated frankly that the Triple Alliance gave to 
Germany a great superiority of strength on the 

203 



EFFORTS FOR BRITISH NEUTRALITY 

Continent, and that its military preponderance 
created a serious situation for the other powers. 
Attention was called to the growth of the German 
navy, and the question was plainly put to the 
Chancellor, whether he thought that its further 
increase would contribute to more friendly rela- 
tions. The subject of Germany's naval program 
was discussed and the possibility of spreading the 
proposed increments of shipbuilding over a num- 
ber of years was suggested ; but the main issue was 
the future action of the two countries in case of a 
continental war.* 

The proposal of Germany was the absolute neu- 
trality of each country in case the other was en- 
gaged in war, binding them not to enter into any 
combination against each other, but granting to 
each perfect freedom of action regarding all other 
nations. This proposal, if agreed to, would leave 
Germany free to make war at her pleasure, so long 
as it was in no way directed against Great Britain. 
It accorded to Great Britain the same privilege, 
but this could hardly be regarded as a means of 
insuring a general European peace. 

In response, Lord Haldane suggested a mutual 
understanding by both countries against all ag- 
gressive military and naval combinations. This 



1 An official statement regarding the mission of Lord Haldane 
was issued by the British Government on August 31, 191 5. Lord 
Haldane's full report of his mission was published officially in 
May, 1918. Both these documents may be found in The New York 
Times Current History, for July, 1918, pp. 166, 170. See also a 
statement in Obstacles to Peace, Boston, 1917, pp. 32, 33, by S. S. 
McClure. 

203 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

would have exchided all plans of conquest, but this 
proposal did not meet with the Chancellor's 
approval. 

In the course of the discussions, Lord Haldane 
pointed out that no arrangement could be entered 
into mth Germany inconsistent with the loyal ob- 
servance of the peace of France and Russia. He 
made it plain that Great Britain could enter into 
no engagement to remain neutral if France were 
attacked or the neutrality of Belgium violated. 
He also said that if Germany insisted upon increas- 
ing her navy, Great Britain would feel obliged to 
double German}^ 's naval estimates. 

The purpose of Germany in these negotiations is 
very clearly disclosed. While apparently acting in 
the interest of peace, the neutrality insisted upon 
pointed directly to a coming war. The promise not 
''to make or prepare to make any (unprovoked) 
attack upon the other, or join in any combination 
or design against the other for purposes of aggres- 
sion, or become party to any plan or naval or mili- 
tary enterprise alone or in combination with any 
other power directed to such end," seemed per- 
fectly fair, so far as it went. It was, however, ren- 
dered apparently too elaborately virtuous by the 
proposed engagement, "If either of the high con- 
tracting parties becomes entangled in a war with 
one or more powers in which it cannot be said to be 
an aggressor, the other party will at least observe 
toward the power so entangled a benevolent neu- 
trality!'' 

204 



EFFORTS FOR BRITISH NEUTRALITY 

How easy it was for Germany to become *' en- 
tangled" in a war in which it could he claimed that 
it was not *Hhe aggressor" is evident from what 
happened in 1914, when Austria-Hungary declared 
war on Serbia, Russia undertook to defend Serbia 
from subjugation by Austria, and Germany, ''en- 
tangled" by the treaty with Austria, though not 
technically "the aggressor," was in reality the vis 
a tergo of the war ! Read in the light of subsequent 
events, it would seem that precisely such a case 
must have been in the mind of the ingenious person 
who devised this formula ; which, in exactly the cir- 
cumstances that actually occurred in 1914, would 
bind Great Britain to maintain toward Germany 
"a benevolent neutrality," even after Belgium and 
France had been invaded. France, bound by the 
terms of her alliance with Russia, would have been 
inevitably drawn into the contest; but Great Brit- 
ain, having no similar alliance with France, would 
be morally and legally held by a one-sided engage- 
ment with Germany! 

I do not doubt that, personally, Bethmann-Holl- 
weg sincerely desired a peaceful arrangement with 
Great Britain ; but the hand that wrote the German 
formula of engagement to neutrality was directed 
by a mind that was preparing for war. The project 
aimed at bound Great Britain to "benevolent 
neutrality," while leaving Germany free to carry 
out her schemes of aggression. An innocent mind 
would not seek such provisions. 

When afterward the negotiations were trans- 

205 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

ferred to London, and came under the precaution- 
ary vision of Sir Edward Grey and the British 
Foreign Office, the "entangled" nature of the Ger- 
man proposals was too transparent for acceptance. 
Germany still insisted on complete neutrality, and 
would make no agreement without it. Grey, on the 
other hand, would not commit Great Britain to this 
disloyal attitude toward the other European pow- 
ers. His attitude was expressed in the formula: 
*' England declares that she will neither make nor 
join in any provoked attack upon Germany. Ag- 
gression upon Germany forms no part of any 
treaty, understanding or combination to which Eng- 
land is now a party, nor will she become a party to 
anything which has such an object.'*^ 

If Germany really wanted a permanent peace, 
here was the opportunity to offer a similar pledge, 
and to join in Lord Haldane's suggestion of a 
mutual undertaking against "all aggressive mili- 
tary and naval combinations," which would have 
the effect of excluding all plans of aggression. 

The obstruction to this agreement was that a 
military party existed in Germany which desired 
Great Britain's pledge of neutrality, in order that 
the Pan-Germanist plans regarding France and 
Russia might, at an opportune moment, be success- 
fully carried into execution. In the eyes of this 
party, England was an obstacle in Germany's path- 
way which in some manner must be removed. 

"England," Bernhardi, who expressed the aims 



1 See Report of 1915, above referred to, p. 170. 

206 



EFFORTS FOR BRITISH NEUTRALITY 

of this party, maintained, "would have to give 
Germany an absolutely free hand in all questions 
touching European politics, and agree beforehand 
to any increase of Germany's power on the con- 
tinent of Europe which may ensue from the forma- 
tion of a Central European Union of Powers, or 
from a German war with France. England would 
have to agree that she would no longer strive to 
prevent by her diplomacy the expansion of Ger- 
many's colonial empire as long as such develop- 
ment would not take place at England's cost. . . . 
England would, further, have to bind herself that 
she would not hinder Austria's expansion in the 
Balkan Peninsula. She would have to offer no op- 
position to Germany's economic expansion in Asia 
Minor, and she would have to make up her mind 
that she would no longer oppose the development 
of Germany's sea-power by the acquisition of coal- 
ing-stations. ... If England in this way ap- 
proaches the Triple Alliance," he affirms, "Euro- 
pean peace would be assured, and a powerful 
counterpoise would be created to the growing in- 
fluence of the United States." ^ 

It would imply a condition of utter blindness to 
the meaning of diplomatic purpose not to see that 
the results just enumerated were the objects aimed 
at in the Kaiser's efforts to secure British neutral- 
ity. With Great Britain neutral, Germany might 
easily carry out the Pan-German plans. Whether 



1 Bernhardi's Britain as Germany's Vassal, London, 1914 ; a 
translation of Unsere Zuktmft, Stuttgart, 1912. 

207 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

they were originally the Kaiser 's o^n plans or not, 
they were the natural fruits of his military ambi- 
tions; and they were the mainspring of Imperial 
German diplomacy in the conduct of these negotia- 
tions for British neutrality. 

During the progress of these conversations just 
enough of them was publicly known to create the 
impression in many minds that William II was en- 
gaged in a noble effort to promote permanent peace. 
It was at this time that Herr Alfred H. Fried was 
publishing his book on The German Emperor and 
the World Peace, in which he proclaimed that the 
Kaiser was the most pacific of all sovereigns. 

*'Why," he asked, ''is the Emperor not being 
supported in attaining his ends? Why is he not 
receiving the cordial assistance of public opinion 
which even an Emperor needs when he wishes to 
convert ideas into deeds?" ^ But, to Herr Fried 's 
disgust, as he complains, "Some German news- 
papers recently characterized as an 'impudent cal- 
umny^ a statement made by the late W. T. Stead to 
the effect that His Majestp was ambitious of be- 
queathing to his subjects the memory of a reign 
which was not stained by a single war." 

At this time numerous pilgrimages by groups of 
clergjmien, journalists, and members of Parliament 
were made to Berlin, in the hope of proving by this 
manifestation of interest the devotion of English- 
men to a general peace and the disposition in Eng- 



1 Fried, The German Emperor and the World Peace, London, 
etc., 1912. 

208 



EFFORTS FOR BRITISH NEUTRALITY 

land for a real friendship ^^dth Germany. These 
messengers, of whom it could be truly said that 
"their feet were shod with the preparation of 
peace," were courteously received in Germany, and 
there were even feeble responses in kind; but an 
impartial observer could not refrain from the con- 
viction that the newspapers referred to by Herr 
Fried as resenting the imputation of pacifism to the 
Kaiser had more intimate knowledge than this 
writer of the real mental attitude of William II. 
A rapprochement with Great Britain the Kaiser, 
for reasons already stated, no doubt desired ; but in 
all this period of faith and expectation on the part 
of the workers for a permanent organization of 
peace, not one word was spoken by the Kaiser to 
indicate that he was in sjmipathy Avith any general 
plan for this purpose, or even disposed to consider 
in any manner the substitution of general legal en- 
gagements for military domination. For him the 
only guarantee of peace was still the superior 
power of the German sword. 

The general situation in Europe in 1912, no doubt, 
confirmed the Kaiser in his resolution to keep his 
military force intact. Aside from the Moroccan 
question, there were other intimate relations be- 
tween Germany and the Mohammedan world. By 
dexterous diplomacy the German ambassador at 
Constantinople, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, 
had managed, at the time of the Young Turk revo- 
lution in the Ottoman Empire, in 1909, to establish 
with the new leaders the same kind of close friend- 

209 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

ship which Germany had long enjoyed with the 
deposed Sultan, Abdul-Hamid. In October, 1911, 
Italy had begun a long-meditated war with Turkey 
by the occupation of Tripoli for the enforcement 
of long-delayed reforms which implied the con- 
quest of the country. By this conflict between 
Italy, Germany's ally, and Turkey, of whom the 
Kaiser was posing as the friend and protector, 
Germany was placed in a position of extreme em- 
barrassment. The situation was further compli- 
cated by Italy's decision, since she could not end 
the war definitively in Tripoli, on account of the 
Arab methods of warfare, to risk the intervention 
of Europe, by extending the war to the Turkish 
islands, and even blockading the coast of Syria. 
At the same time, Europe was taken by surprise 
by the formation of the Balkan League, which 
threatened the total expulsion of the Ottoman 
regime from Europe and foreboded the establish- 
ment of a Balkan Confederation that would for- 
ever bar the progress of Austro-German control in 
the peninsula. For Germany to oppose by force the 
procedure of Italy, however, would be to destroy the 
Triple Alliance. To aid her against Turkey, on the 
other hand, would be to lose the friendship of the 
Turks, on which the Kaiser was relying, not only for 
the completion and control of the Bagdad Railway 
scheme, which was intended to connect Hamburg 
with the Persian Gulf, but for the military aid 
which Prince von Biilow has informed us Germany 
was then counting on in the next European war. 

210 



EFFORTS FOR BRITISH NEUTRALITY 

For every reason, therefore, it was Germany's 
policy to remain inactive, while awaiting that dis- 
position of affairs which would render opportune 
the execution of the Pan-German plans. 

This situation was, in effect, continued, even 
after the Peace of Lausanne, of October 18, 1912, 
between Italy and Turkey — ^brought about through 
the influence of Germany in her anxiety to end the 
conflict before the destiny of the ^gean islands 
might call for the intervention of the other Euro- 
pean powers. The cause of this continuation was 
the breaking out of the first Balkan War. 

As early as February, 1912, a league had been 
formed between Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, 
and Serbia for the expulsion of the Ottoman Em- 
pire from Europe and the reorganization of the 
Balkan Peninsula upon national lines. 

As such a division of the territory intermediate 
between Austria-Hungary and Turkey in Asia 
would frustrate the Austro-German schemes of 
territorial and economic development, a joint 
effort was put forth to prevent ''any modification 
of the territorial status quo in European Turkey"; 
but the proclamation of this purpose, by agreement 
of the powers, on October 8, 1912, was too late. 
War between the Confederation and Turkey, begun 
on that same day by Montenegro, on the 15th had 
been declared by all the confederated states. 

If Germany and Austria-Hungary had entered 
into that war to preserve the integrity of Turkish 
dominion in Europe, they would have encountered 

15 211 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

the opposition of Russia, as well as of the Balkan 
states, and other powers might have been drawn 
into the conflict. Under these circumstances the 
occasion was not promising for Austro-German 
success, for all the Balkan powers, with the excep- 
tion of Rumania, were in the league. How formid- 
able and how unexpected this Balkan combination 
was is shown by the surprise Avhich the activity of 
the new Confederation created at Berlin. 

**I dined at Kiderlen-Wachter 's, " writes the 
Belgian Minister in Berlin, ''on the evening when 
news was brought him of the Turkish defeat at 
Kirk-Kilisseh. No words of mine can paint his 
amazement. He almost refused to believe that a 
fortified position, held by excellent troops, should 
have been carried in a few hours by an army of 
peasants."^ 

Before the opportune moment for German action 
in the Balkans could arrive, it was evidently neces- 
sary to divide the Confederation and win over to 
the Austro-German interests a part at least of the 
Balkan states. 

In the beginning there had been no doubt in Ger- 
many that the Balkan War would be of short dura- 
tion and result in the defeat and dissolution of the 
Confederates. The ground of this belief was the 
fact that the Turkish army had been trained and 
reorganized by German officers and liberally sup- 
plied with German equipment, while the army of 
the Confederation consisted in levies of untrained 



1 Beyens, Germany Before the War, London, etc., 1916, p. 250. 

212 



EFFORTS FOR BRITISH NEUTRALITY 

men. It was a surprise, however, when it was 
ascertained that its combined forces numbered 
650,000 men, animated by a resolute determination 
to emancipate their fellow-Christians from Turkish 
rule and to organize the Balkan Peninsula on the 
basis of nationality. Before the month of October 
had ended the great battles of the war had been 
fought and won by the allied armies, and the Turks 
had been driven within a small area near Con- 
stantinople. 

At this point the Turkish government appealed 
to the great powers for mediation, and on Decem- 
ber 12, 1912, the ambassadors of these powers 
united in a conference at London for this purpose, 
while the plenipotentiaries of the belligerents at 
the same time assembled to begin negotiations for 
peace under their auspices. The Balkan uprising 
had then become a European question, in which all 
the great powers had an interest. 

The danger of a general European conflict over 
the settlement was serious. An opportunity was 
presented to solve permanently the Balkan prob- 
lem by organizing on just lines this turbulent area 
of national rivalries, but this required the assent 
of all the powers. A just reorganization could be 
accomplished only by giving to each of the rival 
nationalities such frontiers and such access to the 
great international waterways as its future eco- 
nomic prosperity demanded. In brief, what was 
needed was a peace based upon fundamental prin- 
ciples of justice, and not upon the will and ambi- 

213 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

tions of the great powers called upon to outline 
the conditions of peace. 

Serbia had taken possession of Durazzo, which 
gave her access to the sea, and she declined to sur- 
render it. To the retention of this seaport by 
Serbia Austria-Hungary stoutly objected, and be- 
gan the mobilization of her troops. *'A territorial 
increase of Serbia represents an immediate danger 
to Austria-Hungary," it had been declared, ''and 
the monarchy must hinder it." If Serbia should 
bar the way to the future southward expansion of 
the Dual Monarchy by a continuous extension of 
territory, including a port on the Adriatic, the 
Austro-German plans for the future would thereby 
be frustrated. 

The complete solidarity of Germany and Austria 
regarding the Balkan question soon became evi- 
dent. Any permanent settlement that would bar 
the Austro-German plans for future southward ex- 
pansion would be opposed. While Austria-Hun- 
gary was mobilizing an army to prevent the Ser- 
bian retention of Durazzo, Germany, through 
Bethmann-Hollweg, announced that if a third 
power undertook to prevent a member of the Triple 
Alliance from defending its interests, Germany 
would support her ally. With this aid Austria- 
Hungary carried her point in the conference, the 
tribesmen of Albania were constituted into a sepa- 
rate state, with a German prince as sovereign, and 
Serbia was shut off on every side from the sea. 
Here was planted the seed of another war. ' The 



EFFORTS FOR BRITISH NEUTRALITY 

original Balkan alliance had assured Durazzo to 
Serbia, for which she had agreed to surrender 
Macedonia to Bulgaria ; but, now that Durazzo was 
denied her, a quarrel with her neighbor arose over 
the assignment of territory, and before the Treaty 
of London was signed, on May 30, 1913, the Bul- 
garians, Serbs, and Greeks were contesting the di- 
vision of territory. Rumania now entered upon the 
scene and demanded territorial compensation. On 
August 10, 1913, the Treaty of Bucharest was con- 
cluded, by which Rumania acquired the territory 
she desired at the expense of Bulgaria, Greece ob- 
tained Salonika, and Serbia preserved the part of 
Macedonia she had claimed. In the mean time, 
Turkey had taken advantage of the situation to 
win back from Bulgaria about twice what the 
Treaty of London had assigned her. The great 
powers, fearing to precipitate further conflict, 
withheld their hand, and the Balkan Peninsula was 
left nominally at peace, but in reality as a fertile 
seed-plot for future strife. As we now know from 
the revelations of the Italian Prime Minister of 
that time, Signor Giolitti, when the Treaty of 
Bucharest was signed, in 1913, the Austro-IIun- 
garian Foreign Office invited Italy to be a party 
to an attack on Serbia. ^ Italy refused ; but the mo- 
ment for executing this project only awaited a fa- 
vorable opportunity. 



1 Statement of Signor Giolitti on December 5, 1914, in the 
Italian Chamber of Deputies. The text is given in Gauvin, Les 
Origines de la Guerre Europeenne, Paris, 191 5. Also in Scott, A 
Survey of International Relations, etc., New York, 1917, p. 42. 

215 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

In the mean time, the Balkan situation having 
been glided over without a European conflict, the 
policy of preparing for a German war of expan- 
sion by securing the assurance of British neutral- 
ity went steadily on. 

Unable to obtain a free hand to carry on war, 
with the assurance of non-intervention on the part 
of Great Britain, which the Kaiser had sought to 
procure at the time of Lord Haldane 's mission, the 
aim of Germany now was, not to secure a perma- 
nent general European understanding, in which all 
should participate, but by a process of private bar- 
gaining to obtain the acquiescence of Great Britain 
in Germany's predominance in continental affairs. 

The plans of operation were skilfully devised. In 
1912, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, who had so 
ably carried out the policy of Germany at Con- 
stantinople, was transferred as ambassador to 
London; but, after a few months' residence, he 
died on September 24th of that year. 

The reputation of Von Bieberstein as a crafty 
opponent of British interests in the East was well 
known in London, and the British Foreign OfSce 
was proportionately wary of his procedure. Not 
improbably the German Foreign Office became con- 
scious of this disadvantage ; at all events, in select- 
ing his successor the choice fell upon a man of an 
entirely different stamp. If Baron Marschall has 
left memoirs, it is not impossible that the world 
may some day know under what instructions he was 
acting during his short residence in London. In 

216 



EFFORTS FOR BRITISH NEUTRALITY 

the case of Prince Lichnowsky, however, who suc- 
ceeded him, confidential records, designed only for 
his family archives, have been made public, and 
we have from tliis authentic German source an 
explicit statement, not only regarding the manner 
in which his mission was conducted and the spirit 
in which it was received on the part of the British 
officials, but of the disillusionment he experienced 
when he finally discovered the real purposes of his 
own government, of which he had been made the 
unconscious instrument. ^ The story of the ambas- 
sador pours a stream of white light upon the Ger- 
man preparations for the Great War which dissi- 
pates completely the obscurity in which well-known 
facts, otherwise indisputably established, were par- 
tially enshrouded until this unexpected revelation 
of the Kaiser's secret diplomacy made them clear. 
Baron Marschall, Prince Lichnowsky affirms, had 
employed his declining strength in trying *'to con- 
vince the English of the harmless character of our 
fleet, efforts which naturally had no result except 
to strengthen an entirely opposite impression. '^ 
What was needed at London, the Imperial Foreign 



1 The memorandum of Prince Lichnowsky and the reply to it 
issued by Herr von Jagow, Imperial German Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, have been published in the United States, 
first in the Neiv York Times and its Current History for May 
and June, 1918, and subsequently in book form under the titles. 
The Guilt of Germany, Putnam's, New York, 1918; My Mission 
to London, with preface by Gilbert Murray, Doran, New York, 
1918; and The Disclosures from Germany, American Association 
for International Conciliation, New York, 1918. This last con- 
tains the German text, with a translation on the opposite page by 
Professor Monroe Smith, with an introduction and notes by Mon- 
roe Smith and Henry F. Monroe. 

217 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Office apparently saw, was British faith in German 
sincerity. To secure it, Prince Lichnowsky, a 
country gentleman who had been quietly living on 
his estates in Silesia for eight years since he had 
held office in the diplomatic service, and was wholly 
ignorant of the Kaiser's secret purposes, was sent 
to London. This highly honorable and chivalrous 
gentleman, whose acquaintance I made during his 
brief visits to Berlin in the court season, came to 
his new task with an innocent mind and all good 
intentions. Gentle and kindly in his character, he 
was precisely the man to represent in good faith 
Germany's desire for a loyal rapprochement with 
Great Britain. Personally he desired it and firmly 
believed in its possibility. Knowing nothing of 
ulterior designs, he could not do otherwise than 
impress the British Government with the sincere 
friendliness which he personally felt, and which it 
was his mission to create. 

''When I came to London in November, 1912," 
says the Prince, ''anxiety regarding Morocco had 
subsided, for in Berlin, in the mean time, an agree- 
ment had been reached with France. Haldane's 
mission had indeed failed, because we demanded a 
promise of neutrality instead of contenting our- 
selves with a treaty which was to insure us against 
British attacks and attacks with British support. 

"Sir Edward Grey, however, had not given up 
the idea of coming to an understanding with us, 
and made such an attempt first in the colonial and 
economic fields. . . . 

218 



EFFORTS FOR BRITISH NEUTRALITY 

''The moment was undoubtedly favorable for a 
new effort to establish better relations with Eng- 
land. Our enigmatic policy in Morocco had repeat- 
edly shaken confidence in our peaceful intentions; 
it had at least aroused the suspicion that we did 
not quite know what we wanted or that our purpose 
was to keep Europe on edge and, on occasion, to 
humiliate the French. An Austrian colleague, who 
had been long in Paris, said to me : *If the French 
begin to forget la revanche, you regularly remind 
them of it by a good hard kick or two.' " ^ 

With Germany speaking at London in concilia- 
tory tones through Prince Lichnow^sky, it must have 
appeared to the British Government that Germany 
was almost penitent for the rudeness of its past. 
As regards Balkan affairs also, the honest inde- 
pendence of the ambassador must have inspired 
confidence in the Kaiser's Eastern policy. 

"At that time," he writes, '*the first Balkan 
War had led to the collapse of Turkey and, conse- 
quently, to a defeat of our policy, which for years 
had tied itself up with the Turks. Now that Euro- 
pean Turkey was past saving, two possible courses 
were open to us as regarded the settlement of its 
estate. Either we declared that w^e were in no wise 
interested in the determination of boundaries in the 
Balkan Peninsula, and left their adjustment to the 
Balkan peoples, or we supported our allies, pur- 
sued a Triple Alliance policy in the East, and thus 
abandoned the role of mediator. . . . 



1 Monroe Smith's translation, pp. 27, 33. 

219 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

''The salient point was the Albanian question. 
Our allies desired the establislunent of an inde- 
pendent state of Albania, because Austria was un- 
willing to permit the Serbs to gain access to the 
Adriatic, and Italy did not wish the Greeks to push 
their boundary to Valona, or even to the north of 
Corfu. On the other hand, Russia, as is known, 
favored the Serbian, and France tlie Greek, desires. 

"My advice was to consider this question as one 
lying outside the alliance, and to support neither 
the Austrian nor the Italian desires. Without our 
support, however, the Albanian state, whose inca- 
pacity to exist might have been foreseen, could not 
possibly have been established. Serbia would have 
pushed forward to the sea, and the present world 
war would have been avoided. " ^ 

How little the ambassador understood the ulti- 
mate purposes of the Kaiser, as since revealed, this 
passage most clearly demonstrates. It was, per- 
haps, not intended that he should know more than 
was sufficient for the special part he was to play, 
namely, to obtain an entirely free hand for Germany 
on the Continent by winning the entire confidence of 
Great Britain. In tliis a knowledge of the Kaiser's 
real designs would be only an embarrassment. 

*'I was kept in complete ignorance of the most 
important matters,'' he writes, "and I was restrict- 
ed to sending unimportant and tiresome reports." 

How well all this served the designs of the Impe- 
rial German Government, in the conferences of the 



1 Monroe Smith's translation, pp. 35, Z7- 

220 



EFFORTS FOR BRITISH NEUTRALITY 

ambassadors in London during the progress of the 
Balkan Wars, is evident. Under the mask of Lich- 
nowsky's good- will and unconscious ignorance of 
the collusion between Germany and Austria-Hun- 
gary, the Kaiser's aims were completely concealed. 
And the Prince has recorded his amazement when, 
later, he discovered that avoiding a war with Russia 
was not the aim of German policy ! 

Prince Lichnowsky's account of the part he 
played in the general conferences of the ambassa- 
dors in London during the Balkan commotions is 
most enlightening. What renders it of the highest 
importance is that it was exactly the role he was 
ajjparently intended to play by his own government. 
Incidentally, moreover, he pays a high tribute to 
the good faith and conciliatory conduct of the 
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir 
Edward Grey. 

''Soon after my arrival in London,'' he writes, 
*'at the close of the year 1912, Sir Edward Grey 
suggested an informal discussion to prevent a 
European war from growing out of the Balkan 
War. We had, unfortunately, already declined the 
request of the French government, made at the 
outbreak of the war, to join in a declaration of 
disinterestedness. From the outset the British 
statesman took the position that England had no 
interest in Albania and therefore did not mean to 
let war come on this issue. It was his purpose sim- 
ply to act as a mediator, an 'honest broker,' be- 
tween the two groups, and to try to smooth away 

221 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

difficulties. Accordingly, he by no means placed 
himself on the side of his Entente associates; and 
during the negotiations, which lasted some eight 
months, by force of his good- will and his controlling 
influence, he made no slight contributions to an un- 
derstanding. Instead of taking a position like the 
English, we invariably defended the point of view 
which was prescribed to us by Vienna. Count 
Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London, I was 
his second. My task was to support his proposals. 
In Berlin it was the shrewd and experienced Count 
Szogyenyi who ran the affair. His refrain was: 
*Here the casus foederis comes in'; and when, on 
one occasion, I ventured to dispute the correctness 
of this conclusion, I received a serious warning on 
the ground of my 'Austrophobia.' It was also 
asserted, alluding to my father, that I was under 
an ' hereditary burden. ' 

**0n every issue — Albania, a Serbian harbor on 
the Adriatic, Skutari, and in drawing the boundaries 
of Albania — we took the point of view of Austria 
and of Italy, while Sir Edward Grey almost never 
supported that of France or of Eussia. On the 
contrary, in most instances he lent his support to 
our group, in order to give no pretext for war, such 
as was subsequently furnished by a dead archduke. 
It was thus mth his help that we succeeded in coax- 
ing King Nicholas out of Slmtari. Othermse the 
World War might have been started on this ques- 
tion, since we surely would not have ventured to 
urge our ally to make any concession. 



EFFORTS FOR BRITISH NEUTRALITY 

**Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations 
with prudence, calmness, and tact. As often as a 
question threatened to become complicated, he sug- 
gested a formula of agreement that met the case 
and was invariably accepted. His personality won 
him equal confidence among all who took part in 
the conference. ' ' ^ 



1 Monroe Smith's translation, pp. 47, 49. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE KAISER'S DOUBLE DIPLOMACY 

npHERE were between Germany and Great 
"■' Britain several concrete causes of misunder- 
standing which it was well to remove by frank 
negotiation. This was, in fact, a necessary prelimi- 
nary to any real friendship. With perfect sincer- 
ity, just as disputes with France had been ended 
in 1904, and mth Russia in 1907, the British Gov- 
ernment was ready to meet the demands of Ger- 
many, and thus Aviden the circle of the Entente by 
including Germany in it. 

There were three matters regarding which the 
relations of the two countries needed adjustment. 
First of all, Germany, considering herself, as a 
great power, entitled to colonies, desired to have 
a free hand in acquiring them. Secondly, in pur- 
suing her program of economic expansion in the 
East she had obtained valuable concessions from 
Turkey, not only for the building of the Bagdad 
Railway, but for special industrial and commercial 
advantages which Great Britain considered too ex- 
clusive. Thirdly, in order to carry out her colonial 
and economic projects regardless of the opposition 

224 



THE KAISER'S DOUBLE DIPLOMACY 

of Great Britain, Germany had enlarged her navy 
to an extent that created anxiety in England. 

Seeing in these aspirations a formidable rival 
to British interests, Great Britain in 1912 had come 
to regard the German Empire -with suspicion, if 
not wdth sentiments of hostility, for which the occa- 
sional bellicose pronunciamentos of the Kaiser and 
Germany's growing military and naval prepara- 
tions seemed to offer justification. To Germany, 
on the other hand. Great Britain appeared to pre- 
sent an obstacle to the realization of her ambition 
for expansion; and the reconciliation of British 
with French and Russian interests was interpreted, 
not as progress toward a general European under- 
standing and peaceful relations, but, in effect, as a 
menace and an "encirclement." 

When, therefore, the Kaiser showed an inclina- 
tion to consider with the British Government what 
measures could be adopted as means of a rap- 
procliement, this step was welcomed and applauded 
in England as evidence of a changed intention on 
the part of Germany. For a time it appeared as 
if a bridge between the Triple Alliance and the 
Triple Entente was about to be constructed which 
might ultimately lead to a general result of immense 
importance. 

The spirit in which these negotiations were con- 
ducted by the British Government is thus described 
by Prince Lichnowsky: 

"The object of the negotiations between us and 
England, which had begun before my arrival, was 

225 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

to revise and amend our treaty of 1898, which con- 
tained a number of impracticable provisions, even 
as regarded geographical delimitation. Thanks to 
the conciliatory attitude of the British Government, 
I succeeded in giving to the new treaty a form 
which entirely corresponded to our wishes and in- 
terests. All Angola, as far as the 20th degree of 
longitude, was assigned to us, so that we reached 
the Congo territory from the south. Moreover, the 
valuable islands of San Thome and Principe, which 
lie north of the equator and therefore really be- 
longed to the French sphere of interest, were al- 
lotted to us — a fact which caused my French 
colleague to enter energetic but unavailing pro- 
tests. 

** Further, we obtained the northern part of Mo- 
zambique ; the Licango formed the boundary. 

**The British Government sliowed the utmost 
readiness to meet our interests and wishes. Sir 
Edward Grey intended to prove his good-will to 
us, but he also desired to promote our colonial 
development as a Avhole, because England hoped to 
divert the German output of energy from the 
North Sea and Western Europe to the ocean and to 
Africa. 'We don't want to grudge Germany her 
colonial development,' a member of the Cabinet 
said to me. . . . 

''The treaty was substantially complete at the 
time of the King's visit to Berlin in May, 1913. 
At that time a discussion took place in Berlin, under 
the presidency of the Imperial Chancellor, in which 

226 



THE KAISER'S DOUBLE DIPLOMACY 

I took part, and at which some further desires of 
ours were defined. On my return to London I suc- 
ceeded, with the help of the counselor of the em- 
bassy, Herr von Kiihlmann, who was working with 
Mr. Parker upon the details of the treaty, in put- 
ting through our last proposals also; so that in 
August, 1913, before I went on leave, Sir Edward 
Grey and I were able to paragraph the entire 
treaty. 

"At this point, however, new difficulties were to 
arise, which prevented the signing of the treaty; 
and it was only a year later, shortly before the 
outbreak of war, that I was able to obtain authori- 
zation for its definite conclusion. But it never 
reached the point of being signed. ' ' ^ 

A double reason is given why the signature of 
the treaty was postponed. Sir Edward Grey, the 
ambassador reports, was unwilling to sign unless 
the treaty was published, together with the two pre- 
vious treaties of 1898 and 1899, on the ground 
that England was not willing to conceal her 
binding engagements. He was, however, disposed 
to sign if publication were not deferred beyond one 
year. 

Objections were raised by the Imperial German 
Foreign Office, the ambassador affirms, on the 
ground that ''the publication would imperil our 
interests in the colonies." This excuse having 
been shown to be unfounded, a new one was in- 
vented, to the effect that the publication ''might 



1 Monroe Smith's translation, pp. 6i, 65. 
16 227 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

jeopard the position of Herr von Bethmann-Holl- 
weg, bocanse it would be proof of British hypocrisy 
and perfidy!" 

Notwitlistandin^ "ever fresh proposals concern- 
ing publication," continues Lichnowsky, in repeat- 
ed conversations with Sir Edward Grey, the Berlin 
Foreign Office ''remained obstinate"; . . . "so the 
treaty, which gave us extraordinary advantages, 
and was the result of more than one year's work, 
perished," the ambassador concludes, ''because it 
would have been a public success for me." 

While this manifestation of personal sensibility 
on the part of Prince Lichnowsky does not diminish 
the substantial value of his account, which is un- 
affected by the question whether the true reason 
for Germany's indifference to the treaty he had 
elaborated was or was not based on personal 
grounds, there is, in fact, quite a different inter- 
pretation, in the light of other events, to be placed 
upon Germany's hesitation to sign the treaty. One 
thing was still lacking to it ; and there w^as, there- 
fore, from the German point of view, reason for 
further negotiation, namely, to obtain, if possible, 
as the crown and final triumph of it the "benevolent 
neutrality" of Great Britain, in case of continental 
complications. In the mean time, as we shall see, 
the Kaiser was engaging in other conversations and 
was forming plans not yet ripe for discussion, 
which the attitude of Great Britain might pro- 
foundly affect. 

In close connection with the African question, 

228 



THE KAISER'S DOUBLE DIPLOMACY 

that of the Bap:dad Railway also was being dis- 
cussed at London. 

** After we had drawn into conference a repre- 
sentative of Turkey, Hakki Pasha, all the economic 
questions connected witli the German enterprises 
were regulated, in substantial accord with the de- 
sires of the German Bank. The most important 
concession made to me personally by Sir Edward 
Grey was the prolongation of the railway to Basra. 
This particular object had been abandoned, on our 
part, in favor of a connection with Alexandretta. 
Up to this time Bagdad formed the terminus of the 
line. Navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab was to be 
placed under an international commission. We 
were also admitted to participation in the Basra 
harbor works and, in addition, we obtained rights 
in the navigation of the Tigris, which had been pre- 
viously a monopoly of the firm of Lynch. 

*'By virtue of this treaty all Mesopotamia as 
far as Basra became our sphere of interest, with- 
out prejudice to older British rights in the navi- 
gation of the Tigris and in the Wilcox irriga- 
tion works. Our sphere further included the 
whole region of the Bagdad and Anatolian Rail- 
way. 

* ' The British economic domain w^as to include the 
coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin 
line; the French, Syria; the Russian, Armenia. 
Had these two treaties been executed and published, 
an understanding with England would have been 
reached which would forever have dissipated all 

229 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

doubts as to the possibility of an Anglo-German 
co-operation."^ 

There is, indeed, little doubt that, if this treaty 
could have been honorably executed and strictly ob- 
served, as a supplement to the Anglo-French and 
Anglo-Russian understandings of a like character, 
Europe would have entered upon a period of reas- 
surance regarding peace. Russia had already, in 
1910, during the Czar's visit to Potsdam, shown a 
favorable disposition by withdrawing previous op- 
position to the Bagdad Railway, and in 1911 had 
signed an agreement in which Germany had recog- 
nized Russian commercial interests in Persia, and 
Russia had arranged to connect with the German 
railway the Russian railroads in northern Persia. ^ 
The causes of anxiety regarding naval armament 
having been thus to a great degree removed, the 
prospect of overcoming even that element of dis- 
cord was considerably improved. In the early sum- 
mer of 1914, therefore, all the surface indications 
seemed to point toward an era of good under- 
standing. 

Did Germany's part in these negotiations mark 
the final abandonment of the Pan-German plans, 



1 Monroe Smith's translation, pp. 71, 73. For the provisions of 
the treaty regarding the Bagdad Railway see also a document cor- 
rected and approved by the Imperial German Foreign Office, pub- 
lished by McClure, Obstacles to Peace, pp. 41, 42. He cites further 
from the speech of the Chancellor, December 2, 1914, "This under- 
standing was to lessen every possible political friction. The world 
is wide. There is room enough for both nations to measure their 
strength in peaceful rivalry as long as our national strength is 
allowed free scope for development." 

2 See Holt and Chilton, History of Europe, p. 535. 

230 



THE KAISER'S DOUBLE DIPLOMACY 

or was it intended, by a rapprochement with Great 
Britain, through a removal of outstanding dis- 
agreements, to secure from her, when all differ- 
ences were adjusted, that neutrality in a future war 
of expansion on the Continent which had been 
sought at the time of Lord Haldane 's mission, but 
which Germany had then failed to procure? 

The true answer to this question is found in the 
fact that there were two parties in Germany pur- 
suing quite opposite policies. One of these, the evi- 
dence seems to show, hoped to win for Germany 
the objects of her ambition in the colonial and eco- 
nomic sphere through diplomacy; the other in- 
tended to obtain them in more ample measure 
through military action. The former was inspired 
by the more moderate views and pacific tempera- 
ment of Von Bethmann-Hollweg and the Foreign 
Office, the latter by Grand- Admiral von Tirpitz, the 
military caste, and the Pan-Germanists. 

What, then was the attitude of Kaiser Will- 
iam II? 

This question must be answered by the evidence 
derived from the course of events and the testimony 
of competent persons regarding the Kaiser's part 
in them. It is, however, important to remember 
that, during these negotiations, and after they were 
concluded, William II gave no indication that he 
had even for a moment abandoned his lifelong 
theory that the peace of Europe depended upon 
Germany's readiness for war, or his purpose to 
secure from Great Britain her "benevolent neu- 
ral 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Irality," in case war should develop on the Con- 
tinent. On the contrary, we have, as we shall see, 
the Kaiser's o"wti written complaint that Great 
Britain did not finally accord to him the neutrality 
he had expected, and which up to the very moment 
when war was declared by him he believed he had, 
in effect, secured. 

Upon the point whether or not William II was 
meditating future war during the period when the 
negotiations with Great Britain were peaceably 
proceeding, we could hardly expect to have better 
evidence than that derived from the activity of 
Germany in preparing for a conflict for which no 
reason existed, except the Pan-German plans of 
aggression and expansion, which had never been 
abandoned. During all these negotiations the 
Kaiser was actively preparing for war. On March 
18, 1913, a new army bill was submitted to the 
Eeichstag. The reason given for it was the com- 
motion in the Balkans, and especially the successes 
of the Balkan states; but it had been long before 
in contemplation, and the war material for which 
this new appropriation was to pay had already 
been ordered at Krupp's. When the French, 
alarmed at Germany's increase of her army, with 
difficulty passed the law requiring of her recruits 
three years of service instead of two, an attempt 
was made in Germany, through the press, to make 
the German people believe that the increase in the 
French army was the reason for the German army 
bill. In the mean time, the strategic railroads lead- 

232 



THE KAISER'S DOUBLE DIPLOMACY 

ing into Luxemburg and Belgium were the objects 
of renewed attention. On July 23, 1913, the new 
German Imperial and state citizenship law — pro- 
viding that Germans might retain German citizen- 
ship after acquiring citizenship in other countries — 
was proclaimed by the Emperor to go into effect on 
January 1, 1914, simultaneously with a revision of 
the Imperial law regarding liability to military 
service. On August 9, 1913, Austria-Hungary was 
making her secrei .proposal to Italy to join in an 
attack upon Serbia, and received Italy's refusal to 
recognize the casus foederis. It is incredible that 
this proposal would ever have been made without 
the previous assent of Germany. 

*' After Agadir," writes the Belgian Minister to 
Germany, *' William II came to regard a war with 
France as inexorably decreed by Fate. On the 
5th and 6th of November, 1913, the King of the 
Belgians was his guest at Potsdam, after returning 
from Liineburg, where he had paid his usual cour- 
tesy visit to the regiment of dragoons of which 
he was Colonel. On this occasion the Emperor told 
King Albert that he looked upon war with France 
as '^ inevitable and close at hand.' "^ 

The Chief of the General Staff, General von 
Moltke, is reported to have used the same bluster- 
ing language to the Belgian military attache. *' We 
must throw overboard," he is reported to have said 
before some of his own countrymen, **all the stock 
commonplaces about the responsibility of the 



iBeyens, Germany Before the War, pp. 36, 37. 

233 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

aggressor. As soon as there is a ten-to-one chance 
in favor of war, we must forestall our opponent, 
commence hostilities without more ado, and merci- 
lessly crush all resistance." 

Not only was war at that time regarded by the 
Emperor himself as ** inevitable and close at hand," 
but a passage through Belgium in order to attack 
France was in his mind. 

*'What would you do," he asked of King Albert, 
upon this occasion, *'if my troops entered Bel- 
gium?" 

*'I would do my duty," replied the King. * 

In reporting this conversation to the French 
Foreign Office, in his despatch of November 22, 
1913, M. Cambon, the French ambassador at Berlin, 
writes: ''This conversation, it appears, has made 
a profound impression upon King Albert. I am in 
no way surprised at the impression he gathered, 
which corresponds mth what I have myself felt for 
some time. Enmity against us is increasing, and 
the Emperor has ceased to be a friend of peace." 

In December, 1913, a German military mission 
A^'^as sent to Turkey, and its head. General Liman 
von Sanders, was named commandant of the army 
corps at Constantinople; where, in spite of the 
protest of Eussia, the mission remained. Re- 
garded at Constantinople as the personal repre- 
sentative of Kaiser William, Von Sanders was 



1 The French Yellow Book, No. 6 ; in Scott, Diplomatic Docu- 
ments Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, Part I, 

P- 554- 

834 



THE KAISER'S DOUBLE DIPLOMACY 

ranked socially above the German ambassador; 
while Enver Bey, the smart-appearing young Turk- 
ish military attache, whom I knew^ in Berlin, and 
who was in effect an agent of Germany, became the 
Secretary of War of the Ottoman Empire. 

Not suspecting the plot that was forming in the 
East, the British Government, far from exciting 
Russian resentment of this movement for the domi- 
nation of Germany at Constantinople, was assidu- 
ously endeavoring to induce calm at St. Petersburg. 

"When, after a lengthy leave of absence," writes 
the ambassador, '*I returned to London in Decem- 
ber, 1913, the Liman von Sanders question had led 
to renewed tension in our relations with Russia. 
Sir Edward Grey called my attention, not without 
anxiety on his part, to the widespread agitation 
which this matter had aroused in St. Petersburg, 
saying: 'I have never seen them so excited.' 

*^I received instructions from Berlin to ask the 
minister to work in favor of moderation in St. 
Petersburg and to assist us in settling the dispute. 
Sir Edward was quite willing to do this, and his 
mediation contributed in no small degree to smooth- 
ing the matter over." ^ 

In April, 1914, the Kaiser, after a visit to Vienna, 
paid a visit to the Austrian Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand at Miramar, and again in June at Kono- 
pischt, in Bohemia, when he was accompanied by 



^ It is of interest to note that Liman von Sanders was appointed 
commander-in-chief of the Turkish army before the Ottoman 
Empire had entered into the war as a belligerent. 

835 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz and Von Moltke, the 
Chief of Staff of the army. So anxious was 
"William II about the effect upon foreign opinion of 
this latter visit, with such a retinue, that the Ger- 
man ambassador at London was ordered to reas- 
sure the government by asserting that the sojourn 
with the Austrian Crown Prince had no military 
object I 

Inmiediate military activity was probably not 
contemplated during these visits to Francis Ferdi- 
nand, although, as heir to the Dual Monarchy, he 
had acquired great influence in military matters, 
to which the aged Emperor Francis Joseph gave 
little attention. We know, however, from words 
subsequently used by Kaiser "William, that at these 
interviews important confidential relations were 
established between the Imperial guest and his 
host. 

*'Did they, at Konopischt," asks Baron Beyens, 
*' remodel the map of Europe, assign the mastery of 
the Mediterranean to the Austro-German squad- 
rons, fix the moment of the great upheaval? The 
Archduke, so far as one can reach into the soul of 
this inscrutable prince, seemed to be most eager 
for war. Yet, by a decree of fate, he did not live 
to see the accomplislunent of the plans that he drew 
up in cold blood with his guests amid the exquisite 
gardens of his lordly mansion." ^ 

What was the nature of these plans ? There is at 
present no authoritative answer to this question. 



1 Beyens, Germany Before the War, p. 268. 

236 



THE KAISER'S DOUBLE DIPLOMACY 

The Arclidiike, personally disliked at Vienna, was 
understood to have entertained a theory that the 
Dual Monarchy should be transformed into a triple 
monarchy, in which the Slav peoples would take 
their place as a constituent member, co-ordinate 
with Austria and Hungary. A clear understanding 
with Germany would, no doubt, be necessary to the 
accomplishment of this plan; which, with certain 
advantages to Germany, always predominant in 
every partnership, would appeal strongly to the 
imagination of William II. 

On Sunday, June 28, 1914, at Sarajevo, the cap- 
ital of Bosnia, within Austrian jurisdiction, Francis 
Ferdinand was assassinated, with his morganatic 
wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. The crime was 
committed by a young Serb only eighteen years of 
age, a native of Herzegovina, after a previous at- 
tempt by another intending assassin made on the 
same day had failed — so ineffective was the Aus- 
trian police protection of the Crown Prince. The 
assassin, having recently, it is asserted, been in 
Belgrade, although not a Serbian subject, was 
charged with executing a plot originating in the 
Serbian capital and inspired by public officials 
there. 

When the news of this tragedy reached Germany 
the Kaiser was at Kiel. Prince Lichnowsky informs 
us that he was sailing with him on his yacht the 
Meteor when he first learned what had occurred. 

**His Majesty expressed his regrets," writes the 
Prince, **that his efforts to win the Archduke over 

237 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

to his ideas had been rendered vain. Whether the 
plan of an active policy against Serbia had already 
been decided on at Konopischt I am not in a posi- 
tion to know. 

**As I was not kept posted regarding views and 
proceedings in Vienna, I did not attach very great 
importance to this event. All that I could ascertain 
later was that among Austrian aristocrats a feeling 
of relief outweighed other sentiments. On board 
the Meteor, also as a guest of His Majesty, was an 
Austrian, Count Felix Thun. In spite of the splen- 
did weather, he had remained in his cabin all the 
time, suffering from seasickness. After receiving 
the news, however, he was well. Alarm or joy had 
cured him!''* 

Others report that the Kaiaer turned pale and 
was heard to murmur, **So my work of the past 
twenty-five years will have to be started all over 
again!" To the British ambassador, who was also 
at Kiel, he is reported to have said, ' ' It is a crime 
against Deutschtum" {Es ist ein Verbreclien gegen 
das Deutschtum). ^ 

AVhatever may be the true interpretation of these 
expressions, it is certain that the Kaiser was not 
only deeply moved by this tragic event, but that it 
profoundly touched his political plans in the Balkan 
Peninsula. To those who did not know that plans 
had been formed, the tragedy did not seem in any 
intimate way an affair of Germany. 



1 Monroe Smith's translation, p. gg. 

2 Beyens, p. 276. 

238 



THE KAISER'S DOUBLE DIPLOMACY 

That plans of some kind had been formed \\4th. 
Francis Ferdinand is evident from the Kaiser's 
expressions. If they were plans for the peace and 
self-rule of the Balkan nationalities, the publica- 
tion of them would only do honor to the Kaiser and 
to the memory of his friend. Since they have been 
kept secret, it is perhaps not unreasonable to infer 
that, notwithstanding the death of Francis Ferdi- 
nand, the survivor, who had wished to impress his 
ideas upon the Crown Prince, has acted as nearly 
as circumstances permitted in conformity with such 
plans as they had formed. 

If an occasion of war with Serbia was a part of 
those plans, the tragedy of the assassination itself 
seemed to furnish it. By throwing the responsi- 
bility upon the Serbian Government, a pretext for 
Austria's declaring war upon that country could 
readilj'- be found. If, on the other hand, the plans 
in question contemplated the independence of the 
Balkan states and justice toward Serbia, the way 
was open to treat the occurrence, not as an occa- 
sion for war, but as a matter for international in- 
vestigation. Serbia, as a sovereign state, had a 
right to the determination of her guilt or innocence 
by the judgment of her peers. 

This position, which was claimed in Serbia's be- 
half by other powers, was not the one taken either 
by Austria-Hungary or by Germany. Ostensibly, 
Germany's position was that the whole matter- 
was to be left to Austria-Hungary alone; but it 
was known from the beginning that Russia 

239 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

would not take this view. It was known, fur- 
ther, what the European alliances implied, in 
case Russia were drawn into war with Austria 
through efforts for the protection of the small 
Slav state. Without in the strict sense being 
the * 'aggressor," it was evident that Germany- 
might, if the Kaiser so decided, become '* entan- 
gled" in a continental war, precisely as had 
been contemplated when, at the time of Lord 
Haldane's mission. Great Britain's ''benevolent 
neutrality" had been sought if such a case should 
arise. 

If, therefore, there was to be any prospect of ob- 
taining Great Britain's neutrality as the climax of 
the treaty still waiting to be signed, Germany must 
not appear as the "aggressor" in any continental 
war that might occur. The Kaiser did not even go 
to Vienna to attend the "private" funeral of his 
friend. Instead, aa if entirely detached from the 
consequences of the tragedy of Sarajevo, early in 
July he soon vanished from the scene for his usual 
summer cruise in the fiords of Norway; but, if we 
accept the testimony offered by those who claim 
to know, not until after the decision had been 
reached to invade and humiliate Serbia at what- 
ever cost. 

Was there, before the Kaiser 's departure for his 
cruise, as has been asserted, a Crown Council held 
at Potsdam, on July 5th, at which he decided to 
pledge the military support of Germany to Austria- 
Hungary in case of an attempt by Russia to pro- 

240 



THE KAISER'S DOUBLE DIPLOMACY 

tect Serbia from subjugation, under the pretext of 
avenging the crime of Sarajevo? 

The answer to this question, though not strictl}^ 
vital to the proof of Germany's responsibility for 
the general European war, is of great interest. 
The date and results of the alleged Crown Council 
having been publicly stated in the Eeichstag by the 
Socialist deputy Haase in a criticism of the govern- 
ment, his statement was not declared to be false, 
but "inexact." It is of interest, however, to find 
that Prince Lichnowsky confirms Haase 's state- 
ment, affirming that he learned, not at the time, but 
** subsequently, that at the decisive conversation at 
Potsdam, on July 5th, the Vienna inquiry received 
the unqualified assent of all the controlling authori- 
ties, -with the further suggestion that it would not 
be a bad thing if war with Eussia should result. 
At least this statement was made in the Austrian 
protocol which Count Mensdorff [Austrian ambas- 
sador at London! received in London."* The 
American ambassador at Constantinople at that 
time, the Honorable Henry Morgenthau, has af- 
firmed that he w^as informed of this Council by his 
colleague at Constantinople, the German ambassa- 
dor. Baron "Wangenheim, who on July 5th was pres- 
ent at the Council. 

''The Kaiser presided; nearly all the ambassa- 
dors attended ; Wangenheim came to tell of Turkey 
and enlighten his associates on the situation in Con- 
stantinople. Moltke, then Chief of Staff, was there, 



1 Monroe Smith's translation, p. loi. 

241 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

representing the army, and Admiral von Tirpitz 
spoke for the navy. The great bankers, railroad 
directors, and the captains of German industry, all 
of whom were as necessary to German war prepa- 
rations as the army itself, also attended. 

''Wangenheim now told me that the Kaiser sol- 
emnly put the question to each man in turn : Was 
he ready for war? All replied 'Yes' except the 
financiers. They said that they must have two 
weeks to sell their foreign securities and to make 
loans.'' ^ 

Still more recently we have the testimony of 
Doctor Wilhelm Miililon, a former director of the 
Krupp munition works at Essen: 

"In the middle of July, 1914, I had, as I fre- 
quently had," Doctor Miililon writes, "a conversa- 
tion with Doctor Hclffericli, tlien Director of the 
Deutsche Bank in Berlin, and now Vice-Chancellor. 
The Deutsche Bank had adopted a negative attitude 
toward certain large transactions in Bulgaria and 
Turkey, in which the firm of Krupp, for business 
reasons — delivery of war material — had a lively 
interest. As one of the reasons to justify the atti- 
tude of the Deutsche Bank, Doctor Helfferich finally 
gave me the f olloAving : 

*' 'The political situation has become very menac- 
ing. The Deutsche Bank must in any case wait be- 
fore entering into any further engagements abroad. 
The Austrians have just been with the Kaiser. In 



^ Ambassador Morgenthau has given a full account of Baron 
Wangenheim's conversation with him in The World's Work for 
May and June, 1918. 

242 



THE KAISER'S DOUBLE DIPLOMACY 

a week^s time Vienna will send a very severe ulti- 
matum to Serbia, with a very short interval for 
the answer. The ultimatum will contain demands 
such as punishment of a number of officers, dissolu- 
tion of political associations, criminal investiga- 
tions in Serbia by Austrian officials, and, in fact, 
a whole series of definite satisfactions will be de- 
manded at once; otherwise Austria-Hungary will 
declare war on Serbia.' 

^'Doctor Helfferich added that the Kaiser had ex- 
pressed his decided approval of this procedure on 
the part of Austria-Hungary. ' ' ^ 

Upon his return to Essen, Doctor Muhlon relates, 
he spoke of this conversation to Doctor Krupp von 
Bohlen und Halbach, the head of the Krupp firm, 
who was much disturbed to learn that others knew 
of the Kaiser's decisions ; but, since Doctor Miihlon 
had this information, Doctor Krupp did not hesitate 
to state that he personally had it from the Kaiser 
**that he would declare war immediately if Russia 
mobilized, and that this time people would see that 
he did not turn about. The Kaiser's repeated in- 
sistence that this time nobody would be able to 
accuse him of indecision had, he said, been almost 
comic in its effect. ' ' ^ 

1 Dr. Miihlon's statements were first printed in the United 
States in The New York Times, and may be found in Current 
History for May, 1918, pp. 20, 22. Dr. Muhlon has since pub- 
lished a diary, Die Verheerung Europas (The Devastation of 
Europe), Zurich, 1918. An English translation has been published 
in New York by Putnam's, under the title. The Vandal of Europe. 
The full text of Dr. Miihlon's statement in the Times is not to be 
found in the diary. 

~ The same. 
17 243 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

On the very day Helfferich had indicated, July 
23d, Doctor Miihlon proceeds, the Austrian ulti- 
matum to Serbia appeared. Being again at this 
time in Berlin, he declared to Helfferich that the 
ultimatum — ^which contained ten stringent demands 
to be accepted or rejected in forty-eight hours — was 
''monstrous." 

Helfferich admitted. Doctor Miihlon says, that the 
Austrians did not expect the ultimatum to be ac- 
cepted, and were "acting rapidly before the other 
powers could find time to interfere. ' ' The Deutsche 
Bank, in view of the existing situation, was paying 
out no gold. The Kaiser, Helfferich is reported to 
have said, "had gone on his northern cruise only 
as a 'blind'; he had not arranged the cruise on the 
usual extensive scale, but was remaining close at 
hand and keeping in constant touch." 

The official defense of the Imperial German 
Government against the imputations of these 
witnesses may be summed up in the threat to 
try Prince Lichnowsky for high treason, and the 
allegation that Doctor Miihlon is suffering from 
"nerves." 

An attempt has been made by the former Secre- 
tary of State for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Herr 
von Jagow, to answer the criticisms made by Prince 
Lichnowsky. To an astonishing degree, this reply 
confirms the ambassador's assertions.' It reveals 
clearly, and much to the credit of Herr von Jagow, 
that the Foreign Office, until it was interfered with 
and finally overruled by military decisions on the 

244 



THE KAISER'S DOUBLE DIPLOMACY 

part of the Emperor, was sincerely endeavoring to 
reach a good understanding with Great Britain, and 
considered that Germany had been most fairly 
treated by Sir Edward Grey. 

In this document Herr von Jagow does not deny 
that a Council was held at Potsdam on July 5, 1914, 
and made a decision for war. He merely states, 
*'0n July 5th, I was absent from Berlin." As re- 
gards the Kaiser's negotiations with the Archduke 
Ferdinand, he says, *'At Konopischt no plan was 
laid down (festgelegt) for an active policy against 
Serbia;" but, since it was Von Tirpitz and Von 
Moltke, and not Von Jagow, who were invited to 
participate in the Konopischt conferences, his tes- 
timony upon this point is of little value. It must 
not be forgotten that in 1913-14 there were two 
parties and two policies in Germany : one of which 
was relying upon diplomatic action, the other upon 
military action. They were, in reality, as the evi- 
dence clearly shows, to the very end of the negotia- 
tions, and even after the beginning of the war, 
antagonistic. The Kaiser, whose boast is that he 
belongs to no party, made use of both ; but it was 
to the military party rather than to the diplomatic 
side that he constantly inclined. The Chancellor 
and the Foreign Office of which he is the head bent 
before the storm, and finally employed the resources 
of diplomacy to justify the policy of force which 
they had ineffectually endeavored to avoid. Thus, 
Bethmann-Hollweg, Jagow, Zimmermann, and all 
the adherents of the diplomatic method of securing 

245 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Germany's prestige were finally compelled to serve 
the cause they had opposed, but which their master 
had made his own. With perfect honesty, Von 
Jagow says, in commenting upon Lichnowsky's 
representations : 

''I also pursued a policy which aimed at an 
agreement with England, because I was of the 
opinion that tliis was the only way by which we 
could get out of the unfavorable situation into which 
the unequal distribution of strength and weakness 
ot the Triple Alliance had brought us. . Our 
Morocco policy led to political defeat. Happily, 
this had been avoided in the Bosnian crisis and at 
the London conference. Fresh diminution of our 
prestige was intolerable for our position in Eu- 
rope and in the world. The prosperity of 
states and their political and economic successes 
depend upon the prestige which they enjoy in the 
world. ' ^ 

This was the real consideration that determined 
the Kaiser's mind to war. It was, in the last analy- 
sis, a question of Germany 's prestige. This, the Kai- 
ser believed, could be best achieved by war-a war 
that would prove to Europe, and to all the world, 
that Germany's strength could sustain the will of 
Germany's Emperor. It was not war for its ov.m 
sake that was wanted, but a war that would establish 
beyond question Germany's predominance. If this 
could be accomplished by sustaining Austria-Hun- 

1 See the Times Current History, for June 1018 00 c/it cac 
for Von Jagow's reply. "^ ' ^ ' PP* 54i, 545, 



THE KAISER'S DOUBLE DIPLOMACY 

gary in subjugating Serbia, and thus imposing Teu- 
tonic supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, that, with 
the alliance of Turkey, would bring to Germany 
greater advantages than the concessions Great 
Britain was ready to make regarding economic 
privileges. The war should, therefore, if possible, 
be confined to Austria-Hungary and Serbia, with 
the Kaiser dominating the situation by preventing 
any interference. If, however, as was probable, 
Russia should intervene in behalf of Serbia, Ger- 
many would appear ' *in shining armor. ' ' If Russia 
persisted, and France supported her ally, then it 
would be a war between Germany and France, Aus- 
tria and Russia. Great Britain must, if possible, 
be kept neutral. In that case, of which the rap- 
prochement already accomplished seemed to afford 
a promise, a war between Germany and Austria- 
Hungary on the one side and Russia and France on 
the other would bring renown to Germany. France 
was esteemed to be degenerate and on the point of 
internal revolt. Russia was too bulky to be active, 
ill prepared for war, and susceptible to revolu- 
tion. 

"At Berlin," says Baron Beyens, *'the theory 
that Russia was incapable of facing a conflict 
reigned supreme." Herr Krupp von Bohlen, he 
informs us, who sat at a table near him at the Hotel 
Bristol, declared, on July 28th, that 'Hhe Russian 
artillery was neither efficient nor complete, while 
that of the German army had never before been so 
superior to all its rivals. It would be madness on 

247 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Russia \s part, he inferred, to take the field against 
Germany and Austria under these conditions."^ 

Yet Russia had the courage to protest against the 
subjugation of the small Slav state. Cautioned to 
be tractable, Serbia accepted, within the forty- 
eight hours granted, all of the ten demands made in 
the Austrian ultimatum, except two, which it was 
impossible for any state to accept and maintain its 
independent existence ; but even these were not im- 
pertinently rejected. 

*'If the Imperial and Royal Government are not 
satisfied with this reply," concluded the Serbian 
response to the ultimatum, "the Serbian Govern- 
ment, considering that it is not to the common 
interest to precipitate the solution of this question, 
are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understand- 
ing, either by referring this question to the decision 
of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to 
the great powers which took part in the drawing 
up of the declaration made by the Serbian Govern- 
ment on the 18th (31st) of March, 1909." ^ 



1 Beyens, Germany Before the War, p. 286. 

2 For the full text of the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum of July 
23, and of the Serbian reply of July 25, 1914, see Scott, Documents 
Relating to the European War, Part II, pp. 1464, 1468, and pp. 
1472, 1476, reprinted from the Serbian Blue Book. See a summary 
in Illustrative Document No. VII. 

In his book, A Scrap of Paper, London and New York, 1914, 
p. 76, Dr. E. J. Dillon affirms that the German Ambassador at 
Vienna, Tschirschky, not only saw the text of the ultimatum sent 
to Serbia but telegraphed the wording to the Emperor. He 
writes : "I advance this statement with full Knowledge of what 
actually took place ;" and adds : "The versatile monarch suggested 
a certain amendment to the time-limit, the alleged object of which 
was to leave no room for evasion, no loophole for escape." This 
is in keeping with the Kaiser's twelve-hour time-limit to Russia. 

248 



THE KAISER'S DOUBLE DIPLOMACY 

Without further exchange of views, on July 28th, 
the Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on 
Serbia. 

What was Germany's part in this procedure? 

The Imperial German ambassador at London 
gives the answer: 

**1. We encouraged Count Berchtold [the Aus- 
tro-IIungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs] to 
attack Serbia, although no German interest was in- 
volved and the danger of a World War must have 
been known to us. Whether we were acquainted 
wdth the wording of the ultimatum is completely 
immaterial. 

*'2. During the period between the 23d and the 
30th of July, 1914, when M. Sazonof emphatically 
declared that he could not tolerate an attack on 
Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of medi- 
ation, although Serbia, under Russian and British 
pressure, had accepted almost the whole of the ulti- 
matum, and although an agreement about the two 
points at issue could easily have been reached and 
Count Berchtold was even prepared to content him- 
self with the Serbian reply. 

*'3. On the 30th of July, when Count Berchtold 
showed a disposition to change his course, we sent 
an ultimatum to St. Petersburg merely because of 
the Russian mobilization and though Austria had 



For every chance of peace it was invariably made "too late." 
"Events had marched too rapidly." But time is the first essential 
of diplomacy. War can be declared in an hour. Peace requires 
understanding, which demands time for negotiation. 

249 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

not been attacked ; and on the 31st of July ^ we 
declared war against the Russians, altliough the 
Czar pledged his word that he would not permit a 
single man to march as long as negotiations were 
still going on. Thus we deliberately destroyed the 
possibility of a peaceful settlement. 

**In view of these incontestable facts, it is no won- 
der that the whole civilized world outside of Ger- 
many places the sole responsibility for the World 
War upon our shoulders."^ 



^ This date should be, of course, the ist of August. 
2 Monroe Smith's translation, pp. loi, 102. 



CHAPTER X 

THE KAISER'S RESPONSIBHilTY FOR THE 

WAR 

T T is a fact deserving of more consideration tlian 
•*■ it has hitherto received that, in his own written 
justification of Germany's action, Kaiser William 
II does not contradict any one of his ambassador's 
assertions regarding German responsibility for the 
war. On the contrary, he offers no defense of his 
own procedure, except to complain that Great 
Britain complicated his plans by not observing the 
neutrality which he had desired and expected. His 
chief cause of resentment, as stated by himself, is 
that, instead of adhering to what he deemed a 
pledge to remain neutral, while Germany and Aus- 
tria, on the one side, and Russia and France on the 
other, contended over the fate of Serbia, England, 
after trying to prevent war altogether, had decided 
to oppose Germany's plans of attack. 

On August 10, 1914, in reply to an offer of medi- 
ation by the President of the United States, William 
II addressed in his owm handwriting a personal 
communication to the President in explanation of 
his position, beginning with the following statement ; 

851 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

*'l. H. R. H. Prince Henry was received by His 
Majesty King George V in London, who empowered 
him to transmit to me verbally that England would 
remain neutral if war broke out on the Continent in- 
volving Germany and France, Austria and Russia. 

''This message was telegraphed to me by my 
brother from London after his conversation with 
H. M. the King, and repeated verbally on the 
twenty-ninth of July."^ 

From a telegram addressed by Prince Henry to 
King George V, on July 30th, we learn that it was 
on Sunday, July 26th, that the Prince was received 
and had his conference with the King at Bucking- 
ham Palace.^ At that time there was no sufficient 
reason, apart from Germany's ambitions, for be- 
lieving that a general war would occur on the Con- 
tinent, involving Germany and France, Austria and 
Russia. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, pre- 
sented on July 23d, was not answered until 6:30 
p. M. of the 25th. Even if the reply was known in 
London on Sunday, the 26th, its moderation was 
such that it could hardly cause alarm. The attitude 
of Austria-Hungary regarding it had not been an- 
nounced, and there was no reason to expect that it 
would be a complete rejection. More important 

1 Reproduced in facsimile in Gerard, My Four Years in Ger- 
many, New York, 1917, p. 202. 

2 British Blue Book, I, Appendix I, II, No. I. 

The various publications cited in this chapter, such as the British 
Blue Book, German White Book, Russian Orange Book, etc., may 
be found in Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Out- 
break of the European War, London, 1915; and also, with addi- 
tions, in Scott, Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak 
of the European War, 2 vols.. New York, 1916. 

253 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

still, Rnssia had not declared the eonrse to be pur- 
sued regarding Serbia. Even on the 27th Rnssia 
did not go beyond declaring, "So long as the slight- 
est hope exists of avoiding bloodshed, all our efforts 
must be directed to that end ; but if, in spite of our 
earnest "wdsh, we are not successful, Russia will in 
no case disinterest herself in the fate of Serbia."* 

While Russia was thus eager to prevent war alto- 
gether, the Kaiser was endeavoring to obtain an 
assurance of England's neutrality, in confident ex- 
pectation of a war in which he anticipated that Ger- 
many and France, as well as Austria and Russia, 
would be engaged. Of the possible prevention of such 
a war there is in his communication no suggestion. 

It is hardly conceivable that King George, as a 
constitutional monarch, could have given a cate- 
gorical promise that, in all circumstances, England 
would remain neutral during a war in which France 
should be involved. Precisely what language was 
employed in answer to Prince Henry's inquiry 
neither the Prince nor the Kaiser informs us. How 
much of the Prince 's report was mere inference we 
cannot, therefore, judge; but, whatever it was, 
Prince Henry in his telegram tells the King, 
''William was very thankful to receive your mes- 
sage."^ He also assures King George that 
''William is inspired by the greatest sincerity in 
his efforts for the maintenance of peace." Why, 
then, was he seeking from King George neutrality, 



1 Russian Orange Book, I, No. 40. 

2 British Blue Book, I, Appendix II, No. i. 

253 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

and not aid in promoting peace? There is no 
evidence in these documents that such aid had been 
requested. It was neutrality, not aid toward peace, 
the Kaiser himself asserts, that he had sought and 
believed he had been promised. Was it for this that 
he was "very thankful?" Prince Henry, it is true, 
proposes in his telegram to King George that he 
should use his ** influence on France and also on 
Kussia that they should remain neutral," while 
Austria proceeds to crush Serbia. This, he adds, 
'*I consider a certain and, perhaps, the only pos- 
sible way of maintaining the peace of Europe." 
Evidently Prince Henry knew William II 's mind. 
Foreseeing a general war before a sufficient cause 
for its occurrence had been developed, the Kaiser, 
by his own statement of the case, was simply en- 
deavoring to obtain, as the culmination of the un- 
derstanding with Great Britain that had been 
brought about by Lichnowsky's negotiations, the 
neutrality for which Germany had so earnestly 
sought at the time of Lord Haldane's mission. 

It was not, however, upon the assurance of Prince 
Henry alone that William II based the hope of 
securing this result. 

**2. My ambassador in London," he continues, 
** transmitted a message from Sir E. Grey to Berlin 
saying that only in case France was likely to be 
crashed England would interfere. " '^ 

In making this statement Prince Lichnowsky was 



1 Continuation of message to the President. See also Illustrative 
Document No. IX. 

254 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

amply justified ; for, as we now know, on July 25tli, 
the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, 
had said to the British ambassador at St. Peters- 
burg: *'I do not consider that public opinion here 
would or ought to sanction our going to war over a 
Serbian quarrel.'** 

With alacrity, on Sunday, July 26th, as soon as 
Prince Henry's hypothetical question suggested the 
possibility of a continental conflict. Sir Edward 
Grey, taking alarm at this foreboding, proposed to 
Berlin, Paris, and Rome a conference, **to meet 
immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue 
which would prevent complications."^ The Rus- 
sian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sazonof, wel- 
comed the suggestion and thought it ** necessary 
that Great Britain should take instant mediatory 
action."* 

What at this moment was the attitude of Berlin? 

On July 27th, when the British ambassador. Sir 
Edward Goschen, presented Grey's proposal, the 
Imperial German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
Von Jagow, declared, ''The conference you sug- 
gest would practically amount to a court of arbitra- 
tion ; ' ' and he could not, therefore, * ' fall in with it. ' ' 
When the ambassador insisted that the proposal 
*'had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that 
representatives of the four nations not directly in- 
terested should discuss and suggest means for 



1 British Blue Book, I, No. 24. 

2 The same, No. 36. 

3 Russian Orange Book, I, No. 48. 

255 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

avoiding a dangerous situation,'* ^\'ithout denying 
this, Von Jagow remained hostile to the plan and 
declared that such a conference was *'not prac- 
ticable.''^ The Secretary did not need to consult 
the Emperor upon this point; he already under- 
stood his ^^ews and his purpose. Lichnowsky, how- 
ever, did not have this understanding. He, on the 
contrary, informed Sir Edward Grey that the Ger- 
man Government accepted "in principle" mediation 
between Austria and Russia ; ^ whereupon Sir 
Edward, on July 28th, assuming the acceptance of 
the idea of a conference, informed Goschen : * * I am 
ready to propose that the German Secretary of 
State should suggest the lines on which this prin- 
ciple should be applied. ' ' ^ But matters had by 
this time gone too far. Austria had already de- 
clared war on Serbia, and the Imperial German Gov- 
ernment announced its position that there must be 
no interference from outside. 

On July 27th the Russian charge d'affaires at 
Berlin had written to the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs at St. Petersburg: 

''Before my visit to the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to-day his Excellency had received the 
French ambassador, who endeavored to induce him 
to accept the British proposal for action in favor 
of peace, such action to be taken simultaneously at 
St. Petersburg and at Vienna by Great Britain, 



1 British Blue Book, I, No. 43- 
- The same, No. 46. 
3 The same, No. 68. 

256 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon suggested 
that these powers should give their advice to Vienna 
in the following terms : * To abstain from all action 
which might aggravate the situation. . . .' Jagow 
refused point blank to accept this suggestion in 
spite of the entreaties of the ambassador.*'* 

On July 29th the British ambassador at Berlin 
telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey: 

*'I was sent for again to-day by the Imperial 
Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state 
that the Austro-Hungarian government, to whom 
he had at once communicated your opinion, had 
answered that events had marched too rapidly and 
that it was therefore too late to act upon your sug- 
gestion that the Serbian reply might form a basis 
of discussion. '^^ 

Neither the Austrian Red Book nor the German 
White Book contains any Avord from Vienna to this 
effect. It was quite unnecessary. The attitude of 
Vienna had been already decreed at Berlin. There 
is no concealment of this. 

**We declared,'* says the German White Book, 
**in regard to this proposal, that we could not, 
however much we approved the idea, participate in 
such a conference, as we could not call Austria in 
her dispute before a European tribunal. Faithful 
to our principle that mediation should not extend 
to the Austro-Serbian conflict, which is to be con- 
sidered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but 



1 Russian Orange Book, I, No. 39. 

2 British Blue Book, I, No. 75- 

257 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

merely to the relations of Austria-Hungary and 
Russia, we continued our endeavors to bring about 
an understanding between these two powers,"^ 
endeavors which consisted in assuring Austria of 
German support, and threatening Russia with Ger- 
man hostility unless her efforts to obtain justice 
for Serbia were abandoned. 

Kaiser William II was, in the mean time, ceasing 
to be *' thankful" for the neutrality he had be- 
lieved might be expected from Great Britain. The 
interest of the British Government in maintaining 
peace was annoying to him. Why, if England really 
meant to be neutral, was Sir Edward Grey so solici- 
tous to avoid a general war? William II, as his 
message to the President implies, was growing 
indignant about it. 

Something, therefore, must be attempted to re- 
strain Great Britain's activities for peace. How 
could that be better accomplished than by Germany 
herself taking the field as a peacemaker? The 
effect of this move in Great Britain is thus de- 
scribed by Sir Edward Grey under date of July 
29th, in a telegram to the British ambassador at 
Berlin : 

"The German ambassador has been instrncted by 
the German Chancellor to inform me that he is en- 
deavoring to mediate between Vienna and St. 
Petersburg, and he hopes with good success. Aus- 
tria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and 
he is endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a satis- 



^ German White Book, preliminary statement. 

258 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

factory form at St. Petersburg the scope and ex- 
tension of Austrian proceedings in Serbia. ... I 
urged that the German Government should suggest 
any method by which the influence of the four pow- 
ers could be used together to prevent war between 
Austria and Russia. France agreed. Italy agreed. 
The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence 
was ready to be put into operation by any method 
that Germany could suggest, if mine was not ac- 
ceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come 
into operation by any method that Germany thought 
possible, if only Germany would 'press the button' 
in the interests of peace.''* 

We shall see presently how Germany pressed the 
button! 

The subject of mediation having been thus passed 
over to Germany, the Imperial German Foreign 
Office at once proceeded to take soundings on the 
question of British neutrality. Would Great Britain 
stand aside and permit Germany and Austria to 
fight Russia and France without interference? 

This effort to obtain reassurance for the Kaiser 
is best narrated in the follomng telegram of July 
29th, from Sir Edward Goschen: 

''I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. 
His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam. 

"He said that, should Austria be attacked by 
Russia, a European conflagration might, he feared, 
become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations 
as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to 



1 British Blue Book, I, No. 84. 
18 259 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the 
following strong bid for British neutrality. He 
said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge 
the main principle which governed British policy, 
that Great Britain would never stand by and allow 
France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. 
That, however, was not the object at which Ger- 
many aimed. Provided that the neutrality of Great 
Britain Avere certain, every assurance would be 
given to the British Government that the Imperial 
Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at 
the expense of France, should they prove victorious 
in any war that might ensue. 

"I questioned his Excellency about the French 
colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a 
similar undertaking in that respect. As regards 
Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long 
as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity 
and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was 
ready to give his Majesty's government an assur- 
ance that she would do likewise. It depended upon 
the action of France what operations Germany 
might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when 
the war was over, Belgian integrity would be re- 
spected if she had not sided against Germany. 

"His Excellency ended by saying that ever since 
he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had 
been, as you were aware, to bring about an under- 
standing A\^th England ; he trusted that these assur- 
ances might form the basis of that understanding 
which he so much desired. He had in mind a gen- 

260 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

eral neutrality agreement between England and 
Germany, tliongh it was of course at the present 
moment too early to discuss details, and an assur- 
ance of British neutrality in the conflict which the 
present crisis might possibly produce, would enable 
him to look forward to realization of his desire.*** 

To this Sir Edward Grey promptly answered : 

"His Majesty's Government cannot for a mo- 
ment entertain the Chancellor 's proposal that they 
should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. 
What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by 
while French colonies are taken and France is 
beaten, so long as Germany does not take French 
territory as distinct from the colonies. ... It 
would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain 
with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace 
from which the good name of this country would 
never recover." 

On July 29th, William II had received the follow- 
ing telegram from Czar Nicholas : 

''I am glad you are back in Germany. In this 
serious moment I ask you earnestly to help me. An 
ignominious w^ar has been declared against a weak 
country, and in Russia the indignation, which I 
fully share, is tremendous. I fear that very soon 
I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised 
upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures 
which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity, as a 
European war would be, I urge you in the name of 



1 British Blue Book, I, No. 85. See Illustrative Document No. 
yill for Sir Edward Grey's reply. 

261 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

onr old friendship to do all in yonr power to re- 
strain your ally from going too far."^ 

Then followed the exchange of telegrams between 
the Kaiser and the Czar, in which Nicholas II 
pleaded for the Kaiser's mediation with Austria, 
and William II, assuring him of his good offices, 
menaced him with war if he resorted to military 
preparations against Austria. This correspond- 
ence was published in full in the German White 
Book, but not one word of the alleged mediation 
which the Kaiser professed to be conducting with 
Austria was made public! The part Austria was 
to play had been already arranged, and Germany's 
support had been already pledged. There is no doc- 
umentary evidence that any mediation, in the proper 
sense of the word, was undertaken by the Kaiser. 

The subject of British neutrality on July 30th 
suddenly assumed a definite form. The Kaiser him- 
self, in his communication to the President above 
referred to, states how he understood it. 

**0n the 30th," he says, **my ambassador in Lon- 
don reported that Sir Edward Grey, in course of a 
* private' conversation, told him that if the conflict 
remained localized between Russia — not Serbia — 
and Austria, England would not move, but if we 
'mixed' in the fray she would take quick decisions 
and grave measures, i.e., if I left my ally, Austria, 
in the lurch, to fight alone, England would not touch 



1 German White Book, No. 21. 

" Continuation of message to the President. See Illustrative 
Document No. IX for Grey's interview with Lichnowsky. 

262 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

Unwittingly, the Chancellor, in his request for 
neutrality, had lifted the veil and disclosed to Great 
Britain the predatory designs of Germany. The 
nature of the war William II had anticipated in his 
hypothetical question to King George was now bet- 
ter understood at London. Bethmann-Hollweg had 
been unable to give any assurance regarding the 
French colonies when France had been weakened 
by a war in which Germany was to be the victor ! 
Belgium and Holland, too, were subject to contin- 
gencies. It was for such exploits that British neu- 
trality was sought ! 

Continuing to unfold his mind to the President, 
the Kaiser says : 

^'This communication [the German ambassador's 
telegram of July 30th, above referred to] being 
directly counter to the King's message to me, I 
telegraphed to H. M. on the 29th and 30th, thank- 
ing him for his kind messages through my brother, 
and begging him to use all his power to keep Fran-ce 
and Russia, his allies, from making any warlike 
preparations calculated to disturb my work of medi- 
ation, stating that I was in constant communication 
with H. M. the Czar. In the evening the King 
kindly answered that he had ordered his govern- 
ment to use every possible influence with his allies 
to refrain from taking any provocative military 
measures. At the same time H. M. asked me if I 
would transmit to Vienna the British proposal that 
Austria was to take Belgrade and a few other 
Serbian towns, and a strip of country, as a *main 

263 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

mise' to make sure that the other Serbian promises 
on paper should be fulfilled in reality. This pro- 
posal was in the same moment telegraphed to me 
from Vienna for London, quite in conjunction with 
the British proposal. Besides, I had telegraphed to 
H. M. the Czar, the same as an idea of mine, before 
I received the two communications from Vienna and 
London. As both were of the same opinion, I 
immediately transmitted the telegrams vice versa, 
Vienna and London. I felt that I was able to tide 
the question over and was happy at the peaceful 
outlook. ' ' ^ 

Here is the first definite statement of the charac- 
ter of the advice given to Austria. Unfortunately, 
there is no document, although the exchanges be- 
tween the Kaiser and the Czar are printed in the 
German White Book, to show that William II ever 
telegraphed to Nicholas II as an idea of his own the 
substance of Sir Edward Grey's proposal. Grey's 
message was never publicly referred to until No- 
vember 9, 1916, when the Chancellor, Bethmann- 
Hollweg, replying to a charge made by Sir Edward 
Grey, informed the Reichstag that on July 30, 1914, 
he had sent the following instructions to the Ger- 
man ambassador at Vienna : 

** Should the Austro-Hungarian Government re- 
fuse all mediation, we are confronted with a con- 
flagration in which England would go against us, 
and Italy and Rumania, according to all indications, 
would not be with us ; so that with Austria-Hungary 



1 The message to the President. 

264 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

we should confront three great powers. Germany, 
as the result of England's hostility, would have 
to bear the chief brunt of the fight. The political 
prestige of Austria-Hungary, the honor of her 
arms, and her justified claims against Serbia can 
be sufficiently safeguarded by the occupation of 
Belgrade or other places. We therefore urgently 
and emphatically ask the Vienna Cabinet to con- 
sider the acceptance of mediation on the proposed 
conditions. Responsibility for the consequences 
which may otherwise arise must be extraordinarily 
severe for Austria-Hungary and ourselves."^ 

Is it possible that William II ever sent this mes- 
sage to the Czar as his own idea? The Chancellor's 
statement leaves no such impression. The reason 
for sending this message was a wholly new one. It 
was that, if Austria-Hungary made no concession 
beyond what they had previously been advised to 
make, the Central Powers would be '' confronted 
with a conflagration" in which England would go 
against them! 

"The Austro-Hungarian Government, " the Chan- 
cellor continues, "acceded to our urgent repre- 
sentations by gi\^ng its ambassador in Berlin the 
following instruction: 

" 'I ask your Excellency most sincerely to thank 
Herr von Jagow, the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, for the information given through Herr 
von Tschirschky, and to declare to him that, despite 
the change in the situation which has since arisen 



1 Not referred to in the Gcnmn White Book. 

265 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

through the Russian mobilization, we are quite 
ready to consider the proposals of Sir Edward 
Grey for a settlement between us and Serbia. A 
condition of our acceptance is, of course, that our 
military action against Serbia should meanwhile 
proceed, and that the English Cabinet should induce 
the Russian Government to bring to a standstill the 
Russian mobilization directed against us, in which 
case also we, as a matter of course, ^vill at once 
cancel our defensive countermeasures forced upon 
us in Galicia.' "* 

Evidently, this reply is not an unconditional ac- 
ceptance of Sir Edward Grey's proposal, which 
was that Austrian military action in Serbia should 
not ''proceed," but be "suspended"; for, as he 
states, "otherwise a mediation would only drag on 
matters, and give Austria time to crush Serbia. ' ' " 
Furthermore, this message was not sent from Vi- 
enna until July 31st. ^ If, therefore, the Kaiser is 
correct in his statement, "I immediately trans- 
mitted the telegrams vice versa, Vienna and Lon- 
don," and these telegrams were, as he says, "quite 
in conjunction," the transmission could not have 
occurred until late in the day on the 31st of July. 
The really important point, however, is that this 
alleged agreement for a conference, which Germany 
had constantly opposed, but w^hich is here repre- 
sented as so acceptable that the Kaiser could say. 



1 Printed in substantially the same terms in the Austro-Hun- 
garian Red Book, I, No. 51. See Illustrative Document No. X. 

2 British Blue Book, I, No. 88. 

3 Austro-Hungarian Red Book, as above. 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

"I felt that I was able to tide the question over and 
was happy at the peaceful outlook," was never com- 
municated by William II to the Czar! If, as the 
Kaiser thought, there was an open door of peace, 
the fact was not communicated to Russia. 

''While I was preparing a note to H. M. the Czar 
the next morning," the Kaiser continues in his 
message to the President, 'Ho inform him that 
Vienna, London, and Berlin were agreed about the 
treatment of affairs, I received the telephones from 
H. E. the Chancellor that on the night before the 
Czar had given the order to mobilize the whole of 
the Russian army, which was, of course, also meant 
against Germany, whereas up till then the southern 
armies had been mobilized against Austria. ' ' 

The Kaiser here represents that in the morning 
of July 31st, while preparing a note to the Czar 
to inform him that "Vienna, London, and Berlin 
were agreed about the treatment of affairs," he 
was interrupted by telephone messages from the 
Chancellor that "on the night before" the Czar had 
given the order to mobilize the whole Russian 
Army. In his telegram of Juh^ 31st to King George, 
however, he says: "Your proposals coincide Avith 
my ideas and with the communication which I have 
this evening received from Vienna, and which I 
have passed on to London. I have just heard from 
the Chancellor that intelligence has just reached 
him that Nicholas this evening has ordered the 
mobilization of his entire army and fleet." ^ 



1 British Blue Book, I, Appendix I, II, No. 3. 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

The contemporary statement undoubtedly is to 
be preferred to that made from memory. It was, 
therefore, in the evening of July 31st that William 
II received the reply from Vienna, and at the same 
time learned that the Czar had ordered general 
mobilization. The German White Book plainly 
states that the general Eussian mobilization was 
ordered ** during the afternoon of the 31st of 
July." It could not, therefore, have been known 
by William II in the morning of the 31st. 

On that same date he received from Nicholas II 
the following telegram: 

**I thank you cordially for your mediation, which 
permits the hope that everything may yet end 
peaceably. It is technically impossible to discon- 
tinue our military preparations, which have been 
made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It 
is far from us to want war. As long as the nego- 
tiations between Austria and Serbia continue my 
troops will undertake no provocative action. I give 
you my solemn word thereon. I confide with all 
my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for success 
of your mediation in Vienna, for the welfare of our 
countries, and the peace of Europe.'*^ 

To this the Kaiser replied at 2 p.m., without re- 
ferring to any general mobilization — of which he 
was not yet informed — saying: **I now receive au- 
thentic news of serious preparations for war on my 
eastern frontier;'* and adding, ''The responsibility 
for the disaster which is now threatening the whole 



1 German White Book, no number. 

268 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

civilized world will not be laid at my door. In this 
moment it still lies in your power to avert it."^ 

On the evening of July 31st William II not only 
held in his possession the answer of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government alleging its modified con- 
sent to follow the suggestions of Sir Edward Grey, 
but a telegram sent by the Austro-Hungarian For- 
eign Office to all its embassies and legations, saying : 
*' Negotiations dealing with the situation are pro- 
ceeding between the Cabinets at Vienna and St. 
Petersburg, and we hope that they may lead to a 
general understanding.''^ 

At the same time he had in hand a telegram from 
Nicholas II, reading: **It would be right to give 
over the Austro-Serbian problem to The Hague 
Tribunal. I trust in your wisdom and friend- 
ship.'' ' Not only this, the Kaiser knew that, on 
July 31st, Sazonof, the Russian Minister of For- 
eign Affairs, had handed to the German ambassa- 
dor at St. Petersburg the following statement, ac- 
cepting in principle the proposal of Sir Edward 
Grey: 

"If Austria consents to stay the march of her 
troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognizing 
that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the 
character of a question of European interest, she 
admits that the great powers may examine the 
satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro- 

1 German White Book, no number. 

2 Austro-Hungarian Red Book, I, No. 53. 

3 Published in the Russian press on January 31, 1915. See 
Scott, Documents, Part II, p. 1029. Not printed in German White 
Book, and afterward explained as "unimportant." 

2G9 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Hungarian Government without injury to her rights 
as a sovereign state or her independence, Russia 
undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude. ' ' * 

Only the knowledge by Nicholas IT of the fact of 
Austria's acceptance and Germany's approval were 
necessary to the meeting of a conference for a 
pacific settlement of the Austro-Serbian contro- 
versy, yet the Kaiser did not send to the Czar the 
note he says he was preparing. 

In these circumstances, on the evening of July 
31st, upon the announcement in Berlin of a Russian 
order for general mobilization, an ultimatum was 
telegraphed to St. Petersburg directing the Im- 
perial German Ambassador to inform the Russian 
Government that, if Russia did not stop every meas- 
ure of war against Germany and Austria-Hungary 
within twelve hours and notify Germany definitely 
to that effect, German mobilization would follow.^ 
At midnight of the 31st this ultimatum was deliv- 
ered. 

It was "mobilization," not a declaration of war 
that was to follow if Russia did not comply with 
Germany's demands. Yet at 12.52 p.m. of August 
1, the German ambassador at St. Petersburg was 
instructed, "In case the Russian Government make 
no satisfactory reply to our demand, your Excel- 
lency will please transmit this afternoon, five 
o'clock (mid-European time), the following state- 
ment: 



1 Russian Orange Book, I, No. 67. 

2 German White Book, No. 23. 

270 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

**His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sove- 
reign, in the name of the Empire, accepts the 
challenge and considers Himself in a state of war 
with Russia. Please wire, urgent, receipt and 
time of carrying out this instruction by Russian 
time."* 

Kaiser William II had at last staged the tragedy 
for which his whole reign had been a preparation. 
Three matters of importance deserve consider- 
ation in this connection. 

The first is the attitude of Great Britain, accused 
by Germany of having brought on the war by a 
process of "encirclement.'' On July 30th King 
George V telegraphed to Prince Henry: 

*'I earnestly desire that such misfortune as a 
European war — the evil of which could not be reme- 
died — may be prevented. My government is doing 
the utmost possible in order to indued Russia and 
France to postpone further military operations, 
provided that Austria declares herself satisfied 
with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighbor- 
ing Serbian territory as a pledge of a satisfactory 
settlement of her demands, while at the same time 
the other countries suspend their preparations for 
war. I rely on William applying his great influence 
in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. 
In this way he will prove that Germany and Eng- 
land are working together to prevent what would 
be an international catastrophe. Please assure 
William that I am doing all I can, and will continue 



* German White Book, No. 23. 

271 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

to do all in my power to maintain the peace of 
Europe."^ 

On July 31st, Sir Edward Grey declared to the 
German ambassador : 

**If Germany could get any reasonable proposal 
put forward which made it clear that Germany and 
Austria were striving to preserve European peace 
and that Russia and France would be unreasonable 
if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Peters- 
burg and Paris, and go to the length of saying that 
if Russia and France would not accept it his Maj- 
esty's Government would have nothing more to do 
wdth the consequences; but, otherwise, I told the 
German ambassador that if France became involved 
we should be drawn in." ^ 

If William II was sincere in his mediation for 
peace between Russia and Austria-Hungary, why 
did he not at least test the purpose of Russia by 
presenting to the Czar the note he says he was pre- 
paring on the 31st? He had the assurance that if 
Russia rejected a reasonable proposal the British 



1 British Blue Book, I, Appendix I, II, No. 2. 

2 The same. No. in. 

Every utterance of Sir Edward Grey tended to confirm the con- 
viction at Berlin that Great Britain was strongly averse to war. 
"Over and over again," writes Dr. E. J. Dillon, "I heard the 
chances of British neutrality discussed by statesmen of the two 
military empires, and the odds in favor of our holding strictly aloof 
from hostilities were set down as equivalent) to certainty. The 
grounds for this conviction were numerous, and, to them, con- 
vincing. . . . British neutrality was an unquestioned postulate 
which lay at the very root of the scheme engineered by the empire- 
builders of Berlin. And they clung to it throughout with the 
tenacity of drowning men holding on to a frozen plank in Polar 
seas." — A Scrap of Paper, London and New York, 1914, pp. 140, 
141. 

273 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

Government would have nothing more to do with 
the consequences. Considering the Austrian con- 
cession reasonable, as he claims to have done, he 
had the opportunity to throw the responsibility for 
war upon Russia in a sense which even Great Brit- 
ain would be bound to accept. 

But what if Russia should conform to this reason- 
able proposal? Then, of course, there would be no 
war! 

Did the Kaiser believe, from the tone of Great 
Britain's communication, that in the event of war 
her neutrality was still possible? Nothing seemed 
to prevent it but the safety of France. As late as 
August 1st, the date on which Germany declared 
war on Russia, Prince Lichnowsky reopened this 
subject at London. 

*'He asked me,'' wrote Sir Edward Grey on that 
day to Goschen, ^'if Germany gave a promise not 
to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to 
remain neutral. He even suggested that the integ- 
rity of France and her colonies might be guaran- 
teed."^ 

At the moment of the German resolve to declare 
immediate war on Russia there was evidently a 
belief in Berlin that Great Britain was not only 
strongly indisposed to engage in war, but wholly 
unprepared to offer effective aid to France. Swift 
action, it was believed in Berlin, would end the con- 
test before Great Britain could interpose. 

But there were additional reasons on August 1st 

1 British Blue Book, I, Appendix I, II, No. 123. See Illustrative 
Document No. XI. 

273 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

for concluding at Berlin that Great Britain was not 
to prove an obstruction to German plans, so urgent, 
so unexpected, were the British efforts for peace, 
as reported from London by Lichnowsky. Two 
telegrams were received from him on that day, both 
of which seemed to imply an extraordinary effort 
on the part of Great Britain to keep out of war. 
The first one road: 

* * Sir Edward Grey has just called me to the tele- 
phone and has asked me whether I thought I could 
declare that in the event of France remaining 
neutral in a German-Russian war we would not 
attack the French. I told him that I believed that 
I could assume responsibility for this."^ 

The second, dated August 1, 1.15 p.m. : 

**. . . Sir Edward Grey's Private Secretary has 
just been to see me in order to say that the Minister 
wishes to make proposals to me for the neutrality 
of England, even in the case that we had war with 
Russia and France. I see Sir Edward Grey this 
afternoon and will communicate at once. ' ' ^ 

The first of these telegrams does not indicate the 
hour when it was sent, but its substance shows that 
it was the earlier of the two, and in his memoran- 
dum Prince Lichnowsky definitely says the conver- 
sation referred to occurred in the morning. 

Disappointing for the Kaiser as this alleged 
prospect of British neutrality eventually proved, it 
would appear that, on August 1st, there seemed to 



1 British Blue Book, I, Appendix I, II, No. 5. 

2 Published in the Norddeiitsche AUgemcine Zcitung of Septem- 
ber 6, 1914. 

274 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

him good reason for the belief that Great Britain 
might persuade France not to take part in a con- 
tinental war, and that in any case Great Britain was 
ready to negotiate regarding terms of neutrality. 

This inference was, of course, an error, as Lich- 
nowsky explains in the following comment: 

*'0n the morning of August 1st, Sir William 
Tyrrell called on me, to tell me that his chief still 
hoped to find a way out. Would we remain neutral 
in case France did the samef I understood that 
we were to declare ourselves ready, in such case, to 
spare France ; but his meaning was that we should 
remain altogether neutral, that is, toward Russia 
also. That was the well-known misunderstanding. 
Sir Edward had an appointment with me for that 
afternoon. At the moment he was at a meeting of 
the Cabinet, and. Sir William Tyrrell having hur- 
ried to him at once, he called me up on the tele- 
phone. In the afternoon, he talked only about Bel- 
gian neutrality and the possibility that we and 
France might face one another in arms without 
attacking."^ 

The important point is that, on August 1st, Will- 
iam II understood that British and possibly French 
neutrality might be hoped for ; while he, in company 
with Austria-Hungary, carried on a war with 
Russia and Serbia. His state of mind while labor- 
ing under this misapprehension is of special inter- 
est. 

Fortunately, the Kaiser has expressed himself 



1 Monroe Smith's translation, p. iii. 
11) 275 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

somewhat explicitly on this point in his message to 
the President : 

*'In a telegram from London my ambassador in- 
formed me he understood the British Government 
would guarantee the neutrality of France and 
wished to know whether Germany would refrain 
from attack. I telegraphed to his Majesty the King 
personally that mobilization, being already carried 
out, could not be stopped, but if H. M. could guar- 
antee with his armed forces the neutrality of 
France I would refrain from attacking her, leave 
her alone, and employ my troops elsewhere. H. M. 
answered that he thought my offer was based on a 
misunderstanding, and as far as I can make out 
Sir E. Grey never took my oifer into serious con- 
sideration. He never answered it. Instead, he de- 
clared that England had to defend Belgian neu- 
trality, which had to be violated by Germany on 
strategical grounds, news having been received that 
France was already preparing to enter Belgium 
and the King of the Belgians having refused my 
petition for a passage under guarantee of his coun- 
try's freedom. I am most grateful for the Presi- 
dent's message." 

What becomes of the charge of "encirclement" 
when the inventor of this catchword could seriously 
believe, even for a moment, in the British guaran- 
tee of French neutrality while Germany subdued 
Russia? Yet, in his telegram of August 1st to King 
George V, William II is more explicit even than ho 
is in his message to the President. He says : 

276 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE JVAR 

* ' I have just received the communication of your 
government offering French neutrality under the 
guarantee of Great Britain. To this offer there 
was added the question whether, under these con- 
ditions, Germany would refrain from attacking 
France. For technical reasons the mobilization 
which I have already ordered this afternoon on two 
fronts — east and west — ^must proceed according to 
the arrangements made. A counter order cannot 
now be given, as your telegram unfortunately came 
too late, but if France offers us her neutrality, 
which must be guaranteed by the English army and 
navy, I will naturally give up the idea of an attack 
on France and employ my troops elsewhere. I 
hope that France will not be nervous. The troops 
on my frontier are at this moment being kept back 
by telegraph and by telephone from crossing the 
French frontier. *' ^ 

How seriously the possibility of British and even 
French neutrality was taken at Berlin is evident 
from the Imperial German Chancellor's telegram 
of August 1st to Prince Lichnowsky, stating that, 
* ' in the event of England guaranteeing with all her 
forces the unconditional neutrality of France in the 
conflict between Germany and Russia," the Ger- 
mans would not cross the French frontier before 
7 P.M. of August 3d. 

At this moment the Kaiser was proclaiming in 
Berlin that the sword had been forced into his hand 



1 British Blue Book, I, Appendix I, II, No. 6. See Illustrative 
Document No. XII. 

377 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

by a coalition of hostile powers, and that he "was 
fighting a war of defense to preserve Germany's 
existence; while, in secret, he was demanding of 
France an "unconditional" neutrality and of Great 
Britain that all her armed forces should be em- 
ployed to restrain France from defending herself, 
thus actually in effect proposing the violation of 
the very principle of neutrality by utilizing the 
whole of Great Britain's forces in Germany's in- 
terest! And if, in forty-eight hours, all this were 
not pledged, William II would not give up the idea 
of an attack on France — although, to avoid col- 
lision, her outposts were withdra^Ti ten kilometers 
from her frontier — and would not leave her alone. 
During this interval his troops, although mobiliza- 
tion, it was represented, had been only just ordered, 
were being kept back by telegraph and by telephone 
from crossing the French frontier. What if a mes- 
sage should fail to reach them? He hoped that 
France would not be nervous! 

All this, it is true, was dispelled by Lichnowsky's 
telegram of August 2d, stating that "the sug- 
gestions of Sir Edward Grey, based on the desire 
of creating the possibility of lasting neutrality on 
the part of England, were made without any pre- 
vious inquiry of France and without knowledge of 
the mobilization, and have been given up as quite 
impracticable."^ In his memorandum he adds: 
"There was no proposal at all, but a question that 
carried with it no binding engagement, since our 



1 British Blue Book, I, No. 9- 

278 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

interview was to take place soon afterward. Ber- 
lin, however, without waiting for an interview, 
made the news the basis of far-reaching activity. ' ' ^ 
In the mean time France and Germany had been 
asked if they would respect the neutrality of Bel- 
gium. The reply of France was prompt and un- 
equivocal, that of Germany was withheld ; but, not- 
withstanding that, on May 2, 1913, it had been 
stated in the Reichstag that **the neutrality of Bel- 
gium is guaranteed by international treaty," the 
evasion of the Foreign Office rendered it evident 
that Germany did not intend to respect it. In his 
message to the President, quite as franld}^ as the 
Imperial Chancellor in his announcement to the 
Reichstag on August 4th that "necessity knows no 
law," the Kaiser places this violation of a treaty 
obligation on the ground of military strategy ; but 
his conscience rebukes him in the midst of his at- 
tempt at self -justification. In his autograph mes- 
sage, as the facsimile reveals, he had written, 
' ' Knowledge having been received that France was 
already preparing to enter Belgium" ; but the false- 
hood of this statement was too glaring and too 
easily refuted. He, therefore, crossed out ** knowl- 
edge" and wrote in "news." 



1 Monroe Smith's translation, p. ill. It is deserving of note 
that, on, July 30th, Sir Edward Grey had said to Prince Lich- 
nowsky : 

"And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, 
and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to 
promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, 
by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy 
would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and 
ourselves, jointly or separately." — British Blue Book, I, No. 101. 

279 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

"Mobilization, having been already ordered/' 
William II wrote, "could not be stopped" — not 
even against a nentral France without the British 
guarantee. And yet it was the simple fact of Rus- 
sia 's mobilization that, in the Kaiser's mind, con- 
stituted a sufficient reason for a declaration of war. 
That is the plea put forth by William II himself 
and emphasized by his Chancellor, who has declared 
the Russian mobilization to be the cause of the war. 

By all the rules and precedents of modern war- 
fare, the proper answer to mobilization is mobili- 
zation. It increases the gravity of negotiation, but 
it does not necessarily terminate it ; it only renders 
it the more urgent. Mobilization does not neces- 
sarily mean war; and even on August 1, 1914, the 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was assured 
by the German ambassador at St. Petersburg that 
it did not.^ Before war was actually declared by 
William. II on Russia, in a telegram dated 2 p.m. 
of August 1st, Nicholas II said to the Kaiser: 

**I comprehend that you are forced to mobilize, 
but I should like to have from you, viz., that these 
measures do not mean war, and that we shall con- 
tinue to negotiate for the welfare of our two coun- 
tries and the universal peace which is so dear to 
our hearts. With the aid of God it must be pos- 
sible to our long-tried friendship to prevent the 
shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence 
your urgent reply. ' ' ^ 



1 Russian Orange Book, I, No. 70. 

2 German White Book — no number. See Illustrative Document 
No. XIII. 

280 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

At that moment, in addition to the assurances 
from the other powers, William 11 had in his pos- 
session the key, as he believed, to the door of peace 
in Austria-Hungary's acceptance of the British pro- 
posal. He knew also that Russia and Austria- 
Hungary were at that time engaged in further 
negotiations. Yet at 7.10 p.m. that evening the 
declaration of war was presented at St. Petersburg, 
on the ground that the Russian Government had not 
answered Germany's demand to cease mobilization 
within twelve hours. 

How readily the Austro-Serbian War could have 
been terminated, and a general European war 
averted if William II had merely withheld his dec- 
laration of war and allowed negotiations to pro- 
ceed, is evident from the telegram sent by Nicholas 
II to George V on August 1st, immediately after 
the Kaiser's sudden and unjustified action in con- 
sidering mobilization as identical with war. He 
says : 

**I would gladly have accepted your proposals 
had not the German ambassador this afternoon 
presented a note to my government declaring war. 
Ever since presentation of the ultimatum at Bel- 
grade, Russia has devoted all her efforts to finding 
some pacific solution of the question raised by 
Austria 's action. Object of that action was to crush 
Serbia and make her a vassal of Austria. Effect 
of this would have been to upset balance of power 
in Balkans, which is of such vital interest to my 
Empire. Every proposal, including that of your 

281 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

government, was rejected by Germany and Austria, 
and it was only when favorable moment for bring- 
ing pressure to bear on Austria had passed that 
Germany showed any disposition to mediate. Even 
then she did not put forward any precise proposal. 
Austria's declaration of war on Serbia forced me 
to order a partial mobilization, though, in view of 
threatening situation, my military advisers 
strongly advised a general mobilization, owing to 
quickness with which Germany can mobilize in com- 
parison with Russia.^ I was eventually compelled 
to take this course in consequence of complete Aus- 
trian mobilization, of the bombardment of Bel- 
grade, of concentration of Austrian troops in 
Galicia, and of secret military preparations being 
made in Germany. That I was justified in doing so 
is proved by Germany's sudden declaration of war, 
which was quite unexpected by me, as I have given 
most categorical assurances to the Emperor 
"William that my troops would not move so long as 
mediation negotiations continued. 

*'In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once 
more that I have done all in my power to avert war. 
Now that it has been forced on me, I trust your 



1 "To realize why Russian mobilization must be slow, one has 
only to glance at the Russian railway rolling stock. The whole 
empire, in Europe as well as Asia, owns less than 20,000 passenger 
coaches, 1,000 of which are parlor cars : The total seating capacity 
of these coaches is less than 700,000. while the German seating 
capacity is four times as great, and if one compares the distances 
in Germany with those in Russia, not four times, but more nearly 
forty times as great. Russia has less than 400,000 freight cars, 
while Germany has almost 600,000 freight cars." — Von Mach, What 
Germany Wants, Boston, 1914, following statistics published in 
the North German Gazette of August 22, 1914. 

^8^ 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

country will not fail to support France and Russia. 
God bless and protect you." ^ 

In view of the convincing character of the cumu- 
lative evidence that the crime of causing the war 
rested upon the military designs of Germany, it is 
not surprising that in defending itself against the 
accusation, the Imperial German Government laid 
the blame alternately upon Russia, England, and 
France, according as some incident seemed for the 
moment to serve its purpose. 

When, in September, 1917, the former Russian 
Chief of Statf , Soukhomlinof, was tried for treason, 
the Imperial German Chancellor, abandoning the 
indictment against Great Britain, w^hich had fur- 
nished the chief thesis since England's entrance 
into the war, after the invasion of Belgium, claimed 
that the disclosures made in the trial ** would force 
public opinion in Europe and outside of Europe 
to modify its judgment concerning Germany. ' * ^ 

General Janonchkevitch had testified tliat when, 
on July 29, 1914, Soukhomlinof assured the German 
military attache at St. Petersburg that no order of 
mobilization had been issued, he had at that time a 
signed order in his pocket. This fact, argued the 
Chancellor, furnished a positive proof that Russia 
intended war, and that Germany was, therefore, 
justified in declaring war before Russia was ready. 

He took occasion to go further, and to say that 



1 British Blue Book, I, Appendix I, II, No. 2. 

2 Interview of Doctor Mantler with Chancellor Michaelis, pub- 
lished by the Wolf Agency at Berlin. 

283 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Soukhomlinof was in collusion with the Chauvinist 
group in France, and even to utter the absurd in- 
sinuation that this Russian officer "was sent to 
France for the purpose of placing M. Poincare at 
the head of the French Republic." ^ 

Admitting that the testimony of General Janouch- 
kevitch is truthful, it is not surprising that General 
Soukhomlinof carried in his pocket, on July 29th, 
an order of mobilization which was not issued until 
July 31st. The surprise is that it was not issued 
earlier, for on July 29th Sazonof telegraphed to 
the Russian ambassador at Paris : 

''The German ambassador to-day informed me of 
the decision of his government to mobilize, if Rus- 
sia did not stop her military preparations. Now, 
in point of fact, we only began these preparations 
in consequence of the mobilization already under- 
taken by Austria, and owing to her evident un- 
willingness to accept any means of arriving at a 
peaceful settlement of her dispute with Serbia."^ 

But Russia's right to contemplate a general order 
of mobilization, and to have it ready to be issued 
when needed, hardly required this new menace from 
Germany. Already, on July 5th, the Crown Coun- 
cil at Potsdam had decided to sustain Austria- 
Hungary in the subjugation of Serbia. In fact, 
even overlooking that decision, German mobiliza- 
tion was decided upon on that very day — July 29th 
— by a Crown Council held in the Neues Palais. 



1 Interview of Doctor Mantler with Chancellor Michaelis. 

2 Russian Orange Rook, I, No. s8. 

284 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

On July 30th, the Russian ambassador at Berlin 
telegraphed his Minister : 

*'I learn that the order for mobilization of the 
German Army and Navy has just been issued." * 

A newspaper extra containing this order had 
been published in Berlin, but was at once sup- 
pressed as premature. Mobilization, however, had, 
in fact, been decided upon, and the public announce- 
ment of it had been printed, but publication was 
withheld, as explained by the French ambassador 
in the following despatch of July 30th : 

**Herr von Jagow telephoned to me at tM''o o'clock 
that the news of the German mobilization which had 
spread an hour before was false, and asked me to 
inform you of this urgently ; the Imperial Govern- 
ment is confiscating the extra editions of the papers 
which announced it. But neither this communica- 
tion nor these steps diminish my apprehension with 
regard to the plans of Germany. 

**It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council 
held yesterday evening at Potsdam with the mili- 
tary authorities, under the presidency of the Em- 
peror, decided on mobilization, and this explains the 
preparation of the special editions of the LoJcal- 
Anzeiger, but that from various causes (the decla- 
ration of Great Britain that she reserved her entire 
liberty of action, the exchange of telegrams be- 
tween the Czar and "William II) the serious meas- 
ures w^hich had been decided upon were suspended. 



2 Russian Orange Book, I, No. 60. 

285 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

"One of the ambassadors with whom I have very 
close relations saw Herr Zimmermann at two 
o'clock. According to the Under Secretary of 
State the military authorities are very anxious that 
mobilization should be ordered, because every delay 
makes Germany lose some of her advantages. 
Nevertheless, up to the present, the haste of the 
General Staff, which sees war in mobilization, had 
been successfully prevented. In any case, mobiliza- 
tion may be decided upon any moment. I do not 
know who had issued in the Loliol-Anzeiger, a paper 
which is usually semi-official, premature news cal- 
culated to cause excitement in France. 

** Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe 
tJiat all {he measures for mohilisation which can be 
taken before the publication of the general order of 
mobilization liave already been taken here, and that 
they are anxious here to make us publish our mobil- 
ization first, in order to attribute the responsibility 
to us."* 

With the knowledge possessed at St. Petersburg, 
and especially in view of Germany's greater rapid- 
ity of movement and readiness for war, the fact that 
the Russian order for mobilization was withheld 
until .July 31st is clearly good evidence that Rus- 
sia was still hoping for a peaceful solution of the 
Austro-Serbian problem, which was the only excuse 
for war. "We must consider also that, even as late 
as August 1st, Russian mobilization was only **or- 



^ French Yellow Book, No. 105. See Illustrative Document 
No. XIV. 

286 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

dered," while German mobilization was, according 
to the Kaiser's telegram to King George, already 
practically accomplished. Even on July 31st, Pres- 
ident Poincare had telegraphed to King George, 
whose government had not yet promised to come to 
the aid of France : 

**The military preparations which are being 
undertaken by the Imperial Government, especially 
in the immediate neighborhood of the French fron- 
tier, are being pushed forward every day with 
fresh vigor and speed. ' ' ^ 

That the Czar's order for general mobilization 
was promulgated on July 31st affords no evidence, 
therefore, in view of his solemn avowal to the con- 
trary, that he desired war. Indeed, the testimony 
in the trial of General Souldiomlinof furnishes 
conclusive evidence that the Czar did not desire 
war. General Janouchkevitch testified that "on 
July 29th, the Czar consented to sign the Russian 
mobilization; but, in the night, having received a 
telegram from William II, he gave an* order to sus- 



1 British Blue Book, I, Appendix I, V. No. r. 

Not only were conversations going on at St. Petersburg and 
Vienna between the representatives of Russia and Austria-Hun- 
gary, but, "On August i," writes Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British 
Ambassador at Vienna, "I was informed by M. Schebeko [Russian 
Ambassador at Vienna] that Count Szapary [Austrian Ambassador 
at St. Petersburg] had at last conceded the main point at issue by 
announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to submit 
to mediation the points in the Note to Serbia which seemed incom- 
patible with the maintenance of Serbian independence. . . . Aus- 
tria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this 
point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communica- 
tion made on August ist by Count Mensdorff, to the effect that 
Austria had neither 'banged the door' on compromise nor cut off 
the conversations." — British Blur Piook, I, No. i6i. 

2b7 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

pend that ukase," ^ and it was not published until 
the 31st. 

What becomes, then, of the pretense that Russia 
plunged Europe into war? AYithin forty-eight 
hours of the Czar's decision to arrest military 
preparations, if this testimony be accepted, instead 
of giving time for diplomacy to do its work, Will- 
iam II, in the face of Nicholas II 's plea for peace, 
declared war on Russia. 

There is, therefore, no solid ground for the claim 
that Russian mobilization was the cause of the war. 
Russian mobilization was in response to Austro- 
Ilungarian mobilization and a declaration of war 
on Serbia, which the Imperial German Government 
had abetted and approved, if it had not even sug- 
gested it. 

It was, in fact, only as an ally of Austria-Hungary 
that Germany had any reason to arm against Rus- 
sia. Although the casus foederis did not come into 
existence unless Austria-Hungary was actually 
attacked by Russia, William II had, from the be- 
ginning, treated Russia as if the quarrel with 
Serbia were principally Germany's affair. As re- 
garded from Berlin, the whole Balkan question was 
considered Germany's affair ; for William II did not 
intend that there should be in the Balkans any 
barrier to the Hamburg-Bagdad extension of Ger- 
many's commercial enterprise and supremacy. 
Besides, the Pan-Germans who were influential in 
the military plans of Germany had, as we have seen, 



1 British Blue Book, I, No. I59- 

288 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

definite designs on a disintegrated Russia. The 
attack on France, the Kaiser thought, might per- 
haps be delayed, under Great Britain's guarantee; 
but Russia must instantly disarm and either yield, 
without battle, to German predominance in the 
Balkans and to a German hegemony in Europe, or 
be subdued by the superiority of German force. 
Even in case of entire neutrality in the West, Will- 
iam II declared that, if he left France alone, he in- 
tended to use his troops against Russia. 

Accordingly, although Austria-Hungary had 
announced on July 31st, "Despite the change in the 
situation which has resulted from Russia's mobili- 
zation, we are quite ready to consider the proposal 
of Sir Edward Grey to mediate between us and 
Serbia,"* William II did not permit this proposal 
to come into effect. The Austrians were hoping 
that further negotiations would ''remove disquie- 
tude," while the Kaiser was representing that his 
Empire was in danger. 

In truth, as has been pointed out, *'the decision 
reached at Berlin ... to treat Russian mobiliza- 
tion as an act of war, clearly took the Austrian For- 
eign Office by surprise." ^ 

Until August 5th, the Foreign Secretary of Aus- 
tria, Count Berchtold, remained silent. Germany 
alone, during that interval, was at war with Russia. 
And when, at last, Austria-Hungary also finally 
made her declaration, it w^as based mainly on the 



^ Austro-Hungarian Red Book, I, No. 51. 

- Monroe Smith's Militarism and Statecraft, New York, 1918, 
p. 94- 

289 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

action and representations of Germany. Its state- 
ment is : 

**In view of the threatening attitude assumed by 
Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hunga- 
rian monarchy and Serbia, and in view of the fact 
that, in consequence of this conflict, and according 
to a communication of the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has 
considered it necessary to open hostilities against 
Germany ; furthermore, in view of the fact that the 
latter consequently has entered into a state of war 
with the former power, Austria-Hungary considers 
herself equally in a state of war with Russia." * 

No attack upon Austria-Hungary is here alleged, 
only a ''threatening attitude," on the part of Rus- 
sia. That Russia had considered it necessary to 
open hostilities against Germany is not alleged as 
a known fact, but is taken on the authority of the 
Berlin Cabinet. 

Finally, it is ''in consequence" of Germany hav- 
ing entered into a state of war with Russia that 
Austria-Hungary considers herself "equally," al- 
though thus tardily, also at war with Russia. 

When William II finally interrupted what 
promised to be successful efforts for peace by a 
declaration of war, he did not even pretend that 
he did this in vindication of Austrian rights. The 
war, he declared to the German people, was a "war 
of defense" to preserve the existence of his Empire. 
He said this when, on August 1st, he believed that 
he had no opponent except Russia ; for, as we have 



1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book, I, No. 59. 

290 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

seen, he was counting at that time on British and 
possibly even French neutrality. 

A telegram to Nicholas II accepting the Czar's 
entreaty that mobilization might not be considered 
as equivalent to war, and that negotiations might 
proceed, would have secured the peace of Europe. 

At the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of 
his accession to the throne, on June 8, 1918, Will- 
iam II, speaking to his officers of the General Staff, 
in a moment of frankness, has revealed to the world 
his true purpose in the war. Responding to the 
toast of Field-Marshal Hindenburg, after referring 
to the twenty-six years of "fruitful work" in which 
he had occupied himself with his army and its de- 
velopment, he said: 

"At the outbreak of the war the German people 
were not clear as to what this war was to mean. I 
knew it very well. For that reason, even the first 
outburst of enthusiasm did not deceive me or cause 
any change in my aims and expectations, I knew 
very well what it was all about. For the entry of 
England signified the world struggle between two 
conceptions of the world. It was not a matter of a 
strategic campaign. It was a matter of the strug- 
gle between two conceptions of the world. Either 
the Prussian-German-Germanic world conception 
... or the Anglo-Saxon." 

With characteristic sophistry. Kaiser William II 
identifies the former with "right, freedom, honor, 
and morals"; the latter with "the idolatry of 
money-getting. ' ' 

20 291 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

I pass over in silence this insinuation coming 
from one who can speak of *'my army,'* **my 
navy," and '*my Empire" as being his personal 
property, and who has failed to abolish the Prus- 
sian plutocratic three-class sj'^stem of voting, which 
proportions political rights according to wealth 
and the ability to pay taxes; and I do not dwell 
upon the German looting of French chateaus, the 
extortions practised in Belgium, Ul^rania, and Ru- 
mania, and the whole scheme of plunder advocated 
by the Pan-German party. But we cannot fail to 
see in this utterance the most important self-dis- 
closure which the Kaiser has yet made. Here he 
f ranklj'- abandons the idea of a campaign provoked 
by French revanche or Russian mobilization. 

The meaning of the war, which the Kaiser says he 
understood from the beginning, was a struggle be- 
tween two world conceptions, the Prussian and the 
Anglo-Saxon. During all the time when he was 
seeking British neutrality he was aiming, it seems, 
only to divide his enemies, to allay suspicion of his 
real designs, and, by the immediate subjugation of 
France and Russia, to prepare the way for the real 
struggle, the conflict with the Anglo-Saxon concep- 
tion, the fight for world domination, and the 
triumph of the Prussian idea. Does not this self- 
revelation by "William II completely verify the ex- 
position of his aims and policies presented in these 
chapters? 

I am penning these concluding words on the 
fourth anniversary of England's entrance into the 

293 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

war. Wliy did England enter it? Not for world 
power, not for gain, not to prevent any legitimate 
aspirations of Germany, all of which had just been 
cheerfully conceded in treaties awaiting signature. 
On August 4, 1914, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed 
to the British ambassador at Berlin: 

"We are informed that Belgian territory has 
been violated at Gemmenich. In these circum- 
stances, and in view of the fact that Germany de- 
clined to give the same assurance respecting Bel- 
gium as France gave last week in reply to our 
request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, 
we must repeat that request and ask that a satis- 
factory reply to it and to my telegram of this morn- 
ing be received here by twelve o ^clock to-night. If 
not, you are instructed to ask for your passports 
and to say that his Majesty's Government feel 
bound to take all steps in their power to uphold 
the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a 
treaty to which Germany is as much a party as 
ourselves.''^ 

But the die had been already cast. On that same 
day the Imperial Chancellor said in the Reichstag : 

** Gentlemen, we are now acting in self-defense. 
Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occu- 
pied Luxemburg and have possibly already entered 
on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is a breach of 
international law. 

"The French Government has notified Brussels 
that it would respect Belgian neutrality as long as 



1 British Blue Book, I, No. 159- 

293 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

the adversary respected it. But we know that 
France stood ready for an invasion. France could 
wait; we could not. A French invasion on our 
flank and the lower Rhine might have been disas- 
trous. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful 
protests of the governments of Luxemburg and 
Belgium. The injustice — ^I speak openly — the in- 
justice we thereby commit we will try to make good 
as soon as our military aims have been attained. 
He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his 
all can only consider the one and best way to 
strike.'*^ 

In the interview between the Chancellor and the 
British ambassador which followed began what 
Kaiser William II professes to have understood 
from the beginning to be the real meaning of the 
war — the conflict between the Prussian and the 
Anglo-Saxon conceptions of the world. **Just for 
a word, * neutrality,' a word which in war-time has 
so often been disregarded — just for a scrap of 
paper,'* complained the Chancellor, ** Great Britain 
was going to make war on a kindred nation who de- 
sired notliing better than to be friends with her!" 
*'If it was for strategic reasons a matter of life 
and death to Germany," as he had been told, replied 
the ambassador, "so I would msh him to under- 
stand that it was, so to speak, a 'matter of life and 
death' for the honor of Great Britain that she 
should keep her solemn engagement to do her ut- 



1 The London Times, August ii, 1914. See Illustrative Docu- 
ment No. XV. 

294 



RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

most to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. 
That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what 
confidence could any one have in engagements given 
by Great Britain in the future?" To which the 
Chancellor answered: '*But at what price will that 
compact have been kept? Has the British Govern- 
ment thought of that?" ^ 

*'At what price!" And so, when it comes to 
action, "right, freedom, honor, and morals" — the 
boasted elements of the Prussian world conception 
— turn out to be mere idle words. 

**At what price" has Germany paid, and at what 
price must she yet pay, for the folly and the mad- 
ness of trjdng to impose upon mankind the Prus- 
sian world conception ? No one, in 1914, was disposed 
to disturb the jieace of Germany. Few understood 
her designs and ambitions. But the brutal assault 
upon an innocent and peaceful neighbor, trusting in 
the honor of the great and powerful nations to af- 
ford her protection, suddenly disclosed the lust for 
power, the predatory designs, the espionage, and the 
world-wdde network of conspiracy with which the 
Imperial German Government has enveloped the 
earth. It was the morally inevitable culmination of 
the ambitions, the fantasies, and the impetuosity of 
Kaiser William II, unrestrained by a responsible 
government representing the permanent interests of 
the German people. He promised them gain and 
glory. He has covered them with sackcloth and ashes. 



1 British Blue Book, I, No. 160. See Illustrative Document No. 
XVI. 

295 



EPILOGUE 

T N recording my impressions of the Kaiser I have 
•^ tried to represent him as I believe he will pass 
into history up to the beginning of the Great War. 
Beyond this it is not my present purpose to follow 
him. Of the war itself and of his part in it there is 
no need that I should speak. The most recent 
words and deeds of William II indicate that there 
is no break in the continuity of his aims and pur- 
poses. His policies and his convictions thus far 
remain the same. Events have served only to ren- 
der these more evident and more emphatic. 

When the history of Europe during the last thirty 
years comes to be written, there will, perhaps, be a 
wide divergence among historians regarding the 
position and responsibility of the Kaiser. The 
German school of economic determinists, urging the 
irresistible tide of material grow^th in Germany, 
will endeavor to diminish the part actually played 
by the German Emperor and will tend to reduce him 
to virtual effacement. He may, perhaps, even be 
held up to the sympathy of mankind as in effect a 
martyr, the helpless victim of forces, economic and 
military, over which he had no control. Already, 
legends of this purport have made their appear- 

296 



EPILOGUE 

ance. According to one of these, at the moment of 
signing the declaration of war on Russia the Em- 
peror is represented as saying to the military- 
officers who are said to have forced his hand : "Gen- 
tlemen, you will live to regret this. ' ' ^ According 
to another tale, it was the Crown Prince who, pistol 
in hand, frightened the Emperor into a decision by 
the threat of a military revolution and William II 's 
deposition.^ 

Such episodes as these do not harmonize with the 
recorded utterances of William II, repeated from 
the beginning of his reign and continued after the 
war began. AVhile it is probably true that, for a 
time, he hoped to achieve his ends without actual 
bloodshed, it is undeniable that he had created a 
situation which rendered war inevitable, unless 
Russia, as well as Serbia, should prove content to 
undergo the deep humiliation which the Kaiser had 
deliberately and insistently endeavored to impose 
upon Nicholas II. Having prepared for war with 



1 Mr. A. G. Gardiner, editor of the London Daily News, assured 
Mr. S. S. McClure that he had "sure sources of information" 
for this statement. See McClure, Obstacles to Peace, p. 73. 

~ The influence of the Crown Prince upon WiUiam II has been 
greatly overestimated. His imprudence has often been reproved 
by the Kaiser, v^^ho has too high an opinion of himself to subordi- 
nate his own judgment to this young man or in any respect to 
fear him. His popularity with the army, which the Crown Prince 
has always cultivated, was before the war considerable; but the 
test of war has not developed any considerable military talent in 
this admirer of Napoleon I. According to Beyens, "At an official 
dinner, where he sat next to the wife of an ambassador from 
one of the Entente Powers, he could not think of anything more 
clever and gallant to say than that it was his cherished dream to 
make war and to lead a charge at the head of his regiment." 
There is no record that this last-named exploit has ever been per- 
formed by him. — Gertnany Bcfor.' the War, p. 63. 

S97 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

elaborate care, and resting the prestige of the Ger- 
man Empire on its military superiority, he needed 
only to be convinced that the moment was favor- 
able to German success to launch the fatal thunder- 
bolt. That conviction, at the moment of declaring 
war, as we have seen, was confidently entertained. 
It was not until Great Britain's entrance into the 
conflict that doubt arose. It was then too late to 
retreat without loss of prestige, as well as the re- 
nunciation of all plans of conquest. Emboldened 
by Great Britain's lack of preparation, in defiance 
of "French's contemptible little army," the con- 
quest of Belgium and the assault on France were 
pushed mth ferocious energy, until the tide was 
checked by the battle of the Marne. 

Notwithstanding all this, and even dismissing the 
illusion that beneath his ''shining armor" "William 
II has always wished and labored for peace, there 
are those who will endeavor to maintain that 
neither he nor any other man who might happen 
to be the German Emperor could have prevented 
the European conflict which broke out in 1914. It 
was caused, it will be contended, by the inevitable 
development of forces wholly beyond the control 
of man. The growth of population, the need for 
new territories fit for German occupation and ex- 
ploitation, the necessity of controlling tropical and 
semi-tropical lands as sources of raw materials, 
were irresistibly pushing the German nation to- 
ward expansion and colonization. Arrayed against 
both these tendencies were powerful neighbors, 

298 



EPILOGUE 

Russia and France on the Continent, Great Britain 
on the sea. Russia, it will be insisted, was pursuing 
a secular policy of driving the Turks out of Europe 
and taking possession of Constantinople as a gate- 
way to the maritime world and as a barrier to 
German commerce in the Balkan Peninsula, Asia 
Minor, Syria, and Mesopotamia. France was re- 
solved to avail herself of the first opportunity to 
recover her lost provinces, Alsace and Lorraine; 
and, therefore, impatient for Russia to engage in 
war with Germany, which would furnish an occasion 
for sustaining her ally in crushing Germany. Great 
Britain, jealous of the commercial development of 
Germany, and especially of her growing navy, had 
spread her Empire over the whole earth, had occu- 
pied the most vital points with her naval stations, 
and would block with her tremendous sea-power 
the plans of Germany for obtaining like advantages, 
thus retaining through her maritime strength a 
monopoly of the sea. To give all this array of ob- 
stacles to German expansion a dramatic effect, the 
legend of ''encirclement" will perhaps be revived, 
by which the peaceful entente between Great Brit- 
ain, France, and Russia has been magnified into an 
organized opposition to Germany and distorted into 
a malignant and aggressive form of hostility. 

So long as this legend receives credence — as it 
has and still does in Germany — the determinists 
will seem to have good ground for their contention. 
Given all these factors of physical necessity and 
political conspiracy, it would seem true that neither 

299 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

William II nor any possible German Emperor could 
have avoided an ultimate collision. 

^ Unfortunately for this theory, it cannot, in the 
light of demonstrable facts, be maintained that 
this alleged "encirclement" was real. Great Brit- 
ain, long denounced in Germany as the ''real 
enemy," has clearly manifested a disposition to 
promote satisfaction of the legitimate needs of the 
German people in the negotiation of the Grey-Lich- 
nowsky treaties, and this fact is not disputed. Had 
Great Britain, with her extended commerce, closed 
her ports to Germany, or made them virtually in- 
accessible by a prohibitory tariff, there might have 
been ground for the accusation that England had 
established and was maintaining a monopoly of 
foreign trade; but, on the contrary, all England's 
ports were open to German exports, and all her 
colonies were for Germany unobstructed sources of 
raw materials. If, on the other hand, a dread of 
German procedure and its consequences has, at 
times, been expressed in England, and remedies 
have been discussed, it was the natural effect of 
what was known of Germany's confessed aims and 
purposes. The rapid development of the German 
navy might well excite apprehension in England 
when German ships were already enjoying not only 
the perfect ''freedom of the seas," but were partici- 
pating with British ships in the commerce of Great 
Britain itself in her home ports of Plymouth and 
Southampton. The military interest in the Zeppe- 
lin airships, which could hardly justify enthusiasm 

300 



EPILOGUE 

as auxiliaries of civil life, was, perhaps, an even 
more exciting cause of British apprehension. 
When to all this is added the influence of the volum- 
inous and menacing Pan-German literature — un- 
equaled in brutal projects by the Chauvinism of any- 
other nation — circulating freely in a country where 
a rigid surveillance and control of the press are 
customary, there was ample room for public solici- 
tude on the part of neighboring peoples regarding 
the intentions of a power that not only was pos- 
sessed of the greatest military strength of any 
nation in the world, but whose Emperor on every 
critical occasion was openly proclaiming the doc- 
trine that the only guarantee of peace is the sword. 
Subsequent disclosures have demonstrated how 
great was the perversion of the truth in the German 
representation of the aggressive designs of the 
Entente Powers. No evidence of the existence of 
a treaty of actual pre-war alliance between these 
powers has ever been produced. There existed at 
the outbreak of hostilities by the German declara- 
tion of war no written compact between Great 
Britain and the other Entente Powers. Sir Edward 
Grey openly avowed that if war developed between 
Austria-Hungary and Russia, England would not 
intervene.* Even on August 1st, after Germany 
had declared war on Russia, King George V, in an- 
swer to President Poincare's appeal for the assur- 
ance of British aid, replied, without defining the 



1 British Blue Book, I, No. 25. Sec Illustrative Document 
No. XVIII. 

301 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

attitude of his country beyond declaring that it was 
open to discussion: 

"You may be assured that the present situation 
in Europe has been the cause of much anxiety and 
preoccupation to me, and I am glad to think that 
our two governments have worked so amiably to- 
gether in endeavoring to find a peaceful solution 
of the question at issue. 

''It would be a source of real satisfaction to me 
if our united efforts were to meet with success, and 
I am still not mthout hope that the terrible events 
which seem so near may be averted." ^ 

Here is no sign of a hostile compact against Ger- 
many. Strange language indeed is this for an 
arch-conspirator, when the hour had come to strike ! 
And yet there is no word of accusation or complaint 
on the part of France or Russia in response to this 
detached manner of regarding an alleged common 
warlike undertaking. No prior engagement even 
of mutual defense is mentioned, no obligation of 
England is insisted upon, either by France or Rus- 
sia. When the alleged ''conspiracy" is uncovered 
by events, there is disclosed nothing but sincerity, 
dignity, innocence, and a striving after peace. 

How, then, shall the determinists support their 
thesis ? Shall they say the Kaiser was pushed into 
war by German necessities? In what category are 
these necessities to be found? The German people 
were not starving. Their industry and their trade 
were never more prosperous. Their ships were on 

1 British Blue Book, I, Appendix, I, V, No. 2. 

303 



EPILOGUE 

every sea — but provided with a secret code of warn- 
ing to seek refuge when war would break out — and 
their goods were in every market. Great Britain 
was their best customer. 

But the future, it will be said, had to be provided 
for. Territory for expansion and colonies for raw 
material were needed by Germany. 

There was unquestionably room for Germans in 
other parts of the world. They were already to 
be found everywhere, and everywhere were among 
the most prosperous inhabitants. The other coun- 
tries were not refusing German industry cotton, 
copper, tropical products; in short, whatever they 
needed at the general market prices. 

But these facts, I am told, are quite irrelevant. 
What Germany wanted was that these things should 
be German, that they should belong to Germany, 
and that Germans spreading over the world should 
not cease to be Germans. They must still belong 
to the Empire, not be lost by absorption in other 
nations. 

We come, then, in the end, not to a natural, but 
only to a political necessity. In essence it is, as we 
shall see, merely a dynastic ambition. An empire 
to be extended, not because its people cannot other- 
wise find homes and prosperity in the world, but 
because they must continue, however numerous they 
may become, to adhere to one political system and 
furnish additional strength to one particular gov- 
ernment. They are needed as taxpaj^ers and as 
soldiers. Therefore other peoples must be annexed 

303 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

to the German Empire in order that Germans may 
remain German subjects. 

Regarding Germans for a moment not as sub- 
jects of a government, but merely as human beings, 
or as a people, these alleged "necessities" wholly 
disappear. It is only when contemplated from a 
governmental point of view that new territory and 
new colonies are * ' necessities, ' ' They are, no doubt, 
necessities to the unlimited growth of an empire. 
In truth, they will always be thus necessary, no 
matter how great an empire may become. Its only 
ultimate limit, upon this theory, is the whole sur- 
face of the earth. 

Primarily, therefore, the interest in imperialism 
is dynastic. It is the natural desire of the sovereign 
to enlarge his realm. In a secondary sense, it is 
true, his subjects also may, to a certain extent, find 
an interest in this expansion. Honors, immunities, 
and possessions accompany the growth of empire. 
Those to whom these fall become partners in the 
enterprise. But it is none the less a predatory ad- 
venture, in the spoils of which only a few partici- 
pate. That the people as a whole profit by such 
djTiastic conquests is an illusion. 

However we regard the matter, whether from the 
natural or the political point of view, it is evident 
that responsibility for the AVorld War cannot be 
thro^!VTi back upon purely natural causes. The de- 
cisions that have produced it are acts of personal 
will. 

Who, then, is to be held accountable? 

304 



EPILOGUE 

When a conflagration is voluntarily started vre 
cannot throw the blame for the occurrence upon the 
chemistry of combustion. We seek the incendiary. 
And if we mean that other conflagrations shall not 
occur, we render it impossible for him to repeat his 
act. 

It is in this spirit that the President of the United 
States, as the voice of the American people, has 
addressed the people of Germany. He has assumed 
that Kaiser William II, having been empowered 
by the German people to declare M^ar, and by doing 
so having automatically brought many nations into 
it, is responsible for the consequences. The Ger- 
man people have decided to share this responsibil- 
ity ; and they, in turn, must, therefore, be regarded 
as accountable. 

It is just that they should be so held ; and, in the 
great assize that is to be faced in the peace con- 
ference, this question of responsibility must be met. 

The German nation is great and powerful. To 
treat it as a criminal is not an easy or a welcome 
task, but it must either voluntarily suppress this 
menace to the world's peace or be itself regarded as 
such a menace. 

The German people have thought it wise to link 
the future of their national development with the 
power of the army and navy rather than to base 
it upon understandings. They have believed that 
the policy that has made Prussia the master of 
Germany could make Germany the master of Eu- 
rope, and perhaps of the world. That Prussia was 

305 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

from the beginning a military and not an industrial 
and commercial state, such as Germany has become, 
was overlooked. A military state can afford to 
challenge its neighbors and browbeat its competi- 
tors. It does not intend to make bargains, but to 
take what it wants wherever its force can prevail. 
An industrial and commercial state, however, must 
retain the confidence of its customers. It cannot 
win them by superior force. 

The alliance of great business with military poli- 
cies in the German Empire has proved an unfortu- 
nate form of enterprise. The preponderant partner 
has wrecked German business. Conquest has, ap- 
parently, opened new fields of exploitation ; but the 
world-market has been lost because the world's 
confidence has been forfeited. Only a new and 
reorganized Germany can ever regain it. 

The greatest misfortune of the German people 
will not consist in a military defeat, M^hich might 
be to their own advantage in the future through a 
better international status, or even the enforced 
payment of indemnities for the devastations 
wrought by the invasion of other countries. The 
faith of mankind in Germany's integrity as a na- 
tion will be a far more serious loss. However much 
men may differ regarding matters of detail, what- 
ever varying interpretations may be placed upon 
diplomatic or other documents, whatever light may 
be thrown upon the beginning or the conduct of 
the war by future disclosures, the impartial portion 
of mankind is convinced that the Great War, with 

306 



EPILOGUE 

all its horrors and sufferings, could have been 
avoided by Germany, and by Germany alone, with- 
out material or moral loss. 

In his book on Der WeWkrieg, the Swiss writer 
Zurlinden has pointed out four possibilities of peace 
which lay before Kaiser William II in July, 1914. 

*'l. Germany," he says, *' declared its disinterest- 
edness in the Austro-Serbian conflict. The Treaty 
of the Triple Alliance did not bind Germany to fur- 
nish military aid to her ally unless attacked, whereas 
Austria-Hungary was the aggressor. This interpre- 
tation of the alliance was uncomplainingly admitted 
hy Germany when Italy, under the same obligations 
as Germany to Austria-Hungary, declared her neu- 
trality. 

**2. Germany could have declared that Austria- 
Hungarj^ should content herself with the extraor- 
dinary submission consented to in Serbia's reply 
to the ultimatum, and that there should be no war. 

'^3. The Austro-Serbian conflict, in so far as it 
was not fully conciliated in the reply to the ulti- 
matum, could be submitted to a European confer- 
ence; or 

* ' 4. To the International Tribunal at The Hague. ' ' 

To all these possibilities the Kaiser had opposed 
an emphatic "No," and had decided upon war.^ 

'^ Zurlinden, Der Weltkrieg, I, p. 385 ; who quotes Naumann, 
Mitteleuropa, pp. 168, 169, as follows: "When last summer the 
Austrian Hereditary Prince and his wife were slain by a young 
criminal, there was in the terms of the treaty no necessity for 
the German Empire to trouble itself on account of this procedure. 
That Kaiser William and his admirers nevertheless did so was 
more than a treaty obligation. . . . The World War is, therefore, 
more than a war resulting from a casus foederis (Vcrtragskrieg), 
it is a community of feeling (Gesinnungsgentcinschaft), as if we 
were already grown together." See also Illustrative Document 
Na XVII. 3„ 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

But the whole fault of William II does not consist 
in declining to embrace any of these possibilities 
of peace. A basis of peace had, in his oa\ti judg- 
ment, as he himself declares in his message to the 
President of the United States, already been ac- 
cepted by Austria-Hungary. We now know that, 
although this proposal was in his possession, he did 
not even communicate it to Nicholas II, although the 
Czar implored him not to consider mobilization as 
equivalent to war. Instead, without waiting even 
a day for negotiation, he suddenly declared war, 
when he had in his twelve-hour ultimatum only 
threatened mobilization ; knowing, at the time, that 
unless Russia was cowed by his threat into sub- 
mission to his arbitrary will, this resort to war on 
Russia would involve France as well — upon whose 
unprotected frontiers his troops had been preparing 
to advance — unless Great Britain should obtain 
French neutrality. 

The question has arisen, and has been discussed, 
Would not the Imperial German Reichstag, if it 
had the sole determination of the issue, have decided 
precisely as the Kaiser did? Hugo Kramer has 
expressed the opinion that it would, and he advances 
as a reason for this conclusion the statement that 
the vote of credit for the conduct of the war was 
equivalent to a vote of approval of the war.^ 

There is, perhaps, no human being on earth so 
fiendish as consciously to have willed this war, as 
it has developed. It is probably true that every 



1 Quoted by Zurlinden, p, 386. 

308 



EPILOGUE 

German, and William II first of all, could say with 
perfect honesty, ''I did not will this war.'' What 
was willed by William II was not this war, but a 
swift, short, victorious war which would secure 
large indemnities, add some coveted territories to 
Germany, and enable the German Emperor, when- 
ever he pleased to do so, to dictate the terms of 
peace, thus placing him in a position of complete 
mastery on the Continent preparatory to another 
swift, short w^ar that would obtain for Germany 
the desired supremacy on the sea. 

Even reduced to the low^est terms, the resolution 
of Kaiser William II to support Austria-Hungary 
in the determination to crush Serbia and obtain 
the mastery in the Balkan Peninsula at the risk of 
a general European war involves a great re- 
sponsibility, and reveals the spirit in which war 
upon Eussia was declared. Assuming that the gov- 
ernment of the little Slav state was responsible for 
efforts to frustrate the plans of Austria-Hungary, 
and even that some Serbian officials were connected 
with a plot to assassinate the Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand and his wife — which has not been clearly 
established — and that chastisement, even severe 
chastisement, was deserved, an assault upon the 
Serbian people as a whole without a trial, or even 
an impartial investigation, was not a civilized 
method of procedure. It was a condemnation to 
death of the innocent along with the guilty, and 
made no distinction between them. The violation 
of Belgian neutrality by armed invasion was of the 

309 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

same moral quality, magnified to an open disregard 
of a solemn pledge. The needless resort to war and 
the disregard of a binding covenant, in order to 
render war successful, cannot be explained away 
by any form of natural determination on the part 
of the nation. They were not *^ necessities," they 
were voluntary national crimes. 

Even with the memory of Bismarck and his pride 
in the alteration of the Ems telegram in mind, we 
cannot imagine that, in 1888, the German people 
would have supported the German Emperor in the 
course pursued by him in 1914. In 1888, when Will- 
iam II ascended the throne, as we have seen in the 
first chapter of this book, such an exploit as was 
lightly entered into in 1914 was precisely what the 
German people contemplated with dread and aver- 
sion. But in the intervening thirty years the char- 
acter of Germany has changed. It has been 
thoroughly Prussianized. A hasty plunge into a 
foreign war was accepted without internal obstruc- 
tion. The nation that had trembled with apprehen- 
sion for what the impulsive and erratic young mon- 
arch might do ended by placing its destinies entirely 
in his hands. 

It did this wdth perfect comprehension of what 
it was doing. William II never concealed his am- 
bitions from his owti people. What he did was to 
induce the nation to share them. A different kind 
of an emperor would have produced a different 
Germany. William II trained his people to war 
and to believe in war. It was t-he tradition of his 

310 



EPILOGUE 

House and the foundation of his throne. An indus- 
trial Germany, a commercial Germany, might have 
been developed without the military note being al- 
ways sounded. The inclinations of other nations — 
''the satisfied nations" if one chooses to name them 
so— might have been utilized at the great peace con- 
ferences and upon the occasions when similar over- 
tures were made, and sincerely made ; but William 
II was never disposed to accept them. It was not 
the Prussian idea. 

And so, more and more as the years went by, 
Germany came to link its future development with 
the power of its army and its navy. The Reichstag 
in 1914 had no idea that the question of peace or 
war was within its jurisdiction. The subject had 
been placed beyond its deliberation. As for the 
people, they had nothing to do with such matters. 
They were not concerned with the equities, or the 
moralities, or the expediency of war. Their duty 
was simply to do what they were told to do. They 
were informed that there was a hostile conspiracy 
against Germany, that an attack by foreign powers 
had ** forced the sword" into the hands of their 
Emperor, and that they must fight for their exist- 
ence. This they believed, and upon this they 
obediently acted. The All-Highest had spoken. It 
was enough. 

Clearly, a war-machine thus constructed is a 
menace to the world. No nation should enter upon 
a war without knowing why war is necessary and 
without resort to all available means of avoiding 

311 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

it. Dynastic wars, or wars primarily actuated by 
dynastic motives, cannot, of course, be publicly de- 
bated beforehand, but all issues affecting the na- 
tional interests can be. 

In the past, even under confessedly dynastic 
rule, Germans of independent mind have thought 
thus, and have believed their convictions worth ex- 
pressing. Immanuel Kant, for example, living 
under a Prussian king, had the courage to write: 

*'A state should be so internally organized that, 
not the head of the state, to whom war (since he 
carries it on at the expense of another, namely the 
people) costs nothing, but the people, to whom he 
himself is a charge, should have the determining 
voice whether war should or should not be." ^ 

And in another place he adds that, under a con- 
stitution w^hich is not republican, where the subject 
is not a citizen, the case is the most unfortunate 
imaginable ; because the ruler is not a fellow-citizen, 
but the proprietor of the state, and is in no way 
made to suffer loss with regard to his table, his 
hunting, his pleasure castles, and his court life, and 
may therefore regard war as a kind of pastime to 
be undertaken for trivial reasons, the justification 
of which may be left without anxiety to the inge- 
nuity of the ever-ready diplomatic corps.- 

1 Kant, Uber den Gemchiplatc: Das mag in der Theorie gut 
scin, p. 396. 

2 Kant, Von Ewigen Friendcn, p. 436. It is possible that Kant, 
in writing of the ingenuity of the Diplomatic Corps, had in mind 
the marginal note which Frederick the Great on November 7, 
1749, addressed to his minister, Podiwils, saying that it was time 
in secret to look up the legal claims to Silesia, as he had already 
given his orders to his troops. 

312 



EPILOGUE 

Kant may not have realized the practical difficul- 
ties involved in submitting the question of peace or 
war to the decision of the whole body of citizens ; 
but he perceived not only the injustice to the people 
of a state, but the danger to the peace of the world, 
in leaving such a decision to the arbitrary will of a 
ruler. While no rule regarding the declaration of 
war can be enforced upon a sovereign state other- 
wise than by war, it is not improbable that every 
free people will eventually, in their oAvn interest, 
place the war-machine under a supervision where 
war cannot be determined upon at the pleasure of 
a single person, however trustworthy, by a mere 
exchange of telegrams, without public knowledge 
of the circumstances in which the act is performed. 

If, therefore, it be true that the Imperial Ger- 
man Reichstag would have taken the same course 
as that followed by William II, who had deliberately 
determined, according to Doctor Miihlon, to run the 
risk of a general European war if Russia mobilized, 
and yet for weeks kept this resolution a secret, ex- 
cept from his circle of confidants, the Reichstag 
would be the most extraordinary representative 
parliamentary body in the world. 

By the provision of the Imperial German Consti- 
tution, the Reichstag has nothing to do with deter- 
mining peace or war. Article LXIII declares: 
''The entire land force of the Empire w^ll form a 
single army, which in war and peace is under the 
command of the Emperor. '^ Article LXIV reads: 
**A11 German troops are bound to obey the com- 

313 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

mands of the Emperor unconditionally. This duty 
is to be specified in the Banner-oath.'* This article 
further provides that the Emperor may select for 
appointments in the Imperial service ''from the of- 
ficers of all the contingents of the Imperial army;'* 
thus empowering him to place Prussian officers, 
''with or without promotion," in command of all 
the troops. Even without a declaration of war, 
therefore, the Emperor has the whole military force 
of Germany at his personal disposition. 

Under these circumstances, the mere formal dec- 
laration of war is of subordinate importance. By 
Article LXVIII, **the Emperor may, when public 
safety is threatened in the Territories of the Con- 
federation, declare any part thereof to be in a state 
of war." In this case, "the rules of the Prussian 
law of June 4, 1851, remain in force." Whoever, 
therefore, in the German Empire successfully dis- 
putes the authority of the Emperor has first to 
defeat the German army. 

**The Emperor," according to Article XI, **has 
to represent the Empire internationally, to declare 
war, and to conclude peace in the name of the Em- 
pire." When it comes to a formal declaration of 
war against a foreign power, "the consent of the 
Bundesrat is necessary, unless an attack on the 
territory or the coast of the Confederation has 
taken place." 

In the declaration of war on Russia of August 1, 
1914, there is no pretense that an attack had been 
made on German territory. In liis message to the 

314 



EPILOGUE 

President of the United States of August 10th, 
Kaiser William speaks of liis own intention to *' at- 
tack" France, unless Great Britain can secure and 
will guarantee her neutrality, but makes no charge 
of any attack made by France. As regards Bel- 
gium, he had only *'news," not 'Mmowledge,*' of 
French violation ; and the reports of bombs dropped 
upon Nuremberg and other German cities by 
French aviators have been proved by German tes- 
timony to have been pure inventions.^ 

Having no responsibility for the declaration of 
war, it is not remarkable that the Imperial German 
Reichstag, upon the Kaiser's mere requisition, and 
his assertion that the Empire was in danger, 
promptly voted the credits necessary for conduct- 
ing the war mthout inquiring into the details of 
the international situation. In this all parties were 
united. Even the Social Democrats, as a party, 
did not refuse support. There could be no justi- 
fiable dissent on a question of national defense. 
When later Germany, with her own soil free from 
invasion, was seen to be fighting an aggressive cam- 
paign on the territory of ten other nations, the 
question naturally arose how this could be called a 
*'war of defense." The answer, of course, was that 
German valor and military efficiency had beaten 
back the waves of a murderous conspiracy! 

If, however, it had been the constitutional duty of 
the Reichstag to examine into the merits of the 



^ See an account of this testimony in Illustrative Document No. 
XV. 

3X5 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

case, and to bear the responsibility of choosing be- 
tween peace and war, is it conceivable that a 
representative body, charged mth the obligation to 
consider and protect all the varied interests of the 
German people, wonld have pursued the course 
taken by Kaiser William II ? 

As a matter of fact, the members of the Reichstag 
were for the most part ignorant of the diplomatic 
proceedings that were taking place. Although the 
Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia was known 
to the Kaiser, and had been personally revised and 
strengthened by him, it had not been seen before it 
was sent even by the Imperial German Foreign 
Office. It was not publicly known in Germany what 
unexampled demands had been made upon Serbia 
— demands so impossible of acceptance that Sir 
Edward Grey, who was not sympathetic toward 
Serbia, said he *'had never before seen one state 
address to another independent state a document 
of so formidable a character/ So formidable, in- 
deed, was this document that it was intended to 
force a reply of non-compliance, and thus to furnish 
an excuse for war on Serbia.^ The reply of the 



1 British Blue Book, I, No. 5. 

2 "From the first inception of the Austro-German plan of con- 
certed action," says Dr. E. J. Dillon, who was at Vienna and in 
close contact with high authorities, "the parts of each of the 
actors were assigned. Serbia was to be stung into utterances or 
action which would warrant resort to an Austrian punitive expedi- 
tion. . . . Although the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was so 
worded and the time accorded for a reply so limited as to insure 
its rejection, misgivings were, as we saw, felt and uttered in 
Vienna and Budapest that Serbia would knuckle down and execute 
the humiliating behests of the Ballplatz. For this was a con- 
summation which was deemed highly undesirable. . . . Hence the 

316 



EPILOGUE 

Serbian government, bending to the storm and ask- 
ing for adjudication on two points only, was with- 
held from public knowledge in Germany and char- 
acterized in the German press merely as ''wholly 
inacceptable. '^ Five days after the reply was made 
the Kussian charge d'affaires at Berlin reported to 
his government : 

''The Wolff Bureau [the official new^s agency] 
has not published the text of the Serbian reply, 
although it w^as communicated to them. Up to the 
present this note has not appeared in extenso in 
any of the local papers, which, to all appearances, 
do not wish to publish it in their columns, being 
well aware of the calming effect which it would 
have on German readers/'^ 

Having in hand the formula of peace, needing 
only Russia's acceptance — which, as a fact, was in 
substance already assured — would the Reichstag 
have failed, as "William II failed, to conmiunicate 
it to the Russian Government while Nicholas II w^as 
solennily protesting that mobilization did not mean 
war? It was not until November 9, 1916, more than 
two years after the war had been in progress, that 
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, in response to a 

exhaustive precautions adopted for the purpose of provoking a 
negative answer to the ultimatum from Belgrade." — A Scrap of 
Paper, pp. 98, 99. The Serbian reply was received by the Aus- 
trian Minister at 5.58 p.m., on July 25th. He left Belgrade on the 
regular train at 6.30 p.m., as he had previously informed his 
government he would do. (Austrian Red Book, I, No. 22.) He 
had, therefore, only thirty-two minutes, after receiving the reply, 
in which to read the note and reach the train, without inquiring 
how the Austrian Foreign Office would regard the reply. He 
had no need to make that inquiry. 
1 Russian Orange Book, I, No. 46. 

317 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

challenge by Sir Edward Grey, stating that he had 
received from Vienna an approval of this formula, 
admitted that this was true ; but he did not pretend 
that it had ever been sent by the Kaiser or by him- 
self to St. Petersburg. The Kussian order of 
mobilization, he claimed, had rendered peace im- 
possible. The German public was kept in complete 
ignorance of the efforts of Sir EdM^ard Grey to 
preserve peace and of Germany's virtual rejection 
of them. Knowing all the facts, and especially the 
plea of Nicholas II for further negotiation, would 
or could the Reichstag have concealed from the pub- 
lic this possibility of peace, and thus have precipi- 
tated Europe into war? 

Analyze the situation as we may, we are al- 
ways brought back to the *' necessities" created by 
Kaiser William II 's desire for prestige and the 
pressure of the military camarilla of which he was 
the head. 

Into the Kaiser's personal psychology, perhaps, 
we have no right as foreigners to enter. Every 
nation must be permitted to choose to whose hands 
it will confide its destinies. The question of Will- 
iam II 's mental balance is a delicate one for any 
one to touch upon. Whether he is sane or not is 
hardly our business. Experts have differed on that 
subject. There is, in fact, no real objective stand- 
ard of sanity. The same conduct may be counted 
sane or insane in different circumstances and by 
different persons. As a rule, actions and opinions 
that are violently discordant with our own are liable 

318 



EPILOGUE 

to be classed as wanting in sanity. Most excesses 
naturally fall under this judgment in well-balanced 
minds. 

A distinguished alienist, Doctor Charles Mercier, 
offers some illuminating comments on this subject 
which are deserving of consideration. In forming 
an estimate of the Kaiser he says: "We must take 
into consideration not what he thinks or believes, 
which we can only conjecture, but what he does, as 
to which we have more or less trustworthy informa- 
tion ; and in estimating his conduct we must never 
lose sight of the circumstances in which he acts and 
never fail to take account of these circumstances. 
The dominating circumstance of the Kaiser's life is 
that he is the German Emperor/^ "^ 

This writer does well to insist that this circum- 
stance, which is likely to be overlooked, should be 
constantly taken into account. It is true that, when 
he is not playing the part of the Kaiser, William 
II is an agreeable and even a charming man, whose 
intense human interest renders him fascinating to 
those who are subject to personal influences. 

Applying his principle to the German Emperor, 
Doctor Mercier continues : 

**If the English King-Emperor were to act as 
the German Emperor acts ; if he were to change his 
dress a dozen times a day; if he were forever 
boasting and bragging and calling God to witness 



1 Article in Land and Water, reprinted in The Living Age, 
No. 3,867. 

319 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

what a splendid creature he is ; if he were forever 
rattling his saber and blustering about mailed fists 
and shining armor ; if he were to order his soldiers 
to give no quarter, and so forth — Ave might well 
question his sanity ; for the aim of a King must be 
to inspire the respect, the loyalty, and the devotion 
of his subjects ; and if a King of England were to 
behave thus, he would inspire only dislike, disgust, 
and contempt. But the Kaiser is not King of Eng- 
land. He is German Emperor, and the Germans like 
his conduct. It suits them. The more he brags and 
postures and prances before them, the more they ad- 
mire him and the more loyal and devoted they become. 
There is no evidence of madness, then, in this." 

While exempting the Kaiser from madness. Doc- 
tor Mercier does not hesitate to assimilate him to 
another type of mental aberration. ''There are," 
he says, ''undoubtedly, persons who are born with- 
out a rudiment of the moral sense and who grow 
up without its ever becoming developed in them." 
The Kaiser's conduct, this writer contends, sug- 
gests that he belongs to this class. Certainly being 
born heir to a throne does not exempt one from this 
classification, but it greatly enlarges the field of 
action. The devastating of Belgium, the murder 
of Miss Cavell and Captain Fryatt, the sinking of 
the Lusitania and neutral ships with their innocent 
non-combatant passengers, including women and 
children. Doctor Mercier affirms, are regarded by 
William II as "quite right and proper and justi- 

320 



EPILOGUE 

iiable, and in conformity with moral law as lie 
understands it; but the reprisal bombardment of 
German towns is a scandalous and abominable in- 
fraction of the laws of war." *' Other well-recog- 
nized traits of the instinctive criminal are," he 
continues, ''the sentimentality that alternates with 
cruelty, colossal egotism, naive and clamorous van- 
ity, and a craving for notoriety, which displays 
itself in a passion for the lime-light and histrionic 
display. Moreover, the instinctive criminal is very 
often intensely religious. . . . When about to com- 
mit murder he mil go to mass and pray for a 
blessing on his enterprise; and when he has con- 
ducted a successful burglary he mil make a thank- 
offering to the God who has assisted him and held 
him scatheless." 

This is a very impressive indictment; but there 
is a qualification, I think; which in the interest of 
scientific accuracy should be added. William II 
would not consider any of the enormities ordered 
and rewarded by him as right and justifiable unless 
authorized by himself. He would not, as a private 
person, perform any of the acts referred to as crim- 
inal, or approve of any private person performing 
them. They become right because they are ordered 
by the German Emperor. 

There is in the Kaiser's mind a reason for this 
attitude. It is based upon the union of three ele- 
ments: the nature of the state, the Hohenzollern 
tradition of divine right, and the Imperial German 
Constitution. 

321 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

William II is, in the strict sense, not the author 
of any of these. They are parts of the inheritance 
which forms the substance of his obsession — the 
idea of the German Emperor's mission and au- 
thority. 

Long before William II came to the throne the 
Prussian conception of the state had been definitely 
formulated. Hegel had furnished its metaphysical 
basis, and Lasson had depicted its essential fea- 
tures. Its substance was armed force. Says Las- 
son : 

*' Force is the characteristic feature of right. In 
international intercourse, in consequence, there 
are, and can be no laws. . . . Between states there 
can be no thought of law or right. . . . There is no 
right where there is no law, no judge, no superior 
compelling force. . . . States have absolutely no 
mutual duties, because, as between them, there is 
no law or right. . . . There is no commandment of 
right to observe political treaties. . . . Infraction 
of the right by force is a crime in civil life ; a state 
can commit no crime. . . . The state when at peace 
is no real state; it is only when in war that the 
state reveals its full significance. . . . Peace or- 
ganization and all regulations to curb impulse are 
the tomb of courage. ' ' ^ 

The Hohenzollern tradition gives to these ab- 
stract statements a concrete embodiment. The 
head of the state rules by his owti right through 
divine appointment. The Imperial German Consti- 



1 Lasson, Das Culturidcal und dcr Kricg, Berlin, 1868, pp. 7, 15. 

323 



EPILOGUE 

tution facilitates the exercise of this right by mak- 
ing it the duty of the army, in peace and in war, to 
obey unconditionally the German Emperor, in 
whom the whole system centers. 

As an individual person, William II is understood 
to lead a virtuous life. As German Emperor, he is 
subject to no law. The state, for which he acts, is 
above the law. Its only rule of action springs from 
its "necessities." The key to the contradictions in 
the conduct of William II is found in Doctor Mer- 
cier's statement, "The dominating circumstance of 
the Kaiser's life is that he is the German Em- 
peror." 

Through the impulsive and even fanatical tem- 
perament of William II the Prussian inheritance 
has been brought to its logical conclusion. His 
father, Frederick III, who probably could not have 
lived up to the idea of a German Emperor as Will- 
iam II has conceived it, quite certainly would not 
have developed all its latent possibilities. His 
grandfather, William I, did not, in fact, live up to 
it. He gloried in being King of Prussia, but he was 
more or less mystified by the Empire, which in his 
time was not yet Prussianized, and which, never- 
theless, he could not understand as being anything 
else than an extended Prussia. But William II was 
from the beginning both Prussian and Imperial. 
He took the role of German Emperor seriously. 

What the world has to cope' with in dealing with 
Germany is not merely William II as a person. The 
accession of the Crown-Prince Frederick William 

22 333 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

would not improve the international situation. So 
long as the Prussian doctrine regarding the nature 
of the state is retained, even the complete democra- 
tization of German political institutions would not 
restore the world's confidence in the purposes and 
the promises of the German Empire. The real evil 
is the mystical, non-moral Prussian conception of 
the state as an entity existing solely for its own ag- 
grandizement, unrestrained either by moral or con- 
ventional obligations. So long as it is believed and 
taught that the state is power and can do no wrong 
there can be no international security. The main 
advantage of democracy over autocracy as a form 
of human government is that, when accorded its 
true representative character, it renders political 
power responsible to those who must bear the bur- 
dens which the existence of the state necessarily 
imposes. It brings public action to the test of the 
public conscience. But if that is debased by the 
belief that in its outward relations the state is above 
all law and is bound by no duties, then a democracy 
affords no safeguard of peace or of justice. It 
merely exchanges the selfishness of the mass for the 
egotism of a monarch, and substitutes for the va- 
garies of a single autocrat the craving, the violence, 
and the irresponsibility of a multitude. 

That which creates our interest in Kaiser William 
II is not any merely personal qualities that mark 
him as a man. It is that in playing the part of 
German Emperor he has exposed to the view of 
all mankind the danger that inheres in the Prussian 

324 



EPILOGUE 

doctrine of the state. His personal faith and teach- 
ing have only brought to maturity its deadly fruit- 
age; for, believing himself endowed by special 
divine appointment with the immunities of the ir- 
responsible state, in lighting the torch of a World 
War he has held himself without accountability to 
the standards and judgments of civilized men. 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 

No. I 

'T^HE Royal Order of September, 1852, had regii- 
•*- lated the intercourse between the Prussian 
Ministers and the Cro^\Ti. It provided that only the 
Minister President, and not the individual Minis- 
ters, should personally consult the Emperor regard- 
ing the duties of their office. William II, knowing 
that Bismarck would oppose the abrogation of this 
order, nevertheless determined to revoke it. Bis- 
marck's comments on this subject in his letter of 
resignation are as follows: 

If each individual Minister can receive commands from 
his Sovereign without previous arrangements with his 
colleagues, a coherent policy, for which some one is to be 
responsible, is an impossibility. It would be impossible 
for any of the Ministers and especially for the Minister 
President, to bear the constitutional responsibility for the 
Cabinet as a whole. Such a provision as that contained 
in the Order of 1852 could be dispensed with under the 
absolute monarchy and could also be dispensed with to- 
day if we returned to absolutism without ministerial re- 
sponsibility. But according to the constitutional arrange- 
ments now legally in force the control of the Cabinet by 
a President under the Order of 1852 is indispensable. 

326 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCmiENTS 

No. II 

The first delegate of the United States to the 
First Hague Peace Conference, which met on May 
18, 1899, was the Hon. Andrew D. White, at that 
time American ambassador at Berlin. The fol- 
lowing extracts from his account of the Conference 
are important, as thromng a clear light upon the 
attitude of the German Empire in that assembly. 
Under date of May 24th, Mr. White said : 

Meeting Count Miinster, who, after M. de Staal [Presi- 
dent of the Conference], is very generally considered the 
most important personage here, we discussed the subject 
of arbitration. To my great regret, I found him entirely 
opposed to it, or, at least, entirely opposed to any well- 
developed plan. He did not say that he would oppose 
a moderate plan for voluntary arbitration, but he insisted 
that arbitration must be injurious to Germany ; that Ger- 
many is prepared for war as no other country is or can 
be ; that she can mobilize her army in ten days ; and that 
neither France, Russia, nor any other power can do this. 
Arbitration, he said, would simply give rival powers time 
to put themselves in readiness, and would therefore be a 
great disadvantage to Germany. 

Under date of June 9th, he wrote : 

It now appears that the German Emperor is determined 
to oppose the Avhole scheme of arbitration, and will have 
nothing to do with any plan for a regular tribunal, 
whether as given in the British or the American scheme. 
This news comes from various sources, and is confirmed 
by the fact that, in the subcommittee, one of the German 
delegates, Professor Zorn of Konigsberg, who had become 
very earnest in behalf of arbitration, now says that he 
may not be able to vote for it. There are also signs that 
the German Emperor is influencing the minds of his 
allies — the sovereigns of Austria, Italy, Turkey, and Rou- 
mania — leading them to oppose it. 

327 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

On the 16th, Mr. White made this entry in his 
diary : 

This morning Count Miinster called and seemed much 
excited by the fact that he had received a despatch from 
Berlin in which the German Government — which, of 
course, means the Emperor — had strongly and finally de- 
clared against everything like an arbitration tribunal. He 
was clearly disconcerted by this too liberal acceptance of 
his own earlier views, and said that he had sent to M. de 
Staal insisting that the meeting of the subcommittee on 
arbitration, which had been appointed for this day (Fri- 
day) should be adjourned on some pretext until next 
Monday ; ' ' for, ' ' said he, ' ' if the session takes place to-day, 
Zorn must make the declaration in behalf of Germany, 
which these new instructions order him to make, and that 
would be a misfortune. ' ' 

Later it was agreed that Professor Zorn, of the 
German delegation, and Mr. Holls, secretary of the 
American delegation, be sent to Berlin to procure 
a change in the German instructions. Mr. "White 
sent to Prince von Billow, then Imperial Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, a personal letter in 
which he said : 

It is generally said here that Germany is opposed to the 
whole thing, that she is utterly hostile to anything like 
arbitration, and that she will do all in her power, either 
alone or through her allies, to thwart every feasible plan 
of providing for a tribunal which shall give some hope to 
the world of settling some of the many difficulties between 
nations otherwise than by bloodshed. 

No rational man here expects all wars to be ended by 
anything done here; no one proposes to submit to any 
such tribunal questions involving the honor of any nation 
or the inviolability of its territory, or any of those things 
which nations feel instinctively must be reserved for their 
own decision. Nor does any thinking man here propose 
obligatory arbitration in any case, save, possibly, in 

328 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 

sundry petty matters where such arbitration would be a 
help to the ordinary administration of all governments; 
and, even as to these, they can be left out of the scheme 
if your Government seriously desires it. 

The great thing is that there be provision made for 
easily calling together a court of arbitration which shall 
be seen of all nations, indicate a sincere desire to promote 
peace, and, in some measure, relieve the various peoples 
of the fear which so heavily oppresses them all — the dread 
of an outburst of war at any moment. 

On the 23d, Mr. White makes the following rec- 
ord: 

But the great matter of the day was the news, which 
has not yet been made public, that Prince Hohenlohe, the 
German Chancellor, has come out strongly for the arbitra- 
tion tribunal, and has sent instructions here accordingly. 
This is a great gain, and seems to remove one of the worst 
stumbling-blocks. But we will have to pay for this re- 
moval, probably, by giving up section 10 of the present 
plan, which includes a system of obligatory arbitration 
in various minor matters, — a system which would be of 
use to the world in many ways. 

The outcome was, as Mr. White predicted, that 
while the idea of a purely voluntary tribunal was 
accepted, 'Hhe Imperial German Government in- 
sisted that the general treaty of arbitration should 
be dropped as the price of this concession, and it 
was so dropped." — Scott's Survey, p. 321. 

No. Ill 

The complete text of the Daily Telegraph inter- 
view is as follows : 

We have received the following communication from a 
source of such unimpeachable authority that we can with- 

329 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

out hesitation commend the obvious message which it 
conveys to the attention of the public. 

Discretion is the first and last quality requisite in a 
diplomatist, and should still be observed by those who, 
like myself, have long passed from public into private 
life. Yet moments sometimes occur in the history of 
nations when a calculated indiscretion proves of the high- 
est public service, and it is for that reason that I have 
decided to make known the substance of a lengthy con- 
versation which it was my recent privilege to have with 
his Majesty the German Emperor. I do so in the hope 
that it may help to remove that obstinate misconception 
of the character of the Kaiser's feelings towards Eng- 
land which, I fear, is deeply rooted in the ordinary Eng- 
lishman's breast. It is the Emperor's sincere wish that it 
should be eradicated. He has given repeated proofs of 
his desire by word and deed. But, to speak frankly, his 
patience is sorely tried now that he finds himself so con- 
tinually misrepresented, and has so often experienced the 
mortification of finding that any momentary improvement 
of relations is followed by renewed outbursts of preju- 
dice, and a prompt return to the old attitude of suspicion. 

As I have said, his Majesty honored me Avith a long 
conversation, and spoke with impulsive and unusual 
frankness. "You English," he said, "are mad, mad 
as March hares! "What has come over you that you are 
so completely given over to suspicions quite unworthy of 
a great nation? What more can I do than I have done? 
I declared with all the emphasis at my command, in my 
speech at Guildhall, that my heart is set upon peace, and 
that it is one of my dearest wishes to live on the best of 
terms with England. Have I ever been false to my word ? 
Falsehood and prevarication are alien to my nature. My 
actions ought to speak for themselves, but you listen not 
to them but to those who misinterpret and distort them. 
That is a personal insult which I feel and resent. To be 
forever misjudged, to have my repeated offers of friend- 
ship weighed and scrutinized with jealous, mistrustful 
eyes, taxes my patience severely. I have said time after 
time that I am a friend of England, and your Press — 
or, at least, a considerable section of it — bids the people 

330 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCmiENTS 

of England refuse my proffered hand, and insinuates that 
the other holds a dagger. How can I convince a nation 
against its will ? 

"I repeat," continued his Majesty, "that I am the 
friend of England, but you make things difficult for me. 
My task is not of the easiest. The prevailing sentiment 
among large sections of the middle and lower classes of 
my o^vn people is not friendly to England. I am, there- 
fore, so to speak, in a minority in my own land, but it 
is a minority of the best elements, just as it is in England 
with respect to Germany. That is another reason why I 
resent your refusal to accept my pledged word that I am 
the friend of England. I strive without ceasing to im- 
prove relations, and you retort that I am your arch- 
enemy. You make it very hard for me. Why is it ? " 

Thereupon I ventured to remind his Majesty that not 
England alone, but the whole of Europe had viewed with 
disapproval the recent action of Germany in allowing the 
German Consul to return from Tangier to Fez, and in 
anticipating the joint action of France and Spain by sug- 
gesting to the Powers that the time had come for Europe 
to recognize Muley Hafid as the new Sultan of Morocco. 

His Majesty made a gesture of impatience. "Yes," he 
said, "that is an excellent example of the way in which 
German action is misrepresented. First, then, as regards 
the journey of Dr. Vassel. The German Government, in 
sending Dr. Vassel back to his post at Fez, was only 
guided by the wish that he should look after the private 
interests of German subjects in that city, who cried for 
help and protection after the long absence of a Consular 
representative. And why not send him? Are those who 
charge Germany with having stolen a march on the other 
Powers aware that the French Consular representative 
had already been in Fez for several months when Dr. 
Vassel set out? Then, as to the recognition of Muley 
Hafid. The Press of Europe has complained with much 
acerbity that Germany ought not to have suggested his 
recognition until he had notified to Europe his full accept- 
ance of the Act of Algeciras, as being binding upon him 
as Sultan of Morocco and successor of his brother. My 
answer is that Muley Hafid notified the Powers to that 

33X 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

effect weeks ago, before the decisive battle was fought. 
He sent, as far back as the middle of last July, an iden- 
tical communication to the Grovernments of Germany, 
France, and Great Britain, containing an explicit ac- 
knowledgment that he Avas prepared to recognize all the 
obligations towards Europe which were incurred by Abdul 
Aziz during his Sultanate. The German Government in- 
terpreted that communication as a final and authoritative 
expression of Muley Hafid's intentions, and therefore they 
considered that there was no reason to wait until he had 
sent a second communication, before recognizing him as 
the de facto Sultan of Morocco, who had succeeded to his 
brother's throne by right of victory in the field." 

I suggested to his Majesty that an important and influ- 
ential section of the German Press had placed a very dif- 
ferent interpretation upon the action of the German 
Government, and, in fact, had given it their effusive ap- 
probation precisely baceuse they saw in it a strong act 
instead of mere words, and a decisive indication that Ger- 
many was once more about to intervene in the shaping of 
events in Morocco. ' ' There are mischief-makers, ' ' replied 
the Emperor, "in both countries, I will not attempt to 
weigh their relative capacity for misrepresentation. But 
the facts are as I have stated. There has been nothing in 
Germany's recent action with regard to Morocco which 
runs contrary to the explicit declaration of my love of 
peace which I made both at Guildhall and in my latest 
speech at Strassburg." 

His Majesty then reverted to the subject uppermost in 
his mind — his proved friendship for England. "I have 
referred," he said, "to the speeches in which I have done 
all that a sovereign can to proclaim my goodwill. But, as 
actions speak louder than words, let me also refer to my 
acts. It is commonly believed in England that throughout 
the South Africa War Germany was hostile to her. Ger- 
man opinion undoubtedly was hostile — bitterly hostile. 
But what of official Germany? Let my critics ask them- 
selves what brought to a sudden stop, and, indeed, to 
absolute collapse, the European tour of the Boer delegates 
who were striving to obtain European intervention? They 
were feted in Holland: France gave them a rapturous 

332 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 

welcome. They wished to come to Berlin, where the Ger- 
man people would have crowned them with flowers. But 
when they asked me to receive them — I refused. The 
agitation immediately died away, and the delegation re- 
turned empty-handed. Was that, I ask, the action of a 
secret enemy? 

' * Again, when the struggle was at its height, the German 
Government was invited by the Governments of France 
and Russia to join with them in calling upon England to 
put an end to the war. The moment had come, they said, 
not only to save the Boer Republics, but also to humiliate 
England to the dust. What was my reply ? I said that so 
far from Germany joining in any concerted European 
action to put pressure upon England and bring about her 
downfall, Germany would always keep aloof from politics 
that could bring her into complications with a Sea Power 
like England. Posterity will one day read the exact terms 
of the telegram — now in the archives of Windsor Castle — 
in which I informed the Sovereign of England of the 
answer I had returned to the Powers which then sought 
to compass her fall. Englishmen who now insult me by 
doubting my word should know what were my actions in 
the hour of their adversity, 

"Nor was that all. Just at the time of your Black 
Week, in the December of 1899, when disasters followed 
one another in rapid succession, I received a letter from 
Queen Victoria, my revered grandmother, written in sor- 
row and affliction, and bearing manifest traces of the 
anxieties which were preying upon her mind and health. 
I at once returned a sympathetic reply. Nay, I did more. 
I bade one of my officers procure for me as exact an 
account as he could obtain of the number of combatants 
in South Africa on both sides, and of the actual position 
of the opposing forces. With the figures before me, I 
worked out what I considered to be the best plan of cam- 
paign under the circumstances, and submitted it to my 
General Staff for their criticism. Then I dispatched it to 
England, and that document, likewise, is among the State 
papers at W^indsor Castle, awaiting the serenely impartial 
verdict of history. And, as a matter of curious coinci- 
dence, let me add that the plan which I formulated ran 

333 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

very much on the same line as that which was actually 
adopted by Lord Roberts and carried by him into success- 
ful operation. Was that, I repeat, the act of one who 
wished England ill ? Let Englishmen be just and say ! 

"But, you will say, what of the German navy? Surely 
that is a menace to England ! Against whom but England 
are my squadrons being prepared? If England is not in 
the minds of those Germans who are bent on creating a 
powerful fleet, whj^ is Germany asked to consent to such 
new and heavy burdens of taxation ? My answer is clear. 
Germany is a young and growing Empire. She has a 
world-wide commerce, which is rapidly expanding, and 
to which the legitimate ambition of patriotic Germans 
refuses to assign any bounds. Germany must have a 
powerful fleet to protect that commerce, and her manifold 
interests in even the most distant seas. She expects those 
interests to go on growing, and she must be able to 
champion them manfully in any quarter of the globe. 
Germany looks ahead. Her horizons stretch far away. 
She must be prepared for any eventualities in the Far 
East. Who can foresee what may take place in the Pacific 
in the days to come — daj^s not so distant as some believe, 
but days, at any rate, for which all European Powers with 
Far Eastern interests ought steadily to prepare? Look at 
the accomplished rise of Japan ; think of the possible 
national awakening of China ; and then judge of the vast 
problems of the Pacific. Only those Powers which have 
great navies will be listened to with respect when the 
future of the Pacific comes to be solved ; and if for that 
reason only Germany must have a powerful fleet. It may 
even be that England herself will be glad that Germany 
has a fleet when they speak together on the same side in 
the great debates of the future." 

Such was the purport of the Emperor's conversation. 
He spoke with all that earnestness which marks his manner 
when speaking on deeply pondered subjects. I would ask 
my fellow-countrymen who value the cause of peace to 
weigh what I have written, and to revise, if necessary, 
their estimate of the Kaiser and his friendship for Eng- 
land by his Majesty's own words. If they had enjoyed 
the privilege, which was mine, of hearing them spoken, 

334 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 

they would doubt no longer either his Majesty's firm 
desire to live on the best of terms with England or his 
growing impatience at the persistent mistrust with which 
his offer of friendship is too often received. 

No. IV 

The leaders of virtually all the parties in the 
Reichstag in some degree manifested their disap- 
probation of the Kaiser *s statements. 

Doctor Albrecht, speaking for the Socialists, de- 
manded, *'What is the Chancellor prepared to do to 
prevent such occurrences'?" 

Herr Bassermann, on behalf of the National Lib- 
erals, asked, *'Is the Chancellor prepared to take 
constitutional responsibility for the publication of 
the utterances of his Majesty the Emperor in the 
Daihj Telegraph?'' 

Doctor Ablass, of the Progressive group, after 
asserting that matters had become knoAvn ''which 
indicate serious shortcomings in the management of 
foreign affairs that tended to affect unfavorably 
the foreign relations of the German Empire," in- 
quired, "What does the Chancellor propose to do 
to prevent such occurrences?" 

Even the Conservatives, through Prince von 
Hatzfeldt and Herr von Norman, demanded "fur- 
ther information regarding the circumstances that 
led to the publication of the Emperor's utterances 
in the English press," and called for ''precautions" 
that it should not be repeated. 

To these questions Prince von Billow replied : 

3^5 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Gentlemen, I shall not apply myself to every point 
which has just been raised by previous speakers. I have 
to consider the effect of my words abroad, and will not 
add to the great harm already caused by the publication 
in the Daily Telegraph [''Hear, hear!" on the Left and 
Socialists]. 

In reply to the interpellations submitted, I have to de- 
clare as follows : 

His Majesty the Kaiser has at different times, and to 
different private English personalities, made private utter- 
ances which, linked together, have been published in the 
Daily Telegraph. I must suppose that not all details of 
the utterances have been correctly reproduced ["Hear, 
hear!" on the Right]. One I know is not correct; that 
is the story about the plan of campaign [''Hear, hear!" 
on the Right]. The plan in question was not a field 
campaign worked out in detail, but a purely academic 

[laughter among the Socialists] Gentlemen, we are 

engaged in a serious discussion. The matters on which I 
speak are of an earnest kind and of great political im- 
portance — be good enough to listen to me quietly; I will 
be as brief as possible. I repeat therefore : the matter is 
not concerned with a field campaign worked out in detail, 
but with certain purely academic thoughts — I believe they 
are expressly described as "aphorisms" — about the con- 
duct of war in general, which the Kaiser communicated in 
his interchange of correspondence with the late Queen 
Victoria. They are theoretical observations of no prac- 
tical moment for the course of operations and the issue 
of the war. The chief of the General Staff, General von 
Moltke, and his predecessor, General Count Schlieffen, 
have declared that the General Staff reported to the 
Kaiser on the Boer War as on every war, great or small, 
which has occurred on the earth during the last ten years. 
Both, however, have given assurances that our General 
Staff never examined a field plan of campaign, or anything 
similar, prepared by the Kaiser in view of the Boer War, 
or forwarded such to England ["Hear, hear!" on the 
Right and Centre]. But I must also defend our policy 
against the reproach of being ambiguous vis-a-vis the 
Boers. We had — the documents show it — given timely 

336 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 

warning to the Transvaal Government. "We called its 
attention to the fact that in case of a war with England 
it would stand alone. We put it to her directly, and 
through the friendly Dutch Government in May, 1899, 
peacefully to come to an understanding with England, 
since there could be no doubt as to the result of a war. 

In the question of intervention, the colors in the 
article of the Daily Telegraph are too thickly laid on. The 
thing itself had long been known [''Hear, hear!"]. It 
was some time previously the subject of controversy be- 
tween the National Review and the Deutsche Revue. 
There can be no talk of a "revelation." It was said that 
the Imperial communication to the Queen of England, 
that Germany had not paid any attention to a suggestion 
for mediation or intervention, is a breach of the rules of 
diplomatic intercourse. Gentlemen, I will not recall indis- 
cretions to memory, for they are frequent in the diplo- 
matic history of all nations and at all times ["Quite 
right," on the Right]. The safest policy is perhaps that 
which need fear no indiscretion ["Quite right," on the 
Left]. To pass judgment in particular cases as to 
Avhether or not a breach of confidence has occurred, one 
must know more of the closely connected circumstances 
than appears in the article of the Daily Telegraph. The 
communication might be justified if it were attempted in 
one quarter or another to misrepresent our refusal or to 
throw suspicion on our attitude ; circumstances may have 
previously happened which make allusion to the subject 
in a confidential correspondence at least intelligible. Gen- 
tlemen, I said before that many of the expressions used 
in the Daily Telegraph article are too strong. That is true, 
in the first place, of the passage where the Kaiser is rep- 
resented as having said that the majority of the German 
people are inimieally disposed towards England. Be- 
tween Germany and England misunderstandings have 
occurred, serious, regrettable misunderstandings. But I 
am conscious of being at one with this entire honorable 
House in the view that the German people desire peaceful 
and friendly relations with England on the basis of mutual 
esteem [loud and general applause] and I take note that 
the speakers of all parties have spoken to-day in the 

337 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

same sense [''Quite right"]. The colors are also too 
thickly laid on in the place where reference is made to our 
interests in the Pacific Ocean. It has been construed in 
a sense hostile to Japan. Wrongly ; we have never in the 
Far East thought of anything but this — to acquire and 
maintain for Germany a share of the commerce of East- 
ern Asia in view of the great economic future of this 
region. We are not thinking of maritime adventure there ; 
aggressive tendencies have as little to say to our naval 
construction in the Pacific as in Europe. Moreover, his 
Majesty the Kaiser entirely agrees with the responsible di- 
rector of foreign policy in the complete recognition of the 
high political importance which the Japanese people have 
achieved by their political strength and military ability. 
German policy does not regard it as its task to detract from 
the enjoyment and development of what Japan has acquired. 
Gentlemen, I am, generally speaking, under the impres- 
sion that if the material facts — completely, in their proper 
shape — were individually known, the sensation would be 
no great one ; in this instance, too, the whole is more than 
all the parts taken together. But above all, gentlemen, 
one must not, while considering the material things, quite 
forget the psychology, the tendency. For two decades 
our Kaiser has striven, often under very difficult circum- 
stances, to bring about friendly relations between Ger- 
many and England. This honest endeavor has had to 
contend with obstacles which would have discouraged 
many. The passionate partisanship of our people for the 
P>oers was humanly intelligible; feeling for the weaker 
certainly appeals to the sympathy. But this partisanship 
has led to unjustified, and often unmeasured, attacks on 
England, and similarly unjust and hateful attacks have 
been made against Germany from the side of the English. 
Our aims were misconstrued, and hostile plans against 
England were foisted on us which we had never thought 
of. The Kaiser, rightly convinced that this state of things 
was a calamity for both countries and a danger for the 
civilized world, kept undeviatingly on the course he had 
adopted. The Kaiser is particularly wronged by any 
doubt as to the purity of his intentions, his ideal way of 
thinking, and his deep love of country. 

338 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 

Gentlemen, let us avoid anything that looks like exag- 
gerated seeking for foreign favor, anything that looks like 
uncertainty or obsequiousness. But I understand that the 
Kaiser, precisely because he was anxious to work zeal- 
ously and honestly for good relationship with England, 
felt embittered at being ever the object of attacks casting 
suspicion on his best motives. Has one not gone so far 
as to attribute to his interest in the German fleet secret 
views against vital English interests — views which are far 
from him? And so in private conversation with English 
friends he sought to bring the proof, by pointing to his 
conduct, that in England he was misunderstood and 
wrongly judged. 

Gentlemen, the perception that the publication of these 
conversations in England has not had the effect the Kaiser 
wished, and in our own country has caused profound 
agitation and painful regret, will — this firm conviction I 
have acquired during these anxious days — lead the Kaiser 
for the future, in private conversation also, to maintain 
the reserve that is equally indispensable in the interest of 
a uniform policy and for the authority of the Crown 
["Bravo!" on the Right]. 

If it were not so, I could not, nor could my successor, 
bear the responsibility ["Bravo!" on the Right and 
National Liberals]. 

For the fault which occurred in dealing with the manu- 
script I accept, as I have caused to be said in the Nord- 
deutsclie Allgemeine Zeitung, entire responsibility. It 
also goes against my personal feelings that officials who 
have done their duty all their lives should be stamped 
as transgressors because, in a single ease, they relied too 
much on the fact that I usually read and finally decide 
everything myself. 

With Herr von Heydebrand I regret that in the mech- 
anism of the Foreign Office, which for eleven years has 
worked smoothly under me, a defect should on one occa- 
sion occur. I will answer for it that such a thing does 
not happen again, and that with this object, without re- 
spect to persons, though also without injustice, what is 
needful will be done ["Bravo!"]. 

When the article in the Daily Telegraph appeared, its 
fateful effect could not for a moment be doubtful to me, 



23 



339 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

and I handed in my resignation. This decision was un- 
avoidable, and was not difficult to come to. The most 
serious and most difficult decision which I ever took in 
my political life was, in obedience to the Kaiser's wish, to 
remain in office. I brought myself to this decision only 
because I saw in it a command of my political duty, pre- 
cisely in the time of trouble, to continue to serve his 
Majesty the Kaiser and the country [repeated ' ' Bravos ! "] . 
How long that will be possible for me, I cannot say. 

Let me say one thing more : at a moment when the fact 
that in the world much is once again changing requires 
serious attention to be given to the entire situation, wher- 
ever it is matter of concern to maintain our position 
abroad, and without pushing ourselves forward with quiet 
constancy to make good our interests — at such a moment 
we ought not to show ourselves small-spirited in foreign 
eyes, nor make out of a misfortune a catastrophe. I will 
refrain from all criticism of the exaggerations we have 
lived through during these last days. The harm is — as 
calm reflection will show — not so great that it cannot with 
circumspection be made good. Certainly no one should 
forget the warning which the events of these days have 
given us [''Bravo!"] — but there is no reason to lose our 
heads and awake in our opponents the hope that the 
Empire, inwardly or outwardly, is maimed. 

It is for the chosen representatives of the nation to 
exhibit the prudence which the time demands. I do not 
say it for myself, I say it for the country: the support 
required for this is no favor, it is a duty which this 
honorable House will not evade [loud applause on the 
Right, hisses from the Socialists]. 

No. V 

The important part of Chancellor Bethmann- 

Hollweg's defense of the Kaiser's speech at Konigs- 

berg is as follows : 

The discourse at Konigsberg is not a manifestation of 
absolutist opinion, inconsistent with the Constitution, but, 

340 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 

it is true, a strong affirmation of the monarchical prin- 
ciple — which is a foundation of the Prussian State law, 
as well as an expression of profound religious convictions 
which are understood and which are shared by numerous 
classes of the nation. [Lively approbation on the Right 
and the Centre.] 

In its development of many centuries, it is not the Prus- 
sian people that has given itself the royalty, but it is 
the work of the great monarchs of the House of Hohen- 
zollern, who, seconded by the tenacity and ability of the 
population, has created first a Prussian nation, then a 
Prussian State [Applause on various benches]. 

The Prussian Constitution, which rests on these historic 
developments, does not recognize the conception of the 
sovereignty of the people. This is why the Kings of 
Prussia are, in relation to their own people. Kings in 
their own right; and if in our days it is attempted, on 
the democratic side, to regard the King of Prussia in a 
manner more lively than before as a dignitary named by 
the people, it is not an occasion for astonishment that 
the King affirms strongly his consciousness of not being 
subject to any sovereignty of the people. 

Personal irresponsibility of the King, independence and 
original existence of his monarchical right, here are the 
fundamental ideas of our State-life, which remain alive in 
the period of constitutional devalopment. 

With the exception of the Social Democrats, the 
speakers of nearly all parties spoke in terms similar 
to those employed by the Chancellor, and the inci- 
dent was thus closed. 

No. VI 

The essential part of Kaiser William II ^s Letter 

on Eeligion to Admiral Hollmann is as follows : 

I distinguish between two different sorts of Revelation : 
a current, to a certain extent historical, and a purely 
religious, which was meant to prepare the way for the 

341 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

appearance of the Messiah. As to the first, T shonld say 
that I have not the slightest doubt that God eternally 
revealed Himself to the race of mankind He created. He 
breathed into man His breath, that is, a portion of Him- 
self, a soul. With fatherly love and interest He f dllowed 
the development of humanity; in order to lead and en- 
courage it further He "revealed" Himself, now in the 
person of this, now of that great wise man, priest or king, 
whether pagan, Jew or Christian. Hammurabi was one 
of these, Moses, Abraham, Homer, Charlemagne, Luther, 
Shakespeare, Goethe, Kant, Kaiser William the Great — 
these He selected and honoured with His Grace, to achieve 
for their peoples, according to His will, things noble and 
imperishable. How often has not my grandfather ex- 
plicitly declared that he was an instrument in the hand 
of the Lord! The works of great souls are the gifts of 
God to the people, that they may be able to build further 
on them as models, that they may be able to feel further 
through the confusion of the undiscovered here below. 
Doubtless God has "revealed" Himself to different peo- 
ples in different ways, according to their situation and 
the degree of their civilization. Then just as we are over- 
borne most by the greatness and might of the lovely nature 
of the Creation when we regard it, and as we look are 
astonished at the greatness of God there displayed, even 
so can we of a surety thankfully and admiringly recog- 
nize, by whatever truly great or noble thing a man or a 
people does, the revelation of God, His influence acts on 
us and among us directly. 

The second sort of Revelation, the more religious sort, 
is that which led up to the appearance of the Lord. From 
Abraham onward it was introduced, slowly but foresee- 
ingly, ail-wisely and ail-knowingly, for othemvise human- 
ity were lost. And now commences the astonishing work- 
ing of God's Revelation. The race of Abraham and the 
peoples that sprang from it regard, with an iron logic, 
as their holiest possession, the belief in a God. They must 
worship and cultivate Him. Broken up during the cap- 
tivity in Egypt, the separated parts were brought together 
again for the second time by Moses, always striving to 
cling fast to monotheism. It was the direct intervention 

343 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 

of God that caused this people to come to life again. And 
so it goes on through the centuries till the Messiah, an- 
nounced and foreshadowed by the prophets and psalmists, 
at last appears the greatest revelation of God to the world. 
Then He appeared in the Son Himself ; Christ is God ; God 
in human form. He redeemed us, He spurs us on. He 
allures us to follow Him, we feel His fire burn in us. His 
sympathy strengthens us. His displeasure annihilates us, 
but also His care saves us. Confident of victory, building 
only on His Word, we pass through labor, scorn, suf- 
fering, misery, and death, for in His Word we have God's 
revealed Word, and He never lies. 

That is my view of the matter. The Word is especially 
for us evangelicals made the essential thing by Luther, 
and as good theologian surely Delitzseh must not forget 
that our great Luther taught us to sing and believe — 
"Thou shalt suffer, let the Word stand." To me it goes 
without saying that the Old Testament contains a large 
number of fragments of a purely human historical kind 
and not "God's revealed Word." They are mere his- 
torical descriptions of events of all sorts which occurred 
in the political, religious, moral, and intellectual life of 
the people of Israel. For example, the act of legislation 
on Sinai may be regarded as only symbolically inspired 
by God, when Moses had recourse to the revival of per- 
haps some old-time law (possibly the codex, an offshoot 
of the codex of Hammurabi), to bring together and to 
bind together institutions of His people which were be- 
come shaky and incapable of resistance. Here the his- 
torian can, from the spirit or the text, perhaps construct 
a connexion with the Law of Hammurabi, the friend of 
Abraham, and perhaps logically enough; but that would 
no way lessen the importance of the fact that God sug- 
gested it to ]\Ioses, and in so far revealed Himself to the 
Israelite people. 

Consequently it is my idea that for the future our good 
Professor would do well to avoid treating of religion as 
such, on the other hand continue to describe unmolested 
everything that connects the religion, manners, and 
customs of the Babylonians with the Old Testament. On 
the whole, I make the following deductions: — 

343 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

1. I believe in One God. 

2. We humans need, in order to teach Him, a Form, 
especially for our Children. 

3. This Form has been to the present time the Old 
Testament in its existing tradition. This Form will cer- 
tainly decidedly alter considerably with the discovery of 
inscriptions and excavations; there is nothing harmful in 
that, it is even no harm if the nimbus of the Chosen 
People loses much thereby. The kernel and substance 
remain always the same — God, namely, and His work. 

Never was religion a result of science, but a gushing 
out of the heart and being of mankind, springing from its 
intercourse with God. 

No. VII 

The substance of the Austrian demands and of 
the replies by Serbia is expressed in the following 
summaries, for which abbreviated form I am in- 
debted to McClure's Obstacles to Peace, pp. 60, 61. 

DEMANDS 

1. Serbia shall suppress all anti-Austrian publications. 

2. Dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and all similar socie- 
ties, confiscate their funds, and prevent their re-forming. 

3. Remove from public education in Serbia all teachers 
and teaching that are anti- Austrian. 

4. Remove from military and civil service all officers 
and officials guilty of anti-Austrian propaganda; Austria 
will name the persons. 

5. Accept collaboration of Austrian representatives in 
the suppression of anti-Austrian propaganda. 

6. Take judicial proceedings against accessories to the 
plot against the Archduke; Austrian delegates will take 
part in the investigations. 

7. Arrest Major Voija Tankositch and the individual 
named Milan Ciganovitch. 

8. Prevent and punish the illegal traffic in arms and 
explosives. 

344 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 

9. Send to Austria explanations of all unjustifiable 
utterances of high Serbian officials, at home and abroad. 

10. Notify without delay that the above measures are 
executed. Reply before 6 p.m. on Saturday, July 25. 

ANSWERS 

1. Yes ; will suppress all anti- Austrian publications. 

2. Yes ; will suppress the Narodna Odbrana and similar 
societies. 

3. Yes ; will expel all anti- Austrian teachers and teach- 
ing as soon as evidence given. 

4. Yes ; will expel all anti-Austrian officers and officials, 
if Austria will furnish names and acts of guilty persons. 

5. Yes; will accept collaboration of Austrian repre- 
sentatives in these proceedings, as far as consonant with 
principles of international law and criminal procedure 
and neighborly relations. 

6. Yes; will take the judicial proceedings; will also 
keep Austria informed; but cannot admit the participa- 
tion of Austrians in the judicial investigations, as this 
would be a violation of the Constitution. 

7. Yes; have arrested Tankositch; ordered arrest of 
Ciganovitch. 

8. Yes; will suppress and punish traffic in arms and 
explosives. 

9. Yes ; will deal with the said high officials, if Austria 
will supply evidence. 

10. Yes, will notify without delay. 

If this answer not satisfactory, Serbia will abide by 
decision of the Hague Tribunal. 

No. VIII 

The reply of Sir Edward Grey to the German bid 
for neutrality was as follows : 

Sin Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, BritisJi Ambassa- 
dor at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. 

Your telegram of the 29th July. 

345 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment enter- 
tain the Chancellor 's proposal that they should bind them- 
selves to neutrality on such tenns. 

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while 
French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as 
Germany does not take French territory as distinct from 
the colonies. 

From the material point of view such a proposal is 
unacceptable, for France, without further territory in 
Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to 
lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordi- 
nate to German policy. 

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for 
us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of 
France, a disgrace from which the good name of this 
country would never recover. 

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away 
whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the 
neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bar- 
gain, either. 

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine 
whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agree- 
ment between England and Germany offered positive ad- 
vantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands 
now. We must preserve full freedom to act as circum- 
stances may seem to us to r*equire in any such unfavor- 
able and regrettable development of the present crisis as 
the Chancellor contemplates. 

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, 
and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining 
the good relations between England and Germany is that 
they should continue to work together to preserve the 
peace of Europe ; if we succeed in this object, the natural 
relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be ip.so 
fncfo improved and strengthened. For that object His 
Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sin- 
cerity and good-will. 

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be 
preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own 
endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which 
Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured 

346 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 

that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued 
against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, 
jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked 
for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, 
and, Germany having a corresponding object, our rela- 
tions sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too 
Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if 
this present crisis, so much more acute than any that 
Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, 
I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow 
may make possible some more definite rapprochement 
between the Powers than has been possible hitherto. 

No. IX 

The following is Sir Edward Grey's report of the 
** private" conversation referred to in the Kaiser's 
message to the President of the United States : 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. GoscJien, British Ambassa- 
dor at Berlin. 

Foreign Office, Juhj 29, 1914. 

Sir: 

After speaking to the German Ambassador this after- 
noon about the European situation, I said that I wished 
to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, some- 
thing that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. 
While it was restricted to the issues at present actually 
involved, we had no thought of interfering in it. But if 
Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue 
might be so great it would involve all European interests ; 
and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone 
of our conversation — which I hoped would continue — into 
thinking that we should stand aside. 

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked 
whether I meant that we should, under certain circum- 
stances, intervene ? 

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use any- 
thing that v;as like a throat or an attempt to apply pres- 

347 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

sure by saying that, if things became worse, we should 
intervene. There would be no question of our intervening 
if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not 
involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did 
become such that we thought British interests required us 
to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision 
would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other 
Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our 
conversations would continue as at present, and that I 
should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German 
government in working for peace. But if we failed in our 
efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it 
involved practically every European interest, I did not 
wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly 
tone of all our conversations had misled him or his gov- 
ernment into supposing that we should not take action, 
and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, 
the course of things might have been different. 

The German ambassador took no exception to what I had 
said ; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had 
already given in Berlin as his view of the situation. 

No. X 

The reply of the Anstro-Hungarian Government 
to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, in answer to 
the Imperial German Government's telegram of 
caution, was thought of so little importance that it 
was not published or referred to in the German 
White Book. Its substance is, however, contained 
in the following telegram : 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassa- 
dors at London and St. Petersburg. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, Juhj 31, 1914. 

I am telegraphing as follows to Berlin : — 
Herr von Tschirschky has in accordance with his instruc- 
tions yesterday communicated a discussion between Sir 
E. Grey and Prince Lichnowsky in which the British Sec- 

348 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUIMENTS 

retary of State made the following announcement to the 
German ambassador : — 

Sazonof has informed the British government that after 
the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, 
he is no longer in a position to deal directly with Austria- 
Hungary, and he therefore requests that Great Britain 
will again take up her work of mediation. The Russian 
government regarded the preliminary stoppage of hostili- 
ties as a condition precedent to this. 

To this Russian declaration, Sir E. Grey remarked to 
Prince Lichnowsky that Great Britain thought of a media- 
tion a quatre, and that she regarded this as urgently neces- 
sary if a general war was to be prevented. 

I ask your Excellency to convey our warm thanks to 
the Secretary of State for the communications made to us 
through Herr von Tschirschky, and to declare to him that 
in spite of the change in the situation which has since 
arisen through the mobilization of Russia, we are quite 
prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to 
negotiate between us and Serbia. 

The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that 
our military action against Serbia should continue to take 
its course, and that the British Cabinet should move the 
Russian government to bring to a standstill the Russian 
mobilization which is directed against us, in w^hich case, 
of course, we will at once cancel the defensive military 
counter-measures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the 
Russian attitude. 

No. XI 

The German reply to Great Britain's inquiry re- 
garding the intention to respect the neutrality of 
Belgium is thus reported, on July 31, 1914, by the 
British ambassador at Berlin: 

Sir E. GoscJien to Sir Edward Grey 
Received August 1 
(Telegraphic) Berlin, July 31, 1914. 

Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram 
of July 31 to Sir F. Bertie. 

349 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

I have seen Secretary of State (Von Jagow), who in- 
forms me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chan- 
cellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from 
what he said that he thought any reply they might give 
could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of 
campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was there- 
fore very doubtful whether they could return any answer 
at all.— British Blue Book, I, No. 121. 



No. XII 

The care observed by the French not to take the 
offensive or invade German territory is evident 
from the f oUoAving secret general order of August 2, 
1914, issued by General Joffre at Paris: 

(1) From information received it appears that the 
Germans have this morning violated the French frontier 
at three points, namely, between Delle and Belfort, oppo- 
site Cirey-sur-Vezouze, and both to the north and south of 
Longwy. 

Under these circumstances, the order forbidding the 
passage of troops eastwards beyond the line laid down by 
telegram No. 129 — 3/11 T. situated generally at a dis- 
tance of 10 kilometres from the frontier, is hereby re- 
scinded. Nevertheless, for national reasons of a moral 
kind and for most important reasons of diplomacy, it is 
absolutely necessary to leave to the Germans all respon- 
sibility for hostilities. Therefore, until further orders, 
covering troops will confine themselves to driving back 
attacking forces beyond the frontier without pursuing 
them and without penetrating into the territory of the 
enemy. 

(2) The Commander-in-Chief intends to take up the 
general offensive only when his forces have been concen- 
trated. 

350 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 
No. XIII 

It is evident that it had been decided that unless 
Russia gave way entirely, and declared her total 
abstention from the purpose to protect Serbia, the 
German declaration of war on Russia, whatever its 
consequences, would be issued. The following^ re- 
port of the Imperial German Government's state- 
ments confirms this view : 

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir 
Edward Grey 

(Received August 1) 
(Telegraphic) Berlin, July 31, 1914. 

Your telegram of 31st July. 

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him 
most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another 
effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war. 

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards 
your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to 
maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Im- 
perial Government to consider any proposal until they 
had received an answer from Russia to their communi- 
cation of to-day; this communication, which he admitted 
had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia 
could inform the Imperial Government within twelve 
hours that she would immediately countermand her mobil- 
ization against Germany and Austria, Germany would 
be obliged on her side to mobilize at once. 

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand 
even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them 
to demobilize in the south as well. He replied that it was 
in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilization 
was only directed against Austria. 

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was 
not satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal 
merited favorable consideration, and in any case he 
would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he 

351 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

repeated that it was no use discussing it until tlie Russian 
Government had sent in tlieir answer to the German de- 
mand. 

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, 
at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German 
Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging 
Austria to show willingness to continue discussions — and 
telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna 
had been of a promising nature — but Russia's mobiliza- 
tion had spoilt everything.— British Blue Book, I, No. 121. 

No. XIV 

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- 
hurg, to Sir Edward Grey (Received July 31). 
(Telegraphic) St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914. 

It has been decided to issue orders for general mobili- 
zation. 

This decision was taken in consequence of report re- 
ceived from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect 
that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of 
Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as 
well as against Serbia. 

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is mak- 
ing active military preparations, and she cannot afford to 
let her get a start. — British Blue Book, I, No. 113. 

No. XV 

The German newspapers did not fail to con- 
tribute as much as possible to the impression that 
Germany was attacked. In this, however, there was 
a lack of co-ordination that renders it easy to ex- 
pose the erroneous charges against the French. 
Two French professors, whose report is cited by 
McClure, have disproved certain widely circulated 
falsehoods. They say : 

As we wished to ascertain whether the German news- 
papers had given a more fletailed account of these oc- 

353 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 

currences, we consulted five of the principal newspapers 
{Vorioaerts, Arbeiter Zeitung of Vienna. Frankfurter 
Zeitung, Kolnisclie Zeitung, Milncliner Neueste Nach- 
ricJiten) from the end of July to the 5th of August. First 
of all we noticed that the aviator who is said to have flown 
over Karlsruhe is not mentioned. As for the others, the 
account of them is as vague as it is in the official note. 
These incidents, given as the cause determining war, take 
up one line, two or three at the most. The bombs never 
left any trace. One of these aeroplanes, that at Wesel, 
is said to have been brought down ; nothing is said of the 
aviator and what became of him, nor is there anything 
about the aeroplane itself. In a word, the Germans took 
care to draw attention to their arrival in Germany and 
then never spoke of them again. They were never seen 
to return to their starting-point. 

But we have still more convincing evidence. We have 
been able to procure a Nuremberg newspaper, the Frank- 
iscJier Kurrier. On the 2d of August, the day the bombs 
are supposed to have been thrown, not a word is said 
about the incident. Nuremberg received the news on the 
3d by a telegram from Berlin identical to that published 
by the other newspapers. Again, the Kolnisclie Zeitung 
of the 3d, in its morning edition, published a telegram 
from Munich which read as follows: "The Bavarian Min- 
ister of "War is doubtful as to the exactness of the news 
announcing that aviators had been seen above the lines 
Nuremberg-Kitzingen and Nuremberg-Anspach and that 
they had thrown bombs on the railway." 



No. XVI 

The following telegrams explain the circum- 
stances which determined the entrance of Great 
Britain into the war : 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. GoscheUy British Ambassa- 
dor at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. 

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His 

353 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

Majesty the Kin«^ for diplomatic intervention on behalf 
of Belgium in the following terms: — 

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's 
friendship and that of j^our predecessor, and the friendly 
attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship 
you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal 
to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Gov- 
ernment to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." 

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the 
German Government have delivered to the Belgian Gov- 
ernment a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing 
free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to 
maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom 
and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening 
in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An 
answer was requested within twelve hours. 

We also understand that Belgium has categorically re- 
fused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. 

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against 
this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in 
common with themselves, and must request an assurance 
that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded 
with and that her neutrality will be respected by Ger- 
many, You should ask for an immediate reply. — British 
Blue Book, I, No. 153. 

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Gosclien, British Ambassa- 
dor at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. 

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Gov- 
ernment will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by 
force of arms, the measures considered indispensable. 

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been 
violated at Gemmenich. 

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that 
Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting 
Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request 
made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat 
that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and 
to my telegram of this morning be received here by 12 

354 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 

o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for 
your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Govern- 
ment feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold 
the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty 
to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves. — Brit- 
ish Blue Book, I,' No. 159. 

Sir E. Gosclien, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir 
Edward Grey. 

London, August 8, 1914. 
Sir, 

In accordance with the instructions contained in your 
telegram of the 4th instant I called upon the Secretary 
of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His 
IMajesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government 
would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr 
von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that 
his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the Ger- 
man troops having crossed the frontier that morning, 
Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von 
Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial 
Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, 
that they had to advance into France by the quickest and 
easiest way, so as to be able to get w^ell ahead with their 
operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as 
early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for 
them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they 
could not have hoped, in view of the paacity of roads 
and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through 
without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. 
This loss of time would have meant time gained by the 
Russians for bringing up their troops to the German 
frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, 
while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. 
I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fnit accompli 
of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he 
would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, 
and I asked him whether there w^as not still time to draw 
back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and 
I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had 
given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back. 
24 355 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

During the afternoon I received your further telegram 
of the same date, and, in compliance with the instructions 
herein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial For- 
eign Office and informed the Secretary of State that un- 
less the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 
12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further 
with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their 
advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports 
and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's 
Government would have to take all steps in their power to 
uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of 
a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as them- 
selves. 

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could 
give no other answer than that which he had given me 
earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire 
rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops 
should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency 
a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out 
that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His 
Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him 
whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would 
necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last 
moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He 
replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours 
or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that 
ease I should have to demand my passports. This inter- 
view took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversa- 
tion which ensued Herr von JagoAV expressed his poignant 
regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of 
the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with 
Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get 
closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work 
in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and dis- 
appointment, but that he must understand that under the 
circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Maj- 
esty's Government could not possibly have acted other- 
wise than they had done. 

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancel- 
lor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an 
opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I 

356 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 

found the Chancellor very agitated. His Exeellenoy at 
once began a harangne, which lasted for about twenty 
minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's 
Government w^as terrible to a degree; just for a word — 
"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often 
been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper Great Britain 
was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired 
nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts 
in that direction had been rendered useless by this last 
terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had 
devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled 
down like a house of cards. What we had done was un- 
thinkable ; it was like striking a man from behind while 
he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He 
held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events 
that might happen. I protested strongly against that 
statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr 
von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical 
reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to 
advance through Belgium and violate the latter 's neu- 
trality, so I would wash him to understand that it was, 
so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honor 
of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engage- 
ment to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if 
attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or 
what confidence could anyone have in engagements given 
by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, 
"But at what price will that compact have been kept. 
Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted 
to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of con- 
sequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for 
breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so 
excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, 
and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from 
adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was 
leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining 
Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to 
the last moment he and his Government had been working 
with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace 
between Austria and Russia. I said that this was parf 
of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just 

357 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

at the moment when the relations between them had been 
more friendly and cordial than they had been for years, 
—British Blue Book, I, No. 160. 

No. XVII 

The attitude of Italy regarding the casus foederis 
with Austria-Hungary is showTi in the following 
communication of August 3, 1914, made by the 
French ambassador at London to Sir Edward Grey : 

In reply to the German Government 's intimation of the 
fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and 
Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions 
of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano replied: — 

"The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences 
which might result, had, in the words of the German Am- 
bassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were there- 
fore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the 
Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would 
remain neutral." 

In making this communication, M. Cambon was in- 
structed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that 
the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive 
war, and that, for this reason, the casus foederis under the 
terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise. — British Blue 
Book, I, No. 152. 

No. XVIII 

The only written agreement to protect France on 
the part of Great Britain is contained in the follow- 
ing letter of November 22, 1912, written by Sir 
Edward Grey to M. Paul Cambon, French ambas- 
sador at London : 

Foreign Office, November 22, 1912. 
My dear Ambassador, 
From time to time in recent years the French and Brit- 

358 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUINIENTS 

ish naval and military experts have consulted together. 
It has always been understood that such consultation does 
not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide 
at any future time whether or not to assist the other by 
armed force. We have agreed that consultation between 
experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an en- 
gagement that commits either Government to action in a 
contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The 
disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets 
respectively at the present moment is not based upon an 
engagement to co-operate in war. 

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Govern- 
ment had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack 
by a third Power, it might become essential to know 
whether it could in that event depend upon the armed 
assistance of the other. 

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to 
expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or some- 
thing that threatened the general peace, it should im- 
mediately discuss with the other whether both Govern- 
ments should act together to prevent aggression and to 
preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be 
prepared to take in common. If these measures involved 
action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be 
taken into consideration, and the Governments would then 
decide what effect should be given to them. 
Yours, Etc., 

E. GKEY. 

British Blue Book, I, Enclosure I in No. 105. 

The manner in which this very attenuated en- 
gagement was "nnderstood by Sir Edward Grey in 
July, 1914, is sho\\Ti in the following letter to Sir F. 
Bertie, British ambassador at Paris : 

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. 
Sir, 

After telling M. Cambon [French ambassador at Lon- 
don] to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told 
him that I meant to tell the German ambassador to-day 

359 



IMPRESSIONS OF THE KAISER 

that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our 
conversations into any sense of false security that we 
should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, 
which we were now making in common with Germany, 
failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought 
it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here ap- 
proached the present difficulty from a quite different point 
of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Mo- 
rocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute 
was one in which France was primarily interested, and in 
which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush 
France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question 
that was the subject of a special agreement between 
France and us. In the present case the dispute between 
Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called 
to take a hand. Even if the question became one between 
Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to 
take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the 
supremacy of Teuton or Slav — a struggle for supremacy 
in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid 
being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Ger- 
many became involved and France became involved, we 
had not made up our minds what we should do ; it was a 
case that we should have to consider. France would then 
have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but 
in which, owing to her alliance, her honor and interest 
obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, 
and we should have to decide what British interests re- 
quired us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, be- 
cause, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with 
regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince 
Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it 
would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled 
into supposing that this meant that we had decided what 
to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise. 
M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very 
clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, 
and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav, 
we should not feel called to intervene ; should other issues 
be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so 
that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, 

360 



ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUTNIENTS 

we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. 
He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and 
made no criticism upon it. 

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He 
anticipated a demand from Germany that France would 
be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assur- 
ance France, of course, could not give ; she was boiind to 
help Russia if Russia was attacked. — British Blue Book, 
I, No. 87. 

The manner in which France understood the en- 
gagement is sho^^^l in President Poincare^s letter 
of July 31, 1914, to H. M. King George V, which 
affirms : 

It is true that our military and naval arrangements 
leave complete liberty to your Majesty's Government, and 
that, in the letters exchanged in 1912 between Sir Edward 
Grey and M. Paul Cambon, Great Britain and France 
entered into nothing more than a mutual agreement to 
consult one another in the event of a European tension, 
and to examine in concert whether common action was 
advisable. — British Blue Book, I, Appendix I, V, No. 1. 



INDEX 



Abdul, Hamid, 72, 75, 210. 

Abraham, 142. 

Adams, John, 104. 

Agadir, 193, 194, 197, 233. 

Albania, 214, 220, 221, 222. 

Albert of Brandenburg, 138. 

Alexander III, Czar of Russia, 
25, 26. 

Algeciras, Act of, 192, 196, 197. 

All-Deutscher Verband, 33, 53. 

Alsace-Lorraine, 108, 109, 181, 
182, 186. 

Althusius, 162. 

Anatolian Railway, 229. 

Angola, 226. 

Arbitration, 84, 85, 86, 102, 103. 

Armament, reduction of contem- 
plated by Bismarck, 28. See 
also Hague Conferences. 

Army, views of William II re- 
garding the, 10, 13. 

Art, use of by William II, 67, 
68, 70, 71. 

Asquith, Mr., British Prime Min- 
ister, quoted, 193, 197. 

Bagdad Railway, 126, 210, 224, 
225, 229, 230. 

Balkan Confederation, 210. 

Barbarossa, 15. 

Belgium, neutrality and invasion 
of, 162, 260, 263, 275, 276, 279, 
293, 294, 295, 309. 

Belgrade, occupation of pro- 
posed, 264, 265. 

Berchtold, Count, Austrian Min- 
ister, 249, 289. 

Berlin, the treaty of, 183. 

Bernhardi, referred to or quoted, 
170, 171, 189, 190, 198, 206, 
207. 



363 



Bethmann-Hollweg, Imperial 
German Chancellor. 133, 134, 
197, 202, 203, 205, 214, 227, 231, 
246, 279, 293, 294, 318. 

Beyens, Baron, Belgian Minis- 
ter at Berlin, quoted, 198, 213, 
233, 236, 247, 297. 

Bismarck, Count Herbert, 18, 21. 

Bismarck, Prince von. Imperial 
German Chancellor, 7, 8, 13, 
15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28, 29, 35, 36, 38, 65, 
66, 68, 171, 172, 182, 183, 310. 

Bjorko, secret treaty of, 59, 62. 

Bosnia, annexation of, 122, 123, 
124, 183, 237. 

Boxer Rebellion, 174. 

Brussels, imaginary treaty of, 
189. 

Bucharest, treaty of, 215. 

Bundesrath, the, referred to, 6, 
22, 153. 

Bunsen, Sir Maurice, referred 
to, 28. 

Busch, Moritz, quoted, 20. 

Biilow, Prince von. Imperial 
German Secretary of State and 
Chancellor, 76, 96, 97, 104, 105, 
107, 112, 113, 114, 115, 118, 122, 
132, 133, 136, 175, 210. 

Byron, Lord, 64. 

"Byzantines," name applied to 
adulators of the Kaiser, 35. 

"Caligula," referred to, 38. 

Cambon, Jules, French ambassa- 
dor at Berlin, 194, 285. 

Caprivi. General von. Imperial 
German Chancellor, 21. 

Cavell, Edith, 320. 



INDEX 



Chancellor, the Imperial German, 

responsibihty of, 7. 

Charlemagne, referred to, 63, 67, 
143. 

Choate, Honorable Joseph H., 
quoted, 88. 

Chun, Prince, 176. 

Clausewitz, 170. 

Coal for Russian Navy, 58. 

Conference to prevent war pro- 
posed by Sir Edward Grey, 255, 
256, 257, 258, 266, 270. 

Congo Convention, the, 197. 

Copenhagen, William II, visit to, 
79. 

Constitution, the Imperial Ger- 
man, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 48, 313, 314, 
315, 321, 323 ; the Prussian, 134, 
135, 136; the United States, 
95. 

Crown Council of July 5th at 
Potsdam, 240, 241, 243, 245. 

Crown Prince, Frederick Will- 
iam, 297, 321. 

Daily Telegraph interview, 110, 

111, 112, 113, 114, 118. 
Damascus, visit of William II 

to, 71. 
Declaration of war by Germany 

on Russia, 270, 271, 280, 281, 

308 ; by Austria-Hungary on 

Russia, 290. 
Decorations, German passion for, 

42, 43. 
Delbriick, Professor, referred to, 

39. 
Delcasse, French Minister of 

Foreign Affairs, 57, 78, 81. 
Delitsch, Professor, reproved by 

William II, 142. 
Deutschtum, 4, 15, 165, 166, 238. 
Divine right, the German idea 

of, 43 ; essential to Junkertum, 

52 ; the Kaiser's claim to, 133, 

134, 137. 
Dopier, Emile, 69. 



Durazzo, contest over, 214, 215. 
Duma, the Russian, 80, 82. 



East Prussia, Duchy of, 138. 
Education, influence of William 

II on, 33, 34. 
Edward VII, King of England, 

53, 54, 81, 83, 108, 127, 128, 

178. 
Ems Telegram, 310. 
Encirclement, the legend of, 129, 

178, 225, 276, 300, 308. 
Enver Bey, 225. 
Erdmannsdorfer, 36. 
Eulenberg, Count, Grand-Master 

of Ceremonies, 98. 

Feudalism, in Germany, 145, 146, 

147. 
Forster, Professor, 161. 
Foreign Office, the German, 96, 

102. 
Frankfort, the treaty of, 181. 
Francis Ferdinand, Austrian 

Archduke, 236, 238, 239, 245, 

309. 
Francis, Joseph, Emperor, 21, 

130, 236. 
Franklin, Benjamin, 104. 
Frederick I, King of Prussia, 66, 

133, 139. 
Frederick II (the Great), King 

of Prussia, 65, 104, 141. 
Frederick III, German Emperor, 

4, 8, 15, 30, 60, 61, 323. 
Frederick, William, the Great 

Elector, 36, 133, 178. 
Frederick, William I, King of 

Prussia, 51. 
Frederick, William IV, King of 

Prussia, 42. 
French Colonies, Germany's in- 
tention to take the, 260, 261, 

263, 273. 
Fried, Herr Alfred H., quoted, 

208, 209. 
364 



INDEX 



Fiirstenberg, Prince, 113. 
Fryatt, Captain, 320. 
Frymann, Daniel, 190, 198. 

GiEBEL, the poet, quoted, 158. 

George V, King of England, 252, 
253, 263. 267, 271, 276, 281, 301. 

George, David Lloyd, quoted, 
195. 

German Emperor, the, functions 
of, 8, 68; title of, 6; William 
II's conception of, 47, 48, 319, 
320, 322. 

Gierke, Professor von, quoted, 
161, 162, 163, 164. 

Giolitti, Signor, Italian Minis- 
ter, quoted, 215. 

Goethe, the poet, 42. 

Goschen, Sir Edward, referred 
to or quoted, 255, 256. 259, 294, 
295. 

Great Elector, 36, 133, 178. 

Grey, Sir Edward, British Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, quoted 
or referred to, 192, 206, 218, 
221, 222, 223, 227, 235, 254, 255, 
256, 257, 273, 276, 279, 293, 301, 
316, 318. 

Gross Deutschland, quoted, 184, 
185, 186, 190. See Tannen- 
berg. 

Hasse, German deputy, 241. 
Hague Conferences, 59, 84, 85, 

86, 87, 91, 96, 110, 127. 
Hague Tribunal, Serbia's appeal 

to the, 248 ; Russia's appeal to, 

269. 307. 
Hakki Pasha, 229. 
Haldane, Lord, his mission, 203, 

203, 204, 206, 216, 217, 218, 231, 

232, 240, 254. 
Hammurabi, 142. 
Hanotaux, M.. quoted, 197. 
Hegel, 147, 322. 

Helfferich, Doctor, 242, 243, 244. 
Helgoland, 49. 



Henry, Prince of Prussia, 252, 

253, 271. 
Herzegovina, annexation of, 122, 

123, 124, 183, 187. 
Heydebrandt, Herr, quoted, 199, 

200. 
Hohenlohe, Prince von. Imperial 

German Chancellor, quoted, 24. 
Hohenzollern, House of, tradi- 
tions, 2, 137, 138. 
Hohneck, proposed ascent of 

the, 109. 
Hollmann, Admiral, letter of 

William II to, 142. 
Holstein, Herr, 20, 21, 26, 27, 

74. 
Holland, see Netherlands. 
Holy Roman Empire, 3. 
Hindenburg, Field Marshal, 291. 
Homer, 142. 

Humboldt, William von, 34. 
Huns, William II's aspiration to 

emulate the, 175. 

IsvoLSKi, Mr., Russian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, 131. 

Jagow, Herr von. Imperial Ger- 
man Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, 244, 245, 246, 
256, 257, 265, 285. 

Janouchkevitch, General, 283, 287. 

Japan, referred to, 55, 56, 57, 60, 
80. 

Jefferson, Thomas, 104. 

Kaiseridee, the legend of the, 15. 

Kant, Immanuel, quoted or re- 
ferred to, 34, 159, 160, 161, 163, 
312, 313. 

Ketteler, von, German Minister 
to China, 174, 176. 

Kiderlen-Wachter, von. Imperial 
German Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, 193, 197, 198, 
213. 

Kiel Canal, 49, 196. 
365 



INDEX 



Konopischt, interviews at, 237, Mercenary soldiers in Germany, 

238, 245. 
Kopenick, the shoemaker of, 149. 
Kluck, General von, 174. 
Kouropatkin, General, 173. 
Kramer, Hugo, 308. 
Kruger telegram, 73, 76, 111. 
Krupp, Doctor von Bohlen und 

Halbach, 243. 
Kvihlmann, Herr von, Imperial 

German Secretary of State for 

Foreign Affairs, 277. 
Kxilturkampf, 65. 



Laband, Professor Paul, 183. 

Lansdovvne, Lord, 106. 

Lasson, Professor, 322. 

Lauff, Joseph, 64. 

Lausanne, the Peace of, 211. 

Leoncavallo, 64. 

Leopold L Emperor of the Holy 

Roman Empire, 139. 
Lese Majcsfe, 44. 
Lichnowsky, Prince, referred to 

or quoted, 217, 218, 219, 220. 

221, 222, 223, 225, 228, 237, 

241, 244, 246, 249, 273, 274, 275, 

278, 279. 
Liman von Sanders, General, 234, 

235. 
Lohengrin, referred to, 98. 
London, treaty of, 215. 
Lusitania, 320. 
Luxemburg, neutrality of, 293, 

294. 
Luther, 142, 169. 

AIajestatsbeleidigung, 44. 

Marschall, von Bieberstein, Bar- 
on, Imperial German diplomat- 
ist, 74. 87, 89, 209, 216, 217. 

Mecklenburg, no constitution in 
the Grand-Duchies of, 158. 

Mediation, German, 262, 263, 264, 
265, 282. 

Mensdorff, Count, 232, 226, 241, 
287. 



366 



145. 

Mercier, Doctor Charles, on the 
sanity of William II, 319, 320, 
323. 

Metz, William II's image on the 
cathedral of, 68. 

Morgenthau, Honorable Henry, 
quoted, 241, 242. 

Morocco, the question of, 75, 76, 
77, 78, 79, 112, 192, 193, 194, 
195, 219, 246. 

Mobilization, Austrian and Rus- 
sian, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 
280, 282, 283, 288, 289, 308, 318 ; 
German, 270, 272, 277, 278, 280, 
284, 285, 286, 287. 

Moltke, the Elder, 77; the 
Younger, 172. 

Moses, 142. 

Mozambique, 226. 

Miihlon, Doctor Wilhelm, quoted, 
242, 243, 244. 

Miinster, Count, quoted or re- 
ferred to, 85, 89. 

Nabopolassar, 177. 

Napoleon I, 146. 

Naumann, Frederick, German 
Deputy, quoted, 307. 

Navy, the German, 11, 53, 225, 
230. See also Sea-povi^er. 

Netherlands, neutrality of, 260, 
263. 

Neutrality of Belgium, 204, 260, 
263, 275, 276, 379, 293, 294, 295, 
309 ; of France, discussed, 274, 
275, 276, 277, 278, 308 ; of Great 
Britain sought, 189, 193, 196, 
200, 202, 204. 205, 206, 207, 208, 
258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 
272, 273, 274, 275. 

Nicholas. King of Montenegro, 
223 

Nicholas II, Czar of Russia, 54, 
58, 59, 62, 79, 80, 82, 84, 108, 
261, 262, 263, 264, 267, 368, 269, 



INDEX 



270, 281, 284, 288, 291, 297, 308, 

318. 
Nogi, General, 173. 
North German Confederation, 6. 
Nuremberg, alleged attack on, 

315. 

Orientalism of William II, 177, 

180. 
Oxford University, William II 

at, 83. 
Oyama, General, 173. 

Pan-German movement and 
party, 33, 53, 56, 184, 185, 186, 
187, 188, 190, 197, 198, 200, 206, 
231, 288. 

Panther, the, sent to Agadir. 
S^ee Agadir. 

Parties. See political parties. 

Peace, as understood by William 
II, 199, 209; opportunity for 
organizing, 90. 

Personal authority of the Kaiser, 
32. 

Personal diplomacy of William 
II, 14, 15, 25. 

Personality of William II, 100, 
101. 

Podewils, Minister of Frederick 
the Great, 141. 

Political parties, hostility of 
William II toward, 45, 46 ; pe- 
culiarities of German. 152. 153. 

President of the United States, 
his powers as compared with 
those of the German Emperor, 
104, 105 ; the representative of 
the people, 305. 

President Poincare, 284, 287, 301. 

Press, freedom of the, not al- 
lowed in Germany, 44. 

Prussia, Constitution of, 10, 134, 
135, 136. 

Creator of the German Empire, 
1 ; the traditions of, 2 ; the re- 
lations of to France, 27 ; to 



Russia, 26, 27, 28; the hostil- 
ity to democracy, 34. 

QuiDDE, Professor, 38. 39. 

Rank, in Germany, 148, 149. 
Reichstag, the, referred to, 5, 

6, 22. 1.^.3, 308. 
Religion. William IPs conception 

of, 140, 141, 142, 143. 
Reval, meeting of Edward VII 

and Nicholas II at, lOS, 116, 

131. 
Riga, the imaginary treaty of, 

189. 
Right, Prussian ideas of, 162, 

163, 164, 167. 
Rights of Man, referred to, 145. 
Roberts, Lord. 111. 
"Roland von Berlin," 64. 
Roon, General, 172. 
Roosevelt, President, 56, 60, 99, 

100. 
Ruprecht, Prince, of Bavaria, 47. 

Saladin. 71. 

"Salt of the Earth" speech by 
William II. 60, 61, 75. 

Sanity of William II, 219, 221. 

San Thorne, 226. 

Sarajevo, 237, 240, 241. 

Sardanapaltis, 65. 

Sazanof. Russian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, 249, 255, 269, 
284, 287. 

Schlieffen, General, 120. 

Schon, Baron von, Imperial Ger- 
man Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, 96. 

Schleswig-Holstein, 49. 

Schiicking, Professor, 161. 

"Scrap of Paper," Bethmann- 
Hollweg's reference to the. 294. 

Sea-power, development of Ger- 
man, 48. 49. 50, 51. 55. 

Secret Treaties. 39, 62, 81. 

German separatism, 3, 4. 

Serbia, relations of to Austrta- 



367 



INDEX 



Hungary, 123, 124, 125, 128. 
See also Hague Tribunal and 
Ultimatum. 

Shakespeare, 142. 

Silesia, 141. 

Skutari, the question of, 222. 

Social Democrats, 45, 152, 153. 

Socialism, Bismarck's attitude to- 
ward, 18. 

Soukhomlinof, General, 283, 284, 
287. 

South African War, the, 111. 

State, Prussian conception of 
the, 322. 

Stead, William T., quoted, 208. 

Stossel, General, 173. 

Sybel, von, 36. 

Szogenyi, Count, 222. 

Tangier, William IPs visit to, 

75, 77. 
Tannenberg, Otto Richard, 

quoted, 184, 185, 186, 190, 191, 

192, 198. 
Teutonic Order. 138. 
Theatre, the, William H's use of, 

63. 
Tiglath-Pileser, 177. 
Titles, in Germany, 148, 149. 
Treaties, Prussian conception of, 

164. 
Tirpitz. Grand Admiral von, 202, 

236, 242, 245. 
Treitschke, quoted, 36. 37. 
Tribalism, German spirit of, 3. 
Triple Alliance. 19, 26, 130, 131, 

181, 202, 207, 225, 246. 
Triple Entente, 190, 225. 
Tschirschky, von. Imperial Ger- 
man Ambassador at Vienna, 

265. 



Turco-Italian War, 125, 126, 210. 
Tweedmouth, Lord, William H's 

letter to, 106, 108. 
Tyrrell, Sir William, 275. 

Ultimatum of Austria-Hungary 
to Serbia, 244, 248; of Ger- 
many to Russia, 270. 

"Uncle Albert," "Uncle Bertie." 
See Edward VH, King of Eng- 
land. 

Universities, the German, subju- 
gation of by William H, 33, 
34, 35, 36, 37. 

Verdun Prize, 35, 36. 

Wagner, Richard, 15. 
Walter von der Vogelweide, 16. 
Wangenheim, Baron, 241, 242. 
War, the Prussian idea of, 168, 

169. 
White, Honorable Andrew D., 85. 
Wilamowitz-Mollendorff, 41, 42. 
William I, German Emperor, 9, 

26. 30, 36, 68, 69, 135, 136, 142, 

155, 182, 323. 
Windthorst, 19. 
World Empire, as viewed by 

William H, 28, 61, 291, 292. 

Young Turk Revolution, 209, 
210. 

Zeppelin, Count, 119, 120. 

Zimmermann, Herr, later Impe- 
rial German Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, 194, 197, 
246, 280. 

Zollverein, the German, 4. 

Zurlinden, quoted, 307, 308. 



THE END 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




